MEMORANDUM OPINION
These two cases, consolidated for discovery and pre-trial purposes, arise from a set of facts that can be described only as sad and regrettable. Plaintiffs, a husband and Wife, were arrested, and the wife was incarcerated briefly, not only for a crime they did not commit, but in fact for a crime that never occurred. Based on these events, plaintiffs here sue (i) the company that erroneously reported that they committed a crime, (ii) the police officer who investigated the matter and filed an affidavit that led to the issuance of arrest warrants for plaintiffs, and (iii) the prosecutor, who, at the time the husband’s case was dismissed, became aware that no crime had been committed, but then failed to take steps to withdraw the warrant for the wife’s arrest, which led six months later to the wife’s incarceration over Christmas,
Defendants seek threshold dismissal of the amended complaints on various grounds. As these dismissal grounds have been fully briefed and argued orally, defendants’ dismissal motions are ripe for disposition.
I.
The pertinent facts may be succinctly summarized.
Defendant Lisa Tingle is an Assistant Commonwealth’s attorney for Arlington County, Virginia (“Prosecutor Tingle”). Defendant Stephanie Rodriguez is an officer with the Arlington County Police Department (“Officer Rodriguez”). Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) is a corporation incorporated in the state of Washington with its principal place of business located in Issaquah, Washington.
In September 2012, Mr. Eshow purchased over $1,000 of flooring from the Pentagon City, Virginia Costco store for a home flooring project. Shortly thereafter, while in another Costco store, Mr. Eshow saw that the same flooring he had recently purchased in the Pentagon City store was on sale in this Costco store for a lower price. Aware of Costco’s policy of permitting purchasers to take advantage of sale prices on recently purchased products, Mr. Eshow inquired of Costco’s store personnel how he might take advantage of this policy with respect to the flooring he had purchased at the Pentagon City Costco. Mr. Eshow was told he could take advantage of the sale price at the store of purchase. Thus, on October 17, 2012, Mr. Esh-ow returned to the Pentagon City Costco store to take advantage of the sale price on the flooring he had purchased there earlier. Store personnel at the Pentagon City Costco store explained to Mr. Eshow how he could take advantage of the new sale price. Specifically, Mr. Eshow was directed to purchase the identical flooring at the sale price then in effect at the store and then to return the flooring immediately after the purchase, using his initial sales receipt as the basis for the refund. Mr. Eshow complied with these instructions. Both Mr. Eshow’s original flooring purchase in September and his refund for the same flooring in October were posted to Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar’s joint Costco membership and credit card account.
On October 17, 2012, the date of the return transaction, Costco called the Arlington County Police Department to report — erroneously—that Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar had committed fraud in the Pentagon City Costco store. Costco made this report despite having sales information, credit card documentation, videotapes showing the second flooring purchase, and statements from store personnel who attended to the transactions at issue. Officer Rodriguez, along with another officer, responded to Costco’s call that same day— October 17, 2012. Officer Rodriguez and her colleague listened to Costco’s claim of alleged fraud,
Costco contends that shortly after the October 17, 2012 incident, Costco representatives contacted Officer Rodriguez and informed her that the allegations against Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar were mistaken and that no fraud had in fact occurred. Plaintiffs do not concede that Costco representatives made any such representation, and Officer Rodriguez denies having received this information from Costco representatives in October 2012. In any event, Officer Rodriguez failed to take any steps to correct or withdraw her affidavit or to secure the withdrawal of the arrest warrants for Mi’. Eshow and Ms. Safar,
Eight months later, in June 2013, Mr. Eshow was stopped for speeding in Fair-fax County, Virginia. Based on the still active October 17, 2012 arrest warrant, Mr. Eshow was arrested and handcuffed in front of his family. Mr. Eshow retained counsel and on July 81, 2013, the case came before the Arlington General District Court. On that day, a Costco representative appeared and told Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle, the prosecutor on Mr. Eshow’s case, that no fraud had occurred and that the charge against Mr. Eshow was a mistake and should be withdrawn. Prosecutor Tingle communicated this information to the judge, who promptly dismissed the case against Mr. Eshow by. an Order nolle prosequi
Costco contends that the Costco representative who advised Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle that the allegations against Mr. Eshow were a mistake did the same with respect to the allegations against Ms. Safar. Again, plaintiffs do not concede that this occurred. It also appears that when Officer Rodriguez came to court in connection with Mr. Eshow’s case, she brought her investigative file, which included investigative notes confirming that the arrest warrants for Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar were premised on the same alleged fraud. This same information was included in Prosecutor Tingle’s case file. Shortly after the case against Mr. Eshow was dismissed, Prosecutor Tingle and Officer Rodriguez composed a report stating, among other things, that warrants had been issued for the arrest of both Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar.
Standard procedures exist for the withdrawal of warrants from state-wide law enforcement databases, and both Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle had been trained in these procedures. Specifically, the relevant procedures state that “[a]n attorney for the Commonwealth may move the court in which the warrant summons would be returnable for the dismissal and/or destruction of any executed warrant or summons issued by a magistrate.” Office of the Exec. Sec’y of the Va. S. Ct., Dep’t of Judicial Servs., Gen’l Dist. Ct Manual, Crim. Procedures, (Rev. 7/15), at 3-2 (available online at <http://www.courts. state.va.us/courts/gd/resources/mawiials/ gdman/chapter03.pdf>). Plaintiffs allege that despite the existence of these standard procedures, Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle maliciously and recklessly failed to take any steps to secure the withdrawal of the pending warrant for Ms. Safar’s arrest.
In late 2013, Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar applied to become American citizens. After passing her citizenship test, Ms. Safar was notified in December 2013 by United States immigration authorities that she was required to obtain a clearance letter from the police in any location where she
As part of the incarceration process in Prince George’s County, Ms. Safar had to disrobe for a full body search and squat while nude to ensure she was not smuggling contraband into the jail facility. Given her culture’s emphasis on modesty and personal privacy, this was especially humiliating for Ms. Safar. She remained in jail until December 26, 2013, when she was brought to Arlington, Virginia. After she was transported to Arlington, Ms. Safar was served with the warrant alleging that she had defrauded Costco. She was then released. On December 27, 2013, the case against Ms. Safar was dismissed by nolle prosequi.
During her period of incarceration, Ms. Safar was the mother and primary caregiver of three young children, then ages four years, two years, and six months, the latter of whom Ms. Safar was breast feeding. Ms. Safar suffered severe mental anguish from being separated from her children over Christmas, and suffered physical pain from the jail’s denial of her request to use a breast pump.
Both Ms. Safar and Mr. Eshow allege that their arrests caused severe emotional distress to them and their children, who perceived that their parents had abandoned them. Additionally, Ms. Safar alleges (i) that she was depressed both during and after her incarceration, (ii) that she continues to suffer from headaches, sleeplessness, and nausea, and (iii) that the experience rendered her unable to nurse her infant son for more than a year.
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss the amended complaints in both cases on various grounds.
II.
Plaintiffs assert two claims against Costco with respect to Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar: a malicious prosecution claim, and a negligence claim.
A.
In Virginia,, to establish a malicious prosecution claim, a. plaintiff must allege that “the prosecution was (1) malicious, (2) instituted by or with the cooperation of [the defendant], (3) without probable cause, and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to [the plaintiff].” O’Connor v. Tice,
Here, Costco contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that plausibly support the first three elements of a malicious prosecution claim, and therefore that plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim against Costco must be dismissed. Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that the amended complaint against Costco alleges sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.
It is appropriate to analyze the first and third elements of a malicious prosecution claim together, as these two elements depend on the same or similar factual allegations. The Supreme Court of Virginia has defined malice — the first element — as “any controlling motive other than a good faith desire to further the ends of justice, enforce disobedience to the cximinal laws, suppress crime, or see that the guilty are punished.” Hudson v. Lanier,
Here, on a motion to dismiss, the question presented is whether plaintiffs have alleged facts that plausibly support a conclusion that Costco was not reasonable in believing that plaintiffs were guilty of the suspected crime. A review of the amended complaint discloses that plaintiffs have done so. Thus, the amended complaint alleges the following facts:
(i) that a Costco employee directed Mr. Eshow to purchase a second set of flooring and to return that set immediately after the purchase, using the sales receipt for the first set of flooring in order to take advantage of the sale price,
(ii) that Mr. Eshow followed these instructions, and
(iii) that after Mr. Eshow completed the purchase of the second set of flooring and then returned that flooring set, Costco suspected that plaintiffs had committed a crime only on the basis of its records and security video footage, which recorded the actions Mr. Eshow took at the instruction of a Costco employee.
On the basis of these factual allegations, a fact finder could plausibly infer that Co
With respect to the second element — that the prosecution was instituted by or with the cooperation of the defendant — one court has correctly noted that no “single, specific rule exists in Virginia for how a court determines whether a criminal proceeding was ‘instituted by, or with the cooperation of a defendant.” Bennett v. R&L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC,
Here, plaintiffs allege facts that plausibly support a conclusion that defendant instigated the proceedings against plaintiffs and exercised some level of control over the decision to have plaintiffs arrested. Indeed, the arrest warrants against plaintiffs were based entirely on Costco’s allegations of fraud, and the warrants never would have issued but for Costco’s decision to report to Officer Rodriguez that Costco believed that plaintiffs had committed fraud.
The result reached here comports.with other district court decisions in this circuit,
In sum, plaintiffs have alleged facts that plausibly support each element of a malicious prosecution claim against Costco, and accordingly, Costco’s motion to dismiss must be denied with respect to this claim.
B.
Costco next contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that plausibly support a negligence claim against Costco because the amended complaint fails to allege a cognizable legal duty that Costco owed to plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has made clear that “a plaintiff who seeks to establish an actionable negligence claim must plead the existence of a legal duty, violation of that duty, and proximate causation which results in injury.” Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,
Here, plaintiffs contend that Costco owed a duty to plaintiffs in two respects: (i) that when Costco reported the supposed crime, Costco had a duty to present to Officer Rodriguez all relevant facts, including exculpatory facts, and (ii) that once Costco realized that no crime had occurred and that the information earlier provided to Officer Rodriguez was erroneous, Costco had a duty to take steps to correct that error. Yet, as Costco correctly contends, no such duty exists under Virginia law independent of a malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia has not explicitly addressed the issue,
In sum, Costco’s motion to dismiss must be denied with respect to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim, but granted with respect to plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
III.
Plaintiffs also assert the following claims against defendant Officer Rodriguez:
(i) Unconstitutional arrest of Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(ii) malicious prosecution with respect to Mr. Eshow and Ms. Safar; and
(iii) gross negligence with respect to the arrest of Ms. Safar.
Officer Rodriguez has moved to dismiss each of these claims on various grounds. After Officer Rodriguez filed her motion to dismiss, and after the parties had fully briefed the matter, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the amended complaint in the case against Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle, seeking only to add the following cause of action against Officer Rodriguez: “Unconstitutional Procurement of Warrants on Both Plaintiffs” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Notably, plaintiffs do not allege any additional facts in support of this proposed cause, of action. Each of the claims against Officer Rodriguez— the three claims alleged in the amended complaint and the cause of action proposed in plaintiffs’ motion to amend — is addressed separately below.
A.
Officer Rodriguez first contends that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against her must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Officer Rodriguez had no constitutional duty to take steps to withdraw the warrants for plaintiffs’ arrest after the arrest warrants had been issued by the magistrate judge.
Inasmuch as plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Officer Rodriguez are premised on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause — whether procedural or substantive due process — the claims must be dismissed because as the Supreme Court has made clear, allegations of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and unlawful seizure are all governed not by the procedural and due process components of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by the Fourth Amendment (incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment). Graham v. Connor,
Officer Rodriguez also seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against her on the ground that these claims fail to allege facts that plausibly support a claim for unconstitutional arrest or malicious prosecution. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has explained that a “malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common law tort.” Lambert v. Williams,
Pertinent here is the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Taylor v. Waters,
Similarly, in Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,
Here, plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not alleges that Officer Rodriguez misled a prosecutor or that she urged a prosecutor to seek indictments against plaintiffs. Rather, the amended complaint merely allege that after the arrest warrants had issued, Officer Rodriguez learned from Costco that the charges were erroneous, but then failed to take any action to terminate the criminal proceedings against plaintiffs or take any steps to withdraw the facially valid arrest warrants.
Moreover, even assuming, ar-guendo, that plaintiffs’ amended complaint states a valid Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Rodriguez, that claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which protects government officials from a suit for damages when their conduct does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
Thus, in sum, all of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Officer Rodriguez must be dismissed because the amended complaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against Officer Rodriguez, and even if the amended complaint did state such a claim, that claim would be barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
B.
Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims against Officer Rodriguez must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. With respect to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim against Officer Rodriguez, Virginia law requires a plaintiff to allege facts that plausibly support the conclusion that at the time the defendant took the action initiating criminal charges, the defendant did not have probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. Stanley v. Webber,
Plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim with respect to the arrest of Ms. Safar must also be dismissed because Officer Rodriguez did not owe Ms. Safar a duty to withdraw the warrant for her arrest. This is so because Virginia does not recognize a cause of action for the negligent investigation or incorrect initiation of criminal process. Boyce v. Bennett, No. 2:14cv249,
C.
After Officer Rodriguez filed her motion to dismiss, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the amended complaint against Officer Rodriguez and Prosecutor Tingle, seeking only to add the following cause of action against Officer Rodriguez: “Unconstitutional Procurement of Warrant's on Both Plaintiffs” in violation of the Fourth Amendment; plaintiffs do not seek to add any factual allegations to the existing complaint. In support of plaintiffs’ proposed cause of action, plaintiffs rely on United States v. Leon,
On this basis, plaintiffs contend that Officer Rodriguez recklessly disregarded the truth by omitting from her sworn affidavit the fact that Officer Rodriguez viewed a video showing Mr. Eshow’s activities in Costco and disregarded the portion of the video depicting Mr. Eshow’s purchase of the flooring in question. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, however, the mere fact that Officer Rodriguez ignored the portion- of the video that contained footage of Mr. Eshow’s flooring purchase in no way supports an inference that Officer Rodriguez recklessly disregarded the truth because that portion of the video was not an “obvious” basis “to doubt the veracity” of Costco’s allegations that plaintiffs had committed a crime, as evidence of a purchase is not inconsistent with the allegation that plaintiffs committed fraud
In sum, all of plaintiffs’ claims against Officer Rodriguez must be dismissed because the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and plaintiffs’ motion to amend the amended complaint must be denied as futile.
IV.
Plaintiffs also assert the following claims against defendant Prosecutor Tingle:
(i) Unconstitutional arrest of Ms. Safar in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
(ii) gross negligence with respect to the arrest of Ms. Safar.14
Prosecutor Tingle has moved to dismiss each of these claims contending that: (i) she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to all claims, and (ii) even if she is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim with respect to the § 1983 claim, and in any event, (iii) the doctrine of qualified immunity insulates Prosecutor Tingle with respect to this claim.
The doctrine of absolute prose-cutorial immunity is well-established; it stems from the “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from [her] public duties, and the possibility that [s]he would shade h[er] decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by [her] public trust.” Imbler v. Pachtman,
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
Prosecutor Tingle contends that Buckley and Goldstein stand for the proposition that there is a temporal bright line such that (i) all of a prosecutor’s pre-probable-cause activity is not insulated by absolute immunity, and (ii) all of a prosecutor’s post-probable-cause activity is insulated by absolute immunity. Although the Supreme Court made clear in Buckley that the first half of this proposition is true, neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has ever held that all of a prosecutor’s post-probable-cause activity is insulated by absolute immunity. To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Buckley explained that “a determination of probable cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken after-
The Fourth Circuit has held that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to seek an arrest warrant against a charged party, Ehrlich,
(i) “the centrality of the challenged conduct to the criminal justice system”;
(ii) “the substantiality of the threat of vexatious litigation, and the extent to which that threat would inhibit performance of important public duties”; and
(iii) “the availability of alternative mechanisms to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct.”
Id. at 1223.
Here, although the third factor— the availability of alternative mechanisms to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct — does not support a conclusion that Prosecutor Tingle is entitled to absolute immunity, as it appears no other mechanisms exist to prevent a prosecutor’s failure to take steps to withdraw an arrest warrant she knows to be premised on erroneous information, the first two factors point persuasively to the conclusion that Prosecutor Tingle’s decision not to take steps to withdraw the warrant for Ms. Safar’s arrest after learning that the arrest warrant was wholly premised on erroneous information was prosecutorial in nature, and therefore entitled to absolute immunity.
With respect to the first factor—the centrality of the challenged conduct to the criminal justice system — it is undisputed that when a prosecutor exercises discretion in deciding who to eharge and whether to swear out arrest warrants, these actions are prosecutorial in nature because they are critical to the prosecutor’s role as an advocate in the criminal justice system and involve substantial discretion. See Ehrlich,
The second factor — the substantiality of the threat of vexatious litigation and the extent to which the threat of litigation would inhibit prosecutorial duties— also supports the conclusion that Prosecutor Tingle is entitled to qualified immunity. Here, as Prosecutor Tingle correctly points out, a conclusion that absolute immunity does not insulate prosecutors for the decision not to take steps to have an arrest warrant withdrawn would lead to the anomalous result that criminal defendants could mount collateral attacks against prosecutors for the unconstitutionr al maintenance of arrest warrants by way of civil litigation, even though these same defendants cannot sue prosecutors for their decision to seek arrest warrants in the first place. This would open the floodgates of litigation to a bevy of lawsuits. It is important to note, in this respect, that the application of absolute prosecutorial immunity in a given case is determined by evaluating the relevant function across a number of cases, not just the case at hand. In other words, although the facts of the present case may seem sufficiently outrageous to warrant prosecutorial liability, the more salient point is that in general, prosecutors ought not to be subject to civil litigation for the maintenance of arrest warrants. If prosecutors lived under the shadow of possible civil liability for improperly maintaining arrest warrants about which they had some doubt, the important role that prosecutors play in the criminal justice system would be inhibited. Thus, in light of the factors articulated in Ehrlich, Prosecutor Tingle is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
In opposition to the conclusion reached here, plaintiffs cite Odd v. Malone,
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, Odd is neither binding nor persuasive here. To begin with, unlike in Odd, Prosecutor Tingle’s pre-charge decision not to withdraw Ms. Safar’s arrest warrant did not occur during a “prolonged and clearly delimited period of judicial inactivity.” Id. at 212.
Given the result required by the absolute immunity doctrine in this context, it is unnecessary to address Prosecutor Tingle’s other arguments, including her qualified immunity argument. It is, nonetheless, worth pointing out that even if Prosecutor Tingle were not' insulated by absolute prosecutorial immunity, she would be entitled to qualified immunity, as plaintiffs have not — and cannot — point to “clearly established” law that stands for the proposition that a prosecutor must take steps to withdraw an arrest warrant once a prosecutor learns that the arrest warrant is premised on erroneous information. Harlow,
A final comment merits mention) There is no doubt that the alleged facts led to egregious results, particularly with respect to Ms. Safar, who was unnecessarily incarcerated for three days over Christmas.
V.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated here, all of plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed except for plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim against Costco.
An appropriate Order will issue.
Notes
. The facts stated here are derived from the amended complaints and "documents incor
. The Costco employees who alleged fraud were not the same employees who had previously directed Mr. Eshow to take advantage of the sale price at the Pentagon City store, nor were they the same employees involved in the return transaction at the Pentagon City store.
. It is worth noting that Prosecutor Tingle was not assigned to Ms. Safar's case.
. The parties agree that Virginia law applies here, as the alleged torts occurred in Virginia. See Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs.,
. As plaintiffs correctly note, the definition of "malice” for purposes of a malicious prosecution action is distinct from the definition of "actual malice” in the context of punitive damages, which requires a showing that a "defendant acted ... in a manner showing reckless and wanton disregard of plaintiff’s rights.” Giant of Va., Inc. v. Pigg,
. Costco contends that plaintiffs cannot establish a lack of probable cause because the amended complaint omits certain material facts. Specifically, Costco contends that the amended complaint omits the fact that plaintiffs’ October 17, 2012 purchase of the flooring at the sale price was made using someone else's Costco membership and credit .card. Costco contends that this obscured what had actually occurred and generated probable cause that plaintiffs had committed fraud. Importantly, however, it is well established that it is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss to look beyond the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
. See e.g., Rodarte v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. 6:12-cv-55,
. See King v. Martin,
. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia recently noted in the context of a malicious prosecution claim that "[i]t may be — but we need not establish for purposes of Virginia law — that the ‘person who places before a prosecuting officer information upon which criminal proceedings are begun' has ‘an obligation to disclose' the discovery of ‘additional information casting doubt upon the accused’s guilt.’ ” Egan v. Butler,
. See also Taylor v. Waters,
. In this respect, district courts have concluded that an officer is not liable for failing to inform a prosecutor of exculpatory evidence discovered after an arrest warrant has issued. See, e.g., Burt v. Aleman, No. 15-CV-4493,
. It is worth noting that according to an opinion of the Virginia Attorney General, a Virginia police officer does not "ha[vej the authority to unilaterally withdraw or dismiss a lawfully issued arrest warrant.” 2003 Op. Arty. Gen. No. 03-25.
. See also Durham v. Horner,
. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint also alleges a malicious prosecution claim against Prosecutor Tingle, but plaintiffs have withdrawn this claim. PI. Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 4.
. See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va. L. Rev. 207, 221 (2013) (arguing that the true justification for absolute prosecutorial immunity is not "that prosecutors are somehow so vulnerable to unwarranted civil liability that they require greater solicitude and protection than, for example, police,” but "that much of what prosecutors do occurs in court, where they may legitimately rely on monitoring by opposing counsel and supervision by a judge”).
. A prosecutor "may move the court in which the warrant summons would be returnable for the dismissal and/or destruction of any executed warrant or summons issued by a magistrate.” Office of the Exec. Sec’y of the Va. S. Ct., Dep’t of Judicial Servs., Gen’l Dist.
. See Pearson,
. Not addressed in this case is whether Prince George’s County should have acted with greater alacrity in producing a judge for Ms. Safar’s case.