Case Information
*1 Before R IPPLE B RENNAN S CUDDER Circuit Judges . R IPPLE Circuit Judge
. Leslie Billings party an em ployment agreement his former employer, RYZE Claim Solutions, LLC (“RYZE”). employment agreement con tains providing Mr. Billings must bring claims against RYZE court, either Marion County Hamilton County, or federal Indiana. Billings nevertheless filed state court. removed 19 2930 the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Relying on Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc. United States District for the Western District Texas U.S. 62–63 (2013), the Eastern District of Cal ifornia concluded Mr. Billings had failed why forum control granted RYZE’s motion transfer venue under U.S.C. § 1404(a) Southern District Indiana.
In due course, district Indiana granted motion summary judgment on Billings’s fed eral claims. district then transferred, sua sponte, back Eastern District California. It ex plained own docket was congested East ern District California had greater familiarity Cali fornia labor law. When was docketed once again Eastern District California, petitioned writ mandamus directing Southern District Indiana request back Southern Indiana.
We must give clauses “‘controlling weight all but most exceptional cases.’” Atl. U.S. Stewart Org., Ricoh Corp. (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Because no such exceptional circumstances exist here, de had jurisdiction pursuant U.S.C. §§ Our jurisdiction secure U.S.C. § See Mathias (“[M]andamus appropriate procedural method obtain review decision motion.”). parted settled approach applying the federal statute cases governed forum selection clause. Accordingly, we grant petition and issue writ mandamus.
I
BACKGROUND A.
RYZE business. It employs remote workers across Nation. One these workers, Mr. Billings, filed action against RYZE and ten unnamed defendants California state court. As amended, complaint stated claim alleging violations Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), U.S.C. § et seq., on behalf Mr. Billings and current and former RYZE employees nationwide. He alleged various violations California Labor Code California Business Professions Code on behalf putative class current former RYZE em ployees who are were employed within state Cali fornia.
RYZE removed United States California. Then, relying clause employment agreement tween Mr. Billings, RYZE moved ven ue U.S.C. Indi ana. Ruling Billings had failed why fo rum “given controlling weight,” granted *4 4 19 ‐ 2930 motion. [2] The was transferred Southern of Indiana.
Once of Indiana, parties en ‐ gaged discovery and resolved numerous discovery ‐ related disputes. The granted RYZE’s motion add counterclaims against Mr. Billings, alleging breach employment agreement, [3] misappropriation of trade secrets violation Indiana Uniform Trade Se crets Act, Ind. Code § 24 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 1 et seq., conversion violation Indiana Code § 34 ‐ 24 ‐ 3 ‐ and computer trespass viola tion Indiana Code § 35 43 2 ‐ The then filed mul tiple motions, including Mr. Billings’s motion certify action as class action under Federal Rule Civil Pro cedure 23(b)(3) as collective action under FLSA, U.S.C. 216(b), RYZE’s motion strike expert report submitted by Mr. Billings, motion for summary judgment regarding Billings’s FLSA claims.
R.19 Atl. Constr. Co., Inc. U.S. Dist. Ct. W. Dist. Tex. (2013)). concluded relevant portion was valid enforceable. See id. 25–26. employment agreement governed law. (Employment Agreement ¶ 8(b)). Section 216(b) Title United States Code, “authorizes em
ployees act together seek redress violations statute’s min imum wage maximum hour provisions.” Ervin OS Rest. Servs., (holding “employees who insti tute collective action against their employer terms FLSA same time litigate supplemental state law claims as class certified according FRCP 23(b)(3)”). 19 2930 5 district court then granted RYZE’s motion for sum ‐
mary judgment on Mr. Billings’s FLSA claim and denied Mr. Billings’s class certification motion extent he sought conditional certification FLSA collective action. Two matters remained briefed outstanding: RYZE’s mo tion strike Billings’s expert report Mr. Billings’s class certification motion under Federal Rule Civil Proce dure 23.
B.
Two days after granted motion for summary judgment on FLSA claim, District Indi ana sua sponte ordered cause “why this matter not be transferred [the] Eastern California further proceed ings.” [5] district court stated that “[t]he backdrop litigation has changed dramatically since evaluated factors trans It well established district has authority sua sponte transfer case U.S.C. § “The language statute broad enough district can order its own initiative.” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § (4th ed. 2019) (collecting cases); see Germaine v. St. Germain Fed. App’x (7th Cir. May 19, 2011) (noting sua sponte ordered case transferred); Carver v. Knox Cty. F.2d (6th Cir. 1989) (“In fact, U.S.C. does require motion; may sua spon te .” ); Mills Beech Aircraft Corp., F.2d (5th Cir. 1989) (“Such transfers made sua sponte .” ); Muldoon Tropitone Furni ture Co. (stating properly transferred “[o]n own motion”).
ferred this matter to this District.” It also emphasized its own docket congestion noted that “the citizens Cali fornia strong adjudicating claims based upon its labor laws.” ordered RYZE respond order first.
RYZE contended its response order cause “[t]here nothing exceptional about this would warrant disregarding agreement now.” submitted transferring back Eastern District California, after Southern District Indiana had “already invested own substantial time effort deciding summary judgment motion, would serve purposes conserving judicial resources.” RYZE, contended that, despite court’s docket conges tion, “[t]he median time filing trial civil cases [was] substantially shorter Southern Indi ana at 26.4 months compared nearly year longer at 36.8 months.” rejected view proper measure congestion. view, assessment “court congestion” takes into account “the extent Court’s unprecedented caseload R.101 at 3. Id. 4. 1. Id.
strain impacts ability of and clerk staff fulfill their duties.” Furthermore, rejected suggestion “that might be able more quickly resolve this matter than Eastern District of California,” stating own “background familiarity” with case was “far out stripped by Eastern District California’s familiarity California’s labor code.” rejected RZYE’s remaining arguments ordered transferred back Eastern California.
On July this action was docketed once again Eastern California. On October ordered cause why remanded state lack subject matter jurisdiction. On same day, sought petition writ mandamus court. After Billings filed response, we ordered proceed full briefing oral argument.
II
DISCUSSION A.
Section Title United States Code, which, among things, codifies common law writ man damus, provides “[t]he Supreme all courts established Act Congress issue all writs necessary appropriate aid their respective jurisdictions *8 8 19 2930 agreeable usages and principles law.” We held “mandamus is appropriate procedural method obtain review a district court’s decision a 1404(a) transfer motion” because, “[w]ithout availability mandamus relief, question proper venue escapes meaningful appellate review.” In re Mathias , 867 F.3d 727, (7th Cir. 2017); see Hicks v. Duckworth , F.2d (7th Cir. (holding mandamus is appropriate “to correct an erroneous transfer out circuit”). We will ‐ sue a writ reverse a transfer order if order was a “‘vio lation a clear indisputable legal right, or, very least, patently erroneous.’” In re Mathias , F.3d Hudson F.3d (7th Cir. 2013)). We review a district transfer decision abuse dis cretion. Rsch. Automation, Schrader Bridgeport Int’l, Inc. F.3d 2010). “[W]here has con sidered all relevant private interest factors, where its balancing these factors reasonable its decision deserves substantial deference.” Piper Aircraft Co. Reyno (1981) (emphasis added); Rsch. Automation, (“Where district gives thoughtful con sideration factors applicable transfer analysis un der section 1404(a), we give decision substantial defer ence.”).
B.
We begin language federal statute must guide district when considering motion one federal another. Section provides “[f]or convenience witnesses, justice, trans fer any civil any division where ‐ might have been brought or to any or division to which all parties consented.” U.S.C. § 1404(a). When deciding whether transfer a § 1404(a), a therefore “must evaluate both convenience and various public ‐ interest considerations.” Atl. Ma rine , U.S. at & n.6. determining whether transfer would in “interest justice,” a may consider several factors, including “docket congestion and likely speed trial in transferor potential transferee fo rums,” “each relative familiarity with relevant law,” “the respective desirability resolving controversies in each locale,” “the relationship each community controversy.” Rsch. Automation at 978. When considering whether case, a must engage “‘flexible individualized analysis’” “look yond narrow rigid set considerations their deter minations.” Id. Stewart U.S. 29).
These considerations, however, will “rarely” outweigh parties’ private interests enforcing forum ‐ selection provision. Atl. Marine U.S. 64. “The presence val id forum ‐ requires courts adjust their usual § 1404(a) analysis three ways.” Id. Two these adjustments are relevant case. First, “the plaintiff’s choice forum merits no weight.” Instead, plaintiff, opposing forum clause, “bears burden establishing third adjustment change venue pursuant U.S.C. “will carry original venue’s choice law rules—a factor some circumstances affect considerations.” Atl. ‐
the parties bargained is unwarranted.” Id. Moreover, “should not consider arguments about the parties’ private interests” because the parties, in contracting to fo ‐ rum ‐ selection clause, “waive the right to challenge the prese ‐ lected forum as inconvenient or less convenient them ‐ selves their witnesses.” Id. at 64. Accordingly, the pri vate ‐ interest factors are deemed “to weigh entirely favor the preselected forum,” “may consider argu ments about factors only.” Id. When this analysis properly applied, it “requires fo rum ‘given controlling weight all but the most exceptional cases.’” Id. 59–60 Stewart U.S. 33). Parties expect to litigate their agreed to fo rum, “courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the par ties’ settled expectations.” C.
Our examination the record convinces us the dis trict employed flawed methodology deciding to send case back the California. First, evident improperly placed burden RYZE justify keeping Indiana. This improper allocation burden evident ordering respond first court’s order cause. As party resisting application fo rum clause, Billings, not RYZE, had burden justifying contrary terms clause. Atl. (“[T]he plaintiff must bear burden showing why agreed.”). 19 2930 11 district erred in concluding that the East ‐ ern of California’s familiarity with the applicable state law “weigh[ed] heavily in favor transfer.” Alt ‐ hough “each court’s relative familiarity the relevant law” is a factor that considered, Re search Automation the district court’s heavy reliance on factor contradicts the Supreme Court’s guid ance in Atlantic Marine . There, the Supreme Court noted “federal judges routinely apply the law a State than the State in which they sit.” Atl. U.S. Notably, Court previously had expressed skepticism about the “expertise” a local district in determining content a state’s law. Salve Regina College Russell U.S. (1991), while de ciding whether a appeals defer a inter pretation law state which sat, found it self “unpersuaded” by proposition, it thought based an “overbroad generalization[].” It continued: proposition judge is better able “in
tuit” answer unsettled question state law is foreclosed by our holding Erie. very essence Erie doctrine is bases state law are presumed communicable federal judge no less than state judge. Almost years ago, Professor Kurland stated: “Certainly, if law not brooding omnipresence sky over United States, neither brooding omnipresence sky Vermont, or New York California.” Philip B. Kurland, Justice Frankfurter, Supreme Erie Doctrine Di versity Cases Yale L. J. (1957). See S. Pac. Co. Jensen, (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law brooding omnipresence (continued … ) No. The of Indiana, in holding that this fac tor entitled heavy weight, did identify, moreover, any features relevant law that were “exception ally arcane.” Id. at 68; see also Aliano Quaker Oats Co. C WL at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. (“[N]or Plaintiffs identified any unique or idiosyncratic aspect Illinois law at issue here that would make this purported greater familiarity Illinois law significant.”). We therefore must conclude district court erred concluding this factor weighed heavily favor back California.
The district also erred treatment another factor, “‘the administrative difficulties flow ing congestion.’” Atl. U.S. at n.6 Piper Aircraft n.6). The concluded “that caseload scheduling congestion this on undersigned’s trial calendar weigh favor transfer.” rejected ( … continued) sky but articulate voice some sovereign or
quasi sovereign can be identified”). Id. 238–39 (internal citations edited) (parallel citations omitted). continued: “To extent available state law controlling issue so unsettled as admit no reasoned divination, we can see no sense judge’s prior exposure nonex posure state judiciary can said facilitate rule reason.” Given skepticism, we see no reason why non local dis trict would less capable discerning content another state’s law.
argument a court’s docket congestion is only considered this factor to extent affects the case’s time to resolution. Instead, court broadly construed “administrative difficulties” to include “trial cal endar congestion, amount time can dedicate to cases, extent to which this Court’s unprecedented caseload strain impacts ability clerk staff fulfill their duties.” evaluated this factor through a differ
ent lens than one usually employed federal courts. We held that, “[t]o extent congestion matters, what important is speed can come trial be resolved .” In Factor VIII IX Concentrate Blood Prod. Litig. (emphasis added). We further explained:
[T]he real issue not whether dismissal [for forum non conveniens ] will reduce con gestion but whether trial speedier another because its less crowded docket. In addition, … [t]he non conven iens doctrine used as solution congestion; remedies, such as placing reasonable limitations amount response order cause, explained factor weighed against transferring back Eastern California because “[t]he median time filing trial civil cases substantially shorter 26.4 months compared nearly year longer 36.8 months.” time each side may present evi
dence, are more appropriate. 958–59 (first last alterations original) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our perspective shared by circuits. See Gates Lear jet Corp. Jensen, F.2d (9th Cir. 1984) (“The real issue not whether dismissal will reduce congestion but whether trial may be speedier another court because less crowded docket.”); Scott F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The law well established that federal not order section merely to” alleviate docket congestion); Fannin Jones (same).
Although district noted it could not sched ule trial for least fourteen months deci sion (or longer if any scheduling delay occurred), it never addressed whether trial would be speedier Eastern We note did not consider additional time would incurred by transferring back Eastern California. This action was docketed with Dis trict year. During time, parties engaged dis covery motions practice, held numerous confer ences with parties, it ruled RYZE’s motion summary judgment. Two fully briefed issues, motion strike Billings’s expert report Mr. Billings’s class certification motion, remained unresolved when ordered cause why transferred back Eastern California. Presumably, would need additional time familiarize itself action. 5–6. 19 2930 15 California. Instead, the merely ob served that its own docket was crowded, its resources strained, before concluding that this factor weighed favor a transfer. [21] 21 Mr. Billings maintains that did not abuse its discretion considering its docket congestion under pub lic factor. He invites our attention to Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe , 220 F.2d 299 Cir. 1955), which we stated, “‘[a]dministrative difficulties follow courts when litigation piled up congested centers instead being handled at origin.’” Id. at n.4 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert , (1947)). That case little value our present inquiry because it did not involve fo rum clause. Indeed, plaintiff’s choice was afforded “‘[a] large measure deference.’” Id. (quoting Josephson McGuire , F. Supp. (D. Mass. 1954)). Billings relies on In re Genentech, Inc. , F.3d
(Fed. Cir. 2009), where stated that “[t]he likely speed to trial ‘factor appears be most speculative … disposition statis tics may always tell whole story.’” Respondent’s Br. In re Genentech, Inc. , F.3d 1347). quoted language fails cap ture fully intended meaning. In In re Genentech , Federal Circuit first stated that, “[t]o extent that congestion relevant, speed can come trial be resolved may be factor.” In Genentech, F.3d Then, stating that “this factor appears be most speculative,” id. Federal Circuit cited Collins American Automobile Insurance Co. Saint Louis (2d 1956). Collins Second Circuit explained it has “of ten questioned reliance upon fact locally congested dockets as proper ground order transfer.” Id. Besides fact “conditions below may no worse than elsewhere,” stated “we think dangerous suggest judge deny entrance his litigant ground his serious burdens; his standable complaints directed elsewhere, as executive legislature.”
Most importantly, given more weight role forum selection clauses play proper application § 1404(a)’s command that, decid ‐ ing motion, consider “the inter ‐ ests justice.” Atlantic Marine , Supreme une quivocally emphasized forum clause plays very significant role furthering “‘vital interests jus tice system.’” Atl. Marine U.S. at (quoting Stewart , U.S. (Kennedy, J., concurring)). These clauses go long way toward establishing predictability certainty legal transactions.
[A] clause establishing ex ante forum dispute resolution has salutary effect dispelling any confusion about where suits arising contract must be brought defended, sparing litigants time ex pense pretrial motions determine cor rect forum conserving judicial resources otherwise would devoted deciding those mo tions.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Shute U.S. 593–94 (1991) (second emphasis added). “[A] proper application requires ‘given controlling weight all but most exceptional cases.’” Atl. 59–60 Stewart U.S. (Kennedy, J., concurring)). “In all but most unusual cas es, therefore, ‘the justice’ served holding par ties their bargain.”
No. ‐ This case is “exceptional” case. Indeed, for pur ‐ poses federal transfer statute, is a very “ordinary” action. Notably, neither nor Billings identified any decision since Atlantic in a refused enforce a valid fo ‐ rum agreement due exceptional circumstances. RYZE invites our attention only two deci ‐ sions. The first these cases is Ha Thi Le Lease Finance Group, LLC No. WL (E.D. La. May 9, 2017). This case very limited help our present ‐ quiry. There, had decide whether sev ‐ er some claims while retaining others. ultimately decided “the need—rooted valued judicial economy—to pursue same claims single single can trump fo rum clause.” *7 Rolls Royce Corp ., 2014)). second RYZE identifies Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, L.L.C. Hun tington Ingalls WL (E.D. La. Jan. 2015). As points out, however, distin guishable because defendant waited six years before moving venue. By time, al ready had ruled on, among numerous other motions, mo tion summary judgment motion reconsidera tion.
We identified several cases where courts have found extraordinary circumstances. Each these cases pre sented significantly more serious unusual situation Petitioner’s Br. No. 19 ‐ 2930
than the one here. For example, the court in ABC Medical Holdings, Inc. v. Home Medical Supplies, Inc. , No. ‐ 2457, WL 5818521, *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2015), the court did not have jurisdiction over one the parties, the court could not sever the claims. court held “it would require litigation substantially the same issues in two different courts.” Id. “The public in efficiency served by liti gating substantially the same claims in one rather than two outweighs prior agreement as forum … .” Id. Sim ilarly, in re Dozier Financial, Inc. B.R. 637, (Bankr. D. S.C. 2018), did enforce forum ‐ selection clause where only one six defendants was bound clause where splitting up would sulted in “substantially duplicative discovery pro ceedings.” acknowledged forum ‐ selection clauses are meant provide greater predictabil ity about where they would engage future litigation, but noted particular case, forum selection clause did opposite. 650–51. See Alabsi v. Savoya, LLC No. cv KAW, WL 1332191, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2019) (“Courts recognize three circumstances which enforcement forum selection clause would unreason able: (1) if inclusion forum clause was product fraud or overreaching, (2) if party challenging forum clause would effectively deprived his day if enforced, (3) if enforcement would contravene strong policy suit was brought.” (citing Murphy Schneider Nat’l, 2004))); Argosy Cap. Grp. III, L.P. Triangle Cap. Corp. Civ. (ER), WL *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. (An exceptional “where core bankruptcy proceeding, case policy toward enforcement fo rum clauses ‘not so strong’ as mandate en forcement face strong countervailing inter ests centralizing bankruptcy proceedings, judicial econo my, overall justice.” Iridium Operating LLC B.R. 836–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002))).
None complications identified by courts these cases present here. Indeed, already had brought Indiana, had partially decided case. Billings articulates no compelling reason seek return juncture. “interests justice,” as delineated Atlantic clearly require complete ad judication case.
Conclusion
We accordingly grant petition writ man damus. deviated substantially methodological course decision making mandated Supreme United States. This excep tional unusual would justify giving controlling weight factors than clause.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED