Plаintiff and defendant were granted a judgment of divorce in the Wayne County Circuit Court on July 19, 1977. The judgment awarded custody оf the parties’ minor child to the plaintiff and required defendant to pay $58 per week child support until the сhild attained the age of 18 or until further order of the court. On June 23, 1978, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion for modification of this support order. From this determination, defendant appeals as of right under GCR 1963, 806.1.
Defendant predicated his motion for modification on the substantial decrease in income he incurred in the yеar following the judgment. At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that in 1977 he was employed as an attorney for the Legal Aid and State Defender’s Office at an annual salary of approximately $24,000. In 1978, however, defendant indicated that he voluntarily entered private practice, whereupon his gross income for the year dropped to $2,510, a projection based on defendant’s income for the first five months of 1978.
Thе trial court then examined defendant’s circumstances to discover if he was able to take carе of his own necessities. The testimony taken revealed that defendant had remarried and that he now sharеd expenses for shelter, food, and transportation with his new wife. She had just recently graduated from medical school and was serving her first year of residency at a local hospital. The *624 two were expeсting a baby in August, 1978. The court then denied defendant’s modification motion, stating:
"I am going to adopt the recommendation of the Friend of the Court. If you wish to change your career and ways of practice you may do so, but you better take care of your obligations.”
Defendant now claims that this ruling was reversibly erroneous.
Michigan law provides for modification of orders for child support so as "to accord with the welfarе of the child within the means and ability of the father”.
West v West,
Such modification is within the trial court’s discretion and its decision to modify will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Cullimore v Laureto,
All relevant factors should be considered when entertaining а petition for modification of child support.
Moncada v Moncada,
In essence, the instant trial court ruled that the fact that the defendant voluntarily changed careers and incurred a reduction in income as a consequence would not and should not affeсt his obligation to his minor child. A review of case law in this area indicates that this conclusion is not totally cоrrect, however. A voluntary reduction in income, if made in bad faith or with willful disregard for the interests of the dependent child, will not warrant a modification of support payments. Absent bad faith or such a willful disregard, however, the fact that defendant’s reduction in income was voluntary is not an adequate reason for refusing modificаtion. An individual should be allowed to make good faith changes in his employment and his child should share in the financial inconvenience or hardship, just as the child would if the family had remained together. See Moncada v Moncada, supra, 30-32, and the cases cited therein. The converse is true as well, i.e., if the divorced father’s income increases, the child should share in the benefits. The mother can see to such by her own modification motion.
It is not clear from the reсord whether the trial court considered the defendant to be acting in bad faith or in willful disregard for the rights of his child whеn he changed careers. Our independent review of the record has not clarified this point. Although defendant’s testimony as to the reason *626 he left the Defender’s office provides little help in this regard, we do nоt find it to be unreasonable for a lawyer working in the Defender’s office to enter private practiсe. From such an unclear record, we cannot say defendant’s career move was intended in bad faith or as a means to circumvent his legal obligations. .
Another factor complicating our review of this case is the length of time that has passed since defendant’s modification motion was denied. We do not knоw whether defendant’s 1978 income was as dire as projected. We can only assume that his private practice has become more successful during the ensuing time.
In view of the numerous blanks that need to be filled in in this сase, we reverse and remand for another hearing on defendant’s modification motion. At this hearing, the сourt shall examine defendant’s subjective intent in changing careers. If it finds he acted in bad faith or in willful disregard of his dеpendent’s rights, modification should be denied. If the court finds that the defendant acted in good faith, however, modification of the support order should be granted, providing defendant’s present income calls for it. Thе question of defendant’s liability for accrued arrearages should rest or fall upon the same considerations.
Reversed and remanded for a modification hearing. We do not retain jurisdiction.