Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc.
903 P.2d 423
Utah
1995
Check Treatment

*1 RYAN, guardian litem ad Sara Plaintiff, S.S., minor, SERVICES, INC.,

GOLD CROSS Ambulance, and

dba Gold Cross Slusher, Defendants.

William J. SERVICES, INC., dba CROSS

GOLD Ambulance,

Cross and William J. Slush Third-Party

er, Plaintiffs and Petition

ers, SMITH, Third-Party O.

Suzanne Respondent.

Defendant and

No. 940289.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. *2 by petitioner

ambulance owned Gold Cross Services, began Inc. As Suzanne Smith intersection, turn in left an the ambulance Following collided with the side of her car. accident, S.S. was found outside her vehi- parties dispute cle. The whether S.S. was wearing a seat belt at the time of the colli- sion. Both and her S.S. mother testified wearing S.S. was her seat belt at the time of contrast, In the collision. Gold Cross’s acci- experts dent reconstruction concluded that wearing S.S. was not her seat at belt time of the accident and that S.S.’s failure to wear the available seat belt caused her to be ejected door, through passenger which opened impact. expert A Gold Cross ejection concluded that as a result of the Lee, Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Salt vehicle, from multiple S.S. suffered skull City, plaintiff. Lake for injuries fractures and other that would not Gary Ferguson, City, B. Salt Lake for likely have occurred had she been restrained petitioners. and remained the vehicle. Poelman, City, L. Stuart Salt Lake In complaint June filed a S.S. respondent. through guardian against ad litem February DURHAM, Cross. Gold Cross filed a Justice: motion in for a limine determination that granted interlocutory appeal from a § Utah Code Ann. 41-6-186 is unconstitu- ruling upholding Third District Court ruling tional and that evidence of S.S.’s constitutionality of Utah Ann. Code 41-6- nonuse of an available seat belt could be denying 186 and defendants’ motion to admit subsequently admitted at trial.1 Plaintiff at trial evidence of nonuse of an ruling filed motion limine for a that seat Services, available belt. Gold Cross belt evidence be excluded from trial. The Inc., Ambulance, dba Gold Cross and William trial court held statute to be constitution- Cross”) (collectively argue J. Slusher “Gold al, motion,- granted plaintiff’s denied defen- that the statute acts as a rule of evidence and motion, encouraged dants’ and an immediate is therefore a intrusion on the interlocutory appeal. petitions Gold Cross rule-making powers Supreme reserved to the prior for resolution to trial on the merits. Court under the Utah Constitution. In addi- tion, Gold Cross asserts that the statute acts constitutionality pres Because the issue of to create an unreasonable classification of law, ents a “we review the trial tort defendants violation of the uniform ruling court’s for correctness and accord of laws contained particular no deference.” Mountain Fuel reject argu- Utah Constitution. We Supply City Corp., Co. v. Salt Lake ments and affirm the trial court. 884, 887 We further note that passen- reviewing

On November S.S. was a when constitutionality, statutes for ger mother, constitutional, an automobile driven presumed her a statute is and “we respondent Smith, traveling any Suzanne 0. resolve reasonable doubts in favor City, constitutionality.” Society south on 700 East Salt Lake Separationists, Utah. time, Whitehead, (Utah petitioner At the same William J. Inc. v. 1993). driving north Slusher was on 700 East in an provides: gence,

1. Section 41-6-186 and not be introduced as evidence litigation to wear a on the issue of or failure seat belt does not comparative negli- mitigation damages. constitute on the issue of 41- law which lies contends that section substantive Gold Cross evidentiary legislature’s power. there squarely as an rule and within the 6-186 acts leg by the an encroachment fore constitutes legislature may regulate, as a creating judicial function of on the islature law, public policy matter of and substantive procedure, see Utah rules of evidence *3 scope legal negligence. the of definitions of Const, VIII, 4, judi § the art. as well as on Brickyard, (recognizing See supervising litigation, see cial function of legislature’s power adopt to statutes of sub Const, V, VIII, sec art. 1. Article Utah “principles ‘whichfix and declare the stantive grants Supreme expressly tion 4 the Utah primary rights respects of individuals as power adopt procedure to rules of Court the ” persons property (quoting and their their legislature and reserves to the and evidence Kappa Assoc. v. Avila S. Condominium by a two-thirds the to amend such rules (Fla.1977))). 599, Corp., 608 Sec 347 So.2d argues majority of both houses. Gold Cross pronouncement represents tion 41-6-186 VIII, adopted that when article section was policy negligence pub around 1985, authority rule-making no over sub safety. Although lic section 41-6-186 con legisla preserved issues was for the stantive language glance appears tains which at first ture. evidence, i.e., to be rule of evidence of seat 4, adoption the Prior to the of section evidence,” “may not belt use be introduced as rule-making power legislature’s was based operative provisions the statute’s announce a substantive/procedural distinction. See principle: “The failure to wear a substantive Management Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n seat belt does not constitute Co., 535, Realty v. Gibbons 668 P.2d Comm. comparative negligence....” approach, Under this “the conceptualized as a Once the statute is legislature affecting enacted laws the sub- law, negligence the statement of substantive rights litigants supreme and the stantive admissibility language regarding is mere sur- adjudi- procedural created rules for the court plusage. Because the statute decrees Hart, rights.” cation of those Kent R. Court negligent, nonuse of seat belts is not evi- Rulemaking Following 1985 Re- Utah the gen- dence thereof is inadmissible under our Constitution, the Utah 1992 Utah vision of rules, regardless of the lan- eral relevance 153, 153; Brickyard, L.Rev. see also guage expressly statute that excludes the P.2d at 539. It is Gold Cross’s contention 401, See Utah R.Evid. 402. such evidence. VIII, adoption 4 affir- of article Accordingly, of sec- we find that enactment matively legislature’s revoked the substan- legislature’s tion 41-6-186 lies within the rule-making power because the constitu- legal regulating function of the substantive expressly preserve it. tion failed to Since violate definitions of and does not 4, adoption argues of section Gold separation powers doctrine article legislature only authority to has V, 1 of the Utah Constitution. amend, enact, not to rules of evidence. majority jurisdictions, by decline to address this contention di- We note that We decision, by judicial rectly disagree legislation we with Cross’s as in Utah or because may to seat belts characterization of section 41-6-186 as a mandate failure use Instead, procedure.”2 as of a con- “rule of evidence or not be used evidence Crane, Quick tributory negligence. v. find that section 41-6-186 sets out a we only procedural Respondent any litigant; 2. does not Gold Cross's the rules must be (citing Brickyard, presumption authority that this has the to nature.” Id. at 1333 court Instead, 539). apply procedural the tradi- adopt directs at Banner did rules. she us distinction, Banner, substantive/procedural it did to v. tional State adoption directly adoption 4 or address the of section which this court decided soon after the not Banner, continuing recognized any impact may have had on of section the court substantive/proce- authority adopt that its rules is limited of the traditional governing powers substantive/procedural dichotomy "The lim- dural distinction: we and this court. Nor do address itations on rules announced this Court which today, required supplant it is not for resolu- enactments are that this issue change not the substantive tion of this case. Court 1187, 1208-09 (1986); statutory see classification has no rational Idaho legitimate legislative pur- to a Wright, 108 Ill.2d Clarkson (1985) pose. 483 N.E.2d Ill.Dec. majority rejected (finding that of states have addressing arguments Before defense). policy reasons for seat belt directly, we out that use Gold Cross’s

rejecting the seat belt defense are summa of the strict and rational basis ter Swajian Corp., rized General Motors minology arguments unhelpful. to frame its (R.I.1989). court in that 559 A.2d 1041 language equal pro Such comes from federal emphasized public policy case the substantive tection under the Fourteenth underlying questions the seat belt issue: readily transposed Amendment and is not recognize safety-belt defense for balancing uni test under the public what it is worth —a manifestation of *4 operation provision form of laws of the Utah policy.... a determination [that Such Mohi, 267 Constitution. See State Utah conduct], negligent non-use of seat belts is (June 15, 1995); Adv.Rep. desirable, properly legisla- if is left to the (Utah 1993). 572, Gaufin, Lee v. 867 P.2d 577 ture. Instead, we utilize for a uniform Id. at 1047. The Utah has made operation of the laws is that re policy regarding legal principles a choice of (1) ferred to above: whether the classifica evidentiary negligence; it has not enacted an (2) reasonable, legislative tion is whether the rule. (3) objectives legitimate, and whether relationship there is a reasonable between next consider con Gold Cross’s Cross, two. See Blue 779 P.2d at tention that section 41-6-186 violates the case, infringes this section 41-6-186 on no operation provision in uniform of laws article Cross, fundamental or critical of Gold 24 of the Utah Constitution. The Fuel, 888, see Mountain 752 P.2d at and operation of essence the uniform of laws imper creates no classifications considered “legislative that classifications re abstract, id.; suspect in missible or see sulting differing treatment for different Lewis, 661, see Malan v. 693 P.2d 674 n. persons must be based actual differences (Utah 1984). Therefore, our determina reasonably that are related to the challenged tion of whether statute is purposes legislation.” of the Mountain Fuel reasonably legitimate legislative related to Co., Supply (citing Malan v. objectives require high does not threshold. Lewis, (Utah 1984)). 693 P.2d Fuel, See Mountain 752 P.2d at 888. We apply determining compliance test we with mind, however, keep in it is not our the uniform of laws merits, desirability, function to defend the or reasonable, “whether the classification is Rather, rationality legislative of action. our objectives legislative whether the of the ac function tois examine the reasonableness of legitimate, tion are and whether there ais light legislative objec the classification in of reasonable between the classifi legislative purposes.” cation and Blue State, Cross & Blue Shield v. Having legal principles stated the (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). claims, governing our review of Gold Cross’s proceed analysis, Gold Cross asks the court to beginning a so- we to the with an scrutiny” statutory called “strict standard because the examination of the scheme to de substantively deprive precisely statute “acts a de- termine what classification is at of general fendant his to be liable to the issue. It is a rule Utah law permits plain- safety extent of by his and violation of a standard set statute larger damage prima tiff to receive a award than or ordinance constitutes facie evidence Warren, regular negligence. would be available under tort stan- Hall v.

dards.” Gold Cross submits the alterna- Motor Vehicle Seat Act, applies Usage §§ tive that even if the court the so- Belt Utah Code Ann. 41-6- standard, (the “Act”), through called “rational basis” the statute -186 establishes pass safety does not constitutional review because such a standard. Unlike most however, legislation, thereby 41-6-186 sets traffic reduce overall exception, stating that violation of the for motor out costs vehicle accidents. Gold requirements belt “does not consti- by reviewing Act’s seat Cross reaches this conclusion negligence.” comparative legislative leading passage tute debate Thus, issue, negli- however, a defendant in an automobile In approaching the Act. using prohibited action is from evi- Gold Cross fails to take into account our approach of the nonuse of an available in reviewing dence of a employ compara- legislative purpose. seat belt to the doctrine of The court does not limit negligence, considering only a doctrine which is otherwise purposes itself to “those plainly available to most tort defendants as a means that can be shown to have been held decreasing liability. their See Utah Code legislators.” some or all Blue Rather, (Supp.1994) (providing Ann. 78-27-38 P.2d at 641. the court will sustain any person is liable to “[n]o defendant seek- action if it can conceive ing recovery amount in excess of justify of facts which would the classifications proportion of fault attributable to that defen- legislation. made Id.

dant”). scheme, part statutory accept any As this court will not conceivable reason enactment, of tort section 41-6-186 creates class defen- for the we do not re- differently who are treated from other quire proof legislative purposes; dants exact Therefore, *5 primary tort defendants. is- enough legitimate purpose it is if a can be sue under Gold Cross’s uniform imputed legislative body. to the Malan, 14; disparate laws is whether this 693 P.2d at 671 n. accord Blue justified. treatment is 779 P.2d at 641. analytical three-step

The model set out Using approach, pur- this we look to the determining tool above is our whether a poses challenged of the statute. challenged scheme of nonuniform treatment not, itself, section 41-6-186 does in and of justified I, principles is under the of article promote safety, legitimate it serves other section 24. The first we address is purposes. Perhaps important, most the stat- anything inherently whether there is unrea adjustment ute serves as an and accommoda- legislature’s treating sonable in the defen Indeed, conflicting tion of interests. as Gold negligence dants automobile actions where points Cross out: plaintiff wearing was not a seat belt cursory A review of [the] de- differently negli from defendants other [leading passage bates of the re- Act] abstract, treating actions. In the veals that discussion centered on two is- these defendants as a class does not consti passage sues. Those in favor of of the Act “ ” tute discrimination Svith no rational basis.’ argued for the benefits terms of Fuel, (quoting Mountain prevented money or minimized and saved. Legal Mountain States Found. v. Public against passage Those were concerned Comm’n, (Utah Serv. infringed personal with whether the Act 1981)). legisla It is not unreasonable for the freedom to choose whether to wear a seat using ture to conclude that a seat belt is a belt. different order of omission than some other mayWe assume that section 41-6-186 serves violation, safety such as failure to wear a conflicting Al- resolve interests. painting motorcycle or a line when though the Act mandates seat belt use and Moreover, riding. helmet when the basis on penal- enforces the mandate with a ten-dollar which the classification is delineated is cer violations, ty for the Act also ensures —via tainly imper not one that could be labelled failure to wear a section 41-6-186 —that seat missible, 890; such as race. id. at Blue See against plaintiff in belt will not be used Cross, 779 P.2d at 640. litigation. portions appear Other of the Act example, purpose.

The second issue we address is the to serve a similar For legislation’s objectives. provides points that for a of the section 41-6-185 objec may singular reportable motor vehicle violation not be Gold Cross submits prevent against person of the Act is to or minimize assessed for violation of objec- justifiable light legislation’s that the of the mandate. We conclude the seat belt public poli- may legitimately set a legislature yet use at the

cy encourages seat belt which We affirm. weigh positive benefits of such same time penalties severity of the policy against ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and HOWE and noncompliance. RUSSON, JJ., concur. legitimately may have those whose concluded STEWART, Justice, Associate Chief not es- causes automobile accidents should concurring in the result: liability simply any portion of because cape majority opinion I concur in the and write wearing injured party was not a seat only any implication to note that Indeed, standpoint, from this section belt. only opinion arise from the that there is one quite with a common 41-6-186 is consistent I, applied to be in all Article section commonly referred to as law tort It cases is not correct. is clear Lee v. “eggshell “thin skull” or skull” doctrine: Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 that a injures injured another takes the one who heightened applies standard of See, e.g., Strong, she finds him. Brunson involving constitutionally protected cases (1966). Utah 2d rights. has been made in numer- doctrine, pay has to Under this the defendant Lewis, opinions. generally ous See Malan injuries, given plaintiff if a is for all even Lee, we stated: Thus, injury more vulnerable to than others. one, we can find not but two holding heightened-scrutiny that the Our legislative purposes challenged behind the Ar- governs standard the manner which Moreover, legislation. reemphasize that I, applied ticle when Article function to examine the desira- is not our implicated sup- objec- bility rationality by» ported rulings of other courts with *6 enough they legitimate if It is respect malpractice to medical statutes and objec- if the classification used to attain the the effect of those statutes on the to is reasonable. tives injuries. negligently recover for inflicted objectives legitimate Because we can find 867 P.2d at 583. Justice Durham in Conde legislation, behind the we next address the University Hospital, marin v. analysis: in our third whether stated: legislature chose a reasonable means to applied heightened courts have Other objectives. find that the clas- achieve its equal protection standard of resulting from sification section 41-6-186 is recovery limiting rights in statutes achieving means for not unreasonable malpractice medical area. Some courts objectives above. Man- discussed have characterized their review as one at dating that nonuse of a belt does not seat level, an intermediate and some have re- negli- comparative constitute ferred to it as a “realistic” review under ensuring reasonable means of ap- the rational basis standard. Both encouraging legislated public policy seat however, proaches, involve a real and impingement adequately weighs belt use thoughtful pur- examination of personal resulting freedom from such a pose leg- and the between the policy against severity penalties purpose. present islation and that In the addition, noncompliance. In chal- case, has not limited lenged legislation related to the recovery, partial but has also extended ensuring legitimate legislative purpose of governmental immunity to restrict persons negligently au- that those who cause Therefore, which existed at common law. liability escape tomobile accidents will not heightened I would standard of caused nonuse of a equal protection. review under sum, agree court seat belt. with the It should be noted that her statements below that the classifications created sec- quotation with Arti- tion 41-6-186 are reasonable and therefore above were connection (the operation uniform ele equal protection. provision), not federal

laws

Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352. And her due explic-

process argument Condemarin was

itly heightened on a standard of scruti- based

ny. opinion

I need not in this outline all the application that exist between

differences

the uniform of the laws involving constitutionally protected

cases in- involving

terests and cases not such inter-

ests. The essential here is that

equate the two would be to rob constitution-

ally protected protection interests of the impart

constitution was intended to to them. COMPANY,

LARSON LIMESTONE Larson,

Farrell and Gerald

Larson, Petitioners, Utah, OIL,

STATE of OF DIVISION MINING, Respondent. AND

GAS

No. 940440.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. Scribner, E.

Thomas J. Donald McCand- less, Provo, petitioners. Graham, Gen., Att’y A. Mitch-

Jan Thomas ell, Gen., Att’y City, Asst. Salt Lake respondent. Rust, City,

Joseph C. Lake for amicus Salt Associated General Contractors.