84 So. 55 | La. | 1919
Lead Opinion
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Defendant having appealed front a judgment awarding plaintiff damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while in the discharge of functions pertaining to his employment, plaintiff moves that the appeal be dismissed, on the ground that it was obtained by motion at a term of court subsequent to that at which it was rendered, and that it (defendant) was not cited, or prayed to be cited, to answer thereto.
The transcript contains the following “statement of facts” by the trial judge, to wit:
“This cause was tried before the undersigned on June 8, 1913, and taken under advisement for decision on briefs to be filed by both sides. August and September being the months of vacation . of the Eighth district court, the case was decided and judgment rendered and signed in open court the 20th day of October, 1917. This date was not of regular term of court for Catahoula parish. The court opened for the express purposes of rendering and signing judgment in this case, and immediately after doing so adjourned sine die. The motion for new trial in this case was filed on Monday, the first legal day following the date of judgment. The motion for new trial was taken up, tried, and overruled on the [first] day the court was opened and in session after signing the judgment.”
The minutes of the court show the rendition and signing of the judgment, the granting of an appeal, and (with the statement of the judge) the immediate adjournment of the court sine die on October 20, 1917, the hearing and overruling on November 12th of a motion for new trial (which had been filed on October 22d); and the filing of a motion for, and granting of, an appeal on the same day, followed on Novemfoer 21st by the filing of a bond for a suspensive appeal.
Opinion.
“Whoever intends to appeal, may do so either by petition, or by motion in open court at the same term at which the judgment was rendered,” etc. Act No. 163 of 1898; State ex rel. Murray v. Judge, 50 La. Ann. 985, 24 South. 132; McCutchen v. Hudson, 132 La. 178, 61 South. 157.
As it appears from the statement of the trial judge that August and September are the months during which his court is in vacation, it follows that the months from October to July, inclusive, are the ten months constituting his continuous term or session, and that the appeal herein taken on November 12th from a judgment rendered on Oc
The motion to dismiss is therefore overruled.
Opinion on the Merits
On the Merits — Statement of the Case.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant is indebted to him in the sum! of $15,000, under the general law of tort, or, in the alternative, in the sum of $4,000 in installments of $10 per week, under Act No. 20 of 1914 (“Burke-Roberts Employers’ Liability Act”). The ease disclosed by the transcript is as follows:
Defendant owned timbered lands on and near Black river, in what is known as Black river swamp, 22 miles from Jonesville, and was having the timber felled and cut into sawlogs, which plaintiff had contracted to haul to the river bank at the rate of $3 per 1,000 feet; he to furnish his own teams, employ, control, and discharge the working men required,' and to be his own master in the matter of handling his outfit and the methods to be adopted in the execution of the contract. He alleges that it was agreed as part of the contract that defendant was to transport the feed required for his stock without charge, but that allegation is not sustained by the proof; our conclusion being that Oliver Smith, who represented defendant in the negotiation of the contract, told plaintiff that defendant could do nothing of that kind at the time; that they would see about it later, after they began towing; that there was nothing definite or binding in what he said; and that, as a fact, defendant had not transported any feed prior to that which was being unloaded at the moment of the accident out of which this suit has arisen, though plaintiff appears to have then been, at work for some time. Plaintiff admits that he was to do the unloading of the feed from defendant’s boat, and, in effect, that he was to pay the expense of drayage and putting it aboard the boat.
The circumstances connected with the accident were as follows: Plaintiff had established his camp on the bank of the river, and about an hour before sundown on October 19, 1916, defendant’s motorboat, in charge of its foremen, Williams and Smith, and carrying 12 sacks of oats for defendant, arrived and was made fast, by means of a three-fourth inch manila rope, to the root of a willow tree, immediately in front of the camp, the rope being attached to the stem of the boat, instead of the bow, for the reason that the oats were loaded on the after part, and, the bank being crooked and the depth of the
Opinion.
It is, however, beyond dispute that the boat was first made fast by means of the rope to the root of the tree, and that plaintiff, immediately in front of whose camp the tree stood, and who therefore had a much better-opportunity of knowing its condition than had defendant or its employes, was afforded an additional hour of daylight within which to consider whether it was safe or unsafe to work beneath the limb, and that the tying of the rope to the tree, if tied it was, was done by plaintiff’s assistant.
It nfay be that the rope was insecurely tied to the root, or that the root gave way, but that was not the proximate cause of the accident, since it was not then that the limb fell. According to McNally’s testimony, that occurred after the rope had become detached from the root and he had wrapped it around the body of the tree and was engaged in tying it. Plaintiff was on the spot, however, and had been living there in his camp with the tree before his eyes, and if its dangerous condition was so obvious that defendant’s employés, who were there for perhaps the first time, should have known it, why should-not he also have known it? And, if he did know it, why did he not stop McNally, or better still, why had he not previously made the request that the boat be moved to a safer place? It had been landed there as the place most convenient to him, and as it required merely the touching of a button or the pulling of a lever, it would no doubt have been moved if such request had been made.
The fact is, as we see it, there was nothing in the appearance of the tree to suggest a doubt as to its capacity to hold the boat, which was but little over 40 feet long, and, as we infer, of rather light draft, since the river was almost without current, or to suggest that it could be so shaken by the pulling of the boat as to bring down an apparently sound limb or fork 14 or 16 inches in diameter. It is true that the limb was rotten, but defendant’s employés did not know that any more than did the plaintiff, who had the better opportunity for finding it out; the decay being visible only to one looking down into the point of junction between the limb and the trunk of the tree from above. As to the trunk below the fork where the rope is said to have been tied by McNally, Oapt. Lashley, who for five years previous to the trial had been in command of a tugboat engaged under the United States government in removing snags from Black river, testified that a tree of that size was not likely to have been appreciably shaken by any such pulling; also that Oliver Smith (defendant’s foreman) pointed out to him a tree which he said was the tree here in question, and that he had cut it down and removed it, and in so doing had observed that the trunk was sound and was a tough variety of willow; and Smith testified that the tree pointed out by him was the tree in question. Our conclusions in the matter, however, are that the limb was blown down by a gust of wind, which is said to have moved just then at the rate of about 30 or 40 miles an hour, and that, if the tying of the boat had anything to do with its falling, it was because the rope on the second occasion was tied to the limb, and not • to the body, of the tree. In general the rule which entitles an employs to rely upon the prevision and superior knowledge of his employer
The trial judge awarded plaintiff $1,500 (being $5 per week for 300 weeks) and $100 in reimbursement of medical expenses. We are of opinion that the judgment so rendered should be annulled, and plaintiff’s demands rejected at his cost.
And it is so ordered.
Rehearing
On Rehearing.
The application for rehearing was based mainly upon the averment that, after the case was submitted to this court for decision and before we rendered judgment reversing the decree of the district court and dismissing plaintiff’s suit, the defendant, appellant, agreed to abide by the judgment of the district court and have the appeal dismissed. In support of the averment that the contest had been thus settled and disposed of, the plaintiff, appellee, annexed to his petition for rehearing the correspondence had between his attorneys and the attorney for defendant, appellant; and he prayed that a rehearing be granted in order that the appeal might be dismissed, and the judgment of the district court be executed. In the alternative, he prayed that, if the appeal should not be dismissed, judgment should be rendered in his favor and in accord with his original petition.
We were not informed of any negotiations for compromise or settlement of the suit until the petition for rehearing was filed.
It is ordered that this case be remanded to the district court for determination of the question whether appellant had agreed to abide by the judgment of the district court, when judgment was rendered herein by the Supreme Court, as alleged in appellee’s petition for rehearing.