Ryan v. United States Marshal for the Southern District of California

Aug 31, 2026

3:26-cv-01517

ORDER DISMISSING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) PLAINTIFF‘S (1) BIVENS CAUSES OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE, AND (2) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On June 18, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff Jeremy Ryan leave to proceed in forma pauperis and to file electronically and dismissed without prejudice his initial Complaint upon sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See generally ECF No. 12 (the “Prior Order“).) Presently before the Court is Plaintiff‘s First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 13), which was timely filed pursuant to the Prior Order.

As previously explained to Plaintiff, (see Prior Order at 2–3), the Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.“); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim“). As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the in forma pauperis provisions of Section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013).

“The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.‘” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014). While Federal ”Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge‘s disbelief of a complaint‘s factual allegations[,] . . . Section 1915([e)(2]) . . . accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint‘s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless,” including “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). A pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

Although Plaintiff‘s First Amended Complaint has addressed the Court‘s prior concerns under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), (compare ECF No. 1, with ECF No. 13; see also Prior Order at 3), the Court concludes that dismissal is again warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) on jurisdictional grounds. As previously explained, (see Prior Order at 3–4), “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,]” and “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

Plaintiff now clarifies that he is bringing this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971), for violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due process under Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). (See FAC at 2–3.) Plaintiff contends that “[t]his case does not present a new Bivens context because the Ninth Circuit has already adjudicated the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees to be free from unwarranted shackling under the Fifth Amendment in this exact District.” (See id. at 3 (citing United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).) Plaintiff‘s reliance on the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Sanchez-Gomez, however, is misplaced for more than one reason. First, the United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Sanchez-Gomez, see generally United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (2018) (vacating and remanding on grounds of mootness), and “a decision that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever[.]” Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991))), overruled on other grounds by Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). Second, unlike this action, Sanchez-Gomez did not arise under Bivens because the plaintiffs were criminal defendants who filed emergency motions in their criminal cases challenging the constitutionality of a district-wide shackling policy after their in-court objections to the policy had been overruled. See Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 384; see also Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 654.

Plaintiff also challenges his “unconstitutional conditions of confinement,” (see FAC ¶¶ 48–52 (cleaned up and emphasis omitted)), relying on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). (See FAC ¶ 49.) Like Sanchez-Gomez, however, Bell was not a Bivens action; rather, the plaintiffs in Bell filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, which the district court then certified as a class action. See 441 U.S. at 526. Consequently, the Supreme Court did not recognize a cause of action under Bivens in Bell.

This brings the Court back to the three causes of action that the Supreme Court has recognized under Bivens: (1) unreasonable searches and seizures committed by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see 403 U.S. at 397; (2) violations of Due Process, such as gender discrimination, under the Fifth Amendment, see Davis, 442 U.S. at 248–49; and (3) failure to provide adequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130–31 (2017). As the Court previously explained, (see Prior Order at 4–5 & n.1), Plaintiff‘s claims differ meaningfully from any of these pre-existing causes of action under Bivens.

Because Plaintiff‘s claim arises in a new context, the Court “must determine[] whether there is any alternative, existing process for protecting the plaintiffs’ interests.” Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W. Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009)). As the Court previously alluded to, (see Prior Order at 4–5), alternative remedies are available here. Indeed, more than one judge in this District has declined to recognize new Bivens claims against individual U.S. Marshals because of the availability of alternative administrative remedies. See, e.g., Romero v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1148–49 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Arellano v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:14-CV-02404-JO-KSC, 2023 WL 5986134, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023). Plaintiff‘s allegations that he was unaware of and/or unable to submit a grievance while in custody do not change this calculus because the Supreme Court has recognized that “a regulation requiring an agency to investigate alleged misconduct offered an adequate alternative Bivens, even though the complainant was ‘not entitled to participate and ha[d] no right to judicial review of an adverse determination‘—and even though . . . the remedial scheme did not provide monetary relief.”¹ See Pettibone v. Russell, 59 F.4th 449, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 497–98 (2022)). This is “because Bivens ‘is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers‘—i.e., the focus is whether the Government has put in place safeguards to ‘preven[t]’ constitutional violations ‘from recurring.‘” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001)) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)). “If there are alternative remedial structures in place, ‘that alone,’ like any special factor, is reason enough to ‘limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.‘” Id. at 493 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137). “So long as Congress or the Executive has created a remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that calibration by superimposing a Bivens remedy.” Id. at 498. The Court therefore declines to do so here.

For all these reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff‘s causes of action under Bivens. See Arellano, 2023 WL 5986134, at *6 (dismissing with prejudice Bivens claim because “further amendment would be futile” because “a Biven[s] claim cannot lie in this scenario“). Because Plaintiff has alleged no viable causes of action, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff‘s First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint on or before September 28, 2026, if he believes he can allege another claim “warranted by existing law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (requiring the court to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires“). If Plaintiff elects not to file an amended complaint by that deadline, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2026

Honorable Todd W. Robinson

United States District Judge

Notes

Plaintiff‘s failure to submit a grievance also demonstrates that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite to the filing of a Bivens action. See, e.g., . This would provide an independent basis for dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff‘s claims.