delivered the opinion of the Court.
In August 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Whelan issued a summons to taxpayer Ryan ordering him to pro-ducé his books for the years 1942 through 1953 inclusive. Ryan appeared but refused to produce the records, claiming thаt because tax liability for those years was long since barred except for fraud, 1 the agent had no right to examine the records unless he could show grounds for suspecting fraud.
The Government then instituted an enforcement proceeding in а federal district court pursuant to § 7402 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 The complaint alleged that on the basis of estimated net worth calcula *62 tions the agent' strongly suspected fraud, and that examination of the records for the years in question was relevant and material in detеrmining its existence. The taxpayer answered, putting the question of probable cause in issue, and, in addition, stating that he had not received the letter required by § 7605 (b) informing him that the Secretary or his delegate had determined the examination to bе necessary. 3
At the hearing the District Judge cleаrly indicated his opinion that the Government need not show probable cause for suspeсting fraud, and ordered Ryan to produce those records which he had available. Although the hеaring confirmed Ryan’s assertion that no “necessity letter” had been sent to him, the judge made no mention of this, probably because counsel did nоt press the point.
The Court of Appeals affirmed,
We granted certiorari, 376 U. S.. 904, on the only issue raised by petitioner, whether the Government must show probable сause for its examination of the records. 4 On thаt issue we sustain the judgment of the Court oT Appeаls for the reasons given in United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48.
Affirmed.
Notes
I. R. C., § 6501. See United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48, at p. 49, note 2.
See id., at p. 52, note 10.
See id., at p. 52.
The рropriety of the court’s interpretation of the necessity letter requirement of § 7605 (b) is, therefore, not before us. See
Trailmobile Co.
v.
Whirls,
