*1 RYAN STEVEDORING CO., INC. PAN-
ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CORP. Argued No. 4. 3-4, 1955; equally March affirmed divided Court, April 11, 1955; granted, May rehearing 16, 1955; reargued 11-12,
October January 9, 1955. Decided *2 petitioner. for cause the argued Schwarts A. Sidney Ash. Edward was brief the him on With respondent. for cause the argued Behrens J. Edward Lawson. H. Charles brief on the himWith Leavenworth 948, S. 348 U. Court, of leave special By amicus States, as the United cause the argued Colby were brief him With affirmance. curiae, urging Attorney General Sobeloff, Assistant General Solicitor Marcuse. Herman Sweeney and A. Burger, Paul opinion the delivered Burton Mr. Justice of liability the toas questions two presents case This a reimburse stevedoring contractor a contractor’s the of to one latter the paid in himby received injuries account on longshoremen first 1. The shipboard. on employment of his course Harbor and Longshoremen’s whether is question a precludes Act1 Compensation Workers’ is whether The second liability. asserting such entering without contractor, where exists per- contracts indemnity, agreement express into long- and operations stevedoring form unsafe contractor’s by the are caused injuries shoreman’s hereafter reasons For cargo. ship’s stowage negative in the question first answer we stated, affirmative. second Corpora- Steamship Pan-Atlantic respondent, In Canton the SS. operated corporation, Delaware tion, a seq. 901 et C. amended, S.U. § seq., as et 1 44 Stat. in Victory the American coastwise trade under a bareboat charter. As evidenced letters, but without a formal stevedoring express contract an indemnity agreement, respondent secured, for year, agreement peti- tioner, Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., corpora- an Alabama tiоn, perform all operations required by respondent coastwise its service. Pursuant to that contract, petitioner loaded the Victory Canton at George- town, South Carolina, with cargo. mixed This included pulpboard, such used making corrugated paper paper bags, shipped in rolls 4 feet wide and 3 to 5 feet long. Petitioner stowed some of these rolls side-by-side on the floor of Hatch 3No. and “nested” others above them by placing upper rolls troughs between the lower ones. To immobilize rolls, *3 was necessary to secure or “chock” the bottom tier with wedges or with pieces miscellaneous of wood known as “dunnage.” There is little evidence as to what place took when the rolls were stowed at Georgetown but it was the uniform practice petitioner’s longshoremen to stow such cargo under the immediate direction of their hatch fore- men, while respondent’s cargo supervised officers the load- ing ship entire and had authority to reject unsafe stowage.
A days few later, July on 20, in navigable water at a pier in Brooklyn, New York, petitioner engaged in unloading these rolls. While one of petitioner’s Brooklyn longshoremen, Palazzolo, Frank in working was Hatch 3,No. roll, one weighing 3,200 about pounds, broke loose from the others, him struck violently and severely injured his leg. left There is no evidence that he negligent. On hand, the other it appears that the in rolls Hatch No.
3 had been insufficiently secured when by peti stowed tioner in Georgetown. This is established by the absence proper wedges dunnage holding the in place rolls the time at of the accident. Longshoremen’s under carrier insurance
Petitionеr’s and furnished compensation $2,940 Palazzolo paid any all without $9,857.36, costing services medical him per- As Commissioner. Deputy by award formal respondent- sued the Palazzolo Act, of that by § mitted He York.2 of New Supreme Court which cargo, stowage unsafe claimed that the unseaworthi- either injuries, established his caused failing in shipowner’s negligence ship, or the ness or both. work, place safe him with a to furnish District States to the United the case removed filed York and of New District Eastern for the Court stipula- By petitioner. against complaint third-party tried shipowner was against case tion, Palazzolo’s $75,000. favor for his a verdict returned jury, disability for which or death (a) of a on If account “Sec. to such person entitled this Act payable under compensation is than the person other some compensation determines deputy elect, giving notice may damages, he is liable may pro Secretary Labor] [of such manner commissioner damages recover compensation or to such vide, to receive person. third such in a com- an award compensation under Acceptance of “(b) such operate as an shall deputy commissioner order filed pensation to com- person entitled right of the employer of all assignment person. against such third pensation to recover has carrier insurance insured and employer is “(i) Where *4 shall insurance carrier the compensation, payment of the assumed section.” employer under this rights of the subrogated to all be (i). (b) (a) 933 amended, C.S. 1440, 33 § as XJ. 44 Stat. 19, 44 see compensation, § an award secure procedure For C. 919. amended, S. 33 U. 1435-1436, § Stat. his payments from compensation accepting after longshoreman, A for his third-party tortfeasor may award, sue an without employer 446, 454-456. Porello, S. 330 U. v. Stevedores American injuries. shipowner for unsea may recover he permit, facts If the Hawn, 346 Pope Talbot & or both. negligence, worthiness, or for U. S.
128 judgment jury entered on the verdict. The District Court sum, petitioner’s above insurance carrier was to From the $12,797.36 reimbursed for the it had advanced because be injuries. of Palazzolo’s shipowner’s third-party
Also com- stipulation, plaint judge was submitted on the same record to the who presided had over Palazzolo’s case. He dismissed the Ill complaint. Supp. Appeals F. 505. The Court of judgment affirmed Palazzolo’s but reversed dismissal judgment and directed that third-party complaint of the Petitioner, 211 shipowner. be for the 2d 277. entered F. contends that the order re- stevedoring contractor, impleader suit is erroneous. versing dismissal application of the wide of the case and the con- Because expressed issues, that have been we flicting views 348 S. 813. The United States granted certiorari. U. in support filed a brief as amicus curiae in the oral 348 S. 948. The part argument. and took U. affirmed judgment equally Court, divided was restored to the docket for S. but the case U. Court, before a full S. 926. reargument U. question Longshoremen’s whether 1. The first Compensation precludes by ship- assertion it, liability contractor’s owner aof the contractor is also the where injured longshoreman. below question, although
Neither court discussed this petitioner presented argument it to them. Petitioner’s upon following provision Longshore- is based and Harbor Act: Compensation men’s Workers’ liability employer prescribed
“Sec. 5. The anof be cоmpensation] section shall exclusive and [for all other such place employer to the representative, his employee, legal wife, husband or
129 other- anyone kin, and next of dependents, parents, employer such damages recover to wise entitled injury or such admiralty on account law or at of pay- to secure fails employer if death, an except Act, an by this required compensation of ment in case representative legal or his employee, injured to claim may elect injury, from the results death to maintain or Act, under compensation damages on account admiralty for at or action law supplied.) (Emphasis . . .” or death. injury of such 33 § S. C. 1426, 44 Stat. U. make the is to provision of this purpose
The obvious its to to contribute employer of an liability statutory such liability exclusive еmployee’s compensation of or claiming under anyone or employee, its to employer injury or death his on account employee, through such employee, return, In arising employment. out given are through him, or claiming under and those com- form of an assured quo quid pro substantial their as a substitute regardless of pensation, fault, prescribes the Act hand, On the other claims. excluded pay compelled that is quo for a quid pro no full amount of for the against it obtained judgment damages.3 longshoreman’s excludes expressly 5 of the Act
Section
entitled
employee,”
others,
“to
injury or
[employee’s]
of such
“on account
recover
it excludes
case,
instant
Therefore,
death.”
contractor, however,
re
has
case,
instant
In the
assuming
quo
quid pro
from the
ceived a contractual
rеsponsibility for the
resulting
doring
ance
Bethlehem
bray v.
requirements,
those
Merryweather,
Shipbuilding Corp. v.
requirements.
shipowner from the contractor’s
including
proper performance
[1895]
See
In the face of formal a bond of indemnity this statute clearly does not cut off a shipowner’s right to recover from a bonding company the reimbursement indemnitor, for good has consideration, expressly con- tracted to pay. Such springs from an inde- pendent contractual right. It is an action or on behalf of the employee and it is not one to recover dam- ages “on of” an employee’s account “injury or death.” It is a simple action to recover, under a voluntary and self-sufficient contract, a sum measured foreseeable damages occasioned to the shipowner by injury death of a longshoreman on its ship.
A like result occurs where a shipowner sues, for breach of warranty, supplier of defective ship’s gear that has caused injury or to a longshoreman death using it in the course of his employment on shipboard. And a like liability for breach contract accrues to a against a stevedoring contractor in any instance when the (a) swpra.
4 See 33 in note § on injury causes cargo stowage improper latter’s employees. its one of other than one to-some shipboard happens here loading contractor coincidence no makes longshoreman injured to be pro Compensation While principle. difference brought actions from stevedoring contractor tects tortious the contractor’s on еmployee account byit its has the contractor employee, injury to causing conduct consequences the full for relief ground logical no as voluntarily obligation, contractual independent its See properly. cargo load the shipowner, sumed *7 446; ello, 330 S. Por U. v. Stevedores Crawford American v. Brown 792-793; Talbot, 206 2dF. & Pope v. Rich v. United 16; Co., 2d 211 F. S. S. American-Hawaiian Stevedoring Arrow States United 688; F. 2d States, 177 329.5 Co., 2d 175 F. a tort upon not founded here is action shipowner’s
The owes contractor stevedoring any duty upon or grounded is complaint third-party employee. to its obli- consensual purely of its breach upon contractor’s 5 Compensation history of the legislative nothing in the is There of that interpretation interpretation. Our contrary calling Act Compensa York Workmen’s by of the New that supported also Aсt is the— provides that Act The latter it is modeled. upon which tion last prescribed compensation] “liability [for of an any other place of be exclusive shall preceding section husband, representatives, personal employee, his whatsoever, to such entitled anyone otherwise kin, or of or next dependents parents, of such on account otherwise or law damages, common at recover Com Laws, Workmen’s McKinney’s Y.N. .” . . . injury or death Law, 11. pensation § Corp., County 278 v. Westchester Lighting Co. Westchester See com- reached have courts state Other 2d 567. 175, N. E. Y.N. respective in their liability clauses exclusive as to parable results Law, Compensation Larson, Workmen’s Acts. Compensation (a). §§76.00-76.44
gation owing to the shipowner cargo stow the in a reasonably safe manner. Accordingly, shipowner’s action for indemnity on that basis is not barred Compensation Act.6
2. The other question whether, is in the absence agreement
express indemnity, con- obligated tractor to reimburse a shipowner for byit caused improper contractor’s stow- age cargo.
The answer to this is found the precise ground of the shipowner’s By action. hypothesis, its action is not based on a bond of indemnity such as it may purchase by way of insurance, may require of its stevedoring contractor, and which expressly undertakes to shipowner save the If harmless. did hold such an express agreement of indemnity here, it is disputed would be enforceable the indemnitor. On the other hand, action for indemnity here is not based merely on ground contractor each is responsible in some degree related for the tortious stowage cargo that caused injury Palazzolo. Such an action, brought without reliance *8 6We do not reach the issue exclusionary of the effect of the Com pensation upon right of comparable action of a under circumstances upon indemnity without reliance agree or service stevedoring ment of a contractor. See Brown v. American-Hawaiian Co., 16,18; S. S. 211 F. 2d States S. S. Co. v. Rothschild International Stevedoring Co., 253; Slattery 205 F. 2d Bros., v. Marra 186 F. 2d (N. statute); 134 J. United States v. Rothschild International Steve doring Co., 181; Liability 183 F. 2d American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 322; 182 F. 2d Telegraph American District v. Kittle Co. son, 946; Compagnie 179 F. 2d McFall Beige, v. Maritime 304 N. Y. 314, 107 N. E. generally, 2d 463. Weinstock, Employer’s And see The Duty Indemnify Shipowners Damages for Recovered Harbor Workers, (1954). 103U. of L. Pa. Rev. 321 bald the present would undertakings, contractual upon ship- or the stevedoring contractor whether question for responsibilities respective of their owner, because burden of ultimate bear stowage, should unsafe has question That judgment. longshoreman’s injured relative of the in terms elsewhere widely discussed been dis- and those tort, parties of responsibility and second- primary of concepts with dealt have cussions Because conduct.7 tortious passive and active or ary upon peti- entirely relies case instant respondent ques- not meet we do obligation, contractual tioner’s or of indemnity of right a noncontractual tion right. such toAct Compensation relation con- a claim is not here also claim shipowner’s The con- Consequently, tortfeasor. a joint tribution v. Halcyon Lines to the decision led siderations See applicable. are not S. Corp., U. Ship Haenn F. Matthews, 182 Co. v. Liability Ins. Mutual American 2d uncontroverted petitioner’s holds here all perform
agreement ques- cargo where place time and at the operations necessarily includes agreement That loaded. tion was but rolls, pulp only to stow not obligation petitioner’s Competency safely. properly them to stow the service elements of are stowage inescapable safety quasi-contractual is obligation This undertaken. a noncon- out of arising in law implied obligation petitioner’s essence It is relationship. tractual work- warranty of petitioner’s is It stevedoring contract. manufacturer’s ato comparable service manlike v. supra; Co., S.S. v. American-Hawaiian Crawford Brown See supra; Beige, Compagnie Maritime Talbot, supra; McFall Pope & Dam Shipowners for Indemnify Duty to Employer’s Weinstock, The Workers, supra. by Harbor ages Recovered *9 warranty product. of the soundness its manufactured shipowner’s changed action is not one for simply breach of contract one for a tort re- because covery may turn upon performance the standard of the petitioner’s service.8 stevedoring
The Court of Appeals
has stated that
petitioner
performance
case is
of its obli-
gation to stow the rolls on board
“in
ship
reasonably
2d,
safe manner.”
F.
at 279. That court also has
affirmed the decision of the District Court
upon
jury
petitioner’s
based
the verdict of the
im-
proper stowage
produced
of the rolls
either the unsea-
worthiness of the
or the
ship,
hazardous working condition
shipowner’s
which is the basis for the
liability to Palazzolo.
suggests that,
Petitioner
because the shipowner had an
obligаtion
supervise
the stowage
right
and had a
reject
stowage
cargo
unsafe
so,
did not do
recovery
now should be barred from
from the stevedor-
ing
any damage
contractor of
caused
that contrac-
tor’s uncorrected failure to stow the
“in
rolls
a reason-
ably safe manner.” Accepting the facts and obligations
stated,
above
the shipowner’s present claim against
the contractor should not thereby be defeated. What-
ever may have been
respective obligations
injured
contractor and
longshoreman
proper
stowage of the cargo, it is clear
that, as between themselves,
contractor,
war-
as the
rantor of its own services,
cannot use the
fail-
ure to discover and correct the contractor’s own breach
Q.
Chicago,
Co.,
See Union Stock Yаrds
v.Co.
B. & R.
196 U. S.
217;
v.
Co., supra;
Brown
American-Hawaiian S. S.
v.
Crawford
Pope
Talbot, supra,
792-793;
Liability
&
at
American Mutual
Ins.
Matthews, supra,
323-325;
Co. v.
States, supra;
at
Rich v. United
Shipbuilding Corp.
Co., supra; Mowbray
Bethlehem
v. Gutradt
Merryweather, supra;
Asphalt Paving Co.,
Dunn v. Uvalde
175 N. Y.
214,
135 failure to dis- warranty Respondent’s of as a defense. petitioner’s own breach of contract cover and correct breach.9 cannot here excuse that judgment Appeals, accordingly, The of the Court of Affirmed. Black, Justice, with whom The Chief Mr. Justice concur, and Mr. Justice Clark Douglas, Mr. Justice dissenting. Ryan Stevedoring
The
is an
petitioner,
Company,
employer subject
Longshoremen’s
to the
and Harbor
Compensation Act.1
5 of that Act
Workers’
Section
com-
all
pletely
rights
longshoremen
abolished
sue their
employers
injuries resulting
negligence
employees.
or his
Act substituted fоr
employer
old
prescribed
compensation
tort remedies a
schedule of
injuries
which
employees’
or death
was declared to be
in place
“exclusive and
of all other
of such em-
ployer
employee
anyone
to the
. . and
otherwise entitled
.
to recover
from such
at law or
admi-
ralty
injury
on account of such
or death . . . .” I think
holding today
promises
the Court’s
breaks
the Act made
both
employers
employees. My
requires
view
more detailed statement of the facts and circumstances
appears
of this case than
opinion.
the Court’s
Palazzolo,
employee
Ryan,
was
stevedore,
injured
unloading cargo
ship
while
on a
owned
respondent,
Steamship Corporation.
Pan-Atlantic
As
33 Palazzolo elected to sue the
by §
authorized
In
accept
compensation
rather than
award.
his com-
9
Compagnie
Cyprien Fabre,
Navigation
v.
F. 2d
See Berti
de
397;
Contracting
Transportation Corp., 4 F.
Co. v. Ocean
Hastorf
584; Mowbray Merryweather, supra;
583, aff’d, 4
Boston
2d
F. 2d
v.
Kendall,
232,
Woven Hose
Mass.
Act. That
right
employers
sue their
away
longshoremen
to.
a fixed
of com-
negligence
for
and substituted
schedule
pensation
injuries regardless
Many
of fault.
workers
compensation
employers opposed
scheme. The
deplored
get
loss of their chance to
ver-
big
workers
tort
Congress thought
give
dicts. But
it best to
them a more
expensive recovery,
though
certain and less
even
far less
in amount
than
tort
might
Many
some
recoveries
be.
employers preferred to take their chance on defeating
employees’
damage
system.
suits under
old tort
of "liability
idea
without fault” was abhorrent
them.
Congress weighed
conflicting
employers
interests of
employees
and struck what was cоnsidered to be a
fair and constitutional
balance.4
Injured employees
thereby lost their
to get large
chance
tort verdicts
their employers,
gained
get
but
right
though
sure
frequently
recovery.
a more modest
33
However, §
did
employees
leave
a chance to recover extra
damages
tort
persons
from third
negligently injured
who
them. And
Congress imposed
while
absolute
on employers,
they were also accorded counterbalancing advantages.
They
longer
were no
to be subjected to the hazards of
large tort verdicts. Under no
they
circumstances were
to be held liable to their
employees
own
for more than the
compensation clearly fixed in
employers
the Act. Thus
given every
were
reason to believe they
buy
could
their
insurance and make other
arrangements
business
bаsis of the limited Compensation Act liability. More
than that,
33 of the
provides
§
Act also
compen-
that for
paid
sation
an employee an employer shall himself be
reimbursed or indemnified out of any money collected as
a result of an employee’s claim
negligent
injury by See Crowell v.
22, 37-42;
Benson,
285 U. S.
New York Central
188,
Co. White,
R.
S.U.
201-202. Cf. Ives v. South Buffalo
Co.,
201 N. Y.
R.
third its because mulcted actually action. third-party prosecuted successfully employee negligence because imposed is thus Liability forbids. the Act This employees. employer’s other “contribu- indemnity,” "common-law called Whether *15 is result name, other any or “subrogation,” tion,” “on more to pay has employer the same. precisely said Congress than employee to his injury of” an account he should. had made here if the that course,
I agree, hold to this agreeing written, oral or contract, a liability indemnify the or to harmless ship- by caused employees injuries petitioner’s to for would the contract part, in whole or negligence owner’s obtained. been have indemnity could valid have been employers forbid does not Longshoremen’s For the indemnify to agreements independent make it to under support slightest there is I think But others. was any such contract that finding record for this in the was made allegation No such made. careful was shipowner’s counsel
complaint. And action that his trial course during stipulate in- common-law but on contract on a based was not may indemnity common-law recognize that I demnity.5 indemnity right of This shipowner]: for Behrens “Mr. [counsel indemnity rather of common-law right is a alleged Pan-Atlantic get such facts My question is how to provision. than a contractual your Honor. before summary judgment in Honor, was a motion there “Your correspondence exchange of was annexed by Ryan, to which case is a contract. Pan-Atlantic, which Ryan and between put be now should those documents question is whether “Now, the infer from your Honor will Honor, whether your or before in evidence contractual subject there no any on the proof the absence indemnity. agree stip- Ryan] we can : I think “Mr. Schwartz [counsel wrong a tort or people two commit arise where
sometimes wrongdoers As between person. hurts the same impose the total circumstances the courts will under some appar- wrongdoer, “active” liability “primary” deems to be ently meaning wrongdoer the court imposed plainly “on indemnity But so negligent. most em- wrongdoer or his negligence account of” recоvery by forbids ployees. expressly The Act such “on stevedoring company from a account” “anyone” longshoremen. one of common- injury Plainly, its indemnity should not be used fasten such law I liability stevedoring company. suppose on a it is for purports to find an actual con- this reason the Court indemnify and thus decides the case on an issue tract presented complaint neither nor considered trial court.
A genuine distinguished contract as from a imposed re- by law, “quasi-contract,” sometimes called a *16 quires agreement parties. mutual It is for this reason that the have frequently courts said that the cardi- nal interpretation rule of contracts is that the in- tention of parties should be ascertained and enforced.6 ordinarily And courts do not language stretch order to arrangement ulate between us that whatever contractual was made Ryan, any expressed pro- between Pan-Atlantic and did not contain indemnity, position vision for and it is Mr. Behrens' in this matter solely upon implied right indemnity, that his claim is over based implied in law. “Mr. Behrens: That is correct. stipulate pro-
“Mr. Schwartz: I will that there is no contractual indemnity. vision for satisfactory stipulate,
“Mr. Behrens: And I will so if that to your Honor. Very “The Court: well.”
6See, Bullus, Hill, g., 528, 534; e. Mauran 16 Pet. Canal Co. v. 15Wall. 99-100.
find person agreed indemnify that one has to another when the latter negligently Special hurts someone.7 cau tion should be in construing used as to im contracts so pose indemnity liability companies on engaged of writing indemnity business insurance.
I think there is not a shred of to support evidence Court’s inference that voluntarily stevedore agreed give up to limited which the Longshoremen’s deliberately designed to аfford. The Court finds nothing support such a except conclusion that agreed stevedore to do a stevedoring job. From that the implies Court it that was to do a good job. workmanlike From there it takes the step next should be more —which difficult than appears says be—and the steve- doring company agreed give also up immunity its under pay the Act and any judgments might be rendered in favor of the employees stevedore’s the ship- owner for its negligence. The precise scope of in- demnity which the Court finds the stevedore intended to assume is left in doubt. Are we to assume that the steve- agreed dore to an unlimited liability indemnity with- out regard to the comparative or qualitative proportions of negligence as between employees its employees and the shipowner? Are we even to assume that the steve- deliberately dore intentionally agreed to indemnify upon a finding court’s that the stevedore’s negligence “sole,” was the “primary,” or “active” cause injury? Findings of fact based on these standards are easy. never inAnd efforts formulate a common-law indemnity remedy courts groped themselves have con- *17 siderably in trying give meaning to the terms “primary” and “active.” an Is understanding of the dif- ferent nuances of “sole,” “primary” and “active” to be at- tributed to stevedoring companies in judicial rewriting of
7 See, g., e. Note, cases 8, collected in 175 A. L. R. 29-32. indemnity contracts? them to make so as contracts
work of a the existence determines this Court Surely before should the case coverage of its scope and contract could these issues court so to the trial back be sent The facts. hearing full after a determined be tried District Court tried in the were not issues been have never The issues Appeals. in the Court of Porello, 330 S. Stevedores, U. Inc. v. In American tried. hearing for a trial court a case to the remanded 446, we indemnity scope of a contract as to the evidence on is not even Here there it written. though was even a contract creating Before indemnify. oral contract did the course we to follow appropriate be might of Porello? rejecting phase Or is the Court Porello. Ceiling Refitting & Ship v. Haenn Halcyon Lines Cf. S.U. Corp., only deprives the here not Court’s action
Finally, the right of it makes the liability, limited of his employer a bar- parties from third recover employees to ways provides two 33 of the promise. ren Section damages from to obtain injured employee for an may elect emрloyee person: (1) The negligent third and sue employer from his statutory compensation waive If (2) damages. negligent person directly third employer compensation award employee accepts statutory assignee person third may sue the in excess employer all recovers claim, but employee’s paid be award must compensation amount of the make an able to Palazzolo was employee. over to the his his suit because bring own election case in the outcome of his financially interested him Palazzolo to sustain money advanced and therefore party case the third injury until his during his away all incentive could be tried. Court takes in the future. Hereafter employers to follow this course circumstances like this will stevedoring companies under *18 know that it decidedly advantage to their that no third- party actions be An brought. employer Ryan like will hereafter if know that he or employee prosecutes his a claim against a party third judgment obtains a the employee’s benefit, every dime of the will judgment paid by have to be the employer himself. Human nature and habits being they what are, employers will not be eager to against finance suits Injured themselves. long- shoremen are not ordinarily wealthy enough support to themselves without work pending the trial lengthy lawsuits. Yet if an employee accepts compensation a only employer award his can bring suit against person, third and the employer will not overly be anxious to sue himself. It suggested has been that we expect can protect employees the courts to under such In circumstances. other words, employee who hаs accepted compensation go must court to him- protect into self against employer his he goes before into court to protect party his claim a third who has negligently injured him. I Congress given cannot believe would have employers complete such if it had control over these suits thought everything employers could be held liable recovered. holding The actual effect of the Court’s is this: The employer assignee employee’s as an of an claim will know that if he a lawsuit, wins he loses lawsuit. This knowledge will not him a give yearning anxiety to file suit. though yields duty Even he to the call and files the lawsuit, might exceedingly he not be anxious write good complaint. might other pleadings His not be all lawyer Although zealous would desire. the em- pay must his be ployer judgment, opening will argument jury. And when last word is said made closing argument, will be who counsel persuades jury give knows that if he his client a pay his client will have to it. verdict Counsel will also happens if he the case know that lose his client will about brought affairs the state Such is be the winner. intended holding Court’s by very him to the subject would contract make a *19 abolished. had Congress that liability Court this disagreement been considerable There has our recent hold about three other courts among and Halcyon Sieracki, 85; 328 U. S. Skipping Co. ings, Seas 342 U. S. Corp., Ceiling Refitting & Ship v. Haenn Lines In Hawn, S. 406. 346 U. Talbot, Inc. v. &Pope and 282; position same in the a worker cases these each of unsea and negligence shipowner alleging a Palazzolo sued ship the against obtained were Judgments worthiness. shipowner that Halcyon case held owners. We of “contribu doctrine common-law not under could part to employers pаy employees’ injured tion” force The Sieracki shipowner. judgment In that & Talbot. Pope were reaffirmed Halcyon cases part of his to shift permit to refused case we argument employer on his injured person’s loss to Longshoremen’s was under employer, who that rejected injury. We contributed Act, negligently accepted it “would if that ground the contention employers who to protect purpose this frustrate [Act’s] liability by Act.” absolute to subjected are way today provides opinion The Court’s at U. S., and remedial change of words simple by under which can three former cases in our reached the results formulas and Palazzolo like Employees Sieracki be undermined. get to their cases impossible practically it will find And a in a court. persons tried third injuries against wholly a steve liability to to shift who wants He simplе method. by very so company can do doring intentionally stevedoring company allege that can him under circum indemnify to agreeing a contract made be allegation will case; like those in stances establishing the fact by simply automatically proved stevedoring company contracted do some work on ship; the result will be that is wholly deprived protection of limited which the Act was intended provide. And while this will be accomplished under the “contract,” really name of it will be achieved because the Court has announced as an principle absolute regard of law that without to whether a stevedoring company agree intends to it indemnify, has so if agreed agrees job. do a Thus indirection rights longshoremen employers recognized and their Sieracki, this Court in Halcyon, Pope & Talbot are taken In away. effect rejected. the Sieracki case is
I would reverse this case.