Aрpellee Marcie Caldwell sued the Comptroller seeking a declaration that section 51.702(b) of the Texas Government Code is unconstitutional. The Comptroller filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The Comptroller now appeals the trial court’s interlocutory order, 1 alleging that the court erred because appellee’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity or the trial court otherwise lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm the trial court’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Caldwell filed a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of section 51.702(b) of the Texas Government Code. The statute provides in part: “In addition to other court costs, a person shall pay $15 as a court cost on conviction of any criminal offense in a statutory county court, including cases in which probation or deferred adjudication is granted.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.702(b) (West Supp. 2000). The court cost is to be collected “in the same manner as other fees, fines, or costs are collected in the case.” Id. § 51.702(c). The court clerk must then send the collected fees or costs to the Comptroller. See id. § 51.702(d). The Comptroller deposits the fees into a judicial fund, which is used to supplement judges’ salaries in participating statutory county courts. See id. Not all counties with statutory county courts have opted to collect the additional fees to supplement judges’ salaries. Because this results in court costs that vary from county to county, Caldwell claims her rights under the due course of law and equal rights provisiоns of the Texas Constitution have been violated.
In her suit, Caldwell, individually and on behalf of the certified class, sought to enjoin the Comptroller from continuing to collect and disburse the court costs collected under section 51.702(b) of the Government Code, asked the court to declare that section 51.702(b) of the Government Code *135 violates the Texas Constitution, and sought reimbursement of rеasonable attorney’s fees. In response, the Comptroller filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging the court was without jurisdiction to consider Caldwell’s suit because (1) Caldwell lacks standing to seek the relief requested; (2) the Comptroller is not the proper defendant; (3) injunctive relief is not proper because Caldwell and the class have an adequate remedy at lаw; (4) Caldwell’s claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (5) Caldwell has no claim for declaratory relief; and (6) Caldwell failed to comply with the Tax Code’s requirements for claiming a refund. The trial court denied the Comptroller’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the Comptroller appeals this interlocutory order. On appeal the Comptroller complains that Caldwell’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity, Caldwell is required to challenge the collection of the fees under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and no justiciable controversy exists between Caldwell and the Comptroller that can be addressed through injunctive or declaratory relief.
DISCUSSION
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.
See Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
Because subject matter, jurisdiction presents a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision under a de novo standard of review. See id. at 65. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we do not look at the merits of the case; rather, we “construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff,” look to the pleader’s intent, and accept the pleadings’ factual allegations as true. Id. at 65. “The truth of the plaintiffs allegations is at issue only if the defendant pleads and proves that the allegations were fraudulently made to confer jurisdiction on the court.” Id. at 65.
In her first point of error, the Comptroller contends that Caldwell’s suit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the State has not waived sovereign immunity in suits such as this one unless the cause of action is brought under the Tax Code. In the alternative, the Comptroller argues that while an exception to sovereign immunity arises for State officials’ ultra vires acts, the Comptroller’s actions were not ultra vires and therefore, the exception does not apply. 2
Sovereign immunity generally protects the State from lawsuits for damages absent legislative consent to sue the State.
See Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ.,
The State maintains that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Caldwell’s cause of action because the “Legislature has not specifically granted Plaintiffs permission to sue the Comptroller” to recover fees from the State or to enjoin the Comptroller other than through the Tax Code. Chapter 112 of the Tax Code sets out the prerequisites necessary to bring suit against the State to recover taxes or fees paid to the State under protest.
See
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 112.052 (West 1992);
Contran Corp. v. Bullock,
The Comptroller also contends that it has not waived its sovereign immunity because the Comptroller’s acts in disbursing the collected fees were not ultra vires. The Comptroller was acting pursuant to the legislature’s mandate, and thus the exception to sovereign immunity does not apply. According to the Comptroller, “there are no cases allowing declaratory and injunctive relief ... from the State without a waiver of sovereign immunity, where the State was acting according to an express statute.” We disagree.
It is axiomatic that a “party must have legislative consent or statutory authorization before it can maintain a suit and recover a judgment that will operate to control state action, subject the state to liability, or affect the state’s property rights and interests.”
Bagg v. University of Tex. Med. Branch,
The Comptroller next argues that Caldwell’s exclusive remedy to contest the section 51.702(b) fees is to file a motion to correct costs under article 103.008 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Comptroller maintains that thе district court is without jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the section 51.702 fees because they are criminal fees and should be contested in the court where the criminal case was last pending. Article 103.008(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “On the filing of a motion by a defendant not later than one year after the date of the final disposition of a case in which costs were imposed, the court in which the case is pending or was last pending shall correct any error in the costs.” Tex.Code Crim. Proe. Ann. art. 103.008 (West Supp.2000). By its express language, this article applies in cases where a party complains of an “error” in the costs assessed. Clearly, Caldwell’s suit does not concern an allegation of any “error” in the calculation of costs. Rather, Caldwell is seeking a declaration that the statute imposing the costs is unconstitutional. We therefore find article 103.008 inapplicable and hold that Caldwell was not limited to filing her suit in the court in which her criminal ease was tried. We overrule the Comptroller’s second point of error.
In her final point of error, the Comptroller presents two arguments. First, she argues that because Caldwell is challenging a criminal statute, she must comply with the requirements set forth in
State v. Morales,
We first address the Comptroller’s characterization of section 51.702 as a criminal statute. Citing
Ex parte Carson,
The Comptroller has overstated the holding in Carson, which involved an appeal of the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 127. Carson argued that certain court costs were unconstitutional. See id. The court of criminal appeals considered the constitutionality of the court costs only as they applied to criminal convictions because the issue was presented on an appeal of a criminal conviction. Contrary to the Comptroller’s assertions, the court did not hold that the statute authorizing the court costs must be a criminal statute, or that the statute can only be challenged through an appeal of the criminal conviction for which they were assessed. The holding in Carson did not turn on whether the statute authorizing the fees could be characterized as a criminal statute, and it certainly did not turn on whether the constitutionality of the statute could be determined in a civil suit. Accordingly, we do not find Carson applicable to this case.
*138
The statute at issue here is intended to supplement judicial salaries, not to criminalize certain behavior. Accordingly, we determine that this is not a criminal statute. Because section 51.702 is not a criminal statute, the trial court need not determine whether a civil court’s equity jurisdiction should be expanded to address the constitutionality of a criminal statute.
See Morales,
With regard to justiciable controversy, the Comptroller directs us to
Lone Starr Multi Theatres, Inc. v. State,
In
Lone Starr Multi Theatres,
the plaintiff attempted to challenge the constitutionality of obscenity statutes by suing the Attorney General — a party without authority to enforce the challenged statutes.
See
The Comptroller suggests that even if the court were to declare the statute unconstitutional and enjoin the Comptroller from administering the fees, counties could continue to collect the fees; their actions would not be the subject of the injunction. We disagree with this proposition for two reasons. First, if the Comptroller were enjoined from depositing the fees in the judicial fund and distributing them to the counties, the counties would have no incentive to continue to collect the fees. Section 51.702 mandates county clerks to send collected fees ,to the Comptroller at least as frequently as monthly. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.702(d). It does not authorize the counties to hold onto the funds indefinitеly or to supplement the judges’ salaries on their own. If the Comptroller were enjoined from depositing and disbursing the fees, the funds could not be returned to the counties to supplement the judges’ salaries. Under the statutory scheme the counties are unable to supplement their judicial salaries directly by collecting the fees.
Moreover, if the court were to declare thе statute- unconstitutional but deny injunctive relief, the Comptroller’s conduct in depositing the funds and distributing them would not be authorized by statute. Likewise, the counties’ collection of the fees would no longer be authorized. If the Comptroller were to continue to *139 deposit the funds and distribute them, the Comptroller would in effect be depositing and distributing funds that were collected pursuant to an unconstitutiоnal statute, and the fees would not be legitimate funds of the State or the counties. Because those funds include fees paid by Caldwell, Caldwell’s rights may have been violated by the Comptroller’s actions, rendering a suit against the Comptroller to remedy the violation or to prevent its recurrence a justiciable controversy within the trial court’s jurisdiction. We therefore hold the Comptroller is engaging in an activity that, is the possible subject of declaratory and injunctive relief. 4 We overrule the Comptroller’s third issue. In deciding this interlocutory appeal, we express no opinion on the merits of Caldwell’s challenge to the statute.
CONCLUSION
Because we determine Caldwell’s suit was not a suit against the State within the rule of sovereign immunity, we hold the trial court was not deprived of its jurisdiction. We further hold Caldwell was not limited to the remedies found in the Tax Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure and that her suit presented a justiciable controversy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.
Notes
. Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code authorizes an appeal of an interlocutory order granting or dеnying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp.2000).
. The Comptroller originally argued that Caldwell’s suit is barred because she seeks monetary damages from the State. However, Caldwell's amended petition clearly asserts that she has relinquished any claims that purport to seek money damages. In her post-submission brief, the Comptroller acknowledges that appellees have rеnounced any claim for monetary relief and that the appeal now centers on the question of the court’s jurisdiction for declaratory and injunctive relief.
. Even if we were to accept the Comptroller's argument and assume that Caldwell’s suit is intended to enjoin the Comptroller from collecting a "tax” as contemplated by Chapter 112 of the Tax Code, Caldwell has not requested a refund of the funds collected. Thus, Caldwell would not be relegated to the requirements of the Tax Code. Moreover, because we hold later in this opinion this is not a suit against the State, Caldwell need not seek legislative consent or exhaust the administrative remedies set out in the Tax Code before instituting this suit.
Compare Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.,
. In reaching this holding, we do not intimate whether an injunction is appropriate under these facts. The injunctive relief sought depends upon the premise that the Comptroller’s actions wеre unlawful or unconstitutional.
See Bagg v. University of Tex. Med. Branch,