78 A.D. 134 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1903
Lead Opinion
The real question presented on this appeal is whether section 3 of the Labor Law, so called (Laws of 1897, chap. 415, as amd. by Laws of 1899, chap. 567), is constitutional; and this question I do not think is an open one for consideration in this court. The Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Podgers v. Coler (166 N. Y. 1) declared that this statute was unconstitutional, and that settled once for all that question. It is, however, suggested that that decision is not binding upon this court, inasmuch as it was not necessary to the determination of the question there presented. Whether this be true or not, it is perfectly obvious, from the four opinions delivered, that the court deemed it wise to, and did, consider such question, and a majority of the judges reached the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional, and they so held, and the orderly administration of justice requires that we should give effect to that decision,
We have, therefore, not only the decision in the Rodgers case, which clearly and unmistakably declares the law to be unconstitutional, but we have several subsequent declarations by that court reaffirming its previous declarations and also the view of our own court as to what the Court of Appeals decided in the Rodgers case. This being so it seems to us the question is effectually settled and it would serve no useful purpose to again open up the discussion.
For these reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Patterson, J., concurred ; O’Brien and Laughlin, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
The plaintiff alleges that prior to the 10th day of May, 1894, he was employed by the defendant through its department of public works “ as rammer; ” that his employment was for no definite or fixed term and that he received wages at the rate of three dollars per day; that on said day chapter 622 of the Laws of 1894 became operative; that he was thereafter employed in the same capacity without definite term until the 1st day of January, 1900, and received compensation at the rate of three dollars per day; that from and after the enactment of chapter 622 of the Laws of 1894 the prevailing rate of wages for this class of work in the city of New York and vicinity was three dollars and fifty cents per day; that he has duly presented a claim for the difference between the compensation received and the prevailing rate of wages, and payment thereof has been refused. The action is brought to recover the difference between the amount received and the compensation to which the plaintiff claims to be entitled by virtue of the provision of the act of 1894 as re-enacted in section 3 of the Labor Law, which requires, among other things, that laborers, workmen and mechanics employed upon public work by a city shall be paid not “ less than the prevailing
If the plaintiff contracted with the city for a lower rate of wages he may not be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of this statute (Clark v. State, 142 N. Y. 101), and it may well be that the circumstances are such that by accepting the lower compensation he should be estopped from claiming more, or that he has waived his right to the higher rate of wages, but none of these things appear on the face of the complaint, and, therefore, they are not presented by the demurrer.
The sole question argued on the appeal is the constitutionality of this provision of the Labor Law as applied to municipal employees, and both parties are desirous of making this a test case, and are anxious that the question should be considered on its merits. We are of opinion that the constitutionality of the law affecting such employees is fairly presented and should be determined.
The Court of Appeals decided in the case of People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler (166 N. Y. 1) that this provision of the Labor Law was unconstitutional and void as to contractors with a municipality for the performance of public work. In the discussion of the question the learned judge who wrote the prevailing opinion expressed the view that it was also unconstitutional as applied to municipal employees. Inasmuch as that question was not necessarily presented such discussion was obiter dictum, and, as we have been frequently reminded by that learned court, would not be deemed an authoritative adjudication by it. Consequently, it is not binding upon us. With respectful deference, therefore, to the view there expressed, we feel free and deem it our duty to decide the question according to our own judgment of the law. Municipal corporations are created by the Legislature, and from it they derive their authority, accompanied by duties and obligations to the State. We do not question the doctrine that a city, with respect to its property and private contract rights, enjoys “practically” the same immunity from legislative interference as individuals; but there are well-recognized exceptions to this rule. The Legislature may not create a liability against an individual, but it is well settled that it may legalize a claim against a municipal corporation which is founded upon a moral obligation, although the claim be not enforcible either by
Moreover the doctrine stated relates to property of the municipality after the same has been acquired and to contracts after the same home been made. The authority of a municipality to acquire property and make contracts is derived from the Legislature, which may impose upon its exercise reasonable conditions, restrictions and obligations. The statute under consideration does not purport to interfere with existing contract rights and is applicable only to contracts made after its enactment. It has always been the practice of the Legislature to fix the salaries and compensation of the principal officers and employees of municipalities or to provide that the same shall be fixed, usually within a maximum and a minimum limitation by some municipal authority. Statutes of this character have never been declared unconstitutional unless they contravene other provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the increase of compensation during a term of office or employment. Furthermore, the constitutionality of statutes fixing the compensation of city employees who are not officers and perform no higher grade of service than those performed by the plaintiff has been sustained. (Clark v. State, 142 N. Y. 101. See, also, McGraw v. City of Gloversville, 32 App. Div. 176; McCunney v. City of New York, 40 id. 482, 484 ; People ex rel. Satterlee v. Board of Police, 75 N. Y. 38.) If the Legislature itself may constitutionally fix the salaries of employees of a municipality, we see no reason why it may not instead provide, as it has done by this statute, that as to employees performing certain classes of work for which there is a
The “ prevailing rate of wages ” does not mean the wages paid by the municipality itself, but the market rate or the rate generally prevailing in the locality for similar services to those performed by the classes of employees enumerated in the statute. (McMahon v. Mayor, supra) The standard thus prescribed by the Legislature is apparently practicable, and the Legislature, presumably upon proper investigation, has so -determined. Of course the statute is not controlling where there is no local prevailing rate of wages with reference to similar services. (McCunney v. City of New York, supra.) It is but right and just that persons engaged in the public service, particularly mechanics, workmen- and laborers, whose compensation is the lowest, should receive as high remuneration as those engaged in similar private employment. Living wages are calculated to insure greater skill and more faithful performance of public services. Furthermore, the public interests are promoted by encouraging laborers, workmen and mechanics tq become permanent residents of the city or vicinity, rather than to leave them in a state of uncertainty and consequent unrest with reference to their tenure of employment and compensation, as would be the case if this statute were declared unconstitutional.
We agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the amount of other claims of this character, no matter how numerous, should not influence the decision as to the constitutionality of the law. Doubtless the city will be able to protect itself against any unjust claims by proving either a contract for the rate of wages paid or waiver or estoppel.
It follows, therefore, that the interlocutory judgment should be
O’Brien, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.