South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Allyssa N. Boulware, John A. Stafford, and Jonathan Boulware, Respondents, and Darryl Armstrong and Ruth Ann Armstrong and Edward Dalsing and Tammy Dalsing, Intervenors, Of whom Edward Dalsing and Tammy Dalsing are Petitioners, and Darryl Armstrong and Ruth Ann Armstrong are Respondents. In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001625
In The Supreme Court THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Heard May 2, 2017 - Filed January 3, 2018
Opinion No. 27759
Appeal from Union County Coreen B. Khoury, Family Court Judge
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Larry Dale Dove, of Dove Law Group, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Petitioners.
Ernest M. Spong III, of Winnsboro, Alexandria Marie Wolf, of Callie A. Charles, LLC, of Spartanburg, Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of Union, and David E. Simpson, of Rock Hill, and Shawn L. Reeves, of Columbia, all for Respondents.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 27, 2013,1 law enforcement took the minor child (Child) into emergency protective custody after discovering an active methamphetamine lab outside the home where Child resided with Allyssa and Jonathan Boulware. Child was sunburned, had several insect bites, suffered from severe diaper rash, and tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. DSS placed Child in foster care with Petitioners on the same day and then commenced an abuse and neglect removal action. Child‘s biological parents are Allyssa Boulware and John Stafford (Parents), and Child‘s legal father by marriage is Jonathan Boulware.
After a hearing on October 9, 2013, the family court issued an order finding a permanent plan of reunification with Parents was in the best interest of Child and adopting a treatment plan requiring Parents to attend parenting classes and substance abuse counseling. In February 2014, the family court held the initial permanency planning hearing and discovered Parents were not attending substance abuse counseling, were not supporting Child, and had been arrested for possession of methamphetamine. The family court approved DSS‘s recommendation of a permanent plan of termination of parental rights (TPR) and adoption, with a concurrent plan of reunification with Parents. In the meantime, the Foster Care Review Board issued its report recommending TPR and adoption within six months.
The instant controversy began when DSS and Parents reached an agreement for Child to be placed with relatives Darryl and Ruth Ann Armstrong (Aunt and Uncle) in order to give Parents more time to work on the treatment plan. The proposed placement with Aunt and Uncle was not an adoptive placement. DSS intended to close its case after Parents completed the treatment plan. On May 31, 2014, DSS notified Petitioners of its intent to remove Child from their home and
In September 2014, the family court granted Petitioners’ motion to intervene and granted their request for a full evidentiary hearing on DSS‘s motion to change the permanent plan to a plan of relative placement with Aunt and Uncle. Aunt and Uncle were added as parties to DSS‘s action. At a January 2015 permanency planning hearing, DSS changed its treatment plan recommendation to TPR and adoption. The family court approved that plan and scheduled a TPR hearing for March 2015. The family court also ordered Petitioners and Aunt and Uncle to be named parties in the DSS TPR action.
After the March 2015 hearing, the family court terminated the parental rights of Parents. The family court also dismissed Petitioners’ adoption action on the basis Petitioners did not have standing to pursue a private action for adoption of a child in DSS custody, citing Michael P. v. Greenville County Department of Social Services, 385 S.C. 407, 684 S.E.2d 211 (Ct. App. 2009), and Youngblood v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, 402 S.C. 311, 741 S.E.2d 515 (2013). Relying upon Youngblood, the family court concluded “the entire legislative scheme should be allowed to work without interference from foster parents who are there to take care of the child, not to generate an adoption for themselves.” The court noted Petitioners and Aunt and Uncle could present their case for adoption to the DSS adoption committee but ruled none had
[T]he terminology in
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-60 (B) , when read in context with the full law regarding child protective services actions, requires that the South Carolina Department of Social Services approve the placement of a child, over whom they have custody, for adoption by that particular family before that family will have standing to proceed to adopt the child.
The family court granted custody of Child to DSS “with all rights of guardianship, placement, care and supervision, including the sole authority to consent to any adoption....” This appeal followed.
The court of appeals affirmed the family court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. S.C. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware, Op. No. 2016-UP-220 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 19, 2016). Relying on Youngblood, the court of appeals held “foster parents do not have standing under section 63-9-60 to file an adoption petition, regardless of whether they are former or current foster parents or whether DSS has made an adoption placement decision.” Id. The court stated its decision was consistent “with the overall policy of the Children‘s Code” and concluded the General Assembly did not intend “to grant standing to foster parents who file adoption actions early in the process while foreclosing standing to foster parents who wait until after DSS has made an adoption placement decision.” Id. We granted Petitioners a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In appeals from the family court, this Court reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). Questions of statutory interpretation are “questions of law, which are subject to de novo review and which we are free to decide without any deference to the court below.” State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547, 552, 732 S.E.2d 861, 863 (2012).
A. Statutory Construction
“Standing refers to a party‘s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Michael P., 385 S.C. at 415, 684 S.E.2d at 215. Prior to commencing an action, a party must possess standing either “by statute, through the principles of constitutional standing, or through the public importance exception.” Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 317, 741 S.E.2d at 518. Statutory standing exists “when a statute confers a right to sue on a party, and determining whether a statute confers standing is an exercise in statutory interpretation.”4 Id.
Adoption proceedings are conducted pursuant to the South Carolina Adoption Act. See
(A)(1) Any South Carolina resident may petition the court to adopt a child.
. . . .
(B) This section does not apply to a child placed by the State Department of Social Services or any agency under contract with the department for purposes of placing that child for adoption.
“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); Michael P., 385 S.C. at 414, 684 S.E.2d at 215. “What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature.” Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)). Appellate courts must follow a statute‘s plain and unambiguous language, and when the language is clear, “the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.” Id. This Court looks beyond a statute‘s plain language only when applying the words literally would lead to a result so patently absurd that the General Assembly could not have intended it. Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 192, 712 S.E.2d 416, 425 (2011).
B. Youngblood and Michael P.
In Youngblood, we addressed the issue of whether foster parents can petition to adopt a child after DSS has placed the child elsewhere for adoption. We concluded the verb “place” is used in section 63-9-60(B) and by DSS to mean “the selection of an adoptive family,” even when the child was not yet physically placed in the adoptive home. Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 314 n.2, 741 S.E.2d at 516 n.2.
Before reviewing Youngblood, we must first briefly review the court of appeals’ holding in Michael P. In Michael P., DSS removed a child from his mother and placed the child in foster care. 385 S.C. at 410, 684 S.E.2d at 212. When DSS asked the foster parents if they wanted to adopt the child, the foster parents declined. Id. DSS then placed the child with another family for adoption. Id. The former foster parents did not approve of the proposed adoptive family and petitioned to adopt the child, asserting they had standing to petition for adoption pursuant to section 63-9-60. Id. at 410-12, 684 S.E.2d at 212-13. The court of appeals disagreed:
We find the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of the Legislature when enacting subsection (B) of 63-9-60 was to clarify that not just “any South Carolina resident” can petition to adopt a child when the child has been placed by DSS in another home for the purposes of adoption. [The
former foster parents] do not have standing based on this statute because [the child] was placed by DSS in [another] home for purposes of adoption.
Id. at 415, 684 S.E.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
In Youngblood, DSS removed a child from her biological parents and placed her with foster parents. 402 S.C. at 313, 741 S.E.2d at 516. DSS then removed the child from the foster parents’ home and placed the child for adoption with a different family. Id. at 314, 741 S.E.2d at 516. The former foster parents then petitioned to adopt the child, claiming they had standing under section 63-9-60. Id. We disagreed, noting, “Thus, while section 63-9-60(A) broadly grants standing to ‘any South Carolina resident,’ section 63-9-60(B) makes that grant of standing inapplicable to a child placed for adoption by DSS.” Id. at 318, 741 S.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added) (citing Michael P., 385 S.C. at 415, 684 S.E.2d at 215).
In the instant case, DSS contends our holding in Youngblood compels the conclusion that the foster parent relationship is temporary and is insufficient to create standing to petition to adopt. We indeed so held in Youngblood, but did so only when addressing the narrow question of whether the foster parent relationship in and of itself creates standing to petition to adopt. 402 S.C. at 322, 741 S.E.2d at 520. The foster parent relationship itself does not create standing for Petitioners, but that reality does not foreclose allowing standing under section 63-9-60 when the “broad grant” of standing has not been closed by the placement of a child elsewhere for adoption.
Here, the court of appeals concluded our holding in Youngblood should not be limited to situations in which former foster parents petition for adoption after DSS has placed the child elsewhere for adoption. The court of appeals found the General Assembly did not intend to grant standing to foster parents who petition for adoption early in the process but at the same time foreclose standing to foster parents who wait until after DSS has made an adoption placement decision. The court of appeals held foster parents do not have standing to petition for adoption under section 63-9-
60, regardless of whether they are former or current foster parents or whether DSS has made an adoption placement decision.
C. Respondents’ Claim of Absurd Result
We note the settled rule that courts may disregard the plain meaning of a statute if the result is so patently absurd the General Assembly could not have intended it. Cabiness, 393 S.C. at 192, 712 S.E.2d at 425. The court of appeals found that granting standing to Petitioners would yield the absurd result of encouraging foster parents to prematurely petition for adoption, thereby contradicting the underlying policy of the Children‘s Code.6 Respondents argue that granting standing to Petitioners would subvert the policy behind the South Carolina Adoption Act to provide permanency for children after a determination there will be no reunification with the biological parents.
We disagree with both contentions. First, section 63-1-20(A) of the Children‘s Code (2010) provides, “A children‘s policy is hereby established for this State.”
rights should be terminated. As reunification has been ruled out by the family court, the South Carolina Adoption Act clearly mandates adoption as the preferred permanent setting for Child. Instead, DSS seeks nonadoptive relative placement with Aunt and Uncle, which can hardly be considered the path to a permanent setting for Child and is contrary to the clear mandate of section 63-1-20(D).
Likewise, a review of section 63-11-720(A) of the Children‘s Code (Supp. 2017) defeats the contention that a finding of standing is an absurd result. This code section sets forth the functions and powers of local foster care review boards.
While section 63-11-720(A)(5) does not create standing for Petitioners, it does reveal the General Assembly‘s intent that Petitioners could initiate TPR and adoption proceedings in the family court once the local foster care review board determined it would not be in Child‘s best interest to be returned to Parents. Here, on January 21, 2014, the local board recommended a plan of TPR and adoption after Child had been in Petitioners’ care for almost six months. As the General Assembly contemplated, Petitioners petitioned the family court for TPR and adoption.
D. Contract Signed by DSS and Petitioners
When Child was placed in foster care with Petitioners, DSS and Petitioners signed a form contract that is customarily entered into by DSS and foster parents when a child is placed in foster care. The contract provides, inter alia, that Petitioners desire to temporarily care for Child, that Petitioners agree to accept Child for an indefinite time, and that if Child
any right in Petitioners to adopt Child. However, nothing in the contract prohibits Petitioners from petitioning the family court for adoption provided they have standing under section 63-9-60.
We acknowledged in Youngblood that the foster care relationship is a temporary and contractual relationship created by the State, and we further noted foster care is “a temporary living arrangement . . . utilized while permanent placement plans are being formulated for the involved children.” 402 S.C. at 321-22, 741 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting 10 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-550(A)(1) (2012)). Accordingly, we held “the foster parent relationship, absent statutory law to the contrary, is insufficient to create a legally protected interest in a child and therefore, does not create standing to petition to adopt.” Id. at 322, 741 S.E.2d at 520. It is indeed settled that the foster care relationship is temporary and does not in and of itself create standing to commence a private adoption action. However, this does not foreclose the existence of standing for foster parents under section 63-9-60, provided the foster parents reside in South Carolina, and provided the foster child has not been placed for adoption by DSS (or by agency under contract with DSS).
CONCLUSION
The issue in this case is not whether Petitioners signed a contract or whether the foster relationship creates standing. Likewise, whether a person who commences a private adoption action under the attendant circumstances is a current foster parent or a former foster parent is of no consequence to the issue of standing under section 63-9-60. To attain standing,
In sum, Youngblood and section 63-9-60 compel a simple analysis. Petitioners are South Carolina residents. When Petitioners commenced their adoption action, Child had not been placed for adoption by DSS. The plain meaning of section 63-9-60 affords standing to Petitioners. See also Michael P., 385 S.C. at 415, 684 S.E.2d at 215 (holding former foster parents did not have standing to adopt under section 63-9-60 because the child had been placed by DSS for adoption).
Our holding aligns with a plain reading of section 63-9-60, is in accord with the purpose of the South Carolina Adoption Act to establish fair and reasonable procedures for adoption, and does not impede the policy behind the South Carolina Children‘s Code to provide permanency for children after a determination there will be no reunification with the biological parents. While allowing Petitioners standing pursuant to the plain meaning of section 63-9-60 may not be a result which DSS prefers, it is not a result so absurd that the General Assembly could not have intended it. We acknowledge the solemn authority entrusted to DSS to safeguard the children of this State and to ensure rapidity in permanently resolving placement issues. Our holding solely answers the question of Petitioners’ standing pursuant to section 63-9-60. We do not
We hold Petitioners have standing to pursue a private action for adoption pursuant to section 63-9-60 because Petitioners are residents of South Carolina and because, at the time Petitioners commenced their adoption action, Child had not yet been placed for adoption by DSS. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the family court to proceed with Petitioners’ action for adoption.9
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BEATTY, C.J. and FEW, J., concur. HEARN, J., concurring in a separate opinion in which KITTREDGE, J., concurs.
JUSTICE HEARN: I concur in the analysis and result reached by the majority but write separately to express my belief that the General Assembly did not intend to grant standing to all South Carolina residents to file an action for the adoption of a child who has been placed in DSS custody. I further believe the court of appeals reached a commonsensical result in construing Section 63-9-60(B) (2010 & Supp. 2017), when it stated: “We do not believe the General Assembly intended to grant standing to foster parents who file adoption actions early in the process while foreclosing standing to foster parents who wait until after DSS has made an adoption placement decision.” S.C. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware, Op. No. 2016-UP-220 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 19, 2016). However reasonable this construction may be, it is at odds with the clear language of Section 63-9-60(B). Moreover, I agree with the majority that the result which emanates from employing the plain meaning of the words of the statute is not necessarily absurd; nevertheless, it is an anomaly that I doubt the General Assembly contemplated. I join the majority opinion because the result is not only warranted by the clear
KITTREDGE, J., concurs.