Flаintiff Jimmy D. Ruthruff appeals by leave granted a February 3, 2003, order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirming a magisrate’s decision to deny benefits on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish a compensable back injury. We reverse and remand for further procеedings.
i
On February 26, 2001, while employed by defendant Tower Holding Corporation as a welder, plaintiff parked his vehicle in Tower’s parking lot. He then opened the
Plaintiff commenced the instant worker’s compensation proceeding and argued that he was entitled to the presumption found in MCL 418.301(3). The magistrate disagreed, and refused to apply the presumption after finding that the instant case was not a “gоing to and coming from work” case within the meaning of MCL 418.301(3). The magistrate further found that plaintiffs injury failed to arise out of and in the course of employment because the circumstances of his employment neither caused nor aggravated an injury, nor increased the risk of injury. The WCAC affirmed without addressing whether the presumption found in MCL 418.301(3) applied. Instead, the WCAC determined that plaintiff failed to show that his injuries arose out of and
ii
Our review in worker’s compensation cases is limited to questions of law. Findings of fact made or adopted by the WCAC are conclusive on appeal, absent fraud, if there is any competent evidence in the record to support them. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co,
hi
An employee is entitled to receive worker’s compensation benefits for personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.; MCL 418.301(1). As a general rule, an employeе who suffers injury while going to or coming from work cannot receive worker’s compensation benefits. Simkins v Gen Motors Corp (After Remand),
*617 An employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises wherе the employee’s work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his or her working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment. Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act. Any cause of action brought for such an injury is not subject to section 131. [MCL 418.301(3).]
This statutory provision “creates a presumption that the employee is ‘in the course of employment while the employee is on the premises where the employee’s work is to be performed.” Thomason v Contour Fabricators, Inc,
Plaintiff argues that the circumstances of his injury fall within the ambit of the coming-and-going provision and, therefore, that the WCAC incorrectly applied the law when the commission refused to apply the statutory presumption in this case. We agrеe. The undisputed facts establish that plaintiff suffered his back injury in the parking lot of defendant employer as he was alighting from his vehicle, which was parked on defendant employer’s premises, and preparing to walk from his vehicle to defendant employer’s facility to begin his shift. Such factual circumstances fall comfortably within the ambit of the statute. Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to the presumption. The WCAC erred as a matter of law when it failed to accord plaintiff the presumption to which he was entitled. The WCAC also erred as a matter of law when it blurred the distinction between the “in the course of” and the “arising out of” tests and treated them as one test. Thomason, supra at 953.
rv
Defendant employer argues that, irrespective of these errors, a remand is unnecessary because the WCAC
Not every injury that occurs in the course of a plaintiffs employment or on an employer’s premises is an injury that arises out of employment. Hill v Faircloth Mfg Co,
In Ledbetter, the employee suffered a seizure and fell, striking his head on his employer’s concrete floor. He died a week later as a result of his injuries. Id. at 332. The issue raised before this Court was whether injuries resulting from an idiopathic fall
In personal risk cases, including idiopathic fall situations, the sole fact that the injury occurred on the employer’s premises does not supply enough of a connection between the employment and the injury. Unless some showing can be made that the location of the fall aggravаted or increased the injury, compensation benefits should be denied.
The policy justification for this line of analysis in personal risk cases has been adequately expressed by Professor Larson:
“It should be stressed that this requirement of some employment contribution to the risk in idioрathic-fall injuries is a quite different matter from the requirement of increased risk in, say, lightning cases. The idiopathic-fall cases begin as personal-risk cases. There is therefore ample reason to assign the resulting loss to the employee personally. The lightning cases begin as neutral-risk cases. There is therefore no reason whatever to assign the resulting loss to the employee personally. To shift the loss in the idiopathic-fall cases to the employment, then, it is reasonable to require a showing of at least some substantial employment сontribution to the harm. But in neutral-risk cases, the question is not one of shifting the loss away from a prima facie assignment to the employee at all, since there has never been ground for any such assignment; all that is needed to tip the scales in the direction of employment cоnnection, under the positional-risk theory, is the fact that the employment brought the employee to the place at the time he was injured — an extremely lightweight casual factor, but enough to tip scales that are otherwise perfectly evenly balanced.” Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, supra at 3-220-3-221.
While this Court firmly believes in the principle that employers should be responsible for work-related injuries of their employees, we do not feel that such responsibility*620 should be stretched to include injuries predominantly personal to the employee. [Ledbetter, supra at 334-336.]
The Court then upheld the denial of dependency benefits because factors strictly personal to the plaintiff caused his fall and the circumstances of his employment did not contribute to his injuries. Id. at 336-337.
This Court has applied the principles announced in Ledbetter in three subsequent cases: McClain v Chrysler Corp,
Ledbetter and its progeny are classified as cases that begin as personal risk cases. They are personal risk cases because the origin or central causal factor of the mishap is admittedly personal. Where the mishap is personal in origin, there is ample reason to assign the resulting loss to the employee personally. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 4.02, p 4-2; § 9.01(1), pp 9-2-9-3; § 9.01(4)(b), pp 9-7-9-8; § 9.03, p 9-22.1. To demonstrate that an injury is one arising out of employmеnt and, hence, to shift the loss to employment, the
Defendant employer asserts that the risk presented in this case was clearly a personal one. If defendant is correct in its characterization of the risk presented, then the WCAC correctly determined that an application of the principles announced in Ledbetter barred benefits.
Professor Larson supplies some insight into the nature of the risk presented in this case in his treatise, when he observed: ■
The consumption of food, like many other activities grouped together in the personal-comfort catеgory, is a reasonable and sometimes necessary incident of the employment. The practice of bringing lunch in a pail is therefore not entirely a personal activity of the employee, but is often a necessary feature of the employment. [Larson, § 9.03(3), p 9-28.]
This scholarly observation leads us to conclude that there is a possibility that the risk present here was not a personal one and, therefore, that the WCAC erred in applying Ledbetter to deny benefits. However, the record is insufficient to conclusively decide this issue because there was nо evidence in the instant record
[t]he law does not weigh the relative importance of the two causes, nor does it look for primary and secondаry causes; it merely inquires whether the employment was a contributing factor. If it was, the concurrence of the personal cause will not defeat compensability. [Larson, § 4.04, P 4-3.]
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the WCAC and remand this matter for an applicatiоn of the statutory presumption and a determination of whether plaintiffs injury arises out of his employment. Plaintiff shall be allowed to reopen the record and both parties shall be permitted to present evidence that will allow a determination of the exact nature of the risk involved in this case. The magistrate shall determine the nature of the risk present in light of the evidence
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
This Court defined an idiopathic fall as “one resulting from some disease or infirmity that is strictly personal to the employee and unrelated to his employment.” Ledbetter, supra, p 333.