This is a sequel to
S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District,
The legal basis for the demand was Wis. Stat. §§ 807.01(3), (4). These sections provide that if a plaintiffs settlement demand is rejected and the plaintiff goes on to win a judgment larger than the demand, he is entitled to twice his taxable costs plus interest at the rate of 12 percent from the date of the demand to the date when the judgment is paid. Thе district court denied Healy’s motion on the ground that Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure occupies the field of settlement offers in federal litigation and precludes the application of state rules dealing with the subject even when, because the basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, the substantive rules of decision are state rather than federal. Rule 68 provides that if a defendant makes a settlement offer which is rejected and the plaintiff wins a smaller amount at trial, the plaintiff shall be hable for the costs that were incurred after the making of the offer. The Wisconsin statute contains a nearly identical provision. Wis.Stat. § 807.01(1). But unlike the Wisconsin statute, Rule 68 makes no provision for settlement demands (that is, plaintiffs’ offers as distinct from defendants’).
The sewage district argues that Healy’s motion, filed as we have said 34 days after the entry of judgment, was untimely, and therefore was rightly denied irrespective of its merits. A local rule of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin requires that the bill of costs be filed within 15 days of the judgment, E.D.Wis.R. 9.01; and a request for prejudgment interest must, the sewage district argues, be filed within 10 days of the judgment because it is a request to alter or amend the judgment and is therefore governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), which has a 10-day deadline.
Because Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) specifies nо deadline for filing a bill of costs, the time for filing such a bill is normally governed by local rules such as that of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
Matei v. Cessna
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Aircraft Co.,
Healy sought “regular” Rule 54(d) costs, the kind awarded to the prevailing party more or less as a matter of course — and was turned down for missing the 15-day deadline — before it asked for double costs and prejudgment interest under the Wisconsin settlement rule. And it made a timely motion for “regular” prejudgment interest, which the district judge denied on the ground that the contract claim was not sufficiently definite to support such an award under the Wisconsin law of contracts. The issues underlying the motion for prejudgment interest that Healy filed under the Wisconsin rule had nothing to do with Healy’s contractual rights and hencе with the judgment it obtained in the suit, just as the double costs it sought were unrelated to the costs taxable under Rule 54(d) because imposed for a completely different reason, as a sanction for turning down a settlement demand.
The proper analogy is to the awarding of attorney’s fees, a proceeding deemed collateral to (which is to say separate from) the case on the merits because the amount of fees cannot be determined until the trial is over and because there is limited overlap between the issues in the trial and the issues bearing on the amount of and entitlement to fees. Being collateral, a motion for attorney’s fees is not subject to the 10-day limit of Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
The clincher is
Lentomyynti Oy v. Medivac, Inc.,
But all that is important today is that we have jurisdiction and so can proceed, as did the district judge, to the merits.
The applicability of state prоcedural rules in federal diversity litigation is a knotty issue. A bit of history may help untie the knot. Before the revolution in federalism of 1938, federal district courts in diversity cases conformed their procedures (with immaterial exceptions) to those of the state in which the court was located, but (again with immaterial exceptions) were not bound by the common law of the state. This pattern was reversed by the promulgаtion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which created a separate and distinctive code of procedure for federal courts in all cases, including diversity cases, and by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
The policy of avoiding potentially outcome-determinative discrepancies between state and federal law in the diversity setting is inconsistent with the policy of subjecting federal litigation, including diversity litigation, to a distinctive set of federal procedures. So it should come as no surprise that there is no clear criterion for deciding whether a particular state rule is “substantive” for purposes of deciding whether
Erie
requires that it be enforced in federal diversity litigation. There are, however, two classes of pretty clear cases, although unfortunately our case falls in neither one. The first consists of eases in which the state rule is in actual conflict with one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurе, so that enforcing the state rule would knock out the federal rule. If the federal rule is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), under which the Federal Rules were promulgated, then it is valid (barring some constitutional objection not here suggested) and the Supremacy Clause requires that the state rules give way.
Burlington Northern Ry. v. Woods,
The second class of pretty easy cases is where the state procedural rule, though undeniably “procedural” in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such as contract law,
Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul Group,
Our case is different. There is no direct conflict between the Wisconsin rule concerning plaintiffs’ settlement demands and any rule оf federal procedure; the part of the state’s offer-of-settlement statute involved in this case governs offers by plaintiffs, while Rule 68 is limited to offers by defendants. Yet at the same time the Wisconsin rule is not confined to any particular area of the law such as insurance contracts or products liability or medical malpractice; the rule does not have substantive goals in any obvious sense. Whаt to do? We must go back to first principles — the course recommended in
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
The Wisconsin rule favors plaintiffs by giving them the option of putting the defendant to the unhappy choice of either settling on terms favorable to the plaintiff or running a substantial risk of increasing the amount of money to which the plaintiff will be entitled if the case is not settled but instead is tried and the plaintiff wins. If a rule so favorable to plaintiffs is inapplicable in diversity cases, defendants in such cases will have an added incentive to remove a diversity case to federal district court, just as in the days before the
Erie
decision, when a more favorable substantive rule of federal common law might induce a defendant to remove a case from state to federal court or even to reincorporate in a different state in order to create diversity of citizenship. Indeed, the Wisconsin rule is not unlike a rule awarding successful plaintiffs punitive damages on top of compensatory damages; and there is no doubt that such a rule, even if not limited to a particular class of cases — even if reflecting a blanket favoritism for plaintiffs over defendants — would be applicable in diversity suits under
Erie. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
Even сloser are cases which hold that a rule shifting attorney’s fees to a losing party is “substantive” for purposes of determining whether it applies in a diversity suit,
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
But would such a classification undermine the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The only candidate for a specifically endangered rule is Rule 68. We were unable at the argument of the appeal to extract from the sewage district’s lawyer any case real or hypothetical in which enforcing the Wisconsin rule on plaintiffs’ demands would tread on the toes of Rule 68. The situatiоn would be different if the ease involved defendants’ offers of settlement, because then we would have a state rule and a federal rule covering the identical issue. It is true that the rules are nearly identical so far as defendants’ offers are concerned. The only difference appears to be that under the Wisconsin rule the defendant must make his offer at least 20
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days before trial and under thе federal rule he need only make it 10 days before trial. Still, this is sufficient inconsistency to make the state rule give way, cf.
Burlington Northern Ry. v. Woods, supra; Exxon Corp. v. Burglin,
Rule 68, like Rule 35, favors defendants; in many other respects, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are very pro-plaintiff, certainly compared with the procedural rules of the average state at the time the rules were first promulgated, but even today. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, “The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 86 Colum.L.Rev. 433, 439-46 (1986). So we can imagine an argument that by subjecting defendants in diversity cases to Wisconsin’s highly pro-plaintiff settlement rule, we would be disturbing a delicate but deliberate balance between plaintiffs and defendants that is struck in the federal rules, and hence undermining the integrity of those rules. The argument is not made, and is anyway unpersuasive. States are allowed to favor plaintiffs — or defendants — who engage in activities, such as, here, making contracts for constructing sewage systems, that are governed by state law. Under Erie, this “favoritism” is to operate even when the persons who have a dispute over state law find themselves in a fеderal court. The power of the state to jigger procedural rules to favor plaintiffs or defendants in federal diversity suits is limited by the Rules Enabling Act and the Supremacy Clause, but the Wisconsin rule does not transgress those limits. Unless — a final possibility, again not argued by the sewage authority — Rule 68 should be interpreted as if it said outright that no defendant may be penalized for failing to accept a settlement demand. Then wе would have a direct conflict, and the Supremacy Clause would be in play.
We cannot find anything in the history or structure of the rule to justify such an interpretation. It is easy to see why the draftsmen of the rule, and the Supreme Court in promulgating it, decided not to make provision for plaintiffs’ settlement demands. By hypothesis, a rule penalizing the defendant for turning down a plaintiffs settlement demand will give the plaintiff — who went on to win the case and get a judgment — an extra dollop of relief, akin to punitive damages or attorneys’ fees. The decision whether to give successful plaintiffs this additional relief involves considerations of adequacy and proportionality of remedies. Committees drafting or promulgating procedural rules might well decide to leave those considerations to other bodies to weigh.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
