15 Wash. 57 | Wash. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment of dismissal rendered upon an order sustaining a demurrer to their complaint. The complaint purports to contain two causes of action. It is alleged in the first cause of action that in 1840 Joseph
In this cause of action the plaintiffs seek to have the entire estate adjudged to belong to them on the grounds of its being a trust estate now in the hands of the legal representative of said Renton. They claim, that they first learned of their Pennsylvania estate and their rights therein in October, 1891, and they, allege that Renton had concealed the facts from them; that he occupied the position of a parent to them from the time he was married to their mother, and took them into his house, they then being eight and four years of age; that he always treated them affectionately, maintained and educated them as if they were his children, and that they bore his name and lived with him as his children until they were married.
A number of objections are urged against this cause of action, one of which is that the plaintiffs’ rights, if they ever had any, were barred by the lapse of time; that it fails to show sufficient reasons why the plaintiffs remained silent from the time they attained their majority until 1891, a period of over thirty years-The only answer to this is that Renton concealed the facts from them and represented that the property was his own.
We are of the opinion that the demurrer to this cause of action was well taken. The complaint fails to show how the plaintiffs obtained their information in 1891, and the bare allegation that they had no knowledge of the facts prior to that time is overcome by the other matters pleaded. It appears that at the beginning of the action they were fifty-nine and fifty-five years of age, and were women with husbands, and they do not
Conceding all that can be legitimately drawn from the allegations in this cause of action, in favor of the plaintiffs, it nevertheless is apparent, beyond all sensible controversy, that the claim is one of the stalest of the stale, and in all reason at this late day and time the plaintiffs, should be “barred from pressing it, there-being no sufficient facts alleged to show any fraudulent concealment or dealing. We are aware that we have uniformly followed a liberal rule in construing pleadings as against demurrers; but the facts apparent from the complaint in this case should make an exception to that rule in considering the bare allegations of the deception by Renton and a want of knowledge on their part. Under all the circumstances shown, good pleading demands that they should allege sufficient facts, with particularity, showing such an exceptional case as would authorize them after all this lapse of time to successfully lay claim to this vast estate accumulated from so small a start. As was said in a somewhat similar case, Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317 (12 Sup. Ct. 867) :
“The disproportion is so great that the conscience is startled, and the inquiry is at once suggested whether it can be possible that the defendant has been guilty of fraud so gross as to involve consequences so disastrous.”
If so, it is apparent that an exceptionally strong case must be made, and it is not made by the general allegations pleaded. Hazard v. Griswold, 21 Fed. 178; Ambler v. Choteau, 107 U. S. 586 (1 Sup. Ct. 556); Kent
The second cause of action relates to the same property, and by it the plaintiffs seek to recover a portion of the estate only. Much that has been said in relation to the first cause of action, as well as the cases cited, bears with equal force upon this one also. We will not pass upon the question of the inconsistency of the two claims, but will consider the second cause pleaded independently of the other in this respect. In this it is alleged that the property wás the community property of William and Sarah Renton, and that on the 24th day of February, 1888, they made a written contract for the purpose of regulating the disposition and status of a part of said property. The death of Sarah M. Renton is alleged, and that thereupon the plaintiffs became entitled to one-half of the property by descent from her, and that the other half of it belonged to William Renton. It is alleged that this contract provided for the appointment of a trustee of the community estate who should manage and control it in its entirety until January 1, 1900, and that shortly after the death of Sarah M. Renton said William Renton was, by the superior court of Kitsap County, that being the court of probate, appointed such trustee, and also administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, and that he qualified as such and filed an inventory of the prop-, erty in that court, but that he claimed a large portion of the estate as his separate property; that an appraisement was had, the usual notice to creditors given, the debts of the estate paid, and the estate brought to a condition for partial distribution. That then he proposed to the plaintiffs that the trust created by the-community property contract be abrogated and the property divided between himself and the plaintiffs,
But we are of the opinion that sufficient grounds to warrant a rescission of the written agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and Renton, and to authorize a cancellation of the deeds of conveyance thereafter executed in pursuance of it, have not been pleaded. While a want of knowledge of the value of the property is alleged, there is nothing to show that the plaintiffs did not have ample opportunity to inform themselves of its value and condition. It is conceded that their suspicions that Renton had
Their claim that they were coerced into this agreement by Renton can hardly be regarded with seriousness. His threat was that he would resign and have another administrator appointed and leave the matter for the determination of the court. The only re-
Furthermore, it appears in their first cause of action that they knew of the Sylva trust -in October, 1891 ? and according to their contention therein they knew
The further claim that the agreement of settlement entered into between the plaintiffs and Renton was invalid because Holmes was not a party thereto is not
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Hoyt, C. J., and Dunbar and Gordon, JJ., concur.