MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this § 1983
1
suit, рlaintiffs, former owners of a Manassas Park, Virginia, pool hall, allege that a June 2, 2004, warrantless administrative search of their property violated their Fourth Amendment rights because it was unreasonably conducted. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the search, which was part of a joint operation with a multi-jurisdictional drug task force seeking to arrest narcotics traffickers who had sold drugs at the pool hall, was unreasonably conducted because the size, scope, duration, and manner of the search unreasonably threatened the pool hall’s patrons and employees. Defendants, the City of Manassas Park, its chief of police, two police detectives, a former confidential police informant, and the Manassas Park mayor, move for summary judgment on four grounds. Specifically, defendants ar
For the reasons that follow, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims, with plaintiffs’ remaining pendent state-law claims to be dismissed without prejudice. Specifically, because the administrative search of plaintiffs’ property was reasonably conducted, it did not violate their Fourth Amendmеnt rights. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed.
I 2
A. The Parties
In 1992, plaintiff Triple D Enterprises, Inc. (“Triple D”), a Maryland corporation owned by plaintiffs David Ruttenberg and Judith Ruttenberg, opened the Rack ‘N’ Roll Billiard Club (“RNR”), a pool hall in Manassas Park, Virginia. David Rutten-berg is a 10% owner of Triple D and served as RNR’s general manager for all times relevant to this suit. 3 His mother, Judith Ruttenberg, is a 90% owner of Triple D and, unlike her son, was never involved in RNR’s day-to-day operations.
Defendant City of Manassas Park (“City”) is an incorporated Virginia municipality that controls the Manassas Park Police Department (“MPPD”). Since 2002, defendant Chief John Evans (“Chief Evans”) has served as the City’s chief of police. Both defendant Detective L, an MPPD officer, and defendant Detective W, an officer with the neighboring Prince William County Police Department (“PWCPD”), have served with their respective departments since the late 1980s. At all times relevant to this suit, Detectives L and W were also members of the Narcotics Task Force (“NTF”), a twelve-to-fifteen officer joint task force formed by the MPPD, PWCPD, and Manassas City Police Department (“MCPD”) in June 2002 to investigate narcotics distribution in Ma-nassas, Manassas Park, and Prince William County.
4
Finally, defendant Thomas Kifer (“Kifer”) is a former RNR security officer who worked for the NTF as a confi
B. RNR’s Business
The record reflects that RNR, which was located in a Manassas Park shopping center, 5 had a maximum legal occupancy of approximately one hundred fifty persons. At all times relevant to this suit, RNR’s premises, rectangular in shape, stretched in length from a front shopping center entrance to a rear alley exit. RNR’s interior included, inter alia, (i) at least ten standard-size pool tables, (ii) several large video game consoles, (iii) several foosball tables, (iv) at least nine circular tables with accompanying bar stools, (v) a number of large-screen televisions, (vi) a bar extending down approximately half the length of one side of its main room, (vii) an elevated stage for dancing, (viii) a disc-jockey booth, (ix) men’s and women’s restrooms, and (x) an upstairs office. In 1993, RNR applied for, and received, a Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) license to sell beer to its patrons. David Ruttenberg testified at his deposition in this matter that RNR sometimes remained open twenty-four hours, but typically closed at 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. on weekdays and circa 5:00 a.m. on weekends. In 2000, in response to a burglary and some domestic disputes that occurred in RNR’s parking lot, David Ruttenberg installed a security camera system. Specifically, he installed sixteen cameras in and around RNR, each of which filmed two frames per second. The system’s video feed was monitored and recorded in RNR’s upstairs office.
C. Illegal Activity at RNR and the NTF’s Investigation
Between November 2003 and June 2004, MPPD officers responded to approximately forty-one calls of varying nature in or around RNR, including approximately twelve calls reporting fights or disorderly conduct, ten reporting patrons’ excessive intoxication, and two reporting drug distribution activity. Ten arrests resulted, including six occurring inside RNR. The record reflects that RNR was cooperative with law enforcement on each occasion police responded to a call; indeed, the record reflects that at least twelve of the forty-one calls were made by RNR employees. 6
In January 2004, the NTF began investigating reports of illegal drug sales in or around RNR. Specifically, the NTF assigned Detective W to conduct undercover surveillance inside RNR, and it assigned Detective L to serve as the case agent supervising Detective W. During a fоrty-three day span from late February 2004 to early April 2004, Detective W, acting un
• On February 24, 2004, Detective W negotiated marijuana deals with three different individuals — Jeffrey Price, Eric Golden, and Christopher Price— inside RNR. Thereafter, Detective W received the marijuana for one sale near RNR’s restrooms, and he received the marijuana for the other two sales in RNR’s parking lot.
• On February 27, 2004, Detective W negotiated and completed a marijuana purchase from Jeffrey Price inside RNR.
• On March 3, 2004, Detective W negotiated a marijuana deal with Jeffrey Price and Andrew Kinsley inside RNR and thereafter received the marijuana in RNR’s parking lot.
• On March 10, 2004, Detective W negotiated and paid for a cocaine deal with Jason Brooke inside RNR, but never received the cocaine.
• On March 24, 2004, Detective W negotiated and paid for a marijuana deal with Jeffrey Price inside RNR and thereafter received the marijuana in RNR’s parking lot.
• On April 5, 2004, Detective W negotiated and paid for a marijuana deal with Jeffrey Price inside RNR and thereafter received the marijuana in RNR’s parking lot.
• On April 8, 2004, Detective W negotiated a marijuana deal over the phone with Jeffrey Price and thereafter received the drugs from Eric Golden in RNR’s parking lot.
• On April 19, 2004, Detective W negotiated a marijuana deal with Jeffrey Price and Eric Golden inside RNR, but never completed the transaction.
Detective L testified that he conducted undercover surveillance from an unmarked vehicle during at least seven of the transactions. Additionally, Detective W’s nоtes reflect his belief that Jeffrey Price, who was directly involved in seven of the eight transactions, was an RNR employee
7
and
In addition to the eight drug transactions, Detective W also observed other ABC violations during the same forty-three day span. Specifically, Detective W’s notes indicate that he observed, inter alia, (i) women exposing their breasts on the dance floor on three separate occasions, 9 (ii) patrons who claimed to be underage drinking beer on one occasion, (iii) apparently underage patrons served beer without identification checks on four separate occasions, and (iv) patrons immediately outside RNR with open alcoholic beverage containers on one occasion. Detective L testified that he notified the ABC of most, if not all, of these violations.
D. Pre-Operation Planning and Briefing
At some point between April 19, 2004, and June 2, 2004, 10 Detectives L and W obtained arrest warrants for Jeffrey Price, Eric Golden, Christopher Price, and Jason Brooke based on those individuals’ narcotics trafficking in and around RNR. On or about June 2, 2004, the NTF and the ABC decided to conduct a joint operation (the “Operation”) at RNR for the dual purposes of (i) executing the four arrest warrants and arresting Andrew Kinsley based on probable cause and (ii) conducting an administrative ABC inspection. 11
At some time prior to 10:00 p.m. on June 2, 2004, the NTF, ABC, and other law enforcement personnel held a pre-Operation briefing at the MCPD. The record reflects that Chief Evans, Detective L, and at least six additional MPPD officers 12 were present. 13 A PowerPoint presentation was given at the briefing, and the presentation listed the following five objectives:
• “Secure all entrances/exits to the establishment”;
• “Enter and attempt to identify individuals inside the establishment”;
• “Arrest individuals wanted by the Task Force”;
• “Arrest individuals who are obviously intoxicated or in violation of other State or City ordinances”; and
• “ABC violations will be handled by ABC agentsf.]”
After several slides providing suspect descriptions, including some photographs, the presentation then described various personnel assignments as follows:
• Detective L, MPPD Det. Trevor Rein-hart, and three other officers were to secure RNR’s front area and locate suspects;
• Five officers were to secure RNR’s rear area, locate suspects, and conduct staged arrests of Detective W and Ki-fer;
• Special Agent Loftis, MPPD Capt. Mark Matthews, and five ABC agents were to conduct the ABC inspection; and
• Six officers were to provide perimeter security outside RNR.
The presentation also advised all officers (i) that Detective L would make an announcement in RNR after the scene was secured and (ii) that after making arrests, officers were to contact Detective L for arrest paperwork and assignments. Because he was the lead case agent for the NTF’s investigation, Detective L, one of several officers who spoke, briefed those present about the individuals to be arrested.
The record further reflects that Detective L prepared a written operations plan (the “Plan”) that further elucidated the information in the PowerPoint presentation and was distributed at the briefing. The Plan listed the five suspects with identifying information, and on the Plan’s second page, a box was checked “No” next to the statement “Suspects [k]nown to be armed.” The Plan’s personal officer equipment checklist provided that officers were to bring, inter alia, (i) a duty weapon, (ii) a ballistic vest, and (iii) a raid jacket. 14 The Plan’s personnel and assignment list included sixteen named individuals and approximately twenty-two personnel identified only by unit and department. The assignments labeled PWCPD 1st Sgt. Rich Cundiff as “Command,” Detective L as “Case Agent,” and Detective W as “Undercover.” The Plan’s final page summarized the NTF’s ongoing investigation and thеn broke down the Operation into the following three phases:
Phase One
Detective W[] will enter [RNR] and provide pre-entry intelligence. 1st Sergeant Jones and the rescue team have been briefed on this phase of the operation and will conduct this phase at the conclusion of this briefing.
Phase Two
The [NTF] obtained arrest warrants for the suspects listed above for various [njarcotics violations. At the appropriate time, Detective W[ ] will open the rear entrance door to aid in our entry. Detective W[ ] and the Cl will be placed in handcuffs and transported out of the establishment. ABC Special Agent J.C. Loftis will conduct ABC checks throughout this operation. Detective W[] will assist with identifying wanted suspects.
Phase Three
Once the establishment is secured, the arrest teams will attempt to locate the wanted suspects. If suspects are not located within the establishment, the arrest teams will attempt to locate thesuspects at their residence or other possible locations.
In addition, the Plan included Detective W’s hand-drawn diagram of RNR’s interi- or.
The Plan’s suspect descriptions provided that four suspects — Jeffrey Price, Eric Golden, Christopher Price, and Andrew Kinsley — were wanted for distribution of marijuana. Jason Brooke was wanted for obtaining money under false pretenses, and Jeffrey Price and Eric Golden were also wanted for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The Plan also described criminal histories for the three suspects with prior records, alerting the officers to the following convictions:
• Jason Brooke: (i) felonious assault, (ii) distribution of marijuana, (iii) manufacture, sale, or possession of a controlled substance, and (iv) obstruction of justice;
• Jeffrey Price: (i) destruction of property and (ii) contributing to the delinquency of a minor; and
• Christopher Price: (ii) entering property with intent to damage, (ii) distribution of marijuana, and (ii) four counts of forgery/uttering.
Although Detective L testified that he prepared the Plan and spoke at the briefing, he also testified that he followed 1st Sgt. Cundiffs recommendations with respect to the number of officers to be used. 15 Chief Evans testified that he was not involved in the Operation’s planning and indeed, that he was first invited to attend the briefing by PWCPD Maj. Col-gan on the day of the Operation because it was to take place in MPPD’s jurisdiction. Chief Evans further testified to his understanding, based upon attendance at the briefing, that PWCPD 1st Sgt. Cundiff and PWCPD Lt. Lanham were the managers of the Operation, and that Detective L was the case agent in charge of paperwork and identifying suspects.
Chief Evans, Detective W, and Detective L all testified that the Operation required sufficient personnel to address safety concerns related to, inter alia, (i) the inherently confrontational nature of executing any arrest warrant; (ii) the general understanding that weapons may be involved when executing arrest warrants, particularly in cases involving alleged narcotics traffickers; (iii) the possibility of encountering intoxicated or disorderly patrons; and (iv) potential patron or employee use of makeshift weapons, including pool sticks, pool balls, and beer bottles. In addition, eight MPPD officers, including Chief Evans, provided sworn affidavits that are a part of this record indicating that they felt the number of officers used (approximately thirty-eight) was necessary to ensure officer and patron safety because, inter alia, (i) RNR had a maximum legal occupancy of one hundred fifty persons, (ii) officers needed to secure multiple areas in and around RNR, and (iii) the officers needed sufficient personnel to conduct both the real and the staged arrests. While it is clear the officers were genuinely concerned about these matters, the record alsо reflects they had no particularized suspicion that any individual inside RNR had a weapon on June 2, 2004, nor does the record show that any officer expected David Ruttenberg to resist the ABC inspection.
E. The June 2, 2004, Operation at RNR
At some point prior to 10:30 p.m. on Wednesday, June 2, 2004, Detective W, dressed in civilian clothing and wearing a wire, entered RNR. Between the time he
At approximately 10:35 p.m., both marked and unmarked police vehicles arrived at RNR. At that time, at least seventeen to twenty patrons and employees were inside RNR, 18 and approximately six to ten individuals were outside on the sidewalk area near the front entrance. The only suspect present was Jeffrey Price, and David Ruttenberg was asleep in the upstairs office. Over the next minute, approximately twenty-three uniformed officers entered RNR. Approximately seven of those twenty-three officers wore black ski masks and all of the masked officers wore clothing that identified them as police officers. The record reflects that at least two of the masked officers — Detective L and Det. Reinhart — were MPPD officers, and the record further reflects that they wore masks to conceal their identities for various current and future undercover operations. No officers wore gas masks, SWAT-style helmets, or protective body armor. The video recordings show thаt most, if not all, of the officers were armed, and one masked officer, MPPD Det. Rein-hart, was the only officer carrying a shotgun.
On entering RNR, the initial wave of officers proceeded to various points throughout RNR’s main room. The video recordings show that as they entered, their weapons were holstered. The recordings also show that Det. Reinhart carried the shotgun with both hands and held it across his abdominal area with the barrel pointing generally downward to his left. Approximately nine officers proceeded to RNR’s rear area, where they conducted the staged arrests of Detective W and Kifer, and where they also secured the rear exits and restrooms. Approximately two to three officers proceeded to the upstairs office, and two to three officers identified and arrested Jeffrey Price. The re
The video recordings reflect that throughout the Operation, no patrons ran, hid, or moved in any sudden manner. The recordings also reflect that at least one patron seated at the bar did not even rise from his barstool when the officers passed him, and most patrons simply stood or sat where they were and observеd the officers as they moved through the area. Also evident from the recordings is that there were RNR patrons outside near RNR’s front door either seated in chairs or standing. As the officers arrived, the recordings show that those patrons remained essentially as they were. One such patron, who was talking on her cell phone as the officers arrived, continued to do so, while another patron, who was seated in the lap of a fellow patron when the officers arrived, elected not to move from this position as the officers deployed. Other than the real or staged arrests of Detective L, Kifer, and Jeffrey Price, the video recordings do not reflect any officer physically touching or pushing any patrons or employees at any time during the Operation.
After Jeffrey Price, Detective L, and Kifer were removed from the premises, the video recordings depict a relatively uneventful administrative inspection lasting for approximately fifty minutes. Specifically, between 10:37 p.m. and approximately 11:28 p.m., the recordings show officers engaged in essentially four different tasks: (i) providing perimeter and observational security for the ongoing ABC inspection, (ii) conducting the ABC inspection 19 behind RNR’s bar, (iii) checking patrons’ identification, and (iv) conversing with various patrons and employees. At approximately 10:40 p.m., the officers brought David Ruttenberg to the bar to ask him about his ABC and other sales records, and at approximately 10:50 p.m. he led them to RNR’s upstairs office, where the officers conducted an inspection for ABC violations. Over the inspection’s remaining thirty-eight minutes, the number of officers gradually dwindled to fewer than ten officers, with the last officers departing at approximately 11:38 p.m. The entire Operation — the arrests and the administrative inspection — lasted no more than fifty-four minutes.
Plaintiffs contend that despite the uneventful nature of the Operation as shown by the video recordings, officers unreasonably threatened both patrons and employees upon entering the premises and during the ABC inspection. Distilled to their essence, plaintiffs’ contentions are as follows:
(i) that the first masked officer to enter pointed a gun at RNR bartender ■ Josh Clare as that officer approached RNR’s bar; 20
(ii) that when several officers entered David Ruttenberg’s upstairs office, the lead officer pointed a pistol at Ruttenberg and said, “Mr. Rutten-berg, please get out of bed, we need you to come downstairs,” and then re-holstered the pistol;
(iii) ■ that Det. Reinhart pointed a shotgun at both patrons and employees throughout the Operation; and
(iv) that RNR patrons and employees were ordered not to move, searched, and questioned during the course of the Operation.
First, with respect to bartender Clare’s assertion, the video recordings depict a masked officer briefly pointing with a gloved hand as he approached the main counter. In this respect, plaintiffs point to Clare’s sworn affidavit, which contends that the officer “pointed an automatic pistol at [his] face[.]” Although the video recording casts significant doubt on this contention, it is appropriate at this stage to assume this disputed fact in plaintiffs’ favor.
21
See JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc.,
As for the roles of the individual defendants, the undisputed record reflects that Chief Evans never entered RNR’s premises, that he did not arrive until after the Operation began, and that, as he testified, he left the area after standing outside RNR for fifteen or twenty minutes. The undisputed record also reflects that Detective W left RNR in handcuffs approximately three minutes after the Operation commenced. Detective L testified during his deposition that upon entering RNR, he proceeded to the rear of the main room and made an announcement from the disc-jockey booth, after which he only remained in RNR until shortly before 10:39 p.m. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Detective L was in and out of RNR until at least 11:09 p.m. Because the video recordings show masked officers inside RNR until at least 11:09 p.m., including some wearing black pants as Detective L testified he wore, it is necessary at this stage to assume that Detective L was inside RNR for at least the first thirty-five minutes of the Operation — the execution of the arrests followed by the initial stages of the administrative inspection.
See JKC Holding,
In sum, the record reflects that the Operation lasted approximately fifty-four minutes, that approximately thirty-eight law enforcement officials participated, 25 that the bulk of the Operation was devoted to an ABC administrative inspection, and that RNR’s patrons and employees were inconvenienced for no more than the first twenty-five minutes of the Operation. The record further reflects that no patrons or employees were physically harmed, injured, or mistreated, and that everyone at RNR on June 2, 2004 — patrons, employees, and law enforcement officials alike— behaved calmly. In other words, the record reflects that the Operation, despite being an inconvenience for all, was carefully planned, quickly executed, and essentially unremarkable.
F. RNR’s Alleged Decline
David Ruttenberg testified that the day after the Operation, a local newspaper published a story with a headline about a drug bust at RNR. He also testified that
G. Procedural History
On June 1, 2006, nearly two years after the Operation, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, alleging that plaintiffs are entitled to money damages from defendants under § 1983. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the following § 1983 claims:
(i) a substantive Due Process claim (“Count I”) (against all defendants);
(n) a First Amendment (made applicable to these defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment) claim (“Count II”) (against all defendants except Mayor Jones);
(iii)a Fourth Amendment (made applicable to these defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment) claim (“Count III”) (against all defendants except Mayor Jones);
(iv) an Equal Protection claim (“Count IV”) (against all defendants except Kifer); and
(v) a claim for conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ substantive Due Process rights (“Count V”) (against all defendants except the City).
In addition to these federal claims, plaintiffs alleged three state-law claims against all defendants except for the City: (i) tor-tious interference with contract (“Count VI”); (ii) common law civil conspiracy (“Count VII”); and (iii) business conspiracy, in violation of Va.Cоde §§ 18.2-499-500 (“Count VIII”).
Defendants promptly moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.Civ.P., and on grounds that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. On December 13, 2006, defendants’ motion was granted; specifically, Counts I, II, IV, and V were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and Count III was dismissed with prejudice on qualified immunity grounds.
Ruttenberg v. Jones,
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of all counts, and on June 17, 2008, a Fourth Circuit panel affirmed in part and reversed in part.
See Ruttenberg v. Jones,
On remand, an Order issued directing the parties to conduct limited discovery with respect to “whether defendants’ June 2, 2004, search of plaintiffs’ property was reasonably conducted.... ”
Ruttenberg v. Jones,
No. 1:06cv639 (E.D.Va. Aug. 8, 2008) (Order). After discovery in this regard, defendants filed the instant motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. Specifically, Chief Evans, Detective L, and the City (collectively, “City Defendants”) argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (i) neither Judith Ruttenberg, nor David Rut-tenberg, have constitutional standing to assert Count III against any of the City Defendants; (ii) the Operation was conducted in a constitutionally reasonable manner; (iii) the record does not support theories of direct, bystander, supervisory, or municipal liability against these defendants; and (iv) even if a constitutional violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights occurred for which Chief Evans or Detective L could be held liable under
Detective W also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (i) that hе did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and (ii) that even if he did so, he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because those rights were not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Plaintiffs filed a timely response in opposition to both motions, and the matter has been fully briefed and argued and is now ripe for disposition.
II
The summary judgment standard is too well-settled to require elaboration here. In essence, summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., only where, on the basis of undisputed material facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Ill
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment present four questions. First, it is necessary to determine whether plaintiffs David and Judith Ruttenberg have Article III standing to assert Count III. Second, it is necessary to determine whether the Operation was an unreasonably conducted administrative search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. If so, it is then necessary to determine whether each defendant may be held liable for that constitutional violation. Finally, assuming the Operation was constitutionally unreasonable, it is necessary to determine, with respect to any defendant officer who may be held liable in his individual capacity, whether that officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity — in other words, whether the constitutional right alleged to have been violated was clearly established at the time of the Operation.
Each of these questions is separately addressed.
A. Standing 29
First, defendants correctly do not contest Triple D’s standing as a corporation to bring a § 1983 claim for damages resulting from a search of RNR’s premises, in violation of Triple D’s Fourth Amendment rights. In this regard, it is clear that a corporation has a Fourth Amendment right to be freе of unreasonable searches of its property.
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Yet, it is
In this respect, the record reflects no distinct harm to Judith Ruttenberg; she was not present during the Operation, nor did she have any expectation of privacy in RNR’s premises separate and distinct from her interests as Triple D’s dominant shareholder. Accordingly, Judith Ruttenberg does not have standing to assert the claim in Count III in her personal capacity.
By contrast, the record reflects sufficient evidence of a distinct harm to David Ruttenberg to give him Article III standing to assert the claim in Count III in his personal capacity. In this respect, it is clear that David Ruttenberg (i) was present during the Operation, (ii) essentially lived in RNR’s upstairs office, and (iii) alleges that his personal Fourth Amendment rights were violated when a police officer allegedly pointed a weapon at him as the officer entered RNR’s upstairs office. Moreover, the record reflects that David Ruttenberg alleges he suffered damages separate and distinct from Triple D’s lost profits, namely, he alleges he suffered various medical problems as a result of the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, David Ruttenberg and Triple D have standing to bring Count III, while Judith Ruttenberg does not.
Before turning to whether the Operation violated the remaining plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, a threshold matter merits brief mention. The Fourth Cirсuit panel decision remanding this case was based on the understanding that Saucier’s two-step analysis required district courts to address both steps, that is to decide first whether a constitutional violation occurred and, if so, only then to consider whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. Because the district court here skipped the first step by assuming without deciding that a violation had occurred, the Fourth Circuit panel reversed and remanded.
See Ruttenberg,
Another point that merits brief mention before commencing the Fourth Amendment analysis is that the Fourth Circuit panel reversed only the dismissal of Count III based on plaintiffs’ third theory — “that the administrative search of RNR violated the Fourth Amendment because it was unreasonably executed.”
Ruttenberg,
(1) The Remand Guidance
First, the panel observed that “ ‘[t]here is no question that the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches ... applies to the performance of administrative searches of commercial property.’ ”
Id.
at 138 (quoting
Turner v. Dammon,
(i) “the nature of the place searched”;
(ii) “the number of people the officers expected to encounter”;
(iii) “the likelihood that the officers would be met with resistance or defiance”;
(iv) “whether the search was unduly prolonged”; and
(v) “the specific conduct of the officers involved, particularly whether they engаged in any unreasonably threatening behavior, such as an abuse of weapons or the causing of physical harm.”
Id.
at 137 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition, when balancing these factors, the panel observed that “it must be remembered that it is not a court’s ‘role to tell local governments how to conduct an administrative search.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Crosby,
To help guide the “highly fact-dependent” inquiry on remand, the Fourth Circuit panel also summarized three Eleventh Circuit decisions it found “instructive in determining whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, [the] administrative search was unreasonably excessive.”
Id.
at 136, 137 (internal quotations omitted). First, in
Swint v. City of Wadley,
51 F.3d
[T]he raids involved 30^10 officers, including eight SWAT team officers; the inspections lasted approximately one and one-half hours; during the search, officers pointed their weapons at club employees and patrons; the police grabbed and shoved one person against a wall and pushed another patron off a bar stool; threatening comments, such as “Shut up, or I’ll shut you up myself,” were made by officers to persons detained; and an officer, with his finger on the trigger, pointed a shotgun in someone’s face.
Ruttenberg,
The search there involved twenty law enforcement officers and lasted over eight hours. In addition, officers arrived in unmarked vehicles and surrounded the property to block the exits. They entered the premises with “automatic shotguns and sidearms drawn.” Notably, one officer stuck a shotgun into an employee’s back and continued to point it at him after the employee turned around. Other employees were “lined up along a fence and patted down and deprived of their identification.”
Ruttenberg,
[F]orty law enforcement officers searched a pair of adjoining nightclubs for two hours. Notably, the officers “expected to encounter 500 to 700 patrons at the two nightclubs,” including many who would be consuming alcohol .... Upon entering, the officers “ordered the patrons to remain where they were, and instructed people on the dance floor to sit on the floor and not to return to their tables.” ... The [Eleventh Circuit] found “no evidence that any officer involved in securing the nightclubs and conducting the investigation drew a weapon or threatened the arrestees or any patrons.”
Ruttenberg,
Finally, based on Swint, Bruce, and Crosby, the Fourth Circuit panel cautioned that “[i]t should be clear from the foregoing that any decision as to reasonableness rests on the particular circumstances of a case” and that although plaintiffs’ “complaint survives a motion to dismiss, ... further factual development may show that no constitutional violation occurred.” Id.
(2) The Operation’s Reasonableness
These principles, elucidated by the Fourth Circuit panel in this cаse and applied here, point persuasively to the conclusion that the Operation was constitutionally reasonable. Specifically, given
(i) the nature of RNR as a late-night pool hall that served alcohol to itspatrons and had a history of attracting and harboring unlawful activity,
(ii) RNR’s maximum legal occupancy of one hundred fifty persons, and
(iii) the Operation’s dual purposes of conducting an administrative inspection and arresting several known narcotics traffickers,
it was constitutionally reasonable for approximately thirty-eight officers to conduct a fifty-four minute operation that was relatively uneventful after its first few minutes, involved little, if any, brandishing of weapons, and caused no physical harm to any patrons or employees.
First, with respect to the nature of the place to be searched, the record reflects that based on what the officers knew about RNR, the Operation they planned and executed was reasonable. Specifically, the officers knew that RNR was a large pool hall that stayed open into the early morning hours, served alcohol to its patrons, and was a venue for negotiation of drug transactions. In other words, the record reflects that RNR posed numerous safety concerns, both for the officers conducting the Operation and for the patrons and employees present during the Operation. Indeed, RNR acknowledged as much when it decided to install a sixteen-camera security system in response to unlawful activity approximately four years before the Operation. Further, in the seven months leading up to the Operation, MPPD officers responded to forty-one calls for police assistance at RNR, including more than twenty involving either fights, excessive alcohol consumption, or drug distribution. Moreover, in a period of less than two months in early 2004, the year of the Operation, Detective W arranged at least eight drug transactions at RNR, including seven with a regular RNR patron who was occasionally paid by RNR for miscellaneous tasks. And finally, Detective W observed numerous other unlawful acts inside RNR, including underage drinking and public nudity. In sum, given the nature of RNR’s business, its history of unlawful activity, and the plan to arrest persons as part of the Operation, it was constitutionally reasonable for the Operation to employ approximately thirty-eight armed officers to ensure the safe and effective conduct of the administrative inspection and execution of arrest warrants on known narcotics traffickers.
The next factor, the number of people the officers expected to encounter, also supports a finding of reasonableness. Specifically, it is undisputed that RNR’s maximum legal occupancy permitted up to one hundred fifty patrons — slightly less than four times as many officers as provided in the Plan. In this respect, it is entirely reasonable to provide for a roughly four-to-one ratio of officers to possible patrons in circumstances like those presented here. Indeed, the record reflects that the officers were assigned to — and generally adhered to — the Plan’s various assignments. Moreover, the video recordings demonstrate that as tasks were accomplished and fewer officers were needed, the number of officers gradually dwindled, and that during the bulk of the administrative search, no more than twenty officers — and at some times, fewer than ten — were inside RNR. In sum, nothing about the officers’ expectations regarding the number of people who would be present suggests this Operation was unreasonable, and in fact, the record shows that the Operation reasonably planned for the number of officers necessary to ensure a safe and orderly Operation. 33
The next factor — whether the search was unduly prolonged — clearly demonstrates that the Operation, which lasted approximately fifty-four minutes, was reasonably conducted. Indeed, after the real and staged arrests were completed in the Operation’s first few minutes, the Operation was relatively uneventful and appears to have taken no longer than was reasonable to complete the ABC administrative inspection. 35 Indeed, by 11:00 p.m., approximately halfway through the Operation, patrons generally either resumed playing pool or left RNR. Accordingly, nothing about the Operation’s length suggests that it was unduly prolonged.
Finally, the record does not reflect that the officers “engaged in any unreasonably threatening behavior, such as an abuse of weapons or the causing of physical harm.”
Ruttenberg,
Accordingly, the factors set forth by the Fourth Circuit panel, applied here, clearly show that the Operation was conducted reasonably. Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with the results in
Swint, Bruce,
and
Crosby.
Indeed, this case is more analogous to
Crosby,
where, as here, the administrative search was reasonably conducted, than it is to
Swint
and
Bruce,
where the searches were held unreasonable. Specifically, in
Crosby,
as here, approximately forty law enforcement officials participated in a dual-purpose operation to execute arrest warrants and conduct an unannounced, nighttime warrantless administrative search of a large liquor-serving establishment.
Crosby,
It is also worth noting that although there is no Fourth Circuit authority directly on point, what little Fourth Circuit precedent exists in analogous cases supports the result reached here. That case law focuses on the reasonable proportionality of the police action in response to the purposes of a search and the nature of the place to be searched. Specifically, in
Turner v. Dammon,
Finally, it is worth noting the stark difference between the Fourth Circuit panel’s description of plaintiffs’ allegations in this case and the facts supported by the current record — or, in some cases, assumed in plaintiffs’ favor. Specifically, in holding that plaintiffs’ complaint survived defendants’ motion to dismiss, the panel described the complaint’s allegations as follows:
[Plaintiffs] allege that over fifty law enforcement officers, including six or seven ABC agents, participated in a search of RNR that lasted more than an hour. According to [plaintiffs], many of the officers were heavily armed SWAT team members dressed in full tactical gear. [Plaintiffs] also claim that RNR patrons and employees were ordered “against the wall to be searched by heavily armed officers,” causing them to be “detained and terrorized.” Finally, [plaintiffs] allege — in their briefs, but not their complaint — that these patrons and employees were held at gunpoint for over an hour.
Ruttenberg,
[Plaintiffs] allege that over — fifty fewer than forty law enforcement officers, including six or seven ABC agents, participated in a search of RNR that lasted more than less than an hour. According to [plaintiffs], many of the officers were ■heavily armed SWAT team members dressed in full tactical gear, one held a shotgun, seven wore black ski masks, and several wore black gloves and bulletproof vests. [Plaintiffs] also claim that RNR patrons and employees were ordered “against-the wall to be searched by heavily armed officers,” to stay still as the officers entered and during the first half of the ABC inspection, causing them to be “detained and terrorized.’’ delayed from playing pool and drinking beer for twenty-five minutes. Finally, [plaintiffs] allege — in their briefs, but not their complaint — that these patrons and employees were held at gunpoint in a room with armed officers who checked identification, searched one patron, and calmly conversed with other patrons and employees for over an- hour approximately twenty-five minutes before the patrons resumed playing pool and drinking beer. Additionally, on entering RNR, one officer may have momentarily pointed a pistol at the bartender, and another officer, upon entering the upstairs office, pointed a pistol at David Ruttenberg while asking him to “please” get dressed and come doumstairs.
Given this comparison, it is pellucidly clear that, as the Fourth Circuit panel observed might be the case, “farther factual development [has] show[n] that no constitutional violation occurred.” Id. at 138.
In the end, it is important to remember that Fourth Amendment rea
C. Each Defendant’s Liability
Even assuming, arguendo, that the current record warranted denying summary judgment on the question of whether the Operation was constitutionally unreasonable, plaintiffs would still be required to demonstrate that each defendant to Count III could be held liable for the constitutional violation at issue. In this respect, Count III alleges a Fourth Amendment claim against Chief Evans, Detective L, Detective W, and Kifer in both their individual and official capacities. Count III also alleges that the City, acting through Chief Evans and others, is municipally liable for the Operation’s alleged constitutional unreasonableness. For the reasons that follow, even assuming that the Operation was unreasonably conducted, it is clear that Kifer, Detective W, Chief Evans, and the City cannot be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations. Genuine disputes of material fact remain, however, regarding whether Detective L could be held liable in his individual capacity absent qualified immunity were the Operation to be found constitutionally unreasonable.
First, plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that Kifer was acting under color of law on June 2, 2004. .Indeed, although Kifer had signed a confidential informant agreement, the record does not reflect that he was being paid by law enforcement, nor does it suggest that he had any involvement in the planning or carrying out of the Operation. Accordingly, Kifer is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count III, even assuming the Operation was unconstitutional. 42
Next, with respect to Count III as brought against Detective W, Detective L, and Chief Evans in their individual capacities, it is important to observe that “[a]s a general matter, a law officer may incur § 1983 liability only through affirmative misconduct.”
Randall v. Prince George’s County,
First, to prove “bystander” liability, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that a defendant “(1) is confronted with a fellow officer’s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent it, and (3) chooses not to act.”
Id.
at 203 (citing
O’Neill v. Krzeminski,
Second, to prove “supervisory” liability, plaintiffs must prove each of the following elements:
(i) “that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff’;
(ii) “that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices’ ”; and
(iii) “that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
Shaw v. Stroud,
With respect to Count Ill’s allegations against Detective L in his individual capacity, the record does not clearly reflect whether Detective L, as the case agent who wrote the Plan, could be held liable pursuant to direct, bystander, or supervisory liability. The parties disagree with respect to both the length of time Detective L was inside RNR as well as his precise role in the Operation’s planning and supervision. Accordingly, assuming, arguendo, that the Operation was constitutionally unreasonable, then Detective L would not be entitled to summary judgment on Count III absent qualified immunity. See infra at Part III.D.
Finally, with respect to Count Ill’s allegations against the City, it is well-settled that “a municipality cannot be held liable
solely
because it employs a tortfea-sor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior
theory.”
Monell,
D. Whether Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights Were Clearly Established
Finally, even assuming that the Operation was constitutionally unreasonable and plaintiff could demonstrate that these defendants should be held liable, the officer defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to Count Ill’s claims against them in their individual capacities unless the plaintiffs’ “clearly established” constitutional rights were violated.
Ruttenberg,
In this case, even assuming the Operation violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, it cannot fairly be said that those rights were clearly established. This is particularly so given the relative lack of Fourth Circuit authority on point, as well as the factual similarities between this case and Crosby. In any event, because the Operation was constitutionally reasonable, it is unnecessary to address whether the constitutional rights at issue, based on the context of this case, were clearly established. But even assuming, arguendo, that the Operation was constitutionally unreasonable and that any officer defendants should be held individually liable, those officer defendants would nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity.
E. Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims
Finally, because all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, over which there is jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, have been dismissed, plaintiffs’ state-law claims in Counts VI, VII, VIII, will be dismissed without prejudice.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”);
see also United Mine
For these reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count III, which must bе dismissed with prejudice, and Counts VI, VII, and VIII must be dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate Order will issue.
Notes
. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
. The facts recited here are derived from the record as a whole and are largely undisputed. Where disputes exist, they are noted, and if material, the analysis proceeds on the assumption that the disputed fact is as plaintiff contends.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
. As RNR’s general manager, David Rutten-berg drew a salary of approximately $50,000 to $60,000 each year between 1993 and 2004. The record reflects that at some point in late 2003, after Hurricane Isabel damaged his Maryland home, he began to live in RNR’s upstairs office.
.The written agreement forming the NTF provides,
inter alia,
(i) that all NTF officers are to report to the PWCPD Vice/Narcotics Bureau Commander, (ii) that all NTF personnel must follow PWCPD policies and procedures, (iii) that all MPPD and MPD officers must follow their own department's policies, (iv) that all other chain-of-command responsibilities within each officer’s department remain otherwise unchanged, and (v) that the departments' chiefs of police are expected to resolve any conflicts in policy. Moreover, the NTF agreement reflects that the PWCPD pro
It is worth noting that Detective L was the only MPPD officer assigned to the NTF. Although the MPPD paid his salary, the record reflects that for NTF purposes he reported directly to PWCPD 1st Sgt. Rich Cundiff, who in turn reported to PWCPD Lt. Lanham and ultimately to PWCPD Maj. Colgan. Although Detective L reported to 1st Sgt. Cundiff, Lt. Lanham, and Maj. Colgan for NTF operations, he was expected to maintain contact with MPPD Maj. Mark Matthews, and the record reflects that Chief Evans still maintained chain-of-command authority over Detective L.
. Triple D sold RNR in April 2008, nearly four years after the events at issue, and nearly two years aftеr this suit was filed.
. Although plaintiffs contend that they made many of the calls because intoxicated patrons from a neighboring bar, the Golden Phoenix, attempted to or did enter RNR, plaintiffs do not dispute that the calls and arrests were made, nor do they dispute that the Golden Phoenix was a neighboring establishment at all times relevant to this suit.
. David Ruttenberg disputed this contention at his deposition, claiming that Jeffrey Price was not an RNR employee, but rather a homeless RNR patron who was occasionally paid by RNR to perform miscellaneous tasks. The distinction is immaterial, however, as it is undisputed (i) that Jeffrey Price was a regular RNR patron, (ii) that RNR paid him to do various tasks on the premises, and (iii) that he had a central role in seven of the eight drug transactions described by Detective W.
Plaintiffs also contend in their pleadings that Jeffrey Price was cooperating with police as part of the NTF investigation. During his deposition, David Ruttenberg cited as evidence an April 2004 confrontation with Jeffrey Price regarding reports that Price had been selling narcotics. Specifically, Rutten-berg testified that when confronted, Price claimed to be working with the police. Rut-tenberg further testified that on one occasion he overheard Price having a conversation with someone Price claimed to be a police officer, and that Ruttenberg obtained the phone number and later matched it to a cell phone used by Detective L. Finally, plaintiffs point to an April 17, 2004, PWCPD intelligence report that reflects a conversation Price and an unidentified female had with police about a narcotics trafficker named Papa Den-teh. Although this report indicates that Detective L was informed of this conversation, it does not suggest that Price was acting as any sort of confidential informant ("Cl”).
In the end, despite plaintiffs’ allegations, the record does not reflect any credible evidence that Price was cooperating with police when the search at issue occurred. In fact, unlike Kifer, who was clearly acting as a Cl on June 2, 2004, and whose arrest on that day was staged, Price was charged and convicted for the drug crimes for which he was arrested June 2, 2004.
. It is worth noting that David Ruttenberg testified that as of late April 2004, he had banned the other individuals involved in drug deals — Eric Golden, Christopher Price, Jason Brooke, and Andrew Kinsley — from RNR. The record does not reflect, however, that any law enforcement officials were aware that those individuals had been banned. Moreover, David Ruttenberg testified that he nevertheless observed Christopher Price and Andrew Kinsley in the general shopping center area— and thus near RNR — after the time Rutten-berg claims they had been banned from RNR.
. David Ruttenberg conceded at his deposition that women had flashed their breasts on RNR’s dance floor, although he contended both that such instances occurred "almost exclusively the week of ... Mardi Gras” and that he instructed his security personnel to curb the behavior. He also conceded that he sometimes encouraged female staff and patrons to dance on RNR’s bar.
. Although Detective L testified that the NTF may have conducted some surveillance of RNR between April 19, 2004, and June 2, 2004, the record does not otherwise describe this surveillance, nor does it reflect that law enforcement obtained any relevant information from any such surveillance. The record does reflect, however, that the MPPD responded to five calls at RNR during that time period.
. The term "Operation,” as used here, encompasses both the execution of the arrests and the performance of the administrative inspection.
. Those six officers were: (i) Det. Trevor Reinhart, (ii) Sgt. Jeffrey Shubert, (iii) Lt. Rupert Prinz, (iv) Capt. Travis Mosher, (v) Det. Howard Perry, and (vi) Lt. Siddiqullah Qazei.
. The record is unclear with respect to whether Detective W was present at the briefing.
. The Plan did not provide any detail with respect to the type of duty weapons to be used, nor did it list any sort of mask or other identity-concealing clothing.
. It is worth noting that neither party deposed 1st Sgt. Cundiff. The only depositions taken by the parties were of Judith Rutten-berg, David Ruttenberg, Chief Evans, Detective W, and Detective L.
.The record reflects that on June 2, 2004, at least twelve of RNR’s sixteen security cameras were operational. The record includes recordings taken during the Operation from five of those twelve cameras. Specifically, the record includes video recordings from cameras stationed in the following locations: (i) outside RNR pointing towards the front entrance (approximately twenty-five minutes), (ii) inside RNR pointing towards the front entrance (approximately nine minutes), (iii) inside RNR above the bar and pointing out towards RNR's pool tables and main room (approximately fifty-three minutes), (iv) inside RNR pointing from the main area towards the stage in the rear of the main room (approximately two minutes), and (v) inside RNR above the stage pointing towards the door leading to the upstairs office (approximately nine minutes). David Ruttenberg testified (i) that he reviewed all video recordings from all cameras on June 3, 2004, (ii) that the recordings made a part of this record are the only recordings he considered relevant, and (iii) that he did not preserve any other June 2, 2004, recordings.
. Plaintiffs contend that Detective W told Detective L during this conversation both that Jeffrey Price was the only suspect present and that approximately ten to twenty individuals were inside RNR. This is a speculative assertion, and is thus not assumed in plaintiff's favor.
See JKC Holding,
. RNR’s computerized "point of sale” terminal reflected that when the police entered RNR, approximately 11 patrons were paying to play billiards, and the video recordings from inside RNR reflect at least six other individuals, including Kifer, Detective L, and at least two RNR employees, were also present.
. It is worth noting that plaintiffs' complaint concedes that the ABC inspection uncovered at least one ABC violation, and it is also worth noting that the ABC ultimately revoked RNR’s license in June 2005 after learning of the violations uncovered during Detective W’s investigation and the Operation.
. Plaintiffs contend in their pleadings and interrogatory responses that this masked officer was Detective L, but they provide no
. Specifically, defendants contend that the officer wore black gloves and merely pointed at Clare with his hand. And it is true that the recordings’ depictiоn of the officer's subsequent actions appears to support defendants' position, namely that as he brings his hand back down to his waist and turns, he does not appear to be holding or holstering a weapon. In this regard, however, the video recording is insufficiently clear to determine that defendants are correct.
. Specifically, one patron claims that she was searched inside RNR, and another patron claims that he was searched outside in RNR's parking lot.
. Defendants counter by pointing to several sworn MPPD officer affidavits claiming that they neither ordered patrons against walls, nor engaged in any dangerous or physically threatening behavior. Of course, because it is necessary at this stage to resolve all factual disputes in plaintiffs’ favor, it is necessary to assume these events unfolded as claimed in the affidavits cited by plaintiffs.
See JKC Holding,
. Specifically, at approximately 10:52 p.m.— seventeen minutes after the first officers entered — the video depicts at least one patron beginning to roll pool balls around on the table where he is standing, and by approximately 10:57 p.m., patrons began either paying their bills or resuming their games. By approximately 10:59 p.m., patrons began to leave RNR’s front sidewalk area, and by 11:00 p.m. — twenty-five minutes after the officers arrived — at least one patron resumed drinking at the bar.
.Plaintiffs’ claims in their pleadings that a larger number of officers participated are not supported in the record.
. Of course, it is worth noting that according to MPPD records, MPPD officers responded to thirty-nine calls at RNR in the nearly eleven months between June 2, 2004, and April 19, 2005. Although this reflects somewhat fewer calls than the forty-one between November 1, 2003, and June 2, 2004, the relatively consistent volume of police activity at least suggests that RNR had not necessаrily suffered as harsh a decline as plaintiffs claim.
. Because it reversed the dismissal of Count III, the Fourth Circuit panel also reversed the dismissal of Counts VI, VII, and VII — the state-law claims — so that this Court could "again consider its supplemental jurisdiction. ...”
Ruttenberg,
. The Fourth Circuit panel’s rejection of plaintiffs’ allegation that the Operation was pretextual renders plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the officers’ subjective intentions, including Detective L's alleged grudge against David Ruttenberg, irrelevant to this motion.
. Because the question of whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring a § 1983 claim is a jurisdictional issue, it must be addressed prior to adjudication of the remaining questions in this case.
See, e.g., Stephens v. County of Albemarle, 524
F.3d 485, 490-91 (4th Cir.2008) (Because § 1983 plaintiff bringing First Amendment claim lacks Article III standing, claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
.
See, e.g.,
13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Richard D. Freer,
Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3573.1 (3d ed. Supp.2008) (corporation may vindicate its federal rights under § 1983);
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338, 353,
. In
Audio Odyssey,
a corporation’s sole shareholder and his wife lacked standing "for various emotional and reputational injuries stemming” from a violation of the corporation's Fourth Amendment rights because the claims did not assert a "distinct” injury "in which the
claimant’s
rights [were] violated, [but was] merely one in which the claimant [was] indirectly harmed” because of injury to the corporation.
. In this regard, it is important to recall that the Supreme Court overruled
Saucier
because,
inter alia,
its rigid order of inquiry often "create[s] a risk of bad decisionmaking” in certain contexts.
Pearson,
Moreover,
Pearson
also recognized that where, as here, a § 1983 claim is also brought against a municipality, the qualified immunity defense is unavailable to that municipality, and thus it may be "worthwhile” for a district court to exercise its discretion and conduct the two-step
Saucier
inquiry with respect to individual officer defendants as well.
Pearson,
. Plaintiffs counter that Detective W should have observed that RNR was not at its maximum occupancy before the Operation commenced, relayed this information to Detective L, and that Detective L should have adjusted the Operation midstream to reduce the num
. Plaintiffs respond to these safety concerns by arguing that the officers did not have any particularized expectation of resistance from RNR employees or patrons. And although the Plan indicated the suspects were not known to be armed, and defendants acknowledge that the officers did not expect any particular resistance from David Ruttenberg regarding the administrative search, these facts demonstrate at most either that the officers' precautions may not have been entirely necessary or that more precautions may have been required in different circumstances. It does not follow, however, that this Operation was unreasonable given all the circumstances.
. Plaintiffs’ contention that the Operation was unduly prolonged because prior ABC inspections took less time is unfounded, as the record does not suggest that the prior ABC inspections were conducted in similar circumstances — late in the evening, during the simultaneous execution of multiple arrest warrants, and after a months-long investigation uncovering numerous ABC violations.
. RNR patron Mark Sovich’s affidavit appears to summarize the officers' conduct most accurately when he states that "[i]t was plain that [the Operation] was rehearsed and they had an objective. To my relief they obtained their objective and left me alone.”
. In this respect, it is of little import that plaintiffs allege the officers searched one female patron's purse, required two female patrons to be escorted to the restroom, and briefly handcuffed one patron in the RNR parking lot. Importantly, because none of these individuals are plaintiffs to this suit, any officer action towards them is only relevant as proof of the reasonableness of the overall Operation.
See Crosby,
.To be sure, there are some differences in the
Crosby
facts. There the search took twice as long, the officers encountered four hundred patrons, and there was “no evidence that any officer involved in securing the nightclubs and conducting the investigation drew a weapon or threatened the arrestees or any patrons.”
Crosby,
. It is true, of course, that the raids in
Swint
are factually similar to the Operation here in some respects — namely,
inter alia,
(i) that some of the officers in
Swint
wore ski masks to conceal their identities, (ii) that the searches in
Swint
were part of a narcotics task force investigation, (iii) that an undercover officer and confidential informant entered the facility prior to the search, and (iv) that some patrons were initially denied permission to use the restroom.
Swint,
.
Turner
was abrogated on other grounds by
Johnson v. Jones,
.
See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing,
. It is worth noting that Kifer has not filed a motion for summary judgment; indeed, he has neither appeared, individually or by counsel, after the Fourth Circuit panel’s opinion in this case. Plaintiffs have not provided any factual basis for his involvement in this case, however, and it thus appears that plaintiffs have abandoned Count Ill's allegations against Kifer.
. It is worth noting that in
Randall,
the Fourth Circuit observed that Shaw's deliberate indifference prong is ordinarily not satisfied where a plaintiff " 'pointfs] to a single incident or isolated incidents[.]’ ”
Randall,
. It is also worth noting that plaintiffs have never advanced any argument that Prince William County should be held liable, nor does the record suggest that Detective W, as a PWCPD detective, engaged in any actions with respect to the Operation that could give rise to liability against Prince William County.
See Amos v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs.,
