(after stating the facts as above).
Appellant relies upon the following alleged errors of the trial court: (1) In overruling the demurrer to the indictment; (2) in denying'appellant’s motion! for a directed verdict at the close of the government’s evidence, and also at the conclusion of all the evidence; (3) in overruling his motion for a new trial; (4) in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment; (5) in admitting in evidence, over his objection, Government Exhibits 9, 10, and 12; and (6) in admitting, over his objection, the testimony of P. A. Buchanan.
The indictment herein involves the statute relating to perjury, 18 USCA § 231 (Cr.
With reference to. the validity of the indictment, appellant contends that the subject-matter of the inquiry, concerning which Mrs. Pearson testified falsely, was not material to the issue then before the referee. The indictment alleged generally that it was material to the issue, and the remaining allegations in no way controvert the general allegation. This is sufficient. Berry v. United States (C. C. A.)
It is next contended by appellant that the indictment is defective in not alleging ■ that appellant knew that the witness would corruptly and willfully give the false testimony; and in support of this contention he cites United States v. Dennee, 25 Fed. Cas., page 817, No. 14,947, decided by the Circuit Court of Louisiana in 1877, and United States v. Evans,
Appellant further contends that the witness cannot be held for perjury on account of any false testimony she may have given before the referee, and for that reason appellant cannot be held for subornation of perjury.' This conclusion would be correct if the premise were sound, but that the premise is not sound" is well settled. Hammer v. United States,
The testimony of P. A. Buchanan was admitted for the purpose of impeaching appellant by his statements made at another time relative to the number of times that Mr. and Mrs. Pearson had been in appellant’s office at St. Louis. There was no error in this, ruling. .
Appellant insists that Government Exhibits 9,10, and 12 were erroneously admitted in evidence. These exhibits were letters. No. 10 was written to Mrs. Pearson by appellant on June 3, 1929; No. 12 was written to bankrupt on July 24, 1929, and was signed “Jim,” which is appellant’s first name; and No. 9 was written to bankrupt on March 3, 1930, and was signed “Jim and Joe,” but it was probably written by Hopewell. On what theory these letters were offered or
The court’s ruling on the motion for a new trial presents no question for our consideration. Judicial Code, § 269; 28 USCA § 391; Brown v. United States (C. C. A.) 9 F. (2d) 588. The evidence supporting the verdict is quite substantial and decidedly convincing.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
18 USCA § 231. “Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, shall «willfully and contrary to such oath state or subscribe any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned not more than five years.”
18 USCA § 232. “Whoever shall procure another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and punishable as in section 231 o£ this title prescribed.”
