delivered the opinion of the Court.
Triеd by the court, sitting without a jury, on an indictment charging statutory burglary, James Gilmore Sadoski was found guilty as сharged. The court sentenced him to serve three years in *1070 the State penitentiary, but suspended execution of the sentence on condition that Sadoski spend 60 days in jail, and placed him on probation for a period of three years.
At trial, Sadoski took the stand in his own defense and testified on direct examination that he had been conviсted of a felony. On cross-examination, he was asked how many times he had been convicted of a felony. His counsel’s objection to the question was overruled, and Sadoski testified that he had been convicted nine times. We granted Sadoski a writ of error limited to review of the trial court’s ruling that it was permissible to ask the accused the number of his felony convictions.
Code § 19.2-268 (Repl. Vol. 1975) permits an accused to testify in his own behalf in any criminal proceeding, “subject to cross-examination as any other witness . . . .” The controlling stаtute, however, in the present case is Code § 19.2-269 (Repl. Vol. 1975), which provides as follows:
A рerson convicted of a felony or perjury shall not be incompetent to testify, but the fact of conviction may be shown in evidence to affect his credit.
In
Hicks
v.
Commonwealth,
It is true, as we acknowledged in Harmon, that an accused is prejudiced by the disclosure that he has been convicted of a *1071 felony. But the General Assembly, by enacting § 4779 of the 1919 Code, made the crucial policy decision, which has never been changed, that the prejudicial effect of establishing the fact of conviction is оutweighed by the probative value of such evidence in determining credibility. The prejudicial effect of showing that an accused has been convicted of multiple felonies may be greater than that resulting from the disclosure of a single felony conviction. Nevеrtheless, if evidence of one felony conviction is important to a determination of credibility, evidence of more than one felony conviction is even more important. Indeed, to restrict the Commonwealth to evidence that would lead the triers of fact to believe that an accused who testifies in his own defense has been convicted of a single felony, when in fact he has been convicted of multiple feloniеs, would be to permit a misrepresentation of the status of the witness.
Courts in other jurisdictions have construed statutes similar to Code § 19.2-269 to permit a defendant testifying in a criminal trial to be asked the number of his felony convictions.
See State
v.
Hall,
We have held that the number and nature, but not the details, of the felony convictions of a witness other than the accused may be shown to the triers of fact.
Hummel
v.
Commonwealth,
We hold that the Commonwealth may ask a defendant who testifies in a criminal proceeding the number of times he has been convicted of a felony, but, consistent with our ruling in Harmon, not the names of the felonies, other than perjury, and not the nature or details therеof. Thus, a defendant in a criminal trial who has been convicted of one or more fеlonies is not subject to as comprehensive cross-examination as non-defendant witnesses, notwithstanding the provisions of Code § 19.2-268.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
