[¶ 1] Frederick E. Saefke, Jr., appealed from a judgment dismissing his action against Attorney General Wayne Ste-nehjem and Burleigh County State’s Attorney Richard J. Riha. Saefke alternatively petitioned this Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ. We affirm the dismissal of Saefke’s claims against Stenehjem and dismiss Saefke’s appeal of his claims against Riha, and we decline to issue a supervisory writ.
I
[¶ 2] Saefke’s claims relate to the Bur-leigh County Commission’s financial contributions to the Bismarck-Mandan Symphony Orchestra [“Symphony”] for July 4th celebrations at the capítol grounds. In a January 3, 2002, letter to Burleigh County Commissioner Marian Haakenson, Riha concluded that, with certain exceptions for distributions to an authorized industry, enterprise, or business of the county which had been established on or before the donation, donations by a political subdivision to private groups were prohibited by N.D. Const, art X, § 18.
[¶ 3] In a June 27, 2002, response to a letter from Burleigh County Auditor Kevin Glatt, Riha reiterated his opinion about
[¶ 4] On July 3, 2002, Glatt asked Riha for an opinion regarding payment of the $5,000 in view of Riha’s June 27, 2002, opinion about the legality of the donation. Riha informed Glatt that he was “obligated to act as the commission directs.”
[¶ 5] On August 9, 2002, Riha requested a formal opinion from Stenehjem about donations from 1997 to 2001 to support the July 4th celebrations for those years and about the 2002 donation. In an August 26, 2002, letter to Stenehjem, Burleigh County Commissioner Claus Lembke explained that, before authorizing the donation, the commission had debated and passed a motion making the July 4th celebration an “authorized enterprise or business” of Bur-leigh County, and the commission followed Riha’s advice “to the letter and acted according to his instruction.” Lembke’s letter indicated Riha “was present during the debate of this issue and never voiced any concern over our actions,” and the commission believed it was “following the law and the constitution.” On September 24, 2002, Stenehjem issued a formal opinion, concluding the donations were prohibited and any authority for a county to make a donation for an authorized industry, enterprise, or business must be derived from a state law that authorized the donation. Ste-nehjem’s opinion also concluded Riha had discretionary authority under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-01(13) to bring an action to recover any money illegally donated against those individual county commissioners who voted for the donations.
[¶ 6] Riha determined that, in addition to the 2002 donation, $11,000 had been donated to the Symphony from 1997 to 2001. According to Riha, he:
decided to demand on behalf of the county re-payment of the $5,000 contribution made in 2002, in lieu of pursuing past contributions. My rationale for deciding on this compromise was as follows:
1) The commissioners did not personally benefit from the contributions, as op- ■ posed to the situation in Grant County-
2) The past contributions were made innocently, before I issued my opinion on the legality of the contributions.
3) A special assistant appointed under section 11-16-07 would have quickly expended far more in county funds than the $11,000 that would eventually be collected. I felt $5,000 was a reasonable compromise, and one the commissioners would accept, thus avoiding costly litigation. The Commissioners who voted for the contribution had already requested that I “appeal” the Attorney General’s opinion to the District Court, as they were anxious to have the decisionoverturned. I declined.... However, it was clear that the Commissioners would vigorously challenge any suit in an attempt to overrule the Attorney General’s opinion. I saw little benefit to the County in spending more county funds on a special assistant than the amount that would eventually be collected.
4) In spite of the law on this issue, I felt there was little likelihood of success. The contributions to the Symphony were politically popular, and the only source of recovery for the monies was from the commissioners personally. I felt the fact that none of the commissioners benefited from the contributions made it unlikely a fact-finder would hold them personally responsible for repayment.
[¶ 7] In November 2002, after a donation from a local benefactor, the Symphony refunded $5,000 to Burleigh County,- and Riha did not initiate a civil action against the individual commissioners to recover donations made from 1997 through 2001. In December 2002, after a request from Saefke to criminally prosecute the commissioners who voted for the donations, Riha formally referred the matter to Stenehjem for possible criminal proceedings against those commissioners. In December 2002, Stenehjem concluded criminal charges were not warranted and declined to prosecute.
[¶ 8] Saefke commenced this action against Stenehjem and Riha, claiming present and former Burleigh County Commissioners misapplied public funds and asking the district court to' (1) overrule Stenehjem’s formal opinion that Riha had discretionary authority to prosecute the county commissioners and Stenehjem’s December 2002 decision that criminal charges against the commissioners were not warranted, (2) find Riha had neglected his duty, and (3) appoint an attorney under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-06 to prosecute civil and criminal actions against the county commissioners who had voted for the donations. Saefke alternatively sought a writ of mandamus directing Riha to fulfill his duties. The district court dismissed Saefke’s action, concluding - his complaint failed to state a claim against Stenehjem and Riha had not failed to perform his duties under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-06. Saefke appealed from the judgment dismissing his action and alternatively sought a supervisory writ.
II
[¶ 9] Saefke asks this Court to overrule Stenehjem’s formal opinion that Riha had “discretionary” authority to prosecute the county commissioners, to hold Riha had a “duty” to prosecute the commissioners, and to issue a supervisory writ directing the district court to appoint an attorney to prosecute civil and criminal actions against the county commissioners who voted for the donations.
A
[¶ 10] Saefke’s complaint alleged Stenehjem’s “Formal Opinion ... with respect to the State’s Attorney having ‘Discretion’ to act against the Burleigh County Commissioners, civilly and that no criminal charges were warranted, by memorandum, December 23, 2002, were both in error.” The district court ruled Saefke’s complaint failed to state a claim against Stenehjem under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(vi).
[¶ 11] The purpose of a N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(vi) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the claims presented in the complaint.
Ziegelmann v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp.,
[¶ 12] Saefke’s complaint effectively asked the district court for a declaratory judgment to overrule the formal opinion and memorandum of Stenehjem. In
In Interest of McMullen,
The requisite precedent facts or conditions which the courts generally hold must exist in order that declaratory relief may be obtained may be summarized as follows: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination....
In order to present a justiciable controversy under the declaratory judgments act, the complaint must allege facts upon which the court can render a judgment or decree that will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty....
Among the essentials necessary to the raising of a justiciable controversy is the existence of a genuine conflict in the tangible interests of the opposing litigants. Complainant must prove his possession of a legal interest or right which is capable of and in need of protection from the claims, demands, or objections emanating from a source competent legally to place such legal interest or right in jeopardy. Although complainant need not necessarily possess a cause of action (as that term is ordinarily used) as a basis for obtaining declaratory relief, nevertheless he must, as a minimum requirement, possess a bona fide legal interest which has been, or with respect to the ripening seeds of a controversy is about to be, affected in a prejudicial manner.
[¶ 13] The attorney general is the chief law officer of the state and legal advisor for state officials.
State v. Baker,
[¶ 14] Other courts have recognized that no justiciable controversy exists in a declaratory judgment action challenging the correctness of an attorney general’s opinion.
See Askew v. City of Ocala,
B
[¶ 16] Saefke’s complaint alleged Riha neglected and failed in his duty to stop the illegal donations and to prosecute the county commissioners for a criminal violation. Saefke alleged Riha did not have “absolute” discretion to decline to prosecute the commissioners, rather Riha had a “duty” to prosecute them. Saefke asked the district court to declare Riha had neglected and failed in his duty and to appoint an attorney to prosecute the civil and criminal allegations under the N.D.C.C. § 11-16-06. Saefke alternatively asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus directing Riha to fulfill his duties.
[¶ 17] The district court concluded Riha did not neglect his duties in settling all civil claims against the commissioners for $5,000 and in referring any potential criminal prosecution to the attorney general, who ultimately concluded criminal charges were not warranted. The district court denied Saefke’s request it issue a writ of mandamus directing Riha to fulfill his duties.
[¶ 18] In
Wilson v. Koppy,
[¶ 19] In
Olsen,
[¶ 20] We exercise our supervisory jurisdiction only rarely and cautiously to rectify errors or to prevent an injustice.
Mitchell v. Sanborn,
Our power to issue supervisory writs is discretionary and cannot be invoked as a matter of right. Sanborn,536 N.W.2d at 682-83 ; B.H. v. K.D.,506 N.W.2d 368 , 372-73 (N.D.1993); City of Fargo v. Dawson,466 N.W.2d 584 , 585 (N.D.1991); Odden v. O’Keefe,450 N.W.2d 707 , 708 (N.D.1990). We exercise our supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts rarely to rectify errors or to prevent injustice where no adequate alternative remedies exist. Sanborn,536 N.W.2d at 682-83 ; B.H.,506 N.W.2d at 372-73 ; Dawson,466 N.W.2d at 585 ; Odden,450 N.W.2d at 708 . Our jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs is, in a sense, both appellate and original in character, because supervisory proceedings are independent in nature with process directed to a trial court, but our decision reviews the trial court’s judicial act. See Burke, 32 N.D.L.Rev. at 199-201 (comparing original supervisory jurisdiction and original jurisdiction to issue prerogative writ in publici juris cases).
[¶ 21] Under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-01(13), state’s attorneys shall prosecute criminal proceedings and institute civil proceedings in the name of a county to recover money paid by the county commissioners without legal authority.
See Olsen,
[¶ 22] Here, Riha’s affidavit states he investigated and considered whether to bring a civil action against the county commissioners, and he concluded it was appropriate, under the circumstances, to compromise the civil action because of the costs involved in collecting a civil judgment for the remainder of the money paid to the Symphony. Riha’s affidavit indicates he investigated and balanced the costs and benefits of bringing a civil action against the likelihood of success. Riha’s reasons for not pursuing a civil action are the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination and support his discretionary decision not to initiate a civil proceeding against the county
Ill
[¶ 23] We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Saefke’s claims against Ste-nehjem, we dismiss Saefke’s appeal from the court’s decision denying appointment of an attorney under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-06, and we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ.