79 S.E. 869 | N.C. | 1913
CLARK, C. J., dissenting. This was indictment for capital offense of burglary. There was evidence on the part of the State tending to support the charge as made. Evidencecontra on part of defendant. The court, among other things, charged the jury that on the bill of indictment and testimony they could render either of three verdicts:
1. Guilty of burglary in the first degree.
2. Guilty of breaking and entering the dwelling-house of another otherwise than by burglarious breaking. Revisal, sec. 3333.
3. Not guilty.
The jury rendered the following verdict:
"We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of housebreaking, with no intent to commit a felony. The jury especially asks the mercy of the court."
On the verdict there was motion to discharge prisoner as on (453) verdict of acquittal. Motion overruled, and defendant excepted. His Honor being of opinion that the verdict as rendered amounted to a conviction of the second offense under section 3333, Revisal, sentenced the prisoner to twelve months on the public roads, and defendant excepted and appealed. After stating the case: Section 3333 of the Revisal is in the following words: "If any person shall break or enter a dwelling-house of another otherwise than by a burglarious breaking; or shall break and enter a storehouse, shop, warehouse, banking house, counting *363 house, or other building, where any merchandise, chattel, money, valuable security, or other personal property shall be; or shall break and enter any uninhabited house, with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein; every such person shall be guilty of a felony, and imprisoned in the State's Prison or county jail not less than four months, nor more than ten years."
So far as the form is concerned, it has been held that under an indictment charging the capital crime of burglary, a conviction may be had of the offense constituted and described in this section of the Revisal, and the question presented by this appeal is on the proper significance of the verdict rendered by the jury. This same law is in The Code of 1883, sec. 996, except that in the clause in section 996, "or shall break and enter any uninhabited house with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein," there is a semicolon between the words "uninhabited house" and the words "with intent to commit a felony," instead of a comma, the divisional pause in the present law. Construing the law as it appeared in section 996 of The Code, the Court has expressly held that the "intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime" was an essential ingredient of the offense (S. v. Christmas,
Again, the first portion of this section is in the disjunctive, "If any one shall break or enter the dwelling-house of another," the design evidently being to afford greater protection to the dwelling, and to hold such an entry a crime in itself, detached from the felonious intent *364 in the later clause of the law, would make it a criminal offense to enter the dwelling of another for the most innocent purpose, even to make a social call. It is clear, therefore, that the present statute should receive the same construction as the former; that the crime is only committed when the houses designated are entered or broken into "with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein"; and the verdict of the jury having negatived this, an essential feature of the crime, amounts to a verdict of not guilty.
It was not controverted on the argument for the State that this was the proper construction of the statute, but it was insisted that the verdict of the jury was irresponsive and insensate, and this being true, that the prisoner should be held for further trial on the present bill.
In Clark's Criminal Procedure, p. 486, it is said: "A verdict (455) is not bad for informality or clerical errors in the language of it, if it is such that it can be clearly seen what is intended. It is to have a reasonable intendment, and it is to receive a reasonable construction, and must not be avoided except from necessity."
As far back as
In the present case, the jury having expressly negatived the existence of any criminal intent on the part of the prisoner, and this, as we have seen, being an essential constituent of the offense charged, it must be held as the correct deduction from these decisions that the verdict is on of acquittal, and the motion of the prisoner for his discharge should have been allowed.
We have been referred to S. v. Hooker,
Reversed.