SAC AND FOX INDIANS OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA v. SAC AND FOX INDIANS OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN OKLAHOMA, AND THE UNITED STATES
No. 614
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 14, 15, 1910. Decided April 24, 1911.
220 U.S. 481
The provision in the act of August 30, 1852, c. 103, § 3, 10 Stat. 41, 56, forbidding payment of Indian annuities to any attorney or agent and requiring the same to be paid to the Indians or to the tribe did not give any vested rights to the Indians but was a direction to agents of the United States.
In the Indian treaties under consideration in this case the Government dealt with the tribes and not with individuals, and the treaties gave rights only to the tribes and not to the members.
Under the act of Mar. 1, 1907, c. 2290, 34 Stat. 1055, authorizing this suit, the action is analogous to one at law to recover money paid under mistake of law or fact, rather than one in equity, and this court follows the rule not to go behind the findings of the Court of Claims. United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, distinguished. 45 Ct. Cl. 287, affirmed.
THE facts, which involve the determination of the status of Sac and Fox Indians under certain treaties and statutes, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Charles H. Merillat, with whom Mr. Charles J. Kappler, Mr. George R. Struble, Mr. H. F. Stiger and Mr. William O. Belt were on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Barry Mohun, with whom Mr. A. R. Serven and Mr. R. W. Joyce were on the brief, for appellee Indians.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson, with whom Mr. George M. Anderson was on the brief, for the United States.
This is a suit brought by the Sac and Fox Indians of the Mississippi in Iowa against the Sacs and Foxes in Oklahoma and against the United States, under the
The facts found by the Court of Claims, abridged, are as follows. Under the treaty of October 11, 1842, 7 Stat. 596, the tribes in question ceded the land then occupied by them in the Territory of Iowa, were assigned a tract in what now is Kansas, and removed thither in 1845, 1846; then numbering 2278, and, in 1851, 2660 persons. In 1855 and from 1862 to 1866 certain members, number unknown, without permission from the United States, re-
We interrupt the recital of facts to dispose at this point of the first claim made by the plaintiffs. The act of 1852 gave no vested rights to individuals. It was not a grant to the Indians but a direction to agents of the United States, subject to other directions from the President. See Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 387. The Government did not deal with individuals but with tribes. Blackfeather v. United States, 190 U. S. 368, 377. See Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U. S. 56. The promises in the treaties under which the annuities were due were promises to the tribes. Treaties of November 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84; October 21, 1837, 7 Stat. 540; October 11, 1842, 7 Stat. 596. See treaty of October 1, 1859, 15 Stat. 467. So the treaty of February 18, 1867, in article 21, speaks of the funds arising from or due the nation under this or previous treaty stipulations, and of payments to bands. 15 Stat. 495, 504. Moreover, when the Government decided to pay only at the tribal agency, and then paid the whole amount due, we must presume, at this distance of time, that its decision was made under the direction of the President. The Court of Claims adds as yet a further reason for rejecting this claim that it does not appear how many of the Iowa Indians returned to Kansas to receive their annuities, but (therein varying from the statement of facts found), that it does appear that some of them did. The course of the Government is sanctioned in principle by the implication of the treaty of October 1, 1859, article 7, 15 Stat. 467, 469. That article recites the anxiety of the Sacs and Foxes that all members of the tribes should share the advantages of the treaty, invites non-resident members to come in and provides for notice to them, but adds the condition that those who do not rejoin and permanently reunite with the tribe within one year shall not have the benefit of any of the stipulations in the treaty contained.
On February 18, 1867, another treaty was made, amended September 2, 1868, proclaimed on October 14, 1868, 15 Stat. 495, by which the tribes sold their lands in Kansas to the United States and agreed to remove to a reservation in what now is the State of Oklahoma. Article 21 was like article 7 of the treaty of 1859, just mentioned, with a condition that no part of the funds
By the
However, the Iowa Indians not being satisfied and having presented a memorial to Congress setting up their present claims except that for pay of their chiefs, the
The fourth claim is based upon article 4 of the treaty of 1842, by which it was agreed that each of the principal chiefs should receive five hundred dollars annually, out of the annuities payable to the tribe, to be used and expended by them for such purposes as they may think proper, with the approbation of their agent. This like the rest of the treaty was a promise not to the chiefs but to the tribe, gave the chiefs no vested rights and was subject to such qualification in its performance as to the parties might seem fit. Whether a payment to Iowa chiefs would have been performance may be doubted, and certainly if the parties saw fit to treat the chiefs on the reservation as the only ones to be paid, no one else has anything to say. The
The fifth and last claim is for a share in proceeds of land ceded by the treaty of 1859. As to this the Court of Claims finds it impossible to ascertain what sum if any is due or to whom it would be payable. We do not see how the claim can be supported when the treaty itself provided that to benefit by it members must rejoin the tribe, meaning the tribe in Kansas, within one year. It is suggested to be sure that the forfeiture as it is called, was dependent upon notice being given as agreed in article 7, and that there is some evidence that notice was not given. The
The plaintiffs contend that, as the act authorizing the suit gave the Court of Claims full legal and equitable jurisdiction, the appeal opens the findings of fact for reconsideration, as was held in United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, 464, 465. That, however, was a suit in equity, whereas the present case is more analogous to an action at law, to recover a fund from parties to whom it was paid under mistake of law or fact, or from the original contractor by whom the payment was made. We should hesitate to depart from the ordinary rule that we do not go behind the findings of the Court of Claims, The Sisseton & Wahpeton Indians, 208 U. S. 561, 566, if, in our view, the question needed to be decided. It is true that the court below stated a principle of evidence that, if it is to be taken literally, cannot be sustained. It said that counsel could not bind the court to admit evidence not admissible by law, and partly on that ground seems to have declined to consider ex parte affidavits which the counsel for the Iowa and Oklahoma Indians agreed might be given the effect of depositions. The counsel for the United States refused to agree, and this was a further, and possibly adequate ground for the exclusion, as the agreement may have been understood to be conditional upon all parties joining. But of course evidence, hearsay or ex parte, for instance, may be admitted by consent, unless perhaps as against the United States, and then should be given
The question remains whether the error, if error there was, did the plaintiffs any harm. The counsel for the plaintiffs treats the statute giving jurisdiction as intended to open the case from the beginning without regard to inconsistent statutes and to provide for an arbitration on the footing of what may seem fair. See United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, 428, 429, 473. Phineas Pam-To-Pee v. United States, 148 U. S. 691, 699. In view of the subject-matter an uneasy doubt is natural whether Congress did not mean rather more than it plainly said. But the jurisdiction given is legal and equitable and the authority is to adjudicate as justice and equity shall require claims for money alleged to be due to them as their proportionate shares of appropriations to fulfill treaty obligations, etc. The statute creates no new right beyond excluding the effect of the lapse of time and, perhaps, the defence of res judicata and satisfaction under the acts of 1895 and 1896; it makes no admission, but simply provides for a trial on the merits. See Stewart v. United States, 206 U. S. 185, 194. A merely moral claim is not made the foundation of a possible recovery. Something must be shown that amounts to a right.
It is apparent from what we have said that no finding as to the number of Indians in Iowa in particular years, without more, could change the result to which the Court of Claims and this court have come. The treaty contracts on which the plaintiffs claims are founded gave rights only to the tribe, not to the members. It was an accepted and reasonable rule, especially in the days when Indians wars still were possible and troublesome, that payments to the tribe should be made only at their reservation and
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, dissenting.
1. On the supposition that the findings of the Court of Claims are binding on this court, the case should be remanded to that court for further consideration because of its error in refusing to consider evidence made competent by the jurisdictional act and by the stipulation between the contending Indians.
2. If this court may go behind the findings, as I think it may on the authority of United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 464, and as it is conceded by the contending Indians that it may, in my opinion the Secretary of the Interior, in apportioning the annuities from 1885 to date, committed error in taking the fixed, unvarying sum of 317 for the Sacs and Foxes in Iowa, and 505 for those in Oklahoma, disregarding any increase or decrease of the respective divisions of the tribe. The tribal rights of the claimant Indians had been recognized, and the jurisdictional
I think, therefore, that a fixed, unvarying sum should not have been selected. Annual tests should have been made and the increase or decrease of the Indians ascertained by the Secretary of the Interior.
The Court of Claims found, it is true, that there was no competent evidence of the increase or decrease of the divisions of the tribe. But in so finding the court disregarded, as I have already said, evidence which the jurisdictional act and the stipulations of the contending Indians made competent, and such evidence, though not strong, established that the claimant Indians had increased. It is pointed out in the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior recognized a small increase of the defendant Indians in 1887.
