Opinion by
¶ 1 Laura Sparks Sweetin, the natural mother of S.S., an adjudicated deprived child, appeals from an order terminating her parental rights following a non-jury trial. Mother argues she is entitled to a new trial because she was deprived of her right to be represented by counsel and of her right to a jury trial. Because Mother was deprived of her fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel when her parental rights were terminated, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the trial, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶ 2 In May 2000, DHS took the minor child S.S. into protective custody when they discovered she had a spiral fracture of her right tibula. Mother stipulated that S.S. was a deрrived child on May 24, 2000. S.S.’s father was later convicted of the abuse and relinquished his parental rights. Mother initially requested and received court-appointed counsel on May 11, 2000. It appears this attorney withdrew, however, and Letitia Kinsey was appointed as Mother’s counsel on December 19, 2000. Ms. Kinsey represented Mother for the remainder оf these proceedings and also represents Mother on appeal.
¶ 3 On November 28, 2001, the State filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her failure to correct the conditions
¶ 4 On October 25, 2002, five days before trial, Mother’s counsel filed a “Motion to Advise Courts of Potential Conflict.” The case style and number were for a criminal case in Murray County and рresumably it was filed there. It was also filed in the instant case. In that pleading Counsel stated she had a criminal jury trial set on October 29 in Murray County that was “set first in time”. The pleading asked both courts to communicate directly and permit a continuance of the non-priority case. It stated that if she (Mother’s attorney) “does not have notice otherwise,” she intended to appear at the criminal trial in Murray County instead of this trial.
¶5 Mother’s counsel makes several allegations in her brief that the State promised a continuance would be granted and that she had tried to contact the judge in this case on several occasions prior to trial. However, these allegations are not suрported by any citation to the record or even an attorney’s affidavit and cannot be considered as evidence on appeal. See Matter of Rich,
¶ 6 Mother’s counsel never requestеd a hearing on her motion, and this matter was not argued until October 30th, the day of the trial. Both the State and the eourt-appoint-ed counsel for the minor child objected to another continuance. Mother’s counsel chose to appear at the Murray County criminal trial, but sent another attorney from her office on the morning of trial in thе instant case for the sole purpose of requesting a continuance. Mother’s substitute counsel advised the court that she was not familiar with the case, and that if the court did not grant the continuance, Mother would have to proceed with trial pro se. The trial court nonetheless denied the request for a continuance and stated the trial would bеgin that afternoon at 1:30 p.m. After opening statements and the testimony of four of the State’s seven witnesses, a second substitute counsel from Ms. Kinsey’s office arrived to represent Mother. This attorney was completely unfamiliar with the case and was only given a short time to determine what had transpired thus far at trial and speak with Mother before the trial continued.
¶ 7 Mother argues on appeal that she was denied due process when the trial court refused to continue the trial, forcing her to proceed pro se for approximately half of the trial, and then with an unprepared substitute counsel for the remainder оf the trial. Mother’s counsel, the same court-appointed attorney who failed to attend the trial, does not raise on appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, if a fundamental constitutional right is violated, it is the duty of this Court to raise the issue sua sponte. In re Adoption ofF.R.F.,
¶ 8 A proceeding to terminate parental rights threatens to end the parent-child relationship, which is a fundamental right protected by the due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2, § 7. In re D.D.F.,
The deprivation of these rights is a serious matter, and failure to provide counsel may result in a deprivation of due process.... [S]uch proceedings shall not be held without the parents having an opportunity to be represented by counsel.
In re D.D.F., ¶¶ 13-14,
¶ 9 Due to the fundamental rights involved, a child deprivation prоceeding “requires that the full panoply of procedural safeguards must be applied ... including] the right to counsel.” In re Chad S., ¶ 12,
While a dependency proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, it is substantially similar. The state is the initiating party, the proceeding is formаl, and the potential loss is quite substantial. Since the state is threatening the deprivation of a fundamental interest, it must provide counsel to indigent parents unless it can demonstrate a compelling state interest in not providing counsel.
Id. at ¶ 13,
¶ 10 The fundamental right to counsel at a termination proceeding includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, because the right would be meaningless if counsel were not required to represent the parent “in a matter consistent with an objective standard of reasonableness.” In re D.D.F., ¶ 15,
¶ 11 Tо prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a parent must show both that the attorney’s performance was deficient, and that it prejudiced the defense. In re R.S., ¶ 16,
¶ 12 However, the “ ‘actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.”’ Young v. State, 1994 OK CR
¶ 13 Here, it is undisputed that Mother did not have any counsel during at least half of the State’s case-in-chief. She was forced to proceed pro se for opening statements and during the State’s examination of four of its seven witnesses. Mother did not present an opening statement and was not able to effectively cross-examine any of these first four witnesses. Because Mother was deprived of her court-appointed counsel during a crucial portion of this trial, we will presume prejudice pursuant to Young v. State and find that Mother was denied her fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 14 We do not agree with the State that representation by substitute counsel during the last half of the trial was sufficient to satisfy Mother’s due process right to assistance of counsel. Mother was entitled to rеpresentation during the entire trial. Allowing less would make the right to counsel meaningless. Further, it is undisputed that the substitute counsel was completely unfamiliar with the case before she arrived and was only allowed a few minutes to prepare during a recess in the middle of trial. See Powell v. Alabama,
¶ 15 The State argues, however, that the court correctly refused to grant the continuance because Mother’s attorney did not properly request the continuance and did not have a true conflict that would prevent her from appearing at this trial. Although Mother’s counsel never requested a hearing, she contends that filing the “Motion to Advise Courts of Potential Conflict” satisfied her obligation to notify the courts of the conflict and that the two judges were then required to communicate and grant a continuance in one of the cases.
¶ 16 We need not determine whether or not Mother’s counsel had an unresolvable conflict with the criminal trial, and whether she complied with the Guidelines for Resolving Scheduling Conflicts in Oklahoma Courts,
¶ 17 It is well-established that trial courts have the discretion to rule on motions for continuances, and this ruling will only bе reversed for an abuse of that discretion. Kinnear v. Dennis,
Absence of counsel is not made one of the statutory grounds for a continuance. If, however, the trial court’s action in overruling an application on this ground resulted in depriving the defendant of the benefit of counsel, or even if it appeared from the reсord that the defendant had a substantial defense to the charge which he was unable to present by reason of the absence of counsel, this court would unhesitatingly set aside a conviction for failure to grant a reasonable continuance.
(emphasis added). The trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a continuance, hоwever, when the defendant was represented by competent co-counsel during the trial. McCormick v. State,
¶ 18 In a civil trial, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance where the defendant’s only counsel became ill in the middle of trial, and a law clerk, who was unfamiliar with the case, was required to finish the trial. Kinnear v. Dennis,
¶ 19 We recognize that the State had an interest in proceeding with trial to obtain permanency for the minor child, who had been in foster care for an extended period. See 10 O.S.2001 § 7001-1.2(B). However, this trial had already been continued several times, at least once at the request of both parties. We do not agree that this presented a sufficiently compelling interest to proceed with the trial on that particular day in violation of Mother’s fundamental right to counsel. Similarly, the trial court’s interest in controlling its docket and the attorneys who appear before it did not justify depriving Mother of her right to counsel. The court has other methods at its disposal for controlling attorneys who do not follow the court’s rules or procedures and who fail to appear for trial leaving their clients to fend for themselves.
¶ 20 As stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court: “We find that parental rights are too precious to be terminated without the full panoply of protections afforded by the Oklahoma Constitution. We know that the best interest and welfare of the child is the primary consideration, but we also know that this goal is best achieved by full compliance with the law.” A.E. v. State,
¶ 21 Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on this ground it is unnecessary to consider Mother’s second proposition of error regarding her right to a jury trial.
¶ 22 REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. It was specifically alleged that Mother had failed to comply with the court-ordered treatment plan in that she failed to follow recommendations indicated by her substancе abuse assessment, failed to complete anger management classes, domestic violence counseling, parenting classes and had failed to provide an appropriate home for S.S.
. This Court has not considered any material submitted by the parties in their Appendixes that were not contained in the certified record. See Oídа. Sup.Ct. R. l.ll(i)(l). It is possible that another continuance was granted in the interim, but the certified record is not clear on this point.
. The "Motion to Advise Courts of Potential Conflict” was apparently an attempt by counsel to comply with Guidelines for Resolving Scheduling Conflicts in Oklahoma Courts,
.The record does not indicate how much time the court allowed the substitute counsel to prepare. Mother’s brief states "approximately seven minutes." However, the court allowed her from the time of the recess until 2:45 p.m. Because the trial was scheduled to begin at 1:30 p.m., and the State had already presented four witnesses prior to the recess, substitute counsel could not have had much time to prepare.
. See footnote 3, supra.
. See footnote 3, supra.