OPINION AND ORDER
The Petitioner Ann Marie Ryman (“petitioner” or “Petitioner Ryman”) has moved to review the entitlement decision of Chief Special Master (“CSM”) Golkiewicz denying her compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 — 300aa-34 (2000) (“Vaccine Act”), and directing that judgment be entered for the Respondent the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“respondent”). The petitioner makes three objections. First, the petitioner objects to the CSM’s use of the so-called Stevens factors for establishing causation in “off-table” vaccine injury cases, concluding that the Stevens test is contrary to law. Second, the petitioner ob-jeets to the CSM’s failure to consider the opinions of the petitioner’s treating physicians, concluding that such failure was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Third, the petitioner objects to the CSM’s failure to consider the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System reports, concluding that such failure was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. For the reasons set out below the Court sustains the CSM’s entitlement decision denying compensation.
Background
The petitioner suffers from rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”). She received her first hepatitis B vaccination on August 1,1995, at a presummer camp physical. Pet’r’s Ex. 1 (Affidavit of Ann Marie Ryman (“Ryman Deck”) ¶ 1). On December 26, 1995, the petitioner was administered her second hepatitis B vaccine. Id. ¶ 5; Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 30. Following the second vaccination, the petitioner went to a rheumatologist, who diagnosed her with “auto immune rheumatoid arthritis” at sixteen years of age. Ryman Decl. ¶ 6.
This case is one of five closely-related vaccine compensation petitions, heard before CSM Golkiewicz, all dealing with the issue of whether hepatitis B vaccine causes RA. Of the other, four, judgment was entered against the petitioner without appeal in Ashley v. HHS, No. 01-221V (Fed.Cl. Oct. 20, 2003); the CSM’s decision denying compensation was affirmed by Capizzano v. HHS,
Discussion
When reviewing a decision of a special master, the Court inquires into whether any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law are arbitrary or capricious,
Vaccine Act litigation can be divided into two types of cases: table and off-table. Table cases are those where the complained-of injury is listed in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14. In these cases, the petitioner enjoys the presumption of causation, and the respondent must show that the vaccine did not cause the injury. In contrast, off-table cases are those where the complained-of injury is not listed in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14. In these cases, the petitioner enjoys no presumption; he or she must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine was both a “but-for” cause of the injury and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Shyface v. Sec’y of HHS,
Objection One: the Stevens factors
The petitioner contends that the use of the Stevens
The CSM incorporated into his entitlement decision the legal reasoning and conclusions of his decision in the related case of Capizza-no v. HHS,
Eschewing the somewhat controversial Stevens factors, the CSM in Capizzano recited the well-known standards for off-table causation in vaccine eases. The CSM explained that the essential standard is that the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that the vaccine caused the injury. This is usually established by reference to a legitimate medical theory that causally connects the vaccination to the injury. The medical theory must be substantiated by proof of a logical sequence of cause and effect. In sum, the petitioner must show both but-for and substantial factor causation. Capizzano at *3,
The CSM went on to discuss the Stevens factors. At the outset, he stated the clear preference for epidemiological studies to prove causation-in-fact. In the absence of such “golden” and rare evidence, the CSM concluded that causation can be proved circumstantially, with reference to the following five factors: medical plausibility; consensus of the medical community as to biologic plausibility; type-injury; a medically acceptable time-frame for onset; and an absence of other likely factors. Id. at *4,
Without leaving a stone unturned, the CSM addressed the Court’s strong critique of the Stevens factors in Althen v. HHS,
Beginning his own causation analysis, the CSM noted that the case law did not contain an accepted definition of “logical sequence of cause and effect.” Id. at *7,
Where the epidemiological evidence does not support eausation-in-fact, the CSM reasoned that recovery can still be had by proving causation circumstantially. Such a showing consists of: (1) the existence of a biologic mechanism
Turning to the evidence presented at the joint hearing, the CSM determined that it was biologically plausible that hepatitis B vaccine causes RA. He made this finding relying upon the Maillefert study,
Although Petitioner Capizzano established biologic plausibility, the CSM concluded that she failed to prove rechallenge because of inadequacies in the petitioner’s expert evidence. The CSM noted a number of difficulties with Dr. Bell’s testimony. First, Dr. Bell could not explain why a well-respected RA textbook asserted that the incidence of RA may be decreasing with time. See Transcript (“Tr.”) (June 11, 2003) at 51. Second, Dr. Bell relied mainly upon case reports in crafting his theory, and case reports are the least rehable type of evidence for establishing vaccine injury causation. Id. at 51-52. Third, Dr. Bell could not cite any discussion in the medical literature within the last twelve months mentioning a connection between the vaccine and RA. Capizzano at *20-21,
Addressing the data upon which Dr. Bell relied, the CSM noted that Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (‘VAERS”) evi
The CSM applied this analysis to Petitioner Ryman’s case. Ryman at *11-*12. The petitioner offered no epidemiological study. She did not identify any genetic markers. She failed to prove that her expert’s proposed biologic mechanism occurred in her. She did not establish that the medical community generally accepts the existence of a causal connection between RA and hepatitis B vaccine. And she failed to prove a logical sequence of cause and effect linking the vaccine to her injury. Id. at *12. The CSM also noted that the record supported other causes for her injury. The petitioner’s May 1996 medical records indicate that she had chronic low back, knee and ankle pain, and had suffered gymnastics injuries. Id. See Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 25, 40. In light of this evidence, the CSM determined that the petitioner had failed to prove by a preponderance that the hepatitis B vaccine caused her RA. See Ryman at *12.
The Court finds no legal error in the CSM’s analysis or its application to the petitioner’s case. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the CSM did not apply the Stevens factors, although he did reference them in Capizzano and Ryman. See Capizzano,
The CSM’s analysis also is consistent with the standards for expert testimony enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Daubert sets forth several factors by which the admissibility of expert testimony is to be adjudged: (1) whether a theory or technique can or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether the theory or technique has a known or potential rate of error and whether standards exist for controlling that risk of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the relevant scholarly or professional community. See Daubert,
Considering all the medical evidence before him, the CSM diligently applied the “logical sequence” test required by precedent. His analysis was no doubt influenced by the Stevens factors, but it was not dictated by them. Moreover, the Court can find no error in the CSM’s using his considerable experience in vaccine cases to formulate a framework by which he can analyze the evidence presented, and, at the same time, give parties fair notice of how they should structure their cases. By organizing the analytical criteria that have been developed over the course of many years’ worth of fact-finding, the CSM has made more articulate— and, hence, transparent — the otherwise tacit process of factual determination. In this endeavor the CSM should be lauded. The record supports the CSM’s determination that the petitioner has not established the existence of a plausible biologic mechanism occurring in her. Tr. at 40, 290; Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 27. Similarly justified was the CSM’s discounting of Dr. Schned’s testimony purportedly supporting rechallenge. Compare Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 14 with Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 28. The CSM’s rejection of Dr. Bell’s theory, because insufficiently corroborated by independent peer review, was in accordance with law. The Court agrees with the analysis set forth in Manville, affirming the CSM’s entitlement decision and discussing the deference the special masters enjoy in fact-finding:
With this wide berth charted for his analysis, the chief special master did'not act arbitrarily and capriciously when reviewing the facts of petitioner’s case. The [deferential standard] is illustrative of the medical evidence available to the chief special master, and his acknowledgment of it and discussion of its probative value are sufficient to pass muster under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Id. at 494. Accordingly, the Court denies the petitioner’s first objection.
Objection Two: failure to consider opinions of treating physicians
The petitioner objects to the CSM’s decision not to credit Dr. Schned’s subjective medical history. The CSM found several difficulties with Dr. Schned’s account. First, Dr. Schned reported that the petitioner received her two vaccinations in the Spring or Summer of 1995, Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 14, when in fact she received them in August and December of 1995. Ryman Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5. Second, Dr. Schned reported that the petitioner completed the vaccination series prior to her canoe trip, Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 14, when in fact she received only the first vaccination prior to summer camp. Ryman Decl. ¶ 1. Third, Dr. Schned implied that the petitioner was diagnosed with “trigger finger” shortly after the canoe trip, Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 14, when in fact she was not diagnosed until December, 1995. Ryman at *9; Pet’r’s Ex. 2, at 28. The CSM was also concerned that Dr. Schned’s account was written one year after the second vaccination. The CSM conceded that Dr. Schned’s account of the onset of the petitioner’s “trigger finger” could support a finding of rechallenge, but the estimated time-frame — four or five months — could place onset either before or after vaccination. Id. at *9-*10. The CSM concluded that Dr. Schned’s account was not probative of rechallenge.
The Court finds no error in the CSM’s analysis or in his weighing of evidence. As noted in the entitlement decision, the ease law expresses a preference for contemporary medical history, not subjective recounting. See Cucuras v. Sec’y of HHS,
While the Court might have weighed the evidence differently, or perhaps not given as much consideration to the inconsistencies in the petitioner’s affidavit as did the CSM, this is entirely beside the point. In fact-finding, the special masters receive deference from the Court unless they have acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The CSM’s discounting of both the petitioner’s affidavit and Dr. Schned’s subjective medical history was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The CSM’s discounting of Dr. Bell’s theories also was perfectly proper given that, by his own admission, Dr. Bell’s biologic mechanism theory depended entirely upon the petitioner’s affidavit. See Ryman at *11; Tr. at 290. Dr. Bell implied that proof of RA rechallenge for hepatitis B vaccinations required that symptoms appear within thirty days of the second exposure. See Ryman at *8; Tr. at 40. The petitioner sought medical help for joint pain in April, 1996, three months after the second vaccination. Ry-man at *8; Pet’r’s Ex.2, at 27. Hence, it is . clear from the foregoing that the CSM did not impose upon the petitioner some insurmountable burden to establish causation. He abided by the “logical sequence” test, but found that the petitioner’s evidence could not substantiate her expert’s theories. The petitioner’s second objection concerns at heart the deference owed to the CSM’s fact-finding. The CSM explained in his entitlement decision that:
[w]hat may appear to be unreasonable nitpicking of petitioner’s affidavit is in reality the critical determination of the substance of petitioner’s case. The absence of corroborating notations in the medical records, the several contradictory documents regarding the timing of events, and the absence of any explanatory testimony leads the undersigned to the firm and inescapable conclusion that the contemporaneous medical records are to be relied upon for the facts of this case... It must follow, therefore, that petitioner’s affidavit is found to be inherently unreliable. [H] With these findings, because the undersigned cannot rely on petitioner’s affidavit, [her] case of rechallenge must fail.
Id. at *11. As the Capizzano Court stated in affirming the CSM’s entitlement decision, “special masters have wide discretion with respect to the evidence they would consider and the weight to be assigned that evidence.”
The petitioner objects to the CSM’s decision not to accord substantial weight to the VAERS reports, which allegedly establish a causal link between hepatitis B vaccine and RA. See Capizzano at *24,
The CSM did not entirely discount the VAERS reports, but he did state that, despite the eleven months given Petitioner Capizzano (and Petitioner Ryman) to supplement the record, no additional evidence was presented to show a causal link. This failure to amplify the record was especially noteworthy to the CSM given that the number of hepatitis B vaccinations is increasing. Cap-izzano at *24,
Conclusion
Having reviewed the record and considered the petition’s objections, the Court finds no error in the CSM’s entitlement decision. The CSM applied the proper legal standard for determining causation in off-table cases. The CSM acted within his discretion in discounting the evidentiary weight of the petitioner’s affidavit, Dr. Schned’s medical history, and the VAERS reports. The CSM also properly declined to follow Dr. Bell’s theories, given the latter’s express reliance on the petitioner’s affidavit.
Accordingly, the entitlement decision of the CSM is SUSTAINED. The petition for review is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for the respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Federal Circuit has noted that, in Vaccine Act litigation, “no uniform definition of [the arbitrary and capricious] standard has emerged.” Hines v. Sec’y of HHS,
. The Stevens factors were first published in the CSM’s entitlement decision in Stevens v. Sec’y of HHS,
. Such was the opinion of the Court in Althen v. United. States,
. These include the identification of any genetic predisposition to a disease, which may then be linked to the hypothesized cause of injury.
. "A rechallenge case is one where adverse symptoms are noted after a dose of the vaccine, an additional dose of the vaccine is given, and the symptoms worsen.” Ryman v. HHS, No. 99-591V, at *4 n. 6 (Fed.Cl. Ch. Spec.Mstr. Sept. 24, 2004) (unpublished decision).
. A biologic mechanism is a medically plausible process by which a component of a vaccine can cause a particular injury.
. J.F. Maillerfert, J. Sibilia, et al. Rheumatic disorders developed after hepatitis B vaccination, 38 Rheumatology 978 (1999), Resp.’s Ex. L.
. The petitioner suggests that this Court follow the causation standard set forth in Golub v. HHS,