Rylee v. Marett, SheriffRylee v. Marett, Sheriff
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Marion
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Marion.T.W. Rylee, plaintiff, brought an action in claim and delivery against W. O. Marett, as Sheriff of Anderson County, defendant, for the recovery of an automobile which had been seized by the defendant while being used for the transportation of alcoholic liquors in violation of the prohibition law. The cause came on for trial .before Hon, Ernest Moore, Circuit Judge, and a jury in the Court of Common Pleas for Anderson Count)‘‘, December 15, 1921. Judge Moore sustained a demurrer to the claim • and delivery proceeding, on the ground that the property was in custodia legis, but allowed the trial to proceed as an action to recover possession of personal property. The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Court adjourned sine die December 17, 1921. A notice of intention to’ appeal *370 was served upon D. W. Harris, one of the attorneys for the defendant, on December 22, 1921, by leaving a copy of same upon his desk in his office. This notice was never seen by Mr. Harris. After the time for appeal had passed, without, as defendant’s counsel understood, any notice of intention to appeal having been served, the defendant was advised by his counsel to advertise the automobile according to law and sell same, which he did. The car was sold by the Sheriff on January 25, 1922. The plaintiff’s case and exceptions on appeal were not prepared and served within the 30 days-limited by law. Early in February, after the time for serving the case and exceptions had expired, plaintiff’s attorneys requested defendant’s attorneys to accept service of the proposed case and exceptions on appeal. Defendant’s attorneys declined to do so, but offered to accept service and allow appeal to proceed, if plaintiff would agree to limit liability to the sale price of the car as fixed by the sale thereof made by the‘Sheriff on January 25, 1922. The plaintiff declined that offer, and thereafter, on March 27. 1922, formally served upon defendant’s attorneys, through the Sheriff’s office, a proposed case and exceptions.
Defendant’s counsel, pursuant to notice, then moved before his ; onor, W. H. Townsend, Circuit Judge, presiding at the April term of the Court of Common Pleas for Anderson County, for an order dismissing plaintiff’s appeal to the Supreme Court. Judge Townsend refused this motion, and ordered that the appeal of the plaintiff be “allowed to stand.” From this order, dated April 15, 1922, the defendant appeals to this Court upon a case and exceptions, served upon plaintiff’s attorneys under date of May 2, 1922.
The contention cannot be sustained. At the time the agreement was signed’, defendant’s appeal from Judge Townsend’s order was pending. It is not suggested that defendant’s counsel actually intended to relinquish defendant’s right to prosecute his appeal and to insist upon the dismissal of‘plaintiff’s appeal by this Court. In the absence* of an express stipulation to that effect, no intention on the part of the defendant’s counsel to withdraw their appeal can be inferred from an agreement to allow plaintiff’s proposed case and exceptions to constitute the return for that appeal. One obvious result of such agreement was to save plaintiff trouble in having to take other steps to complete his return, and it does not appear that his counsel were in any way misled to their prejudice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that defendant is entitled to have his appeal from Judge Townsend’s order and his motion in this Court upon the record to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal first considered and determined. The appeal from Judge Townsend’s order, involving the motion to dismiss, will be *372 referred to as the “defendant’s appeal”; the appeal in the main cause from the trial before Judge Moore, as the “plaintiff’s appeal.”
“The time for taking any step or proceeding in the preparation and perfection of appeals from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court, as now prescribed by law, may be extended by the Judge who heard the cause, or by any one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, upon four days’ notice of such motion being first given to the opposite party, *373 except the time of giving notice of appeal to the opposite party.”
Under the provisions of that Section he had the right to apply, provided the application was made before the expira: tion of the 30 days limited, to the Circuit Judge “who heard the cause,” or to “any one of the Justices of the Supreme Court,” for an extension of the time within which to serve his case with exceptions. Stribling v. Johns, 16 S. C., 112; Tribble v. Poore, 28 S. C., 570; 6 S. E., 577; Brown v. Easterling, 59 S. C., 479; 38 S. E., 118. After having failed in apt time to apply for the desired extension under Section 387, the plaintiff’s only remedy was an application to the Supreme Court for permission to perfect his appeal under the provisions of Section 388. Where the notice of appeal has been duly given, the Supreme Court, under Section 388, may, in its discretion; relieve the party seeking to appeal from the consequences of other omissions in the perfecting‘of his appeal. Wardlaw v. Erskine, 20 S. C., 583; Saverance v. Lockhart, 66 S. C., 541; 45 S. E., 83; Deal v. Deal, 85 S. C, 262; 67 S. E., 241.
*375
“That on the 12th day of January, 1922, deponent’s partner was called to the Legislature, and remained in attendance upon same until early in March. That deponent was kept constantly engaged in the business of his office, with a great deal of work, and had the burden of the entire office on his hands. That deponent began work on the proposed case before the time expired, but was constantly interrupted, and could not put his entire time of any one day on the matter. That he finally, early in February, finished the proposed case and asked the solicitor, Mr. Harris, to accept service; that the Solicitor refused to do so, claiming that no notice of appeal was served upon him. . . . Deponent further says that the delay in perfecting the appeal within the 30 days allowed by law was not willful, but through excusable neglect; that due to the pressure of office work, saddled upon him in the absence of Mr. Dickson, it was impossible to prepare and serve it sooner.”
We do not think this makes a case of “mistake or inadvertence.” The failure to prepare and serve the case and exceptions would seem clearly attributable to giving preference to other office work, which, so far as the record discloses, was certainly not entitled to priority over the important matter of perfecting an appeal within the fixed *376 limit of time prescribed by law. It is true this Court, in the case of Crosswell v. Association, 49 S. C., 374; 27 S. E., 388, in- laying down the rule for the exercise of the Court’s discretion under Section 388, has said that relief would be extended when a party has failed to take some step necessary to perfect his appeal “through excusable inadvertence, or from sickness or other cause beyond his control.” “But,” as the Court further states, “in doing so, care will be taken to prevent, as far as possible, any injury, by delay or otherwise, to the respondent, whose rights are as much entitled to- be respected as are those of the appellant.” However much disposed, through the “fellow feeling” that “makes one wondrous kind,” to look with favor upon the familiar and time-honored excuse of “pressure of work,” we doubt the validity of that plea as a cause beyond one’s control, or as a justification for inadvertence, which results in a failure to perfect a client’s appeal within due time. If the “demnition grind” of the law office becomes too’ strenuous, the over-worked attorney can always apply, under Section 387 (Code Civ. Proc., 1912), for an extension of time, which was not done in this case.
For the reasons stated, the defendant’s appeal is sustained as a motion to dismiss in this Court, and the plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.