Ryan v. . the PeopleRyan v. . the People
It seems, that the word “charges” implies an original complaint, made in the first instance, preliminary to a formal trial for a crime, it does not include indictments.
Upon the trial of an indictment for assault and battery, the offence was alleged to have been committed during an affray at a town meeting; one of the witnesses for the prisoner was asked on cross-examination whether he had been indicted, for assault and battery, committed on that day, this was objected to, objection overruled, and the witness answered “yes,” held, that it was a fair inferenсe that the witness was indicted as one of the participants in the affray; and that the question was competent to show the position he occupied, in respect to the controversy, out of which the affray arose, and his interest in the litigatiоn, and as showing prejudice or bias.
It seems, that the mere fact that a witness has been indicted, cannot legitimately tend to discredit him or impeach his moral character, and that evidence thereof is therefore incompetent; (FOLGER and EARL, JJ., dissenting, and holding that the allowance of questions on cross-examination of a witness, as to his having been indicted, are in the discretion of the court).
One of the witnesses for the prosecution, when asked what he saw of the occurrence, answered among other things, “I should judge he (the com-
Also held, that evidence that the prisoner made an effort to keep out of the way of the sheriff was competent.
It seems, howevеr, that such evidence is very slight, if any evidence of guilt.
(Argued January 14, 1880; decided January 27, 1880.)
ERROR to the General Term of the Supreme Court, in the third judicial department, to review judgment affirming a judgment of the Court of Sessions, in and for the county of Ulster, entered upon a verdict, convicting the plaintiff in error, of the crime of assault and battery.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
F. L. Westbrook, for plaintiff in error. The Court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to try the case. (
A. T. Clearwater, for defendant in error. The provisions of chapter 390 of the Laws of 1879 did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions to try the indictment at bar. (1 Blackstone‘s Com., 87, 90; Smith v. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; 2 Cow., 419; People v. Lambier, 5 Den., 9;
OPINION
CHURCH, Ch. J. The most material point presented is whether the Court of Sessions of Ulster county, had power and jurisdiction to try the indictment in this case.
The act specifies “charges” for several offences, and among them specifies “charges for assault and battery not alleged to have been committed riotously.”
We are of opinion that this act did not take away the jurisdiction of the Sеssions to hear and try this case. Neither the language nor intent necessarily lead to that conclusion. The word “charges” implies an original complaint made in the first instance preliminary to a formal trial for a crime. This case was not in a cоndition where such a charge could be made. An indictment had been regularly found at Oyer and Terminer, which had been sent to the Sessions for trial, and the latter court had jurisdiction of the case for that purpose, when the act was passed. Special Sessions cannot try cases upon indictment, and although an indictment is in an enlarged sense, a charge, yet it would not be included in that term as used in ordinary legal language, or in this act. Nor can an intention be imputed to the Legislature to oust the court of Sessions of jurisdiction to try pending indictments, and the language goes far to show that it was intended to apply only to cases so situated that charges could thereafter be made, in the ordinary way by preliminary complaint. This is the most obvious meaning of the language, and accords with what may be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature. Assuming as claimed that the intent was to require all the cases of crime specified to be tried at Special Sessions with a view to economy, it must be limited to such
Two of the witnesses for the defendant were asked whether they had been indicted. The questions were objected to as incompetent and immaterial, and as not tending to impair their credibility or affect their moral character. The court overruled the objections and exceptions were duly taken. This court in the recent case of The People v. Crapo,** while recognizing the legal right, subject to the discretion of the trial-judge, to put questions to a witness as to specific facts which tend to discredit the witness, or impeach his moral character, held that the mere fact that a witness had been indicted, could not legitimately have that effect, and was therefore incompetent. The rule was applied in that case to an accused person who was sworn as a witness in his own
Mr. Greenleaf says: “the situation of the witness with respect to the parties, and to the subject of litigation, his intent, his motives, his inclination and prejudices * * * are all fully investigated and ascertained, and submitted to the consideration of the jury, before whom he had testified, and who have thus had an opportunity of observing his demeanor, and of determining the just weight, and value of his testimony.”
As to the witness Ford the question was specific whether he had been indicted for an assault and battery committed on the same day. From this it is fairly inferable that he was indicted as one of the participants in the affray at the town meeting at which the assault was made upon the prosecutor. He might therefore have an interest in the litigation, and a feeling of prejudice or bias which was proper for the consideration of the jury in weighing his evidence. As to the witness Butler it does not clearly appear that the indictments against him were for acts committed on that day, although it might be inferred that one of them was. As to the other indictment no exception was taken. We are of opinion that as to one indictment the inference that it was connected with the town meeting, may be indulged, and hence that he was so сonnected with the controversy at the town meeting as to make it proper to show his feeling and bias in respect to the affray, and that for this reason the evi-
The evidence of the defendant‘s witness Hollahan, stating that “I should judge he (the complainant) struck a stone,” was not responsive to the question, which simply asked for what the witness saw of the occurrence in question, and seemed to be а conjecture, instead of knowledge, and there was no error in striking it out.
The evidence that the defendant made an effort to keep out of the way of the sheriff, was very slight, if any evidence of guilt. There are so many reasons for such conduct, consistent with innocence that it scarcely comes up to the standard of evidence tending to establish guilt, but this and similar evidence has been allowed upon the theory that the jury will give it such weight as it deserves, depending upon the surrounding circumstances. It was not error to admit it. I have examined the charge carefully, and do not think that any of the exceptions to it present a legal error.
There was a serious conflict in the evidence whether the defendant committed the assault which produced the injury, but it was the exclusive province of the jury to determine that question, and with their decision we have no power to interfere.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur.
FOLGER and EARL, JJ., concurred in the result only; thinking that in the law of evidence of this State, it had been settled that the trial court may, in its discrеtion, allow the questions put to Ford and Butler on cross-examination and discussed by the chief judge in his opinion. See Southworth v. Bennett (58 N. Y., 659), where it was said by JOHNSON, J., in an opinion (in MSS.) concurred in per totarn curiam: “The question put by the defendant‘s counsel to the plaintiff, whether he wasnot then under indictment for usury, sеems to have been one of those depreciatory questions which, although not relevant to the issue, a judge may, in his discretion, allow to be put on cross-examination.
Judgment affirmed.