82 Neb. 106 | Neb. | 1908
Margaret L. Sabin, the plaintiff, brought this action in the district court against Joseph J. Cameron, the defendant, to recover the sum of $224.90. For her cause of action she alleged that in October, 1904, she entered into a contract, chiefly in writing, with the defendant, whereby he was to furnish all the material, and build and con
We will first consider the errors alleged that relate to the claim of- the plaintiff. It developed during the trial that plaintiff had not paid the entire amount of the alleged lien, but had paid only $20 thereon previous to the commencement of the action. The court, by instructions, limited the amount that plaintiff was entitled to recover to this sum, with interest. The defendant complains because the verdict and judgment are not supported by sufficient evidence. There is no evidence in the record to show that defendant 'ever promised plaintiff that he would reimburse her if she' would pay the alleged lien, and there is no evidence as to when any of the material or .labor, for which the lien was claimed, was furnished or performed, save that furnished by the record of the alleged mechanic’s lien. This court has held that the verified accoufit of the items, with proof of the amount of the claim, is not sufficient to support a decree of foreclosure upon a mechanic’s lien. Urlau v. Ruhe, 63 Neb. 883. This court has also held that the verified account of a mechanic’s lien proves nothing except the filing thereof and the making of the oath thereto. Wakefield v. Latey, 39 Neb. 285. It is evident that the record of the lien could prove no more than the verified account itself. There was, therefore, no competent evidence to show that the material was furnished within the time, or that it went into the premises described, so as to entitle the claimant to a lien. There is no evidence from which it can be said that a valid lien existed against the
The defendant complains of several instructions given by the court, which, in effect, submitted to the jury the question as to whether or not the extras were furnished gratuitously. It appears clear from an examination of the pleadings that the question of whether or not the extras were furnished gratuitously was not an issue.. Plaintiff, by her reply, denied that any extras were fur.nislied, or that any material or labor was furnished, other than those contemplated by the contract. An inspection of the contract discloses that most of the extras furnished, for which claim was made by the defendant, were not mentioned or referred to in the contract. The evidence also disclosed that the improvements made outside of the contract were substantial and of considerable value, and there is no competent evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that there was any intention to furnish the same gratuitously, except that it was claimed by the plaintiff that defendant had not, previous to the bringing of the action, made any demand against her for or on account of the extras. This, however, is denied by the defendant. We do not think the fact alone, even if it be true, as contended by the plaintiff, that he made no previous demand,'would be sufficient to justify a finding that the alleged extras were furnished gratuitously. Besides, the question of whether or not they were furnished gratuitously Avas not made an issue by the pleadings. It is evident that the trial court, by these instructions, submitted to the jury for its determination an issue not Avarrantcd by the pleadings or the evidence. The. rule is _
It follows that the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
By the Court: For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.