History
  • No items yet
midpage
Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Richman
367 F.3d 180
3rd Cir.
2004
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 this сonclusion devising way to reason to statute, separately I write compel logic this should

stress this combine definitions within sec-

that we Rather,

tion, general rule. as a hybrid I submit an offense is

where —as aggravated by deception

theft is—and distinct, two

felony classifications contain tests,

clearly applicable should we conclude for the must be fulfilled order

that both felony. qualify aggravated

offense to as an SABREE, By his Mother and

Hassan SABREE;

Next-Friend, Hana Cather Meade, By

ine her Father and Next-

Friend, Meade; Joseph Fra Robert A.

zier, By Next-Friend, his Mother and Frazier,

Patricia for Themsleves Similarly

All Others Situated

* RICHMAN, B. In Her Official Estelle

Capacity Depart

ment of Public of the Com Welfare Pennsylvania

monwealth Sabree, Meade, and

Hassan Catherine Frazier, Appellants

Joseph

* Pursuant to Clerk’s {Substitution dated and F.R.A.P.

Order 3/28/03 43(c)}

Rule

No. 03-1226. Appeals,

United States Court

Third Circuit.

Argued Sept. May Filed Gold, Stephen (Argued), Philadelphia, F. Shane, Law

PA and llene W. Disabilities PA, Project, Philadelphia, Appellants. *2 Leisch, (Argued), up Common- to live to Doris M. imposed conditions on it Pennsylvania, Department by Congress. wealth Welfare, Philadelphia, PA and Public John Plaintiffs are a class of mentally retard- Kane, Pennsylvania, A. Commonwealth of in ed adults need of medical services from Counsel, Legal Department Office of an intermediate care facility persons for Welfare, PA, Harrisburg, Appel- Public (“ICF/MR with mental retardation ser- lees. vices”). Although they qualify for state Somers, assistance to obtain Perkins, these services Sarah Jane National under Act, the Medicaid Hill, NC, that assistance Program, Health Law has not Chapel been forthcoming. In an effort to force Amicus-Appellants.

Pennsylvania provide to the needed ser- ALITO, BARRY, AMBRO, vices, plaintiffs, pursuant Before to 42 U.S.C. 1983, Judges. Circuit sued the Pennsyl- vania Department of Public Welfare. Pennsylvania argues that provide it would THE OPINION OF COURT cannot, assistance if it could but that it BARRY, Judge. Circuit that, event, remedy the sole for its

non-compliance with the Medicaid Act is I. INTRODUCTION the suspension or funding revocation of from Congress. disagree.1 We money When offers to the states, imposes Court, it often conditions on ac- The District relying heavily on ceptance. funding States welcоme federal Gonzaga University, concluded that Con- to help many gress underwrite of the core ser- had not unambiguously conferred they provide vices to their citizens. Edu- sought to vindi- cation, healthcare, safety, 1983, and public to cate under and dismissed the suit.2 few, concerns, typically Houston, name a while 653, state Sabree v. F.Supp.2d (E.D.Pa.2003). usually are funded in part by blush, federal dol- At first strings lars come with attached. Gonzaga University This appear sup- would new, case the question-not port raises but of conclusion. In Univer- impression first following sity, this Court ability Court foreclosed the of a Doe, 273, Gonzaga University enforce, v. 1983, student means of (2002)-of 153 L.Ed.2d 309 Family Educational (“FER- happens what when a allegedly Rights Privacy state fails Act of 1974 appears disagreement 1. among There to be a 1983 to obtain the "assistance” for whether, appeals our sister courts of as to they qualify. To resolve this issue we Medicaid, pursuant merely a state must not, not, remedy need and do address the provide financial assistance to obtain covered might plaintiffs, be available to but leave that services, the services themselves. to the District Court in the instance. first Bruggeman Blagojevich, See v. 324 F.3d (7th Cir.2003) ("[T]he statutory reference imposes liability anyone 2. Section 1983 appears to 'assistance' to have reference to who, law, deprives color of state under financial assistance rather than to actual person rights, privileges, "of or immuni- services, though medical the distinction was ties secured the Constitution and laws.” Bryson Shumway, missed in v. 308 F.3d Rights fеder- (1st Cir.2002) Chiles, 88-89 and Doe al statute are enforceable under (11th Cir.1998).”). 136 F.3d Thiboutot, 1, 4-8, us, however, Maine v. issue before is whether (1980). plaintiffs may Pennsylvania sue 65 L.Ed.2d 555 Cir.2002). required par- PA”).3 States are not Justice, but states that do writing ticipate program, The Chief funding comply Court, accept federal emphatically: “We for the stated regulations pro- Act reject permit that our cases the Medicaid and with the notion now *3 Secretary of Health and unambiguously mulgated by an con- anything short of (“HHS”). Participating action support a cause of Human right to Services ferred implement § a state brought under 1983.” states must devise added). approved that plan medical assistance of HHS. U.S.C. doubt, Court, high bar no has set 1396; § § 430.10. A state C.F.R. Nonetheless, having plaintiffs. for after comply to with its medical аssistance fails the relevant considered funding plan having the risk of runs backdrop of Gon against Medicaid Act Secretary. revoked U.S.C. University, we are convinced zaga § 1396c. conferred the Congress unambiguously to en plaintiffs here seek plaintiffs qualify no dispute There is reverse the Accordingly, force. we will Pennsylvania’s under services ICF/MR order of the District Court. plan. disputed medical Nor is it assistance waiting languished have on plaintiffs II. DISCUSSION years, to obtain these ser- lists unable Act, and the one now Security dispute, vices. The Title XIX of the Social us, plaintiffs may sue §§ 1396-1396v and before is whether codified at U.S.C. Act,” Pennsylvania under 1983 to enforce the the “Medicaid popularly known as (1) a require Title XIX that federal-state “cooperative established govern- provide state to medical assistance cover- program under which the federal services, and to do so funding ing to for the ment furnishes states ICF/MR promptness.” to “reasonable U.S.C. purpose providing medical assistance 1396a(a)(8),4 1396a(a)(10),5 ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‍§§ eligible persons.” low-income Pa. Pharm. (3d 1396d(a)(15).6 Houstoun, v. F.3d Ass’n 1396a(a)(10) language provides in relevant 3. The relevant FERPA mandated: Section part: plan "A State for medical assistance any under No funds shall be made available making applicable program provide ... ... for medical as- to educational available, policy agency [eligible] has a or or institution which ... indi- sistance ... to all practice permitting the of edu- 1396a(a)(10) (em- release viduals ....” 42 U.S.C. (or personally cation records identifiable added). phasis ...) of stu- information contained therein dents without the written consent of their 1396d(a)(15) provides 6. Section in relevant individual, agency, organ- parents or part: ization. purposes [42 For of this title 1232g(b)(l). 20 U.S.C. seq.] et ... term "medical assistance” [t]he 1396a(a)(8) provides relevant 4. Section payment part all of the cost of means part: following care and services for indi- plan A State for medical assistance must [eligible:] viduals ... who are ... services wishing that all individuals facility in an intermediate care for the men- application make for medical assistance un- tally retarded.... opportunity to do der the shall have 1396d(a)(15). 42 U.S.C. so, and that such assistance shall be fur- promptness to all nished with reasonable eligible .... individuals 1396a(a)(8) (emphasis sympathy That merit does not terminate funds the State.” Pennhurst notice, Halderman, gov- Hosp. our but neither does it State Sch. & escape 1, 28, Rather, reasoning. 67 L.Ed.2d ern our Uni- (1981). Nonetheless, as the Court observed versity provides dispassionate lens in Gonzaga University, in some instances through which this matter must be viewed. Congress has unambiguously First, conferred analysis A three-step required. rights that may be vindicated individual Gonzaga University we must examine brought suits 1983.7 determine the essential characteristics “unambiguously right.” Sec- In Gonzaga University, plaintiff ond, statutory we must assess whether the sought to imposed enforce conditions imparts of Title XIX an “unam- *4 the State of Washington by FERPA.8 Third, biguously right.” conferred we “Congress enacted FERPA under right determine-if individual has spending power to condition receipt of unambiguously been conferred-whеther federal funds on certain requirements re- Congress precluded has individual enforce- lating to the access and disclosure of stu- which, right. analysis, ment of that This dent educational records.” Gonzaga clear, assuredly as will become is not for 278, 122 S.Ct. 2268. timid, compels the conclusion that the Ultimately, rejected the Court viability plaintiffs-42 invoked U.S.C. claim because it concluded 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10), and that in FERPA Congress had not “intend- ” 1396d(a)(15)-unambiguously rights confer ed to create a right. Id. at federal § vindicable under 1983. in original); see J., id. at (Breyer, also S.Ct. 2268 Gonzaga University A. v. Doe and Un- (“The concurring) question, ultimate in re- ambiguously Rights— Conferred spect to private may whether individuals Step One bring statute, a lawsuit to enforce a federal through otherwise, § U.S.C. 1983 or explained As the Court more than twеn- ”) (em- question congressional a intent. ty years ago, legislation pur- “[i]n enacted phasis spending suant to the power, typical remedy noncompliance for state with fed- Accordingly, we must determine wheth- erally imposed conditions is not a Congress er rights intended to confer the noncomplianee cause action for but rath- by plaintiffs. claimed Gonzaga University er action the Federal congressional Government to instructs that intent is mani- given 7. We seeking take as a that when re- Id. at 122 S.Ct. 2268. While the creation § statutory dress under 1983 for a violation of statutorily specific remedies would make right, plaintiff a easier, need not establish that Con- Congress pro- our task has chosen to gress remedy intended to confer a in addition purpose remedy. vidе 1983 as an all Obvi- See, right. e.g., Gonzaga to that ously, require we cannot a clear statement ("Plaintiffs U.S. at suing mandating specification right rule of a under 1983 do not have the burden of text; statutory sue within the to do so would showing private remedy an intent to create a Instead, must, effectively repeal § we 1983. generally supplies remedy because Gonzaga as the Court demonstrates in Univer- rights for the vindication of secured federal sity, statutory examine the text to determine plaintiff statutes. Once a demonstrates that a unambiguously whether has con- right, right statute confers an individual right. ferred an individual 1983.”). presumptively §by enforceable provides remedy language, That 8. For the relevant FERPA see note for statuto- rily rights supra. "makes obvious sense.” Gonzaga University in the Court statutоry language unam While fest when Id. at biguously rights. confers such notion that cases “reject[ed] [its] what statu 122 S.Ct. 2268. To determine anything unambiguous- short of an permit tory necessary rights to confer language is support a cause of ly conferred to the unambiguously, we turn first cases 1983,” carefully under brought action statutory addressed which the Court disturbing, overruling, much less avoided then brought actions 1983. We Univ., 536 Wright and Wilder. means Gonza consider what Court Indeed, as the “rights- ga University requires when it demonstrate, analysis will ensuing Id. at creating language.” crafting relied on those cases Court University. Accordingly, we will by plaintiffs claimed assess the Statutory Rights Wilder, Suter, and Bless- light Wright, § 1983 by Gonzaga University. ing, as construed Pennhurst, only twice has the Since intent to recognized congressional Court (a) Wright Redevelopment v. Roanoke statutory rights vindieable via confer *5 Housing Authority & Wright Redevelop- v. Roanoke 1983: 418, Housing Authority, 479 U.S. ment & permitted §a Wright, In the Court 1983 766, (1987), 107 93 L.Ed.2d 781 ad- S.Ct. by past tenants to recover over- suit Act; Housing and Wil- dressing the Public charges rent-ceiling provision under a Ass’n, 496 Virginia Hospital der v. U.S. Housing explained the Public Act.9 As 2510, 110 S.Ct. 110 L.Ed.2d 455 University, three moti- Gonzaga factors (1990), addressing Title XIX of the Social Wright vated the Court to conclude “that Act. has foreclosed Security The Court ‘a provision unambiguously conferred significant equally 1983 suits two mandatory focusing the indi- [benefit] University): (in Gonzaga cases addition to ” family Gonzaga and its income.’ vidual M., 347, 112 v. Artist 503 U.S. S.Ct. Suter Univ., 122 2268 U.S. S.Ct. (1992), addressing 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 766). First, key to “[t]he [the Court’s] Freestone, 1980; Blessing Act v. inquiry Congress spoke was that terms L.Ed.2d ” Second, (1997), that ‘could not be clearer.’ Id. addressing Title TV-D the Security Act. “conferred entitlements ‘suffi- Social (2) family’s monthly Housing provided per centum of 9. The Public Act in relevant income; part: Dwelling chapter family receiving payments units assisted under this if the be rented to families who are public agency shall welfare assistance from a at the of their lower income families time payments, adjusted part a of such in accor- occupancy initial of such units. Reviews of housing family’s dance with the actual family made at least annu- income shall be costs, designated by specifically such ally. family pay a A shall as rent for dwell- costs, agency family's housing to meet the (other chapter ing unit assisted under this portion payments of such which is so family than a assisted under section designated. 1437f(o) title) highest of this of the (1982 Ill) Supp. 1437a ed. and amounts, following rounded to the nearest dollar: (1)30 monthly per family’s centum income; adjusted ciently qualify and definite to intent for private enforcement.” specific ’” Id. under Pennhurst. 280-81, enforceable 536 U.S. at Wilder, (quoting Wright, 766). 2510). Third, agency charged “the federal Housing the Public Act administering (c) Suter v. Artist M. by a provided procedure ‘had never which complain tenants could to it about the al Suter, In the Court foreclosed an action leged agencies] failures state welfare [of brought parents class of rent-ceiling provi Act’s [the abide and children sought provi who to enforce ” (quoting Wright, sion].’ U.S. at sions of Adoption Assistance and Child 766). 426, 107 S.Ct. Act, required Welfare that states a “plan” have to make “reasonable efforts”

(b) Virginia Hospital Ass’n Wilder keep children out of foster homes.11 According to Gonzaga University, the Su Wilder, In permitted the Court ter Court recognized that because the brought by providers action health care Adoption Act “conferred no specific, indi provision enforce a reimbursement vidually rights, enforceable there was no Act, Security XIX of the Social the same enforcement, ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‍basis for even to Gonza- According Title at issue here.10 class of the principal statute’s beneficia ga University, the Wilder Court was per- 281, 122 ries.” pro- suaded because the relevant Medicaid Suter, 2268 (citing (1) “explicitly visions: Writing for the Court monetary upon plaintiffs”; entitlements Suter, explained: the Chief Justice (2) “required pay ‘objective’ States to *6 monetary entitlement to individual health Careful examination of the ... care providers, with nо sufficient adminis- not unambiguously does confer an en- enforcing requirement trative means of the right upon forceable the Act’s benefieia- against comply”; States that failed to and ríes. The term “reasonable efforts” in (3) “Congress because left no plausibly doubt this context is at least as read ed„ 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 Security provid- 10. Title XIX of the Social Act 42 U.S.C. V) added). part: ed in relevant Supp. (emphasis plan A State for medical assistance Suter, In the Court considered provide payment ... hospital ... for ... of Adoption of the Assistance and Child Welfare services, services, nursing facility and ser- Act, provided part: in relevant facility vices in an intermediate care eligible pay- In order mentally provided plan for State to be retarded under the (dеtermined part, plan through ments under this it shall have a the use of rates approved by Secretary pro- which ... accordance with methods and standards de- ...) veloped by vides that the shall be in in all the State effect which the State State, and, funds, political subdivisions satisfactory and makes if assurances to them, by mandatory upon administered be Secretary, adequate are reasonable and them; that, case, provides in each [and] to meet the costs which must be incurred (A) prior by efficiently economically reasonable will be made operated and fa- efforts care, placement of a child in foster cilities in order to care and services prevent conformity applicable or eliminate the need fоr removal State and home, laws, (B) regulations, quality of the child from his and to make Federal and safety possible it for the child to to his standards and to assure that individ- return eligible uals for medical assistance have home.... 671(a)(3), (15) (1988 inpatient hospital reasonable access ... ed. and I) adequate quality. Supp. (emphasis services of emphasized: “To duty forced 1983. We impose only generalized a rather State, through redress to be enforced not seek on the individuals, the violation of a plaintiff must assert but right, merely not a violation of eliminat- federal reducing in the manner [of federal law. ” ing payments]. 536 U.S. S.Ct.

Suter, (quoted (quoting Blessing, by Gonzaga approvingly original)). 281, 122 S.Ct. Blessing garnered sup- unanimous That (d) Blessing v. Freestone easy it an port surprising: is not case. rejectеd the Blessing, In the Court plaintiffs never asserted individu- claim under 1983 of five mothers whose but, instead, rights attempted al to enforce eligible sup- were to receive child children Congress’s right to demand “substantial services from the State of Arizona port with the terms of a conditional compliance” pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Secu- money. To have allowed the ac- grant of rity Security Act.12Title IV-D Social proceed tion to would have transformed Act enumerated various entitlements.13 personal from a vehicle to vindicate rights under claiming Without into a tam rights qui mechanism. IV-D, Title asserted To evaluate whether had con “they had an enforceable individual enforceable individual in a ferred program to have the State’s achieve ‘sub- statutе, Blessing Court drew on compliance’ requirements with the stantial Suter, Wilder, Wright, and formulated IV-D,” required of the State (1) three-prong test: a statute must be Blessing, 520 Title IV-A.14 by Congress plain intended to benefit the (2) tiff, “vague amorphous,” be Gonzaga University, In the Court ex- impose unambiguous “binding obli plained logic of the unanimous Bless- Blessing, on the gation States.” ing holding: 1353. While in Gon did not zaga University the Court aban on “the provision

Because the focused test, this dispel don did aggregate provided by the services *7 State,” any rather than “the needs of confusion has led some [the] [that] to particular person,” interpret Blessing allowing it conferred no indi- courts rights plaintiffs vidual and thus could not be en- to enforce a statute under (1996) (as Security pro- 42 14.Title IV-A of the Social Act 651-69 amended by Responsibility Op- the Personal and Work part: vided in relevant 1996, portunity Reconciliation Act of Pub.L. program a State ... is found ... to If not 104-193, Act”)). ("PRWOR 110 Stat. 2105 complied substantially have with the re- See, following provision: quirements program], example, of and the Secre- [the tary program determines that is not spousal support State A for child complying substantially provide require- ... that the State ... with such must will made, relating finding services to the establish- at ments the time paternity respect ... ment of ... with to grant payable shall reduce the to eligible] each child ... [who is the State.... any support obligation enforce established 609(a)(8) (1996) (as 42 U.S.C. amended respect [eligible children].... with to Act) added). (emphasis the PRWOR 654(4)(A)-(B)(1996) (as amended Act) (emphasis the PRWOR

187 plaintiff 287, as the long falls with- 536 U.S. at 122 1983 so in zone of interest that the general clearly impаrt Such must an “in entitlement,” protect; to some- statute is intended dividual have an “unmis what is for a thing required less than takable focus on the benefitted class.” Id. di- rights 343, statute to create enforceable (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. 117 1353, rectly from the statute itself under an S.Ct. Cannon University of implied 677, 690-93, of 441 private Chicago, action. U.S. 99 S.Ct. (1979)). 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 Alexan 283, Cf. Sandoval, 275, 289, der v. U.S. “empha- 2268. The clarified and Court 1511, (2001) (“Stat L.Ed.2d 517 rights, that it size[d] violations of utes that focus on person regulated laws, give not rise ac- to protected rather than the individuals cre 283, (citing tions.” Id. at S.Ct. 2268 implication ate ‘no intent of an to confer 340, Blessing, 520 117 S.Ct. 1353 U.S. ”) rights particular persons’ class of original)). in Club, v. Sierra California Significantly, Blessing did Court 287, 294, U.S. 68 L.Ed.2d not, Title IV-D decide that does (1981)). fact, Rather, rights. confer individual The Chief Justice the implied invoked Court failed concluded had private right of action cases to demon- rights, rely- to specific assert instead type “rights-creating strate the terms” Ari- ing general requirement on the unambiguously rights. “substantially confer comply” zona Child Blessing, Welfare Plan. question whether “[T]he (‘We do not foreclose the private right intended create a provisions possibility that some of Title definitively [is] action answered give rights.... IV-D rise individual where negative” “a statute its terms [But,] apparent respon- all is not at grants private no identifi relief than sought any specific dents more class.” & Co. v. able Touche Ross Red ‘rights’ their being declaration that were ington, injunction forcing Ari- violated and an (1979). L.Ed.2d 82 For a statute agency zona’s support child to ‘substantial- such its text rights, create ly of the comply’ with all persons “phrased be terms IV-D.”). Consequently, the Court re- University benefitted.” Cannon v. for a manded the case determination of n. Chicago, whether IV-D Title (1979). 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 We gave rights. rise to individual recognized, example, have that Title 117 S.Ct. 1353. Rights VI of the Civil Act 196415and *8 IX of the Amendments Title Education Rights-Creating Language

2. rights of create be 197216 individual Congress phrased To confer use those “with rights, cause statutes are “rights-creating language.” Gonzaga an unmistakable the benefitted focus provides: provides: person person IX in.the Title VI "No Unit- 16. Title "No United shall, subjected subject- ed ... be on the ... be States shall to discrimina- States basis of sex any program activity receiving pro- tion under or ed to discrimination under education gram activity receiving Federal assistance” on of Federal financial financial the basis or race, color, 1681(a) (emphasis origin. § 20 or national assistance.” added). added). § 2000d

188 (em- rights, aggre while ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‍the individual Id., confers at

class.” of FERPA’s lan focus gate, programmatic phasis to the merely applicable law guage creates Univ., 536 U.S. at Gonzaga dispositive: is The distinction states. 1983; under laws rights are enforceable action, of rights implied private with As Univ., 536 U.S. at Gonzaga not. are § 1983 must be statutory claims under Blessing, 520 U.S. at (citing articulation unambiguous premised on 340, 117 S.Ct. by Congress.17 rights of and conferral structure of a stat- the text and “[W]here statutory lan clarity of the Despite the no indication ute went on bolster guage, the Court rights, new individual intends to create considering the structural ele analysis by suit, private a whether is no basis for there FERPA, emphasize which ments of implied right of or under an under foсus of the programmatic aggregate and 286, 122 2268. With action.” Id. to the indi Although references statute. mind, FERPA. the Court evaluated this of FER- throughout the text appear vidual First, the Court importantly, and most ... PA, the reference provision each “[i]n “individually focused” contrasted describing type of in the context of language of Title VI “rights-creating” triggers funding a practice’ or ‘policy (“no subjected to dis- IX shall be person (cid:127) Indeed, fact prohibition.” crimination”) general FERPA’s authorized the Secre Congress “expressly Ed- addressing the of to ‘deal with violations’ tary of Education (“no made available” ucation funds shall be re designate or [a] ‘establish agency or institution” “educational ” buttressed the Court’s as view board’ “policy prac- prohibited has a which en that FERPA did not cоnfer sessment tice.”).19 Univ., Gonzaga 289, 122 Id. at S.Ct. 2268 rights. forceable noted that 2268. The Court Final 1232g(f)-(g)).20 (citing 20 U.S.C. “FERPA’s nondisclosure highlighted statutory lan ly, the Court policy of institutional speak terms Blessing that in guage reminiscent of instances of practice, not individual finding a of individual against counseled 122 S.Ct. 2268. disclosure.” Id. (“Recipient institutions rights. See id. Ti- The contrast between funding so further avoid termination of can IX and that of FERPA is tles VI and substantially’.... they ‘comply long as mandatory, individual- specific, stark. This, too, Blessing, not unlike ly language of Titles VI IX focused n.16, supra. & implied private 18. See n.15 between 17.The distinction rights action and rights, 1232g(b)(l). rests not in the articulation action 19. 20 U.S.C. availability remedy. but in the ("[T]he Understandably, Court did not reach private right inquiry of action [in initial whether the remedial scheme the issue of 1983]-determining preclude a statutе whether FERPA was sufficient any right from at all-is no different n. confers suit. (“We inquiry implied of action the initial in an need not determine case, 'sufficiently express purpose procedures to deter- of which is are whether FERPA's *9 comprehensive’ independent a statute 'confers to offer an basis mine whether or not ") precluding private due to particular persons.' enforcement our on a class of for Club, private right finding to U.S. at 101 that FERPA creates no v. Sierra 451 California S.Ct. omitted). enforce.”) (citation 1775).

189 Indeed, hardly imagine anyone we can support failed to found that Title IV-D disputing that a state must provide re- the as- part because 1983 suit necessary sistance to obtain ser- with feder- compliance’ quired ‘substantial ICF/MR vices, and that it must do so with “reason- (сiting Blessing, 520 U.S. regulations.”) al promptness,” government able and the 335, 343, 137 however, inquiry, does not do so. Our L.Ed.2d does not there. Indisputably, end these Step B. Title Two law, binding XIX — create on those choosing accept states Medicaid fund- the Court’s treatment of Having traced ing. the same confer Whether we now statutory rights individuals, rights, an- enforceable and turn to the “text structure” question, question other and the we are XIX. upon called to answer. provi To determine whether these Statutory Text provide plaintiffs sions unambiguous familiar canon of begin “We with the ly rights, begin we with what starting the statutory construction “Blessing has come to be called the Test.” lan- interpreting a statute is the point Blessing, 520 guage of the statute itself.” Consumer above, plain 1353. As discussed the lan Safety Sylvania, v. GTE Product Comm’n guage clearly conveys that a the statute Inc., 102, 108, provide” plaintiffs state “must with “medi (1980). L.Ed.2d 766 assistance,” including cal ser ICF/MR vices, right promptness.” Plaintiffs to enforce the with “reasonable seek services, 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(15), §§ by virtue of U.S:C. acquire ICF/MR 1396a(a)(10)21 1396a(a)(8). difficulty, §§ and Without we con- U.S.C. 1396d(a)(15).22 provisions satisfy of the stat- The clude these (1) provide Blessing ... were requires that a state “must Test because: ute [eligible] medical assistance ... all intended beneficiaries 1396d(a)(15), individuals,” 1396a(a)(10), §§ intermediate and includes (2) 1396a(a)(8); rights sought to be care facilities the definition of “medical 1396a(a)(10) & them are and enumer- assistance.” U.S.C. enforced 1396d(a)(15). ated, “vague amorphous”; also seek to en- Plaintiffs obligation imposed on the states is acquire force the services ICF/MR unambiguous binding. promptness,” required with “reasonable 1396a(a)(8).23 lan- U.S.C. But, not end again, inquiry our does declares that a state guage statute because, explained Gonzaga there as is “must ... assistance with rea- University, Blessing may only Test eligible to all individu- promptness sonable plaintiffs “fall[ ] indicate that within 1396a(a)(8). als.” general zone of interest that the statute is something less than provisions, protect; In each of these the statuto- intended to to create ry language unambiguous. required is clear and what is statute text Section 23. For relevant text of Section 21. For relevant 1396a(a)(10), supra. 1396a(a)(8), supra. see note note see text of Section For relevant 1396d(a)(15), supra. see note *10 190 accept Medic- requiring In states directly from the stat

rights enforceable services funding аid Univ., ICF/MR Gonzaga 536 U.S. ute itself....” promptness, Congress with reasonable 283, that 2268. To ensure at S.Ct. entitlements on individu- unambiguously conferred the Congress ” not be clearer.’ als “in terms that ‘could asserted, must determine wheth we Univ., 280, 122 at S.Ct. U.S. “rights-creating terms.” er used 430, (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 284, 122 at 2268. S.Ct. 766). ambiguity. There is no S.Ct. identified the text of Titles The Court Where, here, plain meaning of the as rights- evident, exemplars and IX25 as of not look further to VI24 text is we need See, Univ., e.g., congressional intent. determine creating language. Gonzaga Cisneros, 137, 147, Darby v. U.S. 287, 122 Viewing Titles at S.Ct. 2268. (“Re- (1993) 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 S.Ct. IX, difficult, impos if not we find VI history ... un- legislative course to the matter, sible, distinguish linguistic plain meaning necessary light of the relevant Title XIX lan import text.”).26 statutory provide”-from guage-1^ State must language of Titles person the “No shall” Statutory 2. Structure IX, IX. in Titles VI and VI and Just as general statutory rule of сonstruc- “As in Title XIX are relevant terms used tion, are where the terms of statute precatory.” than “mandatory rather judicial complete.” unambiguous, inquiry is 341, 117 Blessing, 520 at Barrett, Fruit 494 U.S. Adams Co. Further, the “individual focus” of Sections 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 1396a(a)(8) 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(15), and (1990). rules, however, are sus- “General” 536 U.S. is unmistakable. exceptions, and we have ceptible before at 2268. The relevant Title one of those instances which our us XIX enumerate the entitle plain does not end with the lan- inquiry eligible individuals.” ments available to “all recognize, of guage of the statute. We 1396a(a)(8). See, e.g., course, “[statutory ‘is a that construction [entity] “the provisions do not focus on endeavor,’ and, minimum, at a holistic pro regulated rather than the individuals text, account for a full lan- statute’s Sandoval, Alexander v. 532 U.S. tected.” structure, guage punctuation, as well as at 1511. Neither do the subject matter.” United States Nat’l statutory ap references to the individual Am., Independent Agents Bank v. Ins. pear describing type “in the ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‍context of 439, 455, 508 U.S. practice’ triggers a fund ‘policy L.Ed.2d 402 United Sav- ing prohibition.” Gonzaga ings Ass’n Texas v. Timbers Inwood Associates, Ltd., 365, 371, 288, 122 Forest VI, proposition Title see note islative materials for the 24. For the relevant text supra. authorizes individual suits under XIX See, 104-651, 213-14, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 731-32, IX, (1996); H.R.Rep. No. 104- note 2019-20 25. For the relevant text of Title see 211, 270, 288, (1995); supra. H, (1981). H.R.Rep. vol. at 301 No. note, however, unambiguous, Because we find the statute We have cit- however, our history may we do not base decision legislative ed be construed to materials, pass judg- App. legislative or otherwise support reаding See our of the statute. inquiry. (citing congressional leg- their relevance to our various ment on Br. 20-21 *11 (1988)). In F.Supp.2d 98 L.Ed.2d 740 Undoubtedly, the Court was correct in regard. Gonzaga University, the Court instructs that not should the text of the statute opening The section of Title XIX-Sec- examined, be but also its structure. Gon tion 1396-is appropriations the and gener- zaga introductory al statement of the Medicaid good This instruction makes sense: Act.27As that explains, Section Title XIX presume we cannot to confer individual was enacted the purpose “[f]or of enabling rights-that is a for Congress. task As the each State furnish medical as- it, sistance.” 42 aptly put “may play Court we the sor U.S.C. 1396. This lan- guage says nothing of individual apprentice cerer’s but not the sorcerer entitle- rights, ments or but Sandoval, reminds us that we himself.” Alexander v. are dealing agreement with an between judicial 121 S.Ct. 1511. Our func state, particular and re- tion limited to recognizing those calls the axiom of Pennhurst: “In legisla- confers,” Congress “unambiguously which tion enacted pursuant to the spending doing and in so we if would be remiss we power, typical remedy for state non- Congress’s did not consider the whole of compliance with federally imposed condi- voice on the matter-the statute its en tions is not a private cause of action for tirety. noncompliance but rather action Turning sights beyond our the narrow Federal Government to terminate funds to by plaintiffs gives invoked us the State.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Indeed, Court, some pause. the District Hosp., 451 U.S. at 101 S.Ct. 1531. basing largely its decision on the structur- next, Turning Court, as did the District XIX, al elements of Title reached op- 1396(c) to Section does not help posite conclusion from that reach. we rights-creating search for language. Sa in large part grounded District Court bree, F.Supp.2d at 660. Section 1396c 1396c, analysis 1396 and empowers Secretary HHS sus concluded those do not pend payments if to a state it fails to rights-creating language contain the re- “comply substantially” require with the Sabree, quired by Gonzaga University. ments of Title XIX.28 This provides: 27. Section 1396 provides: 28. Section 1396c State, purpose enabling For the each Secretary, If the after reasonable notice and practicable far as under the conditions in opportunity hearing agency to the State State, (1) such to furnish medical assistance administering supervising or the adminis- dependent on behalf of families with сhil- plan approved tration of the State blind, aged, dren and of or disabled individ- title, (1) plan this that the finds has been so uals, whose income and resources are in- changed longer complies that it no with the necessary sufficient to meet the costs of 1902; (2) provisions of section or that in services, medical rehabilitation and plan the administration there is help other services to such families and comply substantially failure to capability individuals attain or retain provision; notify such shall selfcare, independence hereby there is agency payments such State that further appropriated authorized to be for each fis- (or, will not be made to the State in his year carry cal sum sufficient to out discretion, payments will be limited to purposes of this title. The sums made avail- categories parts under or of the State able under this section shall be used for failure), not affected making payments such until the Sec- to States have sub- mitted, retary approved by longer Secretary, and had satisfied that there will no plans comply. State for medical assistance. be such failure to Until he is 42 U.S.C. 1396. pay- so satisfied he shall make no further was in effect at the time of that Title XIX its terms Section 1396 only confirms *12 relationship Congress a between Wilder, creates in the Court allowed claims which recalls, state, particular a but it and XIX, proceed under Title and a similar well, “comply substantially” language the in effect when the Court provision was University. Blessing Gonzaga in and proceed Wright. in allowed claims 1353; at Blessing, 520 U.S. Gonzaga §§ & 1437. But U.S.C. Univ., 289, 122 Gonzaga Wilder; University did not overrule rath- course, Blessing Gonzaga in and 2268. Of er, explained “Congress it that left no University, language such counseled enforce- doubt of its intent against recognition unambiguous- of an ment.” 536 U.S. 280- ly right. Wilder, (quoting correctly But while the District Court 2510). 522-23, 110 S.Ct. Neither 1396 and 1396c do recognized Sections rather, Wright; it did the Court overrule explicit, rights- not contain the “sort of it as an instance in which Con- identified VI,” in Title it did creating language found gress “unambiguously conferred ‘a manda- rights-creat- not consider the existence of tory focusing on the individual [benefit] language provisions in other ing relevant ” family and its income.’ Sabree, F.Supp.2d of Title XIX. at 659. S.Ct. 2268 by in 42 used Wright, 479 U.S. at 1396d(a)(15), 1396a(a)(10), and U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8), however, creates explicitly significance We do not diminish the congres- rights. Admittedly, plumbing for “comply substantially” language in by lan- balancing specific sional intent Rather, recognize Section 1396c. we provisions of Title guage of few discrete plaintiffs Blessing sued under a against larger XIX elements structural provision requiring compli- “substantial of the statute is a difficult task. Nonethe- ance” a state. The Court held that the less, evident, us, that the at least to plaintiffs right aggre- had no such in the statutory language, countervailing despite gate, specifically but reserved decision on statute, unam- structural elements they might rights whether have individual biguously rights plaintiffs confers which statute, provisions under other and can enforce. remanded for a determination of that is- ap- We conclude that Section Blessing, 520 sue. propriations general introductory good 1353. This distinction makеs statement, rights- cannot neutralize the Congress provides remedy sense: 1396a(a)(10), creating language of Sections non-compliance for itself does nec- 1396a(a)(8). 1396d(a)(15), confi- Our essarily preclude coexisting a coherent and securely dence this conclusion rests right intent to create enforceable the fact that the Court has refrained from Significantly, individual beneficiaries. Wilder, overruling Wright up- unlike the in Blessing and Gon- held the exercise individual zaga, plaintiffs here have advanced (or, that contain in the statutes similar claims, discrete, Wilder, identical) rights-creating rooted case of to 42 XIX. (or payments ments to such State limit 42 U.S.C. 1396c shall categories parts under or of the State failure). not affected such Robinson, Congressional Step 992, 1009-11, C. Prеclusion — Three 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (concluding that because the Education of the Handi- unambigu- Even where a has been capped Act permitted aggrieved individu- conferred, may ously a state rebut carefully als to invoke tailored local admin- availability presumption procedures istrative followed federal by demonstrating Congress, either ex- review, judicial Congress could not have by providing comprehensive pressly intended individuals to bypass the enumer- *13 scheme, preclude remedial intended to in- procedure ated directly advance See, e.g., Blessing, dividual suits. 520 U.S. 1983). § court via (“Because petitioner claim provision does not of Title XIX provision Title contains no ex actions, § expressly IV-D curtails plicitly precluding individual actions. As a showing she must makе the difficult result, there is a substantial burden on a allowing go 1983 actions forward state seeking to establish that Congress these circumstances ‘would be inconsistent has provided comprehensive a remedial Congress’ carefully tailored scheme with which individual actions can ”) (quoting scheme.’ Golden State Transit not be reconciled. Title XIX does allow 103, 107, Corp. Angeles, v. Los 493 U.S. for state hearing.29 administrative This (1989)). 107 L.Ed.2d 420 is, however, only remedial component XIX, note, however, clearly falls short burden to “[t]he

We comprehensive enforcement Congress demonstrate that schemes seen expressly has in Sea plain Clammers Smith. remedy “[A] withdrawn is on the defen dant,” ability tiffs to invoke 1983 cannot be lightly and that a court should “not simply by availability defeated ‘the of ad Congress prе conclude that intended to ministrative mechanisms to protect clude rebanee on remedy” 1983 as for plaintiffs Blessing, interests.’” deprivation of an unambiguously conferred Golden right. Transit State Transit Corp., Golden State (citations Corp., 493 U.S. at S.Ct. See omit Wilder, ted). Indeed, also twice has the Court (“The availability found a state administra sufficiently remedial scheme com procedures ordinarily tive prehensive does not fore supplant 1983. See Mid 1983.”). close resort to County Sewerage Auth. dlesex v. Nat’l Sea Ass’n, 1, 13, 14, 20, 101 Clammers III. CONCLUSION (1981) (“Sea L.Ed.2d 435 Clammers”) (acknowledging the “unusual Plaintiffs have advanced claims ly provisions” statutory identify elaborate enforcement em rooted in text that them E.P.A., powering coupled as the recipients with several intended of medical assis- рrovisions allowing specific Pennsyl- instances of tance from the Commonwealth of Congress may enforcement the Federal Water vania. That choose to sanc- Act, Pollution concluding Pennsylvania comply Control tion for failure to preclude intended to individual with its plan own medical assistance does allowed); not explicitly necessarily preclude repercus- actions Smith v. not other 1396a(a)(3) provides 29. Section in relevant individual whose claim for medical assis- part: plan "A State for medical assistance tance under the is denied or is not acted granting opportunity upon promptness....” must ... with reasonable 1396a(a)(3). hearing agency fair before the State sions, against such as individual actions and un- Congress clearly

Commonwealth.

ambiguously conferred the of which allegedly deprived by have been

Pennsylvania, precluded and has not indi- rights.

vidual enforcement of those Ac-

cordingly, the order of the District Court reversed,

will be and this case will be proceedings

remanded for further accor- Opinion.

dance with this

ALITO, Judge, concurring. Circuit analysis

While the and decision of the may direction

District Court reflect *14 Supreme

that future cases in this Court ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‍take, currently binding precedent

area will

supports the decision of the I there- Court.

fore concur in the decision. Court’s America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, THOMAS,

Michael A. Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 03-4506. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Feb. 4,May

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Richman
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: May 11, 2004
Citation: 367 F.3d 180
Docket Number: 03-1226
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.