125 Cal. App. 2d 478 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1954
Lead Opinion
Basically, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Drainage District was created and is operated for the purpose of carrying out a general flood control project for the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries. The waters discharged into these streams at flood times are far in excess of the carrying capacity of the river channels. In the Sacramento Valley, to supplement this carrying capacity, lands have been set aside as by-passes in which the excess waters may be carried. The Yolo By-Pass is a part of this system. It takes water from the Sacramento River, carries it down westerly of the river channel and empties it back into the river at a lower point. This by-pass is in part located in Yolo County and Cache Creek empties into the by-pass area at a point in that county. This creek brings water from Clear Lake and Indian Valley lying in the westerly mountains. It is the largest sediment-carrying stream on the west side of the valley and if uncontrolled would drop its
This action was brought to condemn a right of way to build this third outlet or throat. The district by resolution declared it was necessary that a further right of way easement be acquired for the purpose “of a diverting channel and training levees for the diverting of Cache Creek into Cache Creek Settling Basin and the taking of necessary materials therefor.” It more particularly described the property sought to be taken as “an additional right of way and easement for the construction and perpetual maintenance of said channel and training levees . . . with the right to take materials for the construction thereof.”
Appellant Wallace B. Truslow owned some 1,900 acres of land lying within the settling basin and generally concerning the title situation between the district and Truslow the findings of the trial court disclosed the following: In January of 1935 the district purchased from Truslow’s predecessor in interest a perpetual right and easement without recourse to compensation for damage therefrom for the passage of all flood waters of the Yolo By-Pass which might from time to time inundate some 3,000 acres particularly described in the conveyance to the district and located in the settling basin. There was granted to the district rights of way for construction of levees of the flood control project, described as “ (a) Right of way for construction of the westerly training levee of Cache Creek Settling Basin, said right of way being 200 feet, more or less, in width, ... ; (b) Right of way for the construction of the easterly training levee of the Cache Creek Settling Basin, said right of way being 250 feet
The greater part of Truslow’s lands were leased to respondent King. This lease covered 161 acres of the 234 acres lying in the easement area. His lease had four years to tun. The cause was tried to the court sitting without a jury. After fixing the value of the property taken, the court separately assessed the interests therein of Truslow and King and so apportioned the total award between them. In addition the court awarded to King certain special damages. From the judgment Truslow appeals.
When the action was brought all of Truslow’s lands were burdened by reclamation assessments levied by Reclamation District 2035. After levying the assessment the reclamation district issued bonds. The total of assessments underlying the bonds and constituting a lien on the lands in the district amounted to $2,264,740. None of the bonds have yet matured. The reclamation district was made a defendant in the condemnation actions, its interest being alleged to be that of the holder of assessment liens upon the property sought to
The Appeal op Truslow
Appellant Truslow attacks the entire judgment by claiming that the same is invalid for indefiniteness and failure to decide all of the issues presented in the case. More specifically he makes the following points: 1. That the district attempted to procure an easement upon Truslow’s lands free and clear of the lien of the bond issue thereon and that the judgment “wholly fails to reflect the court’s findings of any of the facts with regard to the bond issue and the lien thereof or the non-joinder of parties.” The attack is not warranted. The court specifically found that the district was entitled to take the incorporeal interest free and clear of the lien of the assessment and bonds, basing its action upon its finding that the value of the interest taken had been more than offset by the benefit conferred by the construction of the improvement proposed (this construction had been completed before the trial was held), with the result that there had been no lessening of the security underlying the bonds. For that reason no security provisions were made with respect to the reclamation district. The court decreed that the property rights taken in the suit were free of any demands arising under the liens which had theretofore been impressed upon the land over which the easements were condemned. The propriety of this action of the court will be treated when we turn attention to the appeal of the district. We are here concerned only with the claim that the judgment did not determine things which necessarily had to be determined to dispose of all of the issues presented to the court. Truslow makes another specific claim of failure on the part of the trial court to dispose of the pertinent issues. It appeared during the trial that in the construction of the new training levees the soil necessary to construct the same was borrowed
During the tenancy of respondent King he had, prior to the initiation of the condemnation action, drilled a water well from which he could irrigate some 300 acres of land, part of which lay within the easement area and the rest of which lay without. This well cost King $4,555. The court found that by the construction of the district’s improvements on the easement area and the use being made of that area the usefulness of the well had been completely destroyed. It awarded King the cost of the well as “special damage,” not payable out of the general award. The lease provided as to wells constructed by King that at the termination of his lease he might remove pumps and pumping machinery, exclusive of casing; and that he could not remove pump houses and engine blocks, the removal of which might impair the usefulness of the well. Truslow argues that from these provisions of the lease it is apparent the well in question belonged to Truslow as a part of his fee estate and that the value of the well should, therefore, be paid entirely to him. We are
Appellant Truslow contends that the amount of damages paid to respondent King under the findings as to the value of his leasehold interest is entirely disproportionate with the amount of damages paid to appellant Truslow as owner of the land over which the easement was taken. In fixing the value of the interests of Truslow and King in the property taken and thus the total award, the trial court applied the rule laid down in City of Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 397 [257 P. 526, 53 A.L.R. 679], The trial court found as a fact, and it is not claimed by appellant Truslow that the finding was not amply supported, that although the district was condemning an easement, yet the nature and use thereof were such that the entire value of the land within the easement was taken. It therefore, for the purpose of fixing damages for the taking and the apportionment of the award between the owner and his tenant, applied the same rule which under the cited decision is applicable where a fee is condemned. The rule was stated in the opinion in that case as follows:
“. . . According to the majority of the decisions the taking of the entire demised property by condemnation proceedings operates to release a tenant from liability for subsequently accruing rent, but a taking of a portion only does not terminate the lease or absolve the lessee of his*486 covenant to pay the full rent. ... ‘. . . in such case the lessee would not be entitled to apportionment or an abatement of the rent for the part of the land taken, but was bound to pay rent for the whole of the premises demised. ... If the covenant to pay rent is not affected by the proceedings and judgment of condemnation, it is clear that the lessor would be entitled as compensation only to the present value of his reversion, which he holds subject to the term created by the lease; and the lessee continuing personally liable but losing his estate, and right to its enjoyment, would be entitled to receive not merely the value of the term, but also a sum of money equivalent to the present value of the sum of the rents payable in futuro. That is, he should receive the value of his term subject to the rent, and such further sum as would be considered a present equivalent for the rent thereafter to be paid, and the lessor would receive correspondingly less.’ ”
Applying this rule, the trial court found that the value of King’s unexpired term fixed as of the date the summons in the action was issued amounted to $19,020; the court further found that the sum of $8,350 represented the rent still to be paid by King on the condemned land for the balance of his term. As to both Truslow and King the trial court found that neither was entitled to specific severance damages for the reason that the benefits conferred by the construction of the works in accordance with the plans as stated in the complaint exceeded the severance damage which consisted only of loss of access. The court further found that the value of all the property taken was the sum of $50,000 and that the value of Truslow’s reversionary interest was the sum of $22,630. The court additionally awarded to King special damages, one item of which we have hereinabove discussed, but since these awards of special damages do not affect appellant Truslow and since the condemnor is not appealing, we need discuss them no further.
It appeared from the evidence that when King rented lands from Truslow the lands were in the main what was described as a jungle, being overgrown with trees and brush. The surface of these lands was mostly irregular and much of the area had been gullied by the action of the waters of Cache Creek pouring out through the two throats and depositing sediment. By the lease King was required to clear and level the leased lands and put them in state for farming, all of which work had been done before this action was begun.
Finally, appellant Truslow contends that the trial court erred in refusing to reopen the case during the period of submission before judgment, to permit evidence that after trial King had forfeited his lease for nonpayment of rent and also had assigned all of his interest in the entire award.
The taking of evidence was concluded on January 25, 1951. The motion to vacate the submission was heard on September 17, 1951. The motion was made on specific grounds as follows : That King had made the assignment above mentioned on or about June 1, 1951; that King had failed to pay the rental of the property leased from and after November 1, 1950, failing to pay the installment which was due on May 1, 1951, in the amount of $9,203.52; that Truslow by legal action, after due notice under the lease, had terminated the lease. It was the position of Truslow that as a legal consequence of the termination of the lease King was not entitled to recover and have paid to him out of the award otherwise payable to Truslow rental accruing after termination and was not entitled to the amount of damages fixed by the court for the loss of his estate for years by condemnation, but was only entitled to recover for the loss intermediate the date the summons in the action was issued and the date of termination, to wit, July 6, 1951. The motion was heard by the court and the minutes of the court show that during the argument counsel for King “offered to pay the rent on real property
While this appeal was pending appellant Truslow presented to this court a motion that it take evidence touching the matter of the trial court’s findings that severance damage was more than offset by benefits resulting to the land from the construction of the training levees; that the judgment of the trial court be modified in accordance with the evidence so adduced upon a rehearing of that issue; that in the alternative the case be in its entirety reversed and remanded to the trial court for retrial in accordance with instructions as to legal issues raised upon Truslow’s appeal. In support of and in opposition to" the motion various affidavits were filed by the parties and depositions of witnesses were taken and supplied to the court. We have determined that the motion must be denied and it is accordingly so ordered. We will state our reasons for this ruling.
Before this action was begun and the third throat for the influx of Cache Creek waters into the settling basin had been constructed under the easements taken there had been a use of the basin for many years and a controlling of the outflow of waters into it by two other throats successively constructed. There had first been constructed a permanent levee as dis
In support of his motion appellant Truslow pointed to various matters appearing in the record, including the findings of the trial court which briefly reflected the matters contained in the opinion which we have above set out and asserted that from these matters and from the testimony of the respondent district’s witnesses he had from the beginning been led to believe that the new channel and training levees would be permanent in nature and perpetually maintained; that, so believing, they made no attempt to show the contrary and that in effect both he and the trial court were of the impression when the evidence was concluded that the channel and training levees were of such nature; that the trial court based its findings of benefits offsetting severance damage upon this assumption of permanency of the new channel and its training levees. This belief, say Truslow and his counsel, continued until it developed, after the rendition of judgment, that the easterly training levee along the new channel was being breached by the flood waters as they flowed through the channel, and the waters were again going over the lands supposed to have been reclaimed by the levee, so that the benefits found by the court to have been conferred upon the remaining lands outside the condemned lands were not being enjoyed. This matter was taken up with the respondent district and meetings were held with those representing the respondent, information was sought and obtained from the federal authorities as to the intended permanency of the training levees and as to whether or not there was any obligation on the part of anyone to repair the levees if and when breached. The result of this was that the position was taken by the state and federal authorities that, in effect, training levees were training levees and that these had never been intended or represented to be anything other than training
We think that it cannot be fairly said that there was any concealment of either the purpose or effect of the training levees and their enclosed channel. The resolutions stated that it was necessary to condemn an additional right-of-way and easement “for the construction and perpetual maintenance” of a new channel and training levees, but this is far from stating or representing that the condemnor would perpetually maintain the channel and its enclosing levees. The language of the resolution defined and was intended to define the measure of the rights sought and surely did not cast and could not have been considered to have cast any contractual obligation with respect to maintenance of the works to be constructed. The complaint alleged and the trial court found that it was necessary for the respondent district to condemn such a right of way and easement, but this finding again concerns the measure of the rights to be taken. There was, of course, no statement in the complaint that there were either
Appeal of Reclamation District No. 2035
Reclamation District 2035 was joined as a defendant, the allegation in respect of it being that it claimed some interest in or lien upon the property to be taken. The district filed an answer, alleging that it had levied upon the lands within its borders an assessment for defraying the cost of construction and maintenance of general reclamation works and had thereafter issued bonds against the assessment; that thereafter refunding bonds had been issued, which were outstanding in the principal sum of $2,000,000; that these bonds would not begin to mature until January 1, 1955, and thereafter would mature serially over a period of 40 years; that the lands to be taken constituted parts of three parcels of land which had thus been assessed; that on the three assessment tracts the total of liens was the sum of $83,292.96; that one tract had been assessed at an average of $59.29 per acre, another at $65.18, and the third at $67.88. Roy E. Cole, Treasurer of the County of Yolo and ex-officio treasurer of
At the trial the evidence introduced by the appellants consisted of a showing that of the three assessment parcels affected, one contained 307 acres assessed for $18,154.55, the second contained 332 acres assessed for $21,690.44, and the third contained 640 acres assessed for $43,447.97. It was further shown that of the first parcel 15.82 acres lay within the right-of-way condemned, of the second parcel 72.73 acres lay therein, and of the third parcel 145 acres lay therein. On the assumption that the total assessment on each parcel could be considered as having been uniformly distributed over the entire parcel, the appellants computed what they called the amounts “to be paid by the Truslow lands on the
But the prayer of the answer of each of the appellants was not in harmony with the arguments as to what portion of the award should be turned over. On the contrary, the appellant district and its treasurer asked that the entire award be turned over to the treasurer up to the amount necessary to answer calls against the total assessments upon the three tracts as the bonds and their interest matured, that is, up to the sum of $83,292.96. This sum consisted, as we have said, of principal and anticipated interest. The granting of this relief could have absorbed the entire award made. Neither the owner Truslow, nor his tenant King, could have received anything.
Appellants, respecting their rights to make demands upon the money paid into court by the condemnor, refer us to text and case law involving rights of mortgagees, such as City of Vallejo v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. 408, 417 [249 P. 1084, 48 A.L.R. 610], Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank v. Bortenstein, 47 Cal.App. 421 [190 P. 850], 29 C.J.S., “Eminent Domain,” section 200, page 1107. We quote the following from that text:
“. . .It is well settled, however, that where there are liens on the land taken or injured, the court may allow the condemnor to pay the award into court for the benefit of the owner and the lienholders, although the lienholders were not made parties to the condemnation proceedings. The award in such case is a substitute for the land taken, and the lien-holder may have his lien satisfied out of the fund awarded and paid into court. This protection extends to judgment liens and to tax liens; and, where only a portion of the*497 property subject to the lien is taken, the lienor is entitled to satisfy the entire amount of his lien from the award.”
That the relief which appellants asked in their pleadings has been granted in like cases cannot be gainsaid. So in Boyle v. Middleburgh Realty Co., 75 Ohio App. 368 [62 N.E.2d 262, 264], it was said:
. . Where the state acquires by condemnation ... a part of a tract on which the taxes have become delinquent, the amount paid by way of compensation for the land so acquired is first to be applied to the payment of all of the delinquent general taxes and there can be no apportionment of any part of such delinquent taxes to the unacquired residue. ’ ’
Continuing, the court said: “It is obvious that no distinction can be drawn between the portion of the special assessments which have accrued and are unpaid and delinquent general taxes. The same reasons which cause us to deny apportionment in the case of liens of general taxes apply with equal force to accrued special assessments. The question then remains whether a court in distributing the fund received in a condemnation proceeding for a portion of a tract of land bearing special assessments may apportion the assessments payable in the future between the land appropriated and the residue. ’ ’
After noting that a statute of Ohio authorized apportionment of taxes on land when a part of the parcel taxed is conveyed away and after stating that the statute provided the only statutory method for such apportionment, the court continued:
“It is our opinion that the provisions of [the statute] which empower ‘the authority certifying such assessments’ ... to make an apportionment of special assessments at the request of the county auditor ‘whenever a portion or portions of a tract or parcel of real estate [bearing unpaid special assessments] is conveyed to another owner or other owners’ can not be construed so broadly as to authorize the court to make an apportionment of the unpaid special assessment liens in this case.
“Likewise, it is our opinion that the court can not base such an authority on its general equity powers. The installments of the special assessments to become due in the future are as truly liens on the benefited property as are delinquént taxes or assessments. Therefore, when a part of the property*498 bearing special assessments is acquired by a public authority, it becomes the duty of the court in distributing money paid into court by way of compensation to pay not only the special-assessment liens already accrued but also to pay, as provided in Section 5677, General Code, or to set aside a sufficient sum to pay, the assessment liens to become due in the future before making any payments from the fund to the landowner.”
In Pomona College v. Dunn, 7 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [46 P.2d 270], the court, again speaking of mortgage liens, said:
“. . . It must be conceded at the outset that the right of a mortgagee in a proper case to subject an award made to the land owner as compensation for a part of the mortgaged premises taken through the medium of eminent domain proceedings to the lien of his mortgage is not open to doubt. Under the familiar doctrine of equitable conversion the award is considered as land and the mortgagee is entitled to so regard it and to have recourse to it in satisfaction of the mortgage lien.”
In Los Angeles Trust t& Sav. Bank v. Bortenstein, supra, at page 423, it is said:
“. . . It is a well-recognized rule of equity, based upon the doctrine of equitable conversion, that when land is taken for public use, the money awarded for such land remains, and is to be considered, as land in respect to all rights and interests relating thereto. The money, in such cases, is deemed to represent the land, and is applied in equity to discharge the liens upon it, precisely in accordance with the legal or equitable rights of creditors or encumbrancers in respect to such land.”
But it cannot be said that in every case the whole award up to the total lien must be paid to the lienholder or set aside for his benefit. It stated in 18 American Jurisprudence, “Eminent Domain,” page 868, section 235, “Mortgages,” that:
“. . . The view obtaining in a majority of jurisdictions is that, where mortgaged land is taken or damaged in. eminent domain proceedings, the mortgagee is entitled either to the whole of the award made for the condemned land, or to a share thereof to the extent of his interest or damage. Thus, where the whole of the mortgaged land is taken in the proceedings, the mortgagee is entitled to the entire award or at least to so much of it as is necessary to satisfy the mort*499 gage indebtedness. Where only a part of mortgaged property is taken, the mortgagee is entitled, generally speaking, to only so mneh of the award as is necessary to compensate him for his interest in the part taken.” (Italics supplied.)
It is stated in 58 American Law Reports 1539 in an annotation that:
“Where only a part of mortgaged property is taken in eminent domain proceedings, the mortgagee is entitled, generally speaking, to only so much of the award as is necessary to compensate him for his interest in the part taken.”
After stating the above general rule, the court said in In re Dillman, 276 Mich. 252 [267 N.W. 623, 625]:
“There is no controlling case upon the latter rule in this state. In In re Widening Woodward Avenue, 265 Mich. 87 [251 N.W. 379], the right of a mortgagee to participate in an award was not challenged. In Detroit, B. C. & W. R. Co. v. First National Bank of Yale, 196 Mich. 660 [163 N.W. 97], where only a small part of the premises was taken, the court divided evenly; four justices denying the mortgagee the award on the ground his security had not been impaired by the taking; and four holding him entitled to the award on the ground a mortgagee is entitled to all the security covered by his mortgage and the court cannot release part of it on appraisal.
“. . . Under any circumstances, a mortgagee has sufficient right to the award to preserve his security against evident or established impairment.” (Italics supplied.)
As to rights in respect of taxes where property is taken in eminent domain an annotation to 79 American Law Reports, 116 et seq., cites many cases and, speaking quite generally, the approach to the problem as adopted in the cases cited is about the same as in the case of mortgages and other liens, that is, that the holder of the liens is entitled to have his interest protected and for that purpose the court may resort to the gross award paid into court by the condemnor after its amount has been fixed in the proceedings.
If a trial court has the power, and we think it has, to measure the amount to be set aside to protect lienholders, by the need for such protection, then this power includes power to find from the facts that no protection is needed, and to refuse for that reason to set aside any fund at all.
As we have seen, the trial court in this case, having found from the evidence that the security of the assessment liens on the parcels involved had been in no wise diminished, denied
The statute contemplates that, when bonds are issued against assessments spread over the lands of a reclamation district in order to obtain money to defray the cost of general reclamation works, one of the main purposes in providing statutory authority for such financing is that by the length of time over which the obligation to pay the assessments is made to run full opportunity will be given to those who own the land to meet the charges out of profits from the use thereof over the years. The bonds here involved were issued in 1936, with no principal payments required until 1955. In that year and for 40 years thereafter l/40th of the bonds or 2% per cent of the- principal bonded indebtedness matured each year. The bonds were non-eallable and were based upon a contract between the bondholders, the district and the owners of the land assessed, whereunder the rate of maturity and in general the contractual rights of the parties could not thereafter be altered, even by legislation. (Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal.App. 683 [20 P.2d 972].) It is said in Hershey v. Cole that the bondholders have the contractual right to have the calls made and the bonds paid at the stipulated maturity rate. Correlative to this right is that of the landowner to have the maturity rate observed so that in fulfillment of the general statutory purpose he will not be compelled to pay in advance. We think it would be inequitable for the court to take from the owners who are otherwise presently entitled to compensation for the loss they have suffered a sufficient sum to pay the principal of the bonds outstanding, and a further sum sufficient to defray interest charges for the full term of the bonds when, under the facts presented, the bondholders have no need for such action. We think the court here was faced with a situation where it was empowered to say,' first, that the relief to be accorded the appellants in respect of the assessment liens should be measured by the need for that protection, and, next, that where the court was satisfied from the evidence no protection was needed it was within the court’s power to refuse to set aside any funds for that purpose.
Peek, J., and Schottky, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 25, 1954, and the following opinion was then rendered:
Rehearing
On petition for rehearing appellant Truslow points out that this court did not in its opinion dispose of his contention that he was entitled to have the award in his favor modified by the addition thereto of interest from the time when, prior to trial and judgment, possession of the property was taken by the condemnor to the time when the award in his favor was paid into court for him. It has been held that just compensation for property taken ought to include the value of the loss of use arising where possession is so taken and that this value may be measured by legal interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum for that period upon the award. (Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 16 Cal. 2d 676 [107 P.2d 618]; see also Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 314 [119 P.2d 734].) This modification cannot be made in favor of appellant Truslow because the reason of the rule under which it is granted does not here apply. Interest is allowed on the theory that where such prior possession is taken the one entitled to the use of the property will not be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the value of the property taken. Truslow’s interest in the property taken was a reversionary interest, he having leased the land to King. He, therefore, was not entitled to the use of the property and since, as has been seen, the taking of a part of the leased property did not abrogate the lease, even pro tanto, Truslow has suffered no loss through the prior possession taken by the condemnor. That loss, if any, has fallen upon King. We cannot, therefore, modify the award to Truslow.
King has throughout been a respondent in the appeals taken by Truslow and by the reclamation district. It is a matter of grave doubt, therefore, he not having appealed from the judgment fixing his award, that this court has appellate jurisdiction to modify his judgment by adding interest to the award. But if we assume such jurisdiction exists we could not upon this record so modify his judgment. The first time that he made the request was when he filed his answer to
Appellant’s (Truslow) petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 21, 1954.