76 Iowa 589 | Iowa | 1889
— On the third day of April, 1885, plaintiff commenced an action against J. C. Campbell, which was aided by attachment, to recover the amount due on a foreign judgment. On the next day the writ of attachment was levied upon seventy shares of the capital stock of the Olin Tile & Brick Company, as the property of Campbell. On the ninth day of May, 1885, D. Heenan presented to the court below his petition, under section 3016 of the Code, claiming to be the owner of the attached stock by virtue of a purchase made by him from Campbell on or about January 1, 1885. On the eleventh day of December, 1885, a trial was had to the court on the petition of Heenan. The court found that the stock had been purchased by Heenan as claimed, but that it had not been transferred to him on the books of the company at the time of the levy. Nevertheless an order was made discharging the stock from the levy of the attachment. That order was reversed on appeal to this court, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. 71 Iowa, 760. Campbell was served with notice by publication, but made default. May 13, 1886, an entry was made on the records of the district court, dismissing the action against Campbell on the ground that the attached property had been released, and the attachment dissolved. That entry was corrected subsequently, in a proceeding instituted for that purpose, to show ^hat the action was not dismissed, and that the lien was reinstated as against Campbell. After the
his appeal therefrom until seven days after it was made. It is now insisted by appellant that the omission of plaintiff to give notice of his intention to appeal, and his failure to perfect an appeal within two days, as provided by section 3019 of the C ode, operated to discharge the attachment, notwithstanding the fact that the order was reversed. Appellee contends that the section specified has no application to orders made in proceedings instituted under the provision of section 3016. It is true that the remedy of a third person claiming a lien upon or interest in the attached property is not by motion to discharge the attachment. Tidrick v. Sulgrove, 38 Iowa, 340. But we find nothing in the Code which limits the application of section 3019 to cases where the attachment is dissolved on motion. ' Its provisions are general, being limited only to cases ‘ ‘ where an attachment has been discharged.” Attachments may be discharged on motion or by final judgment in the original action, or they may be discharged pursuant to the provision of section 3016. That section was
Reversed.