History
  • No items yet
midpage
Sable v. Sable
506 N.E.2d 495
Ind. Ct. App.
1987
Check Treatment

*1 Admittedly, in the landowners this hand, authorizes On the other procedure. comply in case did not with this the appeal "as the in judgments from final the record demonstrates confusion appeals taken Indeed mind this lawyer's the part attempt comply To and an in civil actions." on their TR imply filing of a reasonably the the a motion to correct errors was event awaiting correct errors and motion to necessary or in the event it was not. proceeding with ruling upon it before uncertainty We find that the and under in is the manner appeal, since existing as to the standable confusion in appealed civil judgments employed propriate procedure per in actions. fecting appeal from the court's order an would, reasoning To follow a suf overruling objections constitutes express with the direction extraordinary inconsistent ficiently circumstance filing transcript, infra, prompt for a its inherent discre this court should invoke legislative purpose contrary to the appeal. tionary power to entertain the Lu court in Z M that such by found & ex rel. Lee gar v. State proceed expedited in fash- should Ryan Costanzi v. Accordingly, we at 1019. ion. 456 N.E.2d reference to "final believe is denied. The motion dismiss was contained in the statute judgments" that such an to denote merely intended JJ., concur. HOFFMAN appealable and the refer- then order was taking appeal the manner of ence to provisions of to invoke the concerning jurisdiction

AP 4 (The Appeals. statute

Court "to the appeal be taken

specifies that appeals.")

supreme court or appropri- conclude that the

We therefore appeal from the way proceed an ate with SABLE, Billie Lee (and appointing overruling objections order Respondent-Appellant, is as follows: appraisers) (10) entry of (1) days after Within ten appraisers the appointing the order SABLE, Petitioner-Appellee. Jean the trial court an party shall file with No. 64A03-8607-CV-196. bond; acceptable appeal Indiana, Appeals of Court (30)days filing thirty after Within Third District. appeal the record of bond filed (transcript) shall be proceedings April22,1987. Supreme with the Clerk (unless an ex- Appeals

and Court of time is se-

tension of such court to which the

cured from the taken);

appeal is accompanied transcript should be specify- assignment of errors an

with upon. AP errors relied

ing the

7.2(A)(1)(b). to cor- A TR 59 motion inappropriate.

rect errors appellate pro- the rules of Thereafter interlocutory ap- applicable to

cedure concerning briefing dead-

peals apply

lines, etc.

husband's survival was a necessary condi- receipt tion to payments. of future Under versions of marriage dis solution act it seems clear the award could See, not be sustained. e.g., Sadler v. Sad ler Ind.App., His cox v. Hiscox 179 Ind.App. 378, 385 again amended the statutory definition of proper- ty, 31-1-11.5-2, provide: to

"(d) The term 'property' means all the assets of party either or parties, both including: A right to pen- withdraw benefits; sion or retirement right receive or re- tirement benefits that are not forfeited upon employment, termination of or that vested, as that term is defined in Section 411 U.S.C. Section [26 411] Code, Internal Revenue but that pay- able after the dissolution marriage; disposable receive re- tired or retainer pay, as defined in 10 1408(a), U.S.C. acquired during the mar- riage, may that is or payable after the dissolution marriage." Since the expressed no effec- date and contained no emergency clause, it upon became pro- effective mulgation of the Acts September

The wife commenced this action July hearing 1985. Final was had and the decree April 9, was entered 1986. Since dispute husband does not the court's power to enter the order made under the amendment, question is whether John Lyons, Lyons Truitt, M. Valpa- the court could properly apply that amend- raiso, for respondent-appellant. proceeding. The husband urges it could not. Eugene Ryding, Portage, C. petition- for er-appellee. One of the exceptions traditional general rule that operate

GARRARD, Presiding Judge. prospectively is that a remedial statute This is a marriage dissolution case in must be construed to effect the evident husband portion purpose for which it was enacted. Con the final awarding decree the wife half of necticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. Talbot Life received 14 N.E. 586. Accord by the husband. It is undisputed that ingly, remedial statutes will ret recom and then action her dismissed carry out their rospectively date of the effective after the menced it a vested to do so violates unless purpose amend done so the Had she amendment. guarantee. Malone though the clearly apply even 189 ment would v. Conner as be the same date remained separation 590; In re Smith A statute will fore. it is when regarded as remedial usually be *3 and was remedial is The amendment mis defect or to cure a plainly trial applied by the and considered statute. prior in a existed chief which court. Twp. Dreves, School Inc. v. Oslo W.H. is affirmed. judgment The 388, see 28 N.E.2d (1940), Ind. 217 11, pp. Section Am.Jur.2d Statutes 73 also

275-176. concurs. J. history of the defi Considering the files BUCHANAN, J., and dissents Act Dissolution in the property nition of opinion. separate courts,1 arewe by the interpretation and its 1985 conviction clear led to the dissenting. BUCHANAN, Judge, Ac legislation. remedial is amendment Every amend- respectfully dissent. I its bene was entitled cordingly, the wife Ret necessarily remedial. not atory act is deny some application would its fit unless recently amend of the application roactive right of the husband's. vested here, 81-1- Ind.Code involved ed statute course, statute, of The define changed to 11.5-2(d), which the husband rights between to the retire to include property operates only It employer. his former and The benefits, justifiable. is not may utilize.2 remedy the to the as legislature is violated.1 intent of parent the court to have right was Husband's of principles long accepted of the One just in a parties of the divide the a stat to consider is statutory construction considering the reasonable and may include history, which legislative ute's 831- 'IC in the statute. enumerated factors or after either before passed legislation 1-11.5-11.3 Fowler Wright v. enactment. statute's also It is App., 459 (1984),Ind. his right to have He had no vested considered legislature non-prop presumed as considered of the courts decisions history and not precisely, as erty, or more at matter of subject Al separation. prior to acquired v. Petroleum Stith enactment. of its not time controlling, it need be though it is not (1937), of disso Audit and Control nature Department ignored because of 400, 517. N.E.2d 5 might have the wife proceedings, lution declared, can be there been has often property, "As define original did not version 1. The remedies, they provided right in no vested require vested a the Act we construed but nugatory. changed rendered as to be not so Hiscox, supra. The 1980 asset. in an interest belongs the reme- whatever is that Hence it property to of a definition added Legisla- merely control dy within the pension or present to withdraw include ture, that an only limitation subject benefits, was inter the definition but retirement enforcing of mode adequate reasonable prior deci our reflective of preted as provided or be remain must Sadler, supra. sions. without sub- contract the value leaves impairment." depreciation or stantial recognized that law under 2. Decisions Department Commerce v. Glick of impact prospec- consider the court 74, 77; 16, 12, also see N.E.2d Ind.App. 387 determining pay in pensions 394, 392, (1979), Ind.App. 179 Speidel v. State "just manner" and reasonable was a what 180, 182. 386 See Goodwill dividing parties' assets. other Ind.App. 382 N.E.2d restraints issue of v. Goodwill 1. No here. is raised active laws history surrounding this Unless there strong compel- statute does suggest any not pur remedial ling reasons, statutes normally will pose for its recent amendment. Starting in given prospective application. While 1970s, the late our courts held that marital addressing merely procedural property, according to long-standing princi and remedial matters may applied ples law, of Indiana must consist of assets retroactively, such application is not re- parties have a vested quired.... application is [Rletroactive interest. See Hiscox v. Hiscox the exception, and such laws are normal- 385 N.E.2d trans. de ly prospectively absent nied; Savage Savage strong reasons. trans. denied. Gosnell v. Indiana Water Serv. Soft not only acquiesced in our (1987),Ind., (emphasis view marital property, it enacted this supplied). See also State ex rel. Mental positive view as law. 1980 Acts Pub.L. No. Health Comm'r v. Estate Lotts 180 1 (presently codified at § 31-1-11.5- *4 Ind.App. 347, 332 N.E.2d 234. I can 2(d)(1)). The legislature was therefore ascertain giving reason for aware its definition would exclude certain expanded new and kinds of definition of marital benefits from the defi nition application. of marital property. retroactive light of this statutory history, plain it seems to me that For these reasons I give would not legislature's broadening recent active effect to the statute and would re- definition of simply judgment. verse the change in policy, and is not an attempt to remedy an unwitting omission or defect in

the former statute. The Indiana Supreme recently

gone even further. Even if a statute is nature,

remedial in retroactive

will be denied unless there are "compelling

reasons" to do so:

Case Details

Case Name: Sable v. Sable
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Apr 22, 1987
Citation: 506 N.E.2d 495
Docket Number: 64A03-8607-CV-196
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.