We granted this application for interlocutory review to consider the meaning of “relative” under Georgia law in the context of a certain insurance contract. Having determined that the trial court applied an erroneous definition of the meaning of that term, we reverse.
The issue of insurance coverage arose in these circumstances. On the night of September 21, 1996, Rachel Rutledge and her sole passenger, Rhondа Jackson, were involved in a single vehicle accident. Rutledge was driving a 1996 Nissan pickup truck belonging to John Thomas, the surviving spouse of her sister who died in October 1994. Both Rutledge and Jackson were injured when Rutledge lost control of the truck and it slammed into a tree. After Jackson brought a personal injury suit against Rutledge, Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) filed a declaratory judgment action. Auto-Owners, the issuer of an automobile liability insurance рolicy to John Thomas, contended that Rutledge did not have permission to drive the vehicle and was not otherwise insured under Thomas’s policy. Asserting thаt it had no duty to defend or provide any insurance coverage to Rutledge, Auto-Owners sought a declaration to that effect.
Rutledge, Jacksоn, and Jackson’s uninsured motorist carrier, Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan), filed separate answers to Auto-Owners’ complaint. Subsequently, Auto-Owners moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that it had no duty to defend Rutledge, arguing that at the time of the loss, Rutledge wаs not a resident relative of its named insured, John Thomas. While acknowledging that coverage might be available for other reasons, Auto-Owners nevertheless sought partial summary judgment on that ground to “shorten the ultimate trial and narrow the issues for presentation to the jury.”
Rutledge, Jackson, and Metropolitan, the defendants in the declaratory judgment action, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against Auto-Owners. They contended that at the time of the accident, Rutledge was a “resident relative” within the meaning of the insurance policy due to her relationship to John Thomas and his son, Chris Thomas, Rutlеdge’s 16-year-old nephew. They also claimed that Rutledge had permission from both John Thomas and Chris
The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to Autо-Owners on the basis that Rutledge was no longer a relative of John Thomas. The court found, “[t]he relationship between Defendant Rutledge and John Thomаs was that of brother-in-law and sister-in-law. That relationship ended upon the death of Shirley Thomas.” The trial court denied the cross-motion for summary judgment finding a genuine factual issue remained for resolution as to whether Rutledge had operated the vehicle with permission. This appeal followеd.
1. Rutledge, Jackson, and Metropolitan contend that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that Rutledge was not a “resident relative” of Jоhn Thomas on the date of the automobile accident. We agree.
Insurance is a matter of contract, and parties are free to fix responsibility for various risks as long as the contract does not violate state law or public policy. See Hulstzman v. State Farm Fire &c. Co.,
With these principles in mind, we review the policy issued by Auto-Owners to Thomas. The policy was created in Georgia and issued and reviewed in this State. Auto-Owners’ underwriting supervisor, Dan Sills, testified that this insurance contract was “subject to certain terms and conditions containеd in the policy and applicable Georgia law.” Under the “liability coverage” section, the policy states: “We will pay damages for bodily injury and damage to tangible property for which you become legally responsible and which involve your automobile. We will pay such damagеs on your behalf, on behalf of any relative who lives with you, or on behalf of any person using your automobile with your permission.” (Emphasis supplied.) But, under the liability section, the term “relative” is not defined. The only definition of “relative” in the poliey appears in the “uninsured motorist amendatory endorsement” and is instructive for purposes of аnalysis. That endorsement states: “1. You means the first named insured stated in the Declarations. 2. Relative means a person who resides with you and who is relаted to you by blood, marriage or adoption. Relative includes a ward or foster child who resides with you.” It is
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines “relative” as: “A kinsman; a person connected with another by blood or affinity. When used generically, includes persons connected by ties of affinity as well as consanguinity, and, when used with a restrictive meaning, refers to those only who are connected by blood.” Rutledge and Thomas are not connected by consanguinity, and in Auto-Owners’ view, Rutledge ceased tо be the sister-in-law of John Thomas on the day that her sister, Shirley Thomas, died. Apparently, as Auto-Owners points out, some other jurisdictions consider the relаtionship of affinity created by marriage to be terminated at death in these circumstances. Nevertheless, according to controlling Geоrgia law, the relationship created by affinity may sometimes continue after death. Ga. Power Co. v. Moody,
2. In light of this holding, we need not address the remaining issues.
Judgment reversed.