3 Pa. Super. 426 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1897
Opinion by
The plaintiffs brought an action of trespass against the defendant, to recover damages sustained by them in consequence of an alleged deceit practiced by the defendant, by reason of which the plaintiffs were induced to take a lease, evidenced by writing, and enter into possession of certain premises in the city of Philadelphia. Both of the plaintiffs made an examination of the premises. They informed the defendant of the character of their business, which was the carrying on of a millinery establishment, and that they desired to occupy the premises for that purpose. The business, like the material with which it deals, consisting largely of show; they made special inquiry as to the bulk windows, and, as they allege, were informed that the premises were in good condition, and that a new roof had been put upon the windows in which their goods were to be displayed.
Both the plaintiffs testify that in a personal interview with the defendant prior to the execution of the lease, they informed him as to their business, and that they required bulk windows for the display of their goods; that the house was represented by him to be in good condition, and that the bulk windows had a new roof on them, and that they were in perfect condition. That the defendant understood the business in which the plaintiffs were to engage is shown by the lease which he offered in evidence, in the second clause of which it is provided: “ The lessee shall not occupy the demised premises otherwise than as a millinery store, nor shall tl^ lessee assign this lease nor under-let the premises or any part thereof.” The son of the plaintiff, who was a conveyancer and acted as his agent, says in his examination in chief that at the time of. the execution of the lease “the question was raised whether the property was in good order, and the reply was that it was in good order, which it was at the time.” There is further corroboration of the
As to the first, fourth and fifth assignments, the appellant’s argument is that, inasmuch as the lease which he gave in evidence is signed by but one of the plaintiffs, there can be no recovery by them jointly. The reply to this is that the plaintiffs do not base their right to recover upon the lease. There is evidence that they carried on the business jointly; that both contributed to its capital and shared in the profits. The representations upon which they base their action for deceit were made to both of them. Both relied upon these representations, and jointly pursued the business which was carried on in consequence. We see no error, therefore, in the affirmance of the plaintiffs’ points and the disaffirmance of the defendant’s third and fourth points, as contained in the fourth and fifth assignments of error. Wolfe v. Arrott, 109 Pa. 478, although different in form and as to its facts, fully sustains the general principles herein set forth. We are not called upon to decide