Sabbatino v. Rosin & Sons Hardware & Paint, Inc.Sabbatino v. Rosin & Sons Hardware & Paint, Inc.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.), dated November 29, 1996, which granted the defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied their cross motion for leave to amend the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
As a first cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged that Rosin was negligent insofar as it sold an inherently dangerous and defective product, labeled for professional use only, to a nonprofessional. The plaintiffs’ second through fifth causes of action alleged claims sounding in negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and strict products liability as against Utility, while the sixth through ninth causes of action raised similar claims as against A&P. A tenth cause of action asserted a derivative claim for loss of consortium by the plaintiff Carmela Sabbatino. The causes of action asserted against Utility and A&P also rely, in part, upon a failure to warn theory.
A&P and Utility jointly moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. They argued, inter alia, that as a sulfuric-acid-based drain cleaner, Hot Shot was a hazardous substance within the meaning of the Federal Hazardous Substance Act (15 USC § 1261 et seq.) (hereinafter FHSA), and that its labeling is strictly regulated thereby, and by the pertinent regulations of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (see, 16 CFR 1500 et seq.). As such, those defendants contended, the schemework of Federal regulation preempted the plaintiffs’ causes of action against Utility and A&P. The defendant Rosin also sought summary judgment on the basis of preemption.
In opposition, the plaintiffs argued that their claims were not preempted by Federal law, and further contended that the
The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint in its entirety as against all of the defendants. The court found that all of the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by Federal law insofar as they were “premised upon the adequacy of the warning labels and whether the warning labels comply with the requirements of the FHSA”. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ common-law negligence and product liability causes of action as well as the negligence cause of action against Rosin, because the plaintiffs failed to “substantiate” their claims of a breach of a duty by Rosin, or of design or manufacturing defects as against Utility and A&P.
The Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs’ causes of action predicated upon a theory of failure to warn are preempted by the FHSA. That Federal statute, and its correlative regulations, create labeling requirements which preempt any claim that the warning label on the bottle of Hot Shot purchased by the injured plaintiff was inadequate (see, Wallace v Parks Corp.,
The plaintiffs’ causes of action, however, are not solely predicated upon a failure to warn theory. Indeed, the plaintiffs also asserted independent causes of action predicated upon theories of negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and strict products liability. These causes of action are not preempted by the FHSA (Wallace v Parks Corp., supra, at 137-138). In addition, the plaintiffs’ causes of action predicated upon allegations that the Hot Shot package was defectively designed are also not subject to preemption (Wallace v Parks Corp., supra), nor are they precluded from alleging that the label itself failed to comply with pertinent Federally-mandated requirements. “Such a claim is valid, ‘so long as a plaintiff charges a manufacturer with violations of FHSA-mandated labeling requirements and does not seek more stringent labeling requirements’ ” (Wallace v Parks Corp., supra, at 140-141, quoting Moss v Parks Corp., 985 F2d 736, 740-741, cert denied
The defendant Rosin is also entitled to summary judgment. The plaintiffs seek to hold Rosin liable on a theory that it was negligent in selling a product marked “for professional use only” to a nonprofessional. However, Anthony Sabbatino claims to have read all of the pertinent warnings on the label and he was in the best position to know that he was not a professional plumber; he cannot fault Rosin for failing to protect him from himself. Moreover, having received this warning on the package the plaintiff may not fault Rosin for failing to repeat this very warning or ascertaining his status as other than a professional plumber. As against Rosin, we find that no duty was breached nor did the mere sale of the properly labeled product constitute a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries (see, Eiseman v State of New York,
We have reviewed the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Florio, JJ., concur.