H.R. SADLOWSKI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, - VS - BOARDMAN LOCAL SCHOOLS, et al., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
CASE NO. 12 MA 132
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT
June 7, 2013
2013-Ohio-2870
Hon. Mary DeGenaro, Hon. Gene Donofrio, Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. 11 CV 1790. JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Attorney Robert Rohrbaugh, II, 4800 Market Street, Suite A, Youngstown, OH 44512
For Defendants-Appellees: Attorney David Kane Smith, Attorney Linsday Gingo, Attorney Miriam Pearlmutter, Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co. LPA, 3 Summit Park Drive, Suite 400, Cleveland, OH 44131
DeGenaro, P.J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, H.R. Sadlowski, appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, granting judgment on the pleadings to Defendants-Appellees, Boardman Local Schools, Randall Ebie, Joseph Maroni, Mindy DiPietro, and Anne Bott. On appeal, Sadlowski argues that the trial court erred by adopting the magistrate‘s decision granting Boardman‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because Sadlowski raised specific substantive arguments for the first time in these proceedings on appeal, rather than in support of her objections to the magistrate‘s decision before the trial court,
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 2, 2011, Sadlowski filed a seven count complaint in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas against the Boardman Local Schools, the principal, vice-principal and two guidance counselors of Boardman Center Middle School. Substantively, Sadlowski claims that she was harassed, bullied, and intimidated both on and off school grounds, and that Boardman failed to take any action. Boardman filed an answer denying all substantive allegations, and on February 15, 2012, it filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Sadlowski opposed.
{¶3} The magistrate granted Boardman‘s motion, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 16, 2012 and Sadlowski filed objections to this decision on April 19, 2012. However, the magistrate‘s decision was not filed until May 24, 2012; thus, the trial court notified Sadlowski that the objections would need to be refiled, which was done on May 31, 2012.
{¶4} Both objections were a mere two sentences in length; substantively identical, excepting the date of the magistrate‘s decision being objected to; and neither a factual nor legal error by the magistrate as a basis for the objections was specified:
* * * and pursuant to
Civ. R 53 files the herein objections to the magistrate‘s decision entered into the [sixteenth (16th) day of April] [twenty fourth (24th) day of May] 2012, in the above captioned matter. Supplemental grounds to be filed.
Judgment on the Pleadings
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Sadlowski asserts:
{¶7} “The trial court erred in sustaining Appellee‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings.”
{¶8} After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
{¶9} Granting a defendant‘s
Objections to Magistrate‘s Decision
{¶10} Sadlowski asserts the magistrate erred by granting Boardman‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, for the first time in these proceedings, she makes substantive arguments challenging the magistrates decision beyond merely stating the magistrate erred by granting the motion. On appeal, Sadlowski argues that the magistrate erroneously granted the motion because the breach of contract claim was
b) Objections to magistrate‘s decision.
(ii) Specificity of objection. An objection to a magistrate‘s decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.
* * *
(iv) Waiver of right to assign adoption by court as error on appeal. Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court‘s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii) , unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required byCiv.R. 53(D)(3)(b) .
{¶11} Significantly, Sadlowski failed to raise these substantive arguments in her objections to the magistrate‘s decision before the trial court at all, let alone with the specificity required by
{¶12} Moreover, in light of the initial failure to file the magistrate‘s decision, Sadlowski had not one, but two, opportunities to supplement the objections and raise substantive arguments in support of her objections to the magistrate‘s decision. The failure to supplement the objections had the same effect as if no objections were filed at all. Failure to comply with the specificity requirements of
{¶13} As this court held in Wajda v. M&J Automotive, Inc. 7th Dist. No. 10-MA-7, 2010-Ohio-6584, ¶29:
The Ohio Supreme Court has firmly adhered to these procedural mandates, as reiterated in a recent ruling in which the court dismissed an appeal from a magistrate‘s decision and affirmed the lower court‘s judgment with a terse explanation: “[a]ppellant‘s arguments derive directly from the conclusions of law provided in the magistrate‘s decision. Appellant, however, did not object to those conclusions as
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) requires. Thus, * * * we can proceed no further.” State ex rel. Findlay Industries v. Indus. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 517, 2009-Ohio-1674, 905 N.E.2d 1202, at ¶3.
{¶14}
{¶15} In sum, because Sadlowski raised specific substantive arguments for the first time in these proceedings on appeal, rather than in support of her objections to the magistrate‘s decision before the trial court,
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
Dated: June 7, 2013