Lead Opinion
This case requires application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule and an examination of circumstances when the rule does not apply. We must decide whether the trial court violated the rule.
Appellant, Barbara Ann Marie Ryan, instituted a medical malpractice action in 1985 against Doctors Cattolico and DiTommaso, her family doctors, and against Doctors Berman, Rossman, and Jaffe, consulting specialists, alleging negligent failure to diagnose Cushing’s Syndrome, a rare adrenal disorder that results in elevated levels of the hormone cortisol. This had allegedly necessitated surgery in 1984 to remove a kidney and an attached adrenal tumor. In addition, her complaint alleged that the disease prolonged and exacerbated injuries she suffered when a baking rack fell on her at work in April 1982.
In 1984, she instituted a products liability action in regard to the work-related injury. In 1989, she settled the products liability case and executed a release of claims for injuries and their consequences arising from the accident at work.
Appellees, the defendant doctors, learned of the release and moved to amend their answers in the malpractice action to plead the release. They also moved for summary judgment, asserting that the release barred the malpractice action. Judge Gordon denied both motions. Appellees filed a motion for extraordinary relief wherein they again sought leave to amend their answers to the complaint and to move for summary judgment. The motion for extraordinary relief was heard by a different judge of the same court, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
Appellant appealed. The Superior Court reversed. It held that the coordinate jurisdiction rule prohibited the actions of the second judge.
On remand, the case went to trial before Judge Field. During trial, the defendant doctors again moved to amend their answers to incorporate the release. Judge Field took the motion under advisement.
At the close of the plaintiffs case-in-chief, Judge Field permitted the doctors to amend their answers and to plead the release in the product liability action; she held that the release did not entirely bar the malpractice action but only the portion that occurred after the work-related accident.
The plaintiff filed post-trial motions. Judge Field granted the motions in part: she vacated the entry of nonsuit as to Doctors Cattolico and DiTommaso, Appellant’s family doctors, on the basis that the Appellant’s medical expert’s testimony had been unduly limited at trial. Judge Field denied post-trial motions pertaining to the remaining doctors, consulting specialists Berman, Rossman, and Jaffe, thus leaving in effect the nonsuit affecting them.
The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court affirmed that portion of the trial court’s order allowing amendment of the defendant doctors’ answers to include the release. The court went on, however, to hold that the release barred the malpractice action against Doctors Cattolico and DiTommaso, the family doctors, as well as the action against the consulting specialists. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order that held otherwise. The net result was that the plaintiff, Barbara Ann Marie Ryan, was nonsuited with respect to all the defendants and was out of court entirely.
The issue here is whether Judge Field violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she overruled the prior decision of Judge Gordon of the same court in granting the defendant doctors’ motion to amend their answers to the complaint.
The coordinate jurisdiction rule prohibits a judge from overruling the decision of another judge of the same court, under most circumstances. There are, however, situations when the rule does not apply. This Court stated recently that “a later motion should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless intervening changes in facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question.” Goldey v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania,
We clarified this in Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co.,
Because the post-trial motion process is distinct procedurally from that of rendering a verdict following a non-jury trial and because the considerations of the judge are different at each procedural stage ... we hold that the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply to bar a substituted judge hearing post-trial motionsfrom correcting a mistake made by the trial judge during the trial process.
Id. at 425-26.
This case is not necessarily controlled by either Goldey or Riccio. It has some aspects akin to each of those cases, but is distinguishable in some respects from each. We will therefore consider the purposes of the rule in order to decide whether or not it should be applied in the circumstances of this case.
The salient case on the coordinate jurisdiction rule is Commonwealth v. Starr,
In applying the rule, it is important to keep in mind its purposes and to recognize circumstances which make application of the rule inappropriate. In this case, as in Riccio, the procedural posture of the case was quite different at the time the two different decisions were made; the judge who presided over the trial was in a superior position to reevaluate the question of the products liability release and its relation to the medical malpractice case than was the pretrial judge who made the initial decision. During the trial of the plaintiffs case-in-chief, abundant evidence was presented which established that Appellant was seeking damages in this case for injuries suffered in the work-related products liability case; this supported the conclusion that the release in the products liability case barred the damages, or some of them, sought in this case.
We therefore affirm the order of the Superior Court.
Notes
. See Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, No. 5 EAP 2001,
. This Court granted allocatur on a limited basis to consider only the question of whether the trial court violated the rule of coordinate jurisdiction. The question of the scope of the release and its effect on the medical malpractice litigation is not before us; we have not reviewed the Superior Court’s resolution of this question and do not disturb its holding.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that Judge Field did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she overruled Judge Gordon’s decision by granting Appellees’ renewed motion to amend their answers to the complaint, I disagree with the majority’s analysis in reaching that result. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s primary reliance on this Court’s decision in Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co.,
In Riccio, this Court held only that the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not “bar a substituted judge hearing post-trial motions from correcting a mistake made by the trial judge during the trial process.” Id. at 426. We grounded that decision on the simple fact that the entire purpose of the post-trial motion process is to permit the trial court to correct its own errors prior to review by an appellate court. As we explained: “To not allow a judge deciding post-trial motions to overrule legal errors made during the trial process ... would render the post-trial motion rules meaningless and the post-trial motion process would become nothing more than an exercise in futility.” Id.
Unlike Riccio, the instant case does not involve the reconsideration of an issue on post-trial motions. The majority nevertheless believes Riccio to be applicable, apparently understanding it to stand for the broader proposition that departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is appropriate any time the procedural posture of the case has changed and a subsequent judge is in a “superior position to reevaluate” the motion. Majority Op. at 795. However, in Riccio, we gave no consideration to whether the post-trial motions judge had superior information from which to ascertain the correct resolution of the issue before him and I would not extend the rule in that case to incorporate such considerations. In addition, I do not read Riccio to in any way bar the application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule when two motions of the same kind are filed prior to post-trial proceedings. Rather, under those circumstances, I believe that the court must apply the standard set forth in Goldey v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, and consider whether an “intervening change in facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question.”
In Goldey, this Court specifically stated that under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “a later motion should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless intervening changes in facts or the lato clearly warrant a new look at the question.”
Here, the first trial judge, without explanation, denied Appellees’ motion to amend on the eve of trial, before he had heard any testimony. At the same time that he did so, the judge issued an order denying a motion for summary judgment that Appellees had filed based on the release “on the basis that there exist genuine issues of material fact as stated in Pa. R.C.P. 1035.” 6/2/92 Summary Judgment Order. This second order strongly suggests that the court was not ruling out the possibility that future factual developments might provide the justification necessary for both amendment of the pleadings and entry of judgment in Appellees’ favor based on that release.
When the parties returned to the trial court, with a third trial judge now presiding, Appellees again moved to amend, arguing that they were “now at a different stage of trial,” and, thus, were entitled to relief. N.T., 9/4/98, at 2. Given that the parties were once again at the very same point in the proceedings as they had been the first two times that they moved to amend, and the underlying record facts had not changed in any way, Judge Field rightly refused to grant the renewed motion, explaining on the first day of trial that:
You [the Appellees] don’t like this case. You don’t like Judge Gordon’s ruling. There’s nothing I can do to change it. You don’t have any changed circumstances.
N.T., 9/4/98, at 10. Shortly thereafter, Judge Field reiterated her rationale and invited the parties to renew their motion “at a more appropriate time,” after evidence had been presented to flesh out the issues presented in the motion:
I feel at this time we are basically where Judge Gordon was when he made his decision, and I do not see any way that I could do anything different at this time. That is not to preclude you from makinga similar motion at a more appropriate time. And I think that there are enough sufficient reasons to consider a hearing, at least a portion of the evidence in this case, too. I think there are some questions in there that at least would require some hearing. So we may come back and reexamine it, but I wanted to be very up [front] with you on it.... [T]he timing of the case leads me to believe that at least some evidence should be heard in this case.
N.T., 9/8/98, at 3-4.
In the days of trial that followed, the facts in support of Appellees’ release defense and the motion to amend were developed and refined. In particular, Appellees developed persuasive record evidence that Appellant sought to collect damages in the medical malpractice action that had, in fact, resulted from her work injury and, thus, were barred by the plain language of the release.
Accordingly, there was more than ample new, enhanced and clarified evidence pursuant to which Judge Field could apply the changed facts exception in Goldey, and
Thus, without extending this Court’s limited holding in Riccio, I reach the same result as the majority.
. In addition, as I believe that Goldey's "change in facts” exception applies, I would not resort to reliance on ihe purported "manifest injustice” exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which is questionably grounded in dicta in Commonwealth v. Starr,
. Specifically, Rule 1033 provides:
A party, either by consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at arty time ... amend his pleading. The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new cause of action or defense. An amendment may he made to conform the pleading to the evidence offered or admitted.
Pa. R.Civ. P. 1033 (emphases added).
. In response to the motion to amend. Appellant Barbara Ann Marie Ryan argued, inter alia, that the release did not provide a valid defense and, thus, the proposed amendment would be futile.
. The release provided that:
IT IS A FULL AND FINAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS and shall apply to ALL KNOWN AND UNKNOWN INJURIES and anticipated and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting, or to result, or which might result from said accident, casualty or event, as well as to those now known or disclosed.
Release, at 1 (emphasis in original).
. In her initial pretrial memo in the instant case, Appellant alleged that "Defendants' negligence caused these symptoms [of Cushing’s Syndrome] to become progressively worse.... In consequence, [Appellant] became obese, moon-faced with blotchy skin and striae, buffalo-humped and otherwise disfigured, with resulting humiliation and embarrassment causing her to become reclusive, depressed and anxious. Her endocrine system was thrown into disorder, causing ... aggravated injuries in work accident....” 4/16/90 Plaintiff's Pre-trial Conference Memorandum at 7-8.
. As the majority acknowledges, Judge Field "was in a superior position to reevaluate the question of the products liability release and its relation to the medical malpractice case than was the pretrial judge who made the initial decision.” Maj. Op. at 795.
. In no way should this opinion be read to suggest that a litigant is required to prove a defense in order to establish its right to amend the pleadings to add the defense. As our prior case law makes clear, the right to amend should be "liberally granted," Schaffer, 189 A.2d al 270, and absent prejudice to the adverse party, a court should only deny a motion to amend when the party seeking amendment “will be unable to state a claim on which relief could be granted.” Werner, 681A.2d at 1338. This standard is similar to that of a demurrer and does not require proof of the facts underlying the claim or defense asserted. However, where, as here, a trial judge apparently erred by holding a party seeking amendment to too high of a standard, and facts subsequently developed at trial .make clear that the proposed claim or defense is viable, a succeeding trial judge may use those facts to support the reversal of the first judge, so long as the judge also properly concludes that no prejudice will result to the opposing party.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
As the majority aptly explains, at issue in this case is the substantial tension between maintaining respect for prior rulings in the interest of sound and efficient judicial administration, and the essential ability to correct mistakes in furtherance of the interests of justice. Unlike my colleagues, however, I do not discern material differences arising from the distinct procedural postures in which Judges Gordon and Field made their rulings to deny and allow Appellees to amend their answer, respectively, since I believe that the relevant circumstances were sufficiently developed at the time Judge Gordon made his initial ruling. I would nonetheless affirm the Superior Court’s order, because I find that Judge Gordon’s order was sufficiently infirm, in and of itself, to warrant correction at any time during the course of the proceedings. My reasoning follows.
In her complaint in the present medical malpractice action, Appellant asserted that some of the defendant-physicians had been negligent in their examination and treatment of her beginning in 1978, thus exacerbating her glandular disorder. Further, Appellant made explicit reference to injuries that she sustained in her 1982 work-related accident, contending that such injuries aggravated the symptoms of her pre-existing disease, and, conversely, that the presence of the disease made her injuries worse than they otherwise would have been. Hence, Appellant claimed that the doctors’ alleged negligence was a proximate cause of her total loss of earning power as of the date of the accident.
While recognizing that Appellees and Baker’s Aid are alleged to be not joint but successive tortfeasors, nevertheless, Pennsylvania law prescribes that a plaintiff is generally entitled to only a single satisfaction for her loss. See Brown v. Pittsburgh,
Additionally, those who treated her after 1982 could also have argued that the release constituted a bar to liability as, under Appellant’s theory of the case, the maladies from which she was suffering at that point resulted, at least to some degree, from the 1982 accident. It was thus apparent from the face of the release and the pleadings already of record, at the time of Appellees’ first motion to amend, that the release constituted a possible bar to liability, and hence, that Appellees should have been permitted to amend their answer absent some valid reason for denying the amendment unrelated to the materiality of the release.
It should be acknowledged that there was one such potential reason before Judge Gordon at the time at which he initially denied the amendment-Appellant asserted that, given that Appellees’ effort to amend occurred on the eve of the date set for trial, the amendment would be prejudicial. Appellees, however, claimed to have only recently learned of the settlement, and, unfortunately, Judge Gordon did not provide the rationale supporting his order. Moreover, Judge Gordon postponed the trial to consider the motion, and issued his order denying the motion more than one year later. In my view, it was error for Judge Gordon to issue an unexplained, per curiam order denying Appellees’ petition for leave to amend their answer to assert the release in these circumstances, particularly where the basis for the amendment was always known to Appellant, and disallowance of the amendment opened the possibility for double satisfaction of Appellant’s claim for economic damages.
The majority relies on a change in the procedural posture of the case as negating the application of the coordinate jurisdiction precept. Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co.,
Here, the interests of justice and the coordinate jurisdiction rule would best be served by resting the Court’s present disposition on the injustice connected with the denial of the amendment. Such denial was sufficiently erroneous to permit correction upon renewal of the motion.
. The more common situation presented in the cases involves an injured person who commences actions against both a tortfeasor and a physician who rendered subsequent treatment. See, e.g., Thompson v. Fox,