Defendant, S.B., appeals the trial court’s finding that he was competent to proceed to trial, arguing that the competency issue was improperly decided. We agree. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to Defendant’s other point on appeal, without comment.
Defendant was found incompetent to proceed to trial in two separate cases. Three years later, the court held a hearing, and his attorney advised the court that: “[Defendant] was evaluated by [a doctor]. I just reviewed the — thanks to the State, their copy of the report. And based on that my conversation with [Defendant] and the mother, we are going ahead and stipulate that the child is competent to proceed today.” The State also stipulated to Defendant’s competency, but there was no stipulation to the contents and admission of the doctor’s report for the determination of competency.
Without further hearing or evidence, the court entered a written order finding that Defendant was competent, based solely upon the stipulations by the State and defense, and its own review of the doctor’s report. Both cases proceeded to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of battery on a school board official and disrupting a school function, as charged in the first case, and burglary of a conveyance, as charged in the second case.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c)(7) provides: “If, at any time after such commitment, the court decides, after hearing, that the defendant is competent to proceed, it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed.” A hearing to determine whether competency has been restored after a period of incompetence requires “the calling of court-appointed expert witnesses designated under [rule 3.211], a determination of competence to proceed, and the entry of an order finding competence.” Samson v. State,
However, “where the parties and the judge agree, the trial Court may decide the issue of competency on the basis of the written reports alone.” Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971); see also Molina v. State,
In a similar case, Macaluso v. State,
Macaluso recognized that Rule 3.212 does not sanction stipulations to the ultimate issue of competency. That task is expressly left to the trial judge and that authority may not be delegated to thelawyers in the case. Id. at 915. See Fowler, 255 So.2d at 515 (holding that a court considering the issue of competency can rely on an expert’s written reports if the parties agree).
Jones’ reliance on Macaluso is misplaced. Here, the parties stipulated to the expert reports. The reports became the evidence upon which the trial court relied to decide the ultimate issue. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that either side was prohibited from presenting any other evidence or arguments, and the trial court entered a written order concluding Jones was competent to proceed as required by the Rule. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court held a proper competency hearing as contemplated by Rule 3.212.
Jones,
In the instant case, it is clear from the record that neither party stipulated to the contents and admission of the doctor’s report. Nor was there any form of agreement between the parties and the judge to decide the issue of competency on the basis of the written report alone. Although it can be argued that by stipulating to the report’s determination of competency, the parties stipulated to the report and agreed to determine competency based on the report alone, there is nothing in the case law to suggest that such implicit stipulations and agreements are sufficient to satisfy rule 3.212. See, e.g., Fowler,
Therefore, the trial court erred in its finding of Defendant’s competency. We remand this case to the trial court for a new hearing, and the court may consider any stipulations in accordance with this opinion. See Fowler,
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded.