132 P. 95 | Wyo. | 1913
This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus involving the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff, James Ryan, by the sheriff of Niobrara county in this state. Upon the presentation of the petition to one of the Justices of this court the writ was allowed and made returnable to the court. The officer’s return to the writ, as well as the petition, shows that the plaintiff was arrested and is held by said sheriff by virtue of a warrant issued by the Governor of this state upon a requisition from the Governor of the State of Illinois,
The requisition of the Governor of Illinois directed to the Governor of this state, omitting the caption, attestation and signatures, is as follows : “Whereas, it appears by the papers required by the statutes of the United States, which are hereunto annexed, and which I certify to be authentic and duly authenticated in accordance with the laws of this state, that Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, stands charged with the crime of Confidence Game, which I certify to be a crime under the laws of this state, committed in the county of Cook in this state, and it having been represented to me that he has fled from the justice of this state and has taken refuge in the state of Wyoming; Now, Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and Raws of the United States in such case made and provided, I do hereby require that the said Charles T. ■ Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, be apprehended and delivered to William Murvane, who is hereby authorized to receive and convey him to the State of Illinois, there to be dealt with according to law.” Accompanying and annexed to said requisition is a certified copy of an indictment presented by the grand jurors at the April Term, 1913, of the Criminal Court of Cook County in said State of Illinois, charging that one Charles T. Crane, late of the County of Cook, on the 3rd day of March, 1913, in said county and state, unlawfully, fraudulently and feloniously did obtain from Hope R. McEldow-ney a large amount of money, goods and personal property (describing the same), the goods, money and personal property of Hope R. McEldowney, by means and by use of the confidence game, contrary to the statute, and against the peace and dignity of the people, of the State of Illinois. A second count is contained in the indictment charging the said Charles T. Crane with the crime of grand larceny, alleging the same money and property as that described in the first count, of the value of $15,500, to have been stolen, taken
*318 "STATE OF ILLINOIS,} County oe Cook, fss'
IN THE CRIMINAR COURT OE COOK COUNTY.
The People of the State of Illinois vs. Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan. > Confidence Game.
In the matter of the extradition of Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, defendant mentioned in the above entitled cause, and fugitive from justice.
Affidavit of Hope L. McEldowney, prosecuting witness in aid of the petition for extradition:
Hope L. McEldowney, being first duly sworn, according to law, deposes and says that she resides at 2969 Michigan avenue, City of Chicago, County of Cook and State of Illinois, and that she is acquainted with the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, and knows of her own knowledge that the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, was personally present in the City of Chicago, county and state aforesaid, on the 3rd day of March, 1913.
Affiant further says that on or about the 3rd day of March, A. D. 1913, the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, suggested to this affiant that she ought to put her money in railroad bonds, and told this af-fiant that Great Northern Railroad bonds would he a good investment for her and that he would gladly aid this affiant in helping her to invest her money; that thereupon this affiant, believing in the honesty and integrity of the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, and believing in the representations made by the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, that he would invest this money for her as he stated that he would, gave to the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, the sum of $15,500- Affiant further says that the said
Affiant further says that the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, did not invest the said sum of money of $15,500 in any railroad bonds for her and that she did not receive any bonds at all from the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan; nor'has the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, returned to her the said sum of $15,500, or any part thereof.
Affiant further says that this prosecution is not brought for the purpose of collecting any debt nor to enable any one to ride free at the expense of the State, but is bona fide in every respect, and when the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James Ryan, is returned to the County of Cook and jurisdiction of Illinois, this affiant will appear in the Criminal Court to testify against said defendant in the cause therein pending against him, as will more specifically appear from the attached copy of indictment, which are made a part of this affidavit.
And further affiant saith not.
(Signed) Hope R. McEldowney.
“STATE OE IRRINOIS,\ County oe Cook, (
Hope R. McEldowney being first duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she has read the foregoing affidavit, by her subscribed, and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true in substance and in fact, except as to the matters and things which are therein stated to be upon information and belief, and as to such matters she believes them to be true.
(Signed) Hope R. McEldowney.
*320 Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 18th day of April,
A. D. 1913. (Signed) Frank J. Waesh,
(Seal) Clerk of the Criminal Court.”
The warrant of the Governor of this State issued upon said requisition recites as follows: “Whereas, it appearing from the requisition of His Excellency, the Governor of the State of Illinois, bearing date April 19, 1913, and from papers thereto attached duly authenticated, that "Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, stands charged with the crime of Confidence Game committed in the County of Cook in the year 1913 in said State, and that said Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, is a fugitive from justice and has taken refuge in this state. And, Whereas, the said Requisition requests that the said Charles T. Crane be apprehended and delivered to William Murvane, who is the duly appointed agent and authorized to receive and convey him to the State of Illinois to be dealt with according to law.” Following such recitals the warrant commands any and every sheriff, in whose hands soever the writ may be placed, to arrest the said Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan, and to safely keep and deliver to said William Murvane, agent as aforesaid.
It is alleged in the petition for this writ of habeas corpus that the plaintiff is a resident of this state and has resided therein for a period of abqut three years last past; that he is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the defendant, the sheriff of Niobrara County; that the cause or pretense of such restraint and imprisonment is the requisition and warrant above referred to; that the requisition was honored and allowed by the Governor of this state without receiving any evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to disprove any of the facts stated in the affidavit in support of the requisition pretending to identify the plaintiff with Charles T. Crane, the person named in the indictment; that said indictment does not charge the plaintiff with the commission of any crime or offense, and does not charge one Charles T. Crane with any crime or offense; that said
The return or answer of the defendant to the writ of habeas corpus states that he has the plaintiff in his custody, and produces him in court, and that the cause of his detention is a certain warrant issued by the Governor of this state and a certain order of the District Court of the First Judicial District^ in and for Niobrara County, copies of which are attached to and made a part of the answer. The nature, recitals and command of the Governor’s warrant are
In addition to the requisition papers and the warrant upon which the plaintiff was arrested, counsel representing the sheriff and also the demanding state produced as a witness Mrs. Hope L. McEldowney to identify the plaintiff as the person demanded by the requisition and named in the indictment annexed thereto, the court having suggested in
Mrs. McEldowney not only positively identified the plaintiff as the person indicted by the name of Charles T. Crane, testifying that she appeared before the grand jury in Cook County, Illinois, at the April term this year, that her testimony resulted in the indictment aforesaid, that as such witness she testified against this plaintiff, whom she had known in Chicago as Charles T. Crane, with reference to the crime charged in the indictment, and that the plaintiff is the identical person so indicted and intended to be indicted, but she further testified in substance that she knew the plaintiff as Charles T. Crane, that she first met him in Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 1913, and saw him in that city after that date nearly every day until March 3, 1913, that being the last day she saw him there, and that on that date he obtained from her the money mentioned in the indictment, stating that it was in the form of a draft; the fact of his so obtaining the money being brought out on cross-examination. That on that day he came to her apartments at 2507 Michi
The plaintiff testified as a witness in his own behalf, stating in substance that he resided at Manville, near Lusk, in Niobrara County in this state (formerly a part of Converse County) and had resided there about three years last past. That he had never lived in Chicago, was-not in that city on March 3rd, 1913, and had not been there more than two days at any one time, and then only as he was passing through the city. That he had never seen Mrs. McEldowney in Chicago, or until he saw her at Lusk at the time of the habeas corpus hearing there, and that she had never seen him in. Chicago. That his name was James Ryan; that he had never gone by the name of Charles T. Crane, and had never received any money, draft, or other property from Mrs. McEldowney. He testified in detail respecting where
The Constitution of the United States, in Section 2 of Article IV, provides for inter-state extradition as follows:
“A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.” And by Section 5278 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it is provided: “Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which*326 such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand,, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or Territory.”
Referring to these provisions it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100, 28 Sup. Ct. 58, 52 L. Ed. 121, that the following principles are to be deduced from previous decisions of that court, citing the cases:
“1. A person charged with crime against the laws of a State and' who flees from justice, that is, after committing the crime, leaves the State, in whatever way or for whatever reason, and is found in another State, may, under the authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States, ■> be brought back to the State in which he stands charged with crime, to be there dealt with according to law.
“2. When the Executive authority of the State whose laws have been thus violated makes such a demand upon the Executive of the State in which the alleged fugitive is found as is indicated by the above Section (5278) of the Revised Statutes — producing at the time of such demand a copy of the indictment, or an affidavit certified as authentic and made before a magistrate charging the person demanded*327 with a crime against the laws of the demanding State — it becomes, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the duty of the Executive of the State where the fugitive is found' to cause him to be arrested, surrendered and delivered to the appointed agent of the demanding State, •to be taken to that State.
“3. Nevertheless, the Executive, upon whom such demand is made, not being authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States to cause the arrest of one charged with crime in another State unless he is a fugitive from justice, may decline to issue an extradition warrant, unless it is made to appear to him, by competent proof, that the accused is substantially charged with -crime against the laws of the demanding State, and is, in fact, a fugitive from the justice of that State.
“4. Whether the alleged criminal is or is not such fugitive from justice may, so far as the Constitution and laws of the United States are concerned, be determined by the Executive upon whom the demand is made in such way as he deems satisfactory, and he is not obliged to demand proof apart from proper requisition papers from the demanding State, that the accused is a fugitive from justice.
“5. If it be determined that the alleged criminal is a fugitive from justice — whether such determination be based upon the requisition and accompanying papers in proper form, or after an original, independent- inquiry into the facts —and if a warrant of arrest is issued after such determination, the warrant will be regarded as máking a prima facie case in favor of the demanding State and as requiring the removal of the alleged criminal to the State in which he stands charged with crime, unless in some appropriate proceeding it is made to appear that he is not a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State.
“6. A proceeding by habeas corpus in a court of compe- ■ tent jurisdiction is appropriate for determining whether the accused is subject, in virtue of the warrant of arrest, to be taken as a fugitive from the justice of the State in which*328 he is found to the State whose laws he is charged with violating.
“7. One arrested and held as a fugitive from justice is entitled, of right, upon habeas corpus, to question the lawfulness of his arrest and imprisonment, showing by competent evidence, as a ground for his release, that he was not, within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State, and thereby overcoming the presumption to the contrary arising from the face of an extradition warrant.”
In this cause the plaintiff questions the legality of his arrest and imprisonment upon two principal grounds: 1. That the papers accompanying the requisition are insufficient to show that the plaintiff, James Ryan, is charged with having committed a crime in the State of Illinois, or that Charles T. Crane is so charged. 2. That if the requisition papers be deemed sufficient to show that Charles T. Crane is charged with having committed a crime in Illinois, the plaintiff is not Charles T. Crane, or the person so charged, and was not in the State of Illinois at or about the time when such crime is charged to have been committed. In support of the proposition that the papers are insufficient to show a charge of crime authorizing the arrest or demand for extradition, it is contended in the first place that the affidavit of Mrs. McEldowney is the only paper accompanying the requisition which purports to charge the commission of crime by James Ryan, and that said affidavit is insufficient for the reason that it does not appear to have been made before a magistrate, and for the further reason that the facts stated therein do not show the commission of any crime. That affidavit appears to have been made before the clerk of the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, and is entitled in that court in the case of the People of the State of Illinois vs. Charles T. Crane, otherwise called James Ryan; and in' the matter of the extradition of Charles T. Crane-, otherwise- called James Ryan, “defendant mentioned in the above entitled cause, and fugitive from justice.” It does not
In Maxwell v. People, supra, the court said that it was difficult to give a definition of what is commonly called the confidence game, and, after quoting from Morton v. People, supra, it was further said: “The popular idea of the confidence game, as understood ‘in most of the cities and large
Since the indictment does not mention any alias of the person charged it may be doubtful whether the words “otherwise known as James Ryan,” following the name Charles T. Crane, were properly inserted in the requisition and governor’s warrant. We expressed some doubt about that matter when orally announcing our conclusion to remand the plaintiff, stating, however, that we deemed it to be immaterial for the reason that the name stated in the indictment is also in the requisition and warrant, so that if the insertion therein of the alias was unauthorized it would not constitute a fatal objection to the arrest and detention of the plaintiff, though his true name may be James Ryan, if he is the identical person indicted and intended to be indicted by the ñame of Charles T. Crane and demanded by the requisition, since he may have been known in the State of Illinois by that name, or, if he committed the crime charged may have assumed that name. At the time of writing this opinion
Where a requisition by the Governor of Pennsylvania had demanded one Robert J. Williams, charged with having committed the crime of forgery in that state, and the Governor of Georgia, to whom the requisition was directed, had by his warrant ordered the arrest of Robert J. Williams (alias Spencer Riley) it was held in Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97, 136, that the insertion of the alias name in the warrant of arrest was unauthorized. That was an action for false imprisonment, and, answering the argument made upon the proposition that there was no authority to issue a warrant for Spencer Riley upon the requisition for Robert J. Williams, the court said: “As a distinct legal proposition, it is undoubtedly true, that the Governor of Georgia had no such right; but the error was committed by him in doing that which he believed to be a faithful discharge of his constitutional duty towards the State of Pennsylvania. The insertion of the alias was not necessary in our judgment, to have authorized the arrest of Riley, if, indeed, he was the same individual who committed the forgery, under the assumed name of Robert J. Williams. Had Riley been arrested under the warrant issued for the arrest of Williams, without the insertion of the alias, and been carried to the
In ex parte Glucksman, (C. C.) 189 Fed. 1016, which was a proceeding in habeas corpus and certiorari pending application for extradition, it appeared by the extradition papers that in the summer of 1910 a forgery was uttered by a leather merchant residing at Lodz in Russia, named Leiba Gliksman; that Leibel Pincusov Glucksman, a leather mer
In Tiberg v. Warren, 192 Red. 458, 112 C. C. A. 596, it appeared that the complaint attached to the requisition charged the commission of crime by Johan Tiberg. It does not appear from the opinion whether an alias name was contained in the requisition. But a habeas corpus proceeding to determine the legality of the arrest upon a warrant issued upon the requisition was brought by “Johan Tiberg, also known as Edwin Johansen.” There seems to have been no question made in the case with reference to the name of the person charged.
There is this difference between the facts in this case and those considered in Johnston v. Riley, supra: the requisition, as well as the governor’s warrant, describes the person demanded by the name stated in the indictment and also by the alias, that is to say, by the words “otherwise known as James Ryan.” And he is described in the same manner in the petition of the State’s Attorney for the extradition, and in the affidavit appearing to have been presented with it, each referring to the indictment and the party thereby
To overcome this the plaintiff ahd his wife testified as above set forth, the testimony of the plaintiff directly contradicting that of Mrs. McEldowney, so far as it related to his presence in the State of Illinois and being known there by the name of Charles T. Crane. The testimony of Mrs. Ryan cannot be considered as tending much to reduce the effect of this conflict, or to dispute the testimony of Mrs. McEldowney, for it is not impossible that the plaintiff may have been in New York City when his wife was there in the latter part of January for about a week, and four or five days- the latter part of Eebruary, and also in Chicago on January 18, and the next day, and March 3, and at the
The latest expression of the Supreme Court of the United States relative to the evidence necessary to overcome a prima facie case made by the extradition papers, when in proper form, is found in McNichols v. Pease, supra, where it is said: “When a person is held in custody as a fugitive from justice under an extradition warrant, in proper form, and showing upon its face all that is required by law to be shown as a prerequisite to its being issued, he should not be discharged from custody unless it is made clearly and satisfactorily to appear that he is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Following the statement thus quoted it is further said, “that a faithful, vigorous enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to fugitives from justice is vital to the harmony and welfare of the states, and that ‘while a state should take care, within the limits of the law, that the rights of its people are protected against illegal action, the judicial authorities of the Union should equally take care that the provisions of the Constitution be not so narrowly interpreted as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find a permanent asylum in the territory of another State/ ”
In a previous decision of that court (Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 25 Sup. Ct. 282, 49 L. Ed. 515) it was said: “When it is conceded, or when it is conclusively proved, that no question can be made that the person was not within the demanding State when the crime is said to have been committed, and his arrest is sought on the ground only of a constructive presence at that time, in the demanding state, then the court will discharge the defendant. But the court will not discharge a defendant arrested under a governor’s
In a later New York case decided by the same court, where there was conflicting testimony upon the question, involving the identity of the prisoner with the person charged with crime in the demanding State, an order discharging the prisoner on habeas corpus was reversed, upon the ground that the proof offered to overcome the presumption arising from the official documents was not sufficient to clearly and satisfactorily show that the one in custody was not a fugitive from justice. In the opinion it was said to be a rule laid down by high authority that “mere evidence, of an alibi, or evidence that the person demanded was not in the state as
It is true that habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding to try any question as to the guilt or innocence of a petitioner arrested and held upon an extradition warrant, or to try the question of alibi so far as it relates to his guilt or innocence. But where the same evidence that might be used to establish the defense of alibi on his trial tends also to prove that he is not a fugitive from justice, that is to say, that he was not in the demanding State when the alleged crime was committed, it is proper, we think, to consider it in determining that question in a habeas corpus proceeding, wherein the
The only question in the case upon which there can be any doubt, in our opinion, is that of identity. We cannot say upon the evidence that the plaintiff has clearly and satis fac-