53 S.E.2d 362 | Ga. | 1949
1. Where a verdict is plain and unmistakable in its legal effect, it must speak for itself, unaided by any consideration of the pleadings and facts proved upon the trial for a construction thereof.
2. After the jury had published their verdict and dispersed, their expressions, on being reassembled, as to the intent of their verdict, could not add to or change the plain import and intent of the verdict.
3. Where it appeared, without dispute and upon the face of the record, that the only defendant against whom the verdict was rendered resided out of the county, and that the finding of the jury was in favor of the two defendants on account of whose residence in the county of the suit the court acquired jurisdiction, the court, on motion of the defendant against whom the verdict was returned, should have arrested the judgment.
4. Since the adoption of the Uniform Procedure Act, a motion in arrest of judgment is maintainable in an equity case.
The petition further alleged that, after the plaintiff purchased the property, numerous creditors had filed suits against him, a receiver had been appointed, and the doors of his business had been closed by the receiver; that there was a total failure of consideration, and the "defendants Childers and Ryner should deliver up said notes to petitioner for cancellation"; and that the defendants should restore to the petitioner his $2000 cash, with interest.
By amendment, the plaintiff alleged that it was impossible to make restitution to the defendants, because the property purchased was in the custody of a receiver appointed by the court; that the "conduct of defendant, J. B. Ryner, in this transaction, was one of perpetrating a constructive fraud upon this petitioner, actively entered into by said J. B. Ryner . . and that, therefore, this court of equity should adjudicate the whole transaction in this one action, and should for the reasons alleged in this paragraph, as well as the reasons previously alleged, do complete equity and justice and order J. B. Ryner to restore to petitioners $2000 and interest thereupon, as well as, in moulding its decree *282 to do complete justice, should order petitioner's notes canceled, and the entire transaction rescinded."
The petition prayed: (a) for an injunction against "defendants from negotiating petitioner's notes"; (b) for an order canceling the transaction between the petitioner and the defendants and restoring the parties to their former status; (c) for a judgment against all of the defendants in the amount of $2000, with legal interest, and an order of cancellation of the notes; and (d) for general relief.
On the trial of the case, the jury returned the following verdict: "We the jury find a verdict in favor of the defendant, Mrs. Mary Vaughn. We also find our verdict in favor of the defendant Clay Childers. We further find our verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Green Duke, and against the defendant J. B. Ryner. We recommend the restoration of the $2000 payment without interest, and cancellation of all outstanding notes against the plaintiff."
The defendant Ryner filed a motion in arrest of judgment upon the ground that, the jury having found a verdict in favor of the two resident defendants, the court was without jurisdiction to proceed against the defendant who was not a resident of the county. This motion was overruled, and to this judgment the defendant Ryner excepted.
1. "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity." Code, § 110-105. "While it has been held that the construction of a verdict may be aided by a consideration of the pleadings, and that all the undisputed facts proved upon the trial may be examined and considered in construing the verdict (Mayor c. of Macon v. Harris,
The verdict in the instant case, finding unequivocally for the defendants Vaughn and Childers, and finding specifically against the defendant Ryner with a recommendation of payment of $2000 and a cancellation of notes, can be construed only as a verdict solely against the defendant Ryner, for that is its plain import and intent. Compare Turner v. Shackleford, supra; Small v.Hicks,
2. On the day after the jury had returned their verdict, the court, in the absence of the defendant Ryner and his counsel, reassembled the jury and questioned them as to the intent of their verdict. After explaining to the jury that their verdict was confusing, the court said: "In other words, you rescinded this contract and placed the parties in the same position they were in prior to this transaction. Is that right?" Foreman: "That is true. We are attempting to fix the verdict to place all the parties back in the same position they were in prior to the transaction; that Ryner pay back to Duke the $2000 he paid, and that the notes that were given be canceled up and turned back to Duke, and Ryner of course charge that amount back on his notes he holds against Vaughn Company. Ryner got the money and the notes and we want all that to go back to Duke." The Court: "You then mean that Childers shall surrender the notes to Duke." Foreman: "That's right. Put them back like they started before the sale was made and let J. B. Ryner show the debit on his mortgage of the $2000 and pay that money back to Duke and let Mr. Childers turn the notes also back to Duke."
Irrespective of whether it was proper for the court to reassemble the jury after the publication of their verdict and the jury had dispersed, the colloquy between the court and the jury could not add to or change the plain import and intent of the verdict. "After the dispersal of the jury, the judge has no power either *284
to add to or take from their finding." McCrary v. Gano,
While in the instant case there was no attempt to amend the verdict, the expressions of the jury when reassembled as to their intent could not change or modify the unequivocal finding in favor of two of the defendants. The general verdict was against the defendant Ryner only, and whether the recommendation be treated as surplusage, or a valid finding of the jury on the matters "recommended," no valid or legal judgment could be entered against the defendants (or either of them) in whose favor the jury found.
3. "In order to confer on the court of a particular county jurisdiction to hear and determine an issue between the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant, it is essential that the plaintiff present a case showing grounds for the equitable relief sought against the resident defendant. It has frequently been held that where a non-resident is sued jointly with a resident in the county of the latter's residence, and on the trial the proof shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the resident defendant, the court, in that suit, can grant no relief against the nonresident defendant." Fowler v. SouthernAirlines Inc.,
In a case such as the present one, where it appeared, without dispute and upon the face of the record, that the only defendant against whom the verdict was rendered resided out of the county, and that the finding of the jury was in favor of the two defendants on account of whose residence in the county of the suit *285
the court acquired jurisdiction, the court, on motion of the defendant against whom the verdict was returned, should have arrested the judgment. Turner v. Shackleford, supra; Warren
v. Rushing,
4. Since the adoption of the Uniform Procedure Act, a motion in arrest of judgment is maintainable in an equity case.Perkins v. Castleberry,
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.