ORDER
Plaintiff Kenneth Rutherford filed suit against Defendant Peoria Public Schools District 150 (“the District”), alleging a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA” or “the Act”). Before the Court are Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21.
BACKGROUND
On November 24, 2010, Kenneth Rutherford sustained injuries to his neck, back, and Achilles tendon when a painting scaffold fell and landed on him while he was working. Rutherford, then the head custodian at Lincoln Middle School in the District, reported the incident to his supervisor, Dave Meyers. Meyers instructed Rutherford to attend an evaluation at the Illinois Work Injury Resource Center (“IWIRC”), which is the District’s preferred health care provider for employee medical evaluations. Pl.’s UMF ¶ 51. Dr. Hauter at IWIRC released Rutherford without restriction. Nov. 24, 2010 IWIRC Visit Note, ECF No. 35. However, Rutherford subsequently developed back pain and began to attend various chiropractic and physical therapy sessions. In January 2011, Rutherford saw Dr. Richard Kube, who found that Rutherford had degenera-five changes in his spine, and prescribed an epidural injection and additional physical therapy. Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 20-1.
On March 15, 2011, Dr. Kube restricted Rutherford to sedentary activity. Mar. 15, 2011 Work Status Sheet, ECF No. 20-3 at 58. On March 29, 2011, Dr. Kube gave Rutherford a work status sheet that diagnosed Rutherford with lumbago. Mar. 29, 2011 Work Status Sheet, ECF No. 20-3 at 59. Dr. Kube checked a box indicating that Rutherford could' safely perform at a “Moderate Activity” level, specifying that he could “frequently lift 35 [pounds] and limited lifting 50 [pounds], occasional overhead and floor to waist, occasional bending and twisting as well as prolonged sitting or standing.” Id. Rutherford continued working normally until March 31, 2011, when he delivered Dr. Kube’s note detailing these new restrictions to Meyers. Def.’s UMF ¶ 41. Notably, at all relevant times, Rutherford’s custodial position required that he be able to lift at least 50 pounds. Custodian Qualifications, ECF No. 29 at 4; Pl.’s Resp. UMF ¶2. Meyers told Rutherford that he could not work - for the District until he was released to work without any restrictions. Pl.’s UMF ¶ 76.
Responsibility for handling FMLA issues belonged to the District’s Human Resources department. Pl.’s UMF ¶ 33. From 2010 until June 30, 2012, Teri Dunn was the Director of Human Resources for the District. PL’s Resp. UMF ¶ 13. Gerilyn Hammer served as Director of Employee Services starting in 2004, and in September 2012, upon Dunn’s retirement, took over the Director of Human Resources position. Id. at ¶ 12, 25. At all relevant
On May 31, 2011, Rutherford again met with Dr. Kube, who indicated in a separate work status sheet that Rutherford could lift “50-100 [pounds] max.” May 31, 2011 Work Status Sheet, ECF No. 20-3 at 61. Rutherford had also been cleared for full duty with the ability to lift over fifty pounds in a separate Functional Capacity Evaluation on May 24, 2011. FCE Report, ECF No. 20-3 at 117-18. Rutherford represents that on June 2, 2011, he gave Dr. Kube’s note to both Meyers and the District’s Human Resources office—specifically, that he handed the note to Janet Ogden and Meyers’ secretary and said that he was turning in his paperwork and was ready to return to work. PL’s Dep. 47:4-12; 47:23-48:11, ECF No. 24. The District disputes this because Ogden did not recall when she spoke with Rutherford.
Dunn emailed Ogden and Hammer on August 9, 2011 to direct Ogden to schedule a fitness-for-duty evaluation. ECF No. 55. Rutherford met with Dr. Dru Hauter on August 18, 2011. Aug. 18, 2011 IWIRC Report, ECF No. 56. No functional capacity test was performed, which Dr. Hauter attributed to Rutherford’s “pain” on his report. Id. Dr. Hauter found that Rutherford should be limited to a fifty-pound maximum, and was “not safe to return to work” without modifications. Id. Rutherford attended a third full medical evaluation on September 8, 2011. Rutherford Aff. ¶ 20. Dr. Gunnar Andersson concluded that Rutherford was “capable of working without restrictions.” Dr. Andersson Independent Medical Examination, ECF No. 58.
On June 27, 2012, Rutherford sent an email to the District’s Human Resources department stating, “It has been a year since my release [from my doctor’s restrictions] and I haven’t received any correspondence from the district, as to when I can return to work. Please let me know if there’s anything you need from me as I am eagerly awaiting my return to work date.” Jun. 27, 2012 Pl.’s Email to Dunn and Ogden, ECF No. 67. There is ho evidence that the District ever responded to that email or Rutherford’s July 17, 2012 followup email.
In January 2013, Ogden noted that Rutherford stopped by the Human Resources office on January 11, 2013 and inquired about returning to work. Ogden Dep. 37:12-17; Ogden Dep. Ex. 32, ECF No. 20-2 at 614. Dunn advised Ogden not to speak to him because he had an attorney. Id. Hammer and Ogden discussed Rutherford’s employment status via email on April 23, 2013. Hammer Dep. 67:22-68:10, ECF No. 31. Hammer described his status as she understood it at that point in time as “still qualified as an employee but ... never terminated ;.. with a board action.” Id. at 68. She stated in her deposition that she did not know why he had not been brought back to work at that point. Id. Nor did she direct any of the human resource specialists to inquire further into why Rutherford had not returned to work. Id. at 70:22-71:8. On July 18, 2013, Rutherford sent another email to the District seeking reinstatement. Hammer Ltr to PL, ECF No. 20-3 at 27. In a letter sent on July 30, 2013,
Rutherford now brings the instant claim for interference under the FMLA, seeking an injunction reinstating him to his former position as well as damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interests, costs, and attorneys’ fees. Compl. ¶ 72, ECF No. 1.
DISCUSSION
Rutherford argues that the District violated his rights under the FMLA by failing to provide required notices, failing to reinstate him to his former position as early as June 2, 2011, and forcing him to take more leave than was necessary.
I. Legal Standard on a Motion for Summary Judgment
At the summary judgment stage the court’s function is- not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial[—that is, whether] there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict” in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
When both parties file motions for summary judgment, the court must look to the burden of proof that each party would bear on the issue at trial. Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
I. FMLA Interference Claim
a. Legal Standard
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee up to twelve work weeks of leave during a twelve-month period where the employee has a serious health condition that renders him unable to perform the functions of his position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The Act makes it unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise” of a right created by the FMLA. Id. at § 2615(a)(1). An FMLA interference claim requires only that an employee “show that his employer deprived him of an FMLA entitlement; no finding of ill intent is required.” Burnett v. LFW, Inc.,
(1) he was eligible for the FMLA’s protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.
Burnett,
The FMLA and its implementing regulations require employers to advise employees of their rights under the Act by: (1) posting a general notice of FMLA information and procedures in the workplace, (2) providing an “eligibility notice” to an employee notifying him of his eligibility to take FMLA leave when the employer acquires knowledge that he may qualify, (3) providing a “rights and responsibilities notice” to an employee with written notice of his obligations and the conse
The FMLA provides an eligible employee with the statutory right to be reinstated to the same or an equivalent position when he returns from FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The right to reinstatement is limited by the employee’s ability to perform the “essential function[s]” of his position. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c). An employer may require an employee to prove he is able to resume work, but only if it has advised him of this requirement in the designation notice. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.300(d)(3); 825.312(b). If an employer has successfully provided notice, and the employee is this required to prove fitness to return to work, the employer may require proof in the form of a certification to that effect from the employee’s health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(b). The employer may even require that the certification state the employee is able to perform the essential functions of his job, but only if the designation notice so states and includes a list of the essential functions. Id. Lastly, a fitness-for-duty certification may be required if:
the employer handbook or other written documents (if any) describing the employer’s leave policies clearly provide that a fitness-for-duty certification will be required in specific circumstances (e.g., by stating that fitness for duty certification will be required in all cases of back injuries for employees in a certain occupation), the employer is not required to provide written notice ... but must provide oral notice no later than with the designation notice.
29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(3). Because employees do not have an absolute right to reinstatement, “whether an employer violates the FMLA turns on why the employee was not reinstated.” Kohls v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc.,
b. Analysis
It is undisputed that the District did not provide Rutherford with any of the notices required by § 825.300 and certainly did not provide him with a designation notice advising him that it would not reinstate him without a fitness-for-duty certification. Def.’s Mem. Opp. 41 (“[T]he District failed to send Rutherford an FMLA notice of rights and responsibilities and medical certification form and consequently, it did not send Rutherford any subsequent FMLA designation notice or notice of its return-to-work procedures.”); Dunn Dep. 37:6-9 (“My understanding is that the forms were never completed, the formal forms for FMLA were never completed.”); Dunn Aff. ¶ 6; Ogden Dep. 16-24.
The District has presented no evidence its fitness-for-duty certification requirement was imposed pursuant to a uniformly applied policy or practice of requiring certification, § 825.300(d)(3). The District has produced only its one-page FMLA policy. District FMLA Procedures, ECF No. 73. That policy does not address any fitness-for-duty certification processes. Id. Nor does the Collective Bargaining Agreement address fitness-for-duty certifications for the purposes of reinstatement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement 8A.
Because of the District’s failure to notify Rutherford of its requirements for proof of fitness to return to work, Rutherford was
Rutherford testified that he advised the District of his ability to return to work when he delivered the note to Human Resources and Meyers’ secretary on June 2, 2011; the District has not presented sufficient evidence to dispute that he did so.
Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center,
Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings,
The Court finds that even when the facts are considered in the light most favorable to the District, it has not carried its burden to show the presence of a genuine dispute that it did not interfere with Rutherford’s FMLA rights to notice and reinstatement. Rutherford has presented sufficient evidence for the Court to find, as a matter of law, that the District interfered with his FMLA rights, and that he suffered prejudice as a result.
II. Timeliness of Claims
Rutherford filed his FMLA claim on January 20, 2014. See Compl. The District argues that the claim is untimely, at different times arguing that the last day the claim could have accrued was June 2, 2011, when Rutherford claims he delivered his clean bill of health to the District, Defi’s Mem. 22, or August 2011, when the Dis
a. Legal Standard
A claim may be brought for FMLA violations “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). The statute of limitations is extended to three years in the case of a “willful violation” of the statute. Id. § 2617(c)(2). In any event, the statutory text requires that the court determine the last event giving rise to a claim under the FMLA. Barrett,
b. Analysis
The District argues that Rutherford’s case is foreclosed by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Barrett v. Illinois Department of Corrections. Barrett held that the employer’s denial of leave, whether issued in response to a prospective request or at a retrospective hearing, is the “last event” triggering the two-year statute of limitations. Barrett,
Though the District was not entitled to subject Rutherford to the reinstatement certification process laid out in the FMLA, it did so. After reviewing medical records from Rutherford’s own physicians, the District directed Rutherford to undergo another evaluation in August 2011. See Aug. 9, 2011 Ogden Email to Dunn, ECF No. 54 (“It sounds like Mr. Rutherford’s physician has released him with no restrictions ... What is the next step, fitness for duty?”). Yet another evaluation was conducted on September 9, 2011, at the request of the District (though it is disputed as to who ordered the evaluation); the District received those results on September 29, 2011, via email from Cheryl Stenstrom to Geralyn Hammer, Ex. 39, ECF No. 59; Rutherford Dep. 66:17-67:8. Rutherford was confused by his employment status. Pl.’s Dep. 69:3-7 (explaining the reason for his filing of a December 2011 Labor Relations Board complaint, he said “I was trying to find out why I hadn’t been returned to work. I did everything I was instructed to do and no—I wasn’t back at work.”). So was the District: questions about Rutherford’s employment status bounced around the District’s Human Resources department for many months, well into 2012 and 2013. See Ogden Dep. 32-34; 42:11-19. Meanwhile, District officials refused to communicate directly with Rutherford regarding his employment status because of the ongoing litigation. Hammer Dep. 66:11-22; Jul. 24, 2012 Hammer Email to Dunn, ECF No. 20-2 at 612 (“Kenneth has an attorney which means none of us should talk with him.”)
Because of the protracted nature of the reinstatement process, the date from which Rutherford’s claim accrued should be the date in July 2013 in which the District notified him via letter—mailed on July 30, 2013—that he “abandoned” his job. ECF No. 20-3 at 25-27. It was only at this point that Rutherford knew definitively that his status had been re-classified by the District, that the District did not plan to reinstate him, and that his “FMLA rights were impaired and [he] suffered prejudice” sufficient to merit legal action. Barrett,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the last event constituting the alleged violation for which this claim was brought was the District’s communication to Rutherford, in July 2013, of its decision not to reinstate him to his position. This brings Rutherford’s claim well within the two-year limitations period, creating no need for the Court to analyze the willfulness of the District’s behavior. As a matter of law, the statute of limitations does not bar Rutherford from pursuing the claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21, is DENIED. Remaining for trial is the question of what, if any, damages and/or other relief Rutherford is entitled to receive as a result of the District’s FMLA interference.
Notes
. The Court also GRANTS Defendant’s unopposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Exhibit to Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 76.
. Undisputed facts taken from Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment are identified as “Def.’s UMF.” Undisputed facts taken from Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 77, are identified respectively as "PL’s UMF” and "PL’s Resp. UMF” Pl.’s Mem. Supp, Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.’s Mem. Supp.”) 12, ECF No. 20.
. Dunn states in her affidavit that the District did not receive Dr. Kube's note until August 10, 2011. DunnAff. ¶ 17.
. Whether the District instigated the third doctor visit with Dr. Andersson is unclear: Rutherford claims that he attended at the District’s behest, but the District argues that the visit was required by Stenstrom as third party administrator of the District’s worker’s compensation claims. Def.’s Reply 7. Defendant presented a contrary argument when it was defending Rutherford’s Americans with Disabilities Act claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC”). In its Position Statement, the District stated clearly that it requested the independent medical ■ evaluation to reconcile the
. The letter itself is undated, but Hammer's email correspondence' indicates that it was mailed on July 30, 2013, Aug. 7, 2013 Email to Super. Grenita Latham, ECF No. 20-3 at 25.
. The parties do not dispute that the District was covered by the FMLA, that Rutherford was eligible for FMLA protections as of March 31, 2011, and that he provided appropriate notice to the District. Def.’s Mem. Supp. 19.
. The District argues that the note was understood by the District to impose a fifty pound maximum on Rutherford’s lifting abilities. Def.'s Reply 4, This is not a reasonable reading of the note, and the District provides no evidentiary support that any District employees interpreted the note in this manner.
. The District argues that Rutherford’s Worker’s Compensation filings—particularly his Demand for Vocational Rehabilitation Services, on August 3, 2011—should create a dispute of fact as to his ability- to return to work because the claim stated that Rutherford had “permanent physical injuries” resulting in the District being “unwilling or unable to accommodate" the restrictions. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 28. Demand for Vocational Rehab. Svcs. ECF No. 74. That testimony has no bearing on the information the District had at its disposal when it failed to reinstate Rutherford in June 2011.
. The District argues that it was not aware of Rutherford’s medical release until August 2011. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Disputed Material Facts ¶ 60. Rutherford maintains that he hand-delivered Dr. Kube’s note to Janet Ogden, telling her “Here’s my paperwork so I can return to work.” Pl.’s Dep. 48:4-11, As evidence that Rutherford did not bring in his doctor’s note on June 2, 2011, the District points to the deposition testimony of Janet Ogden. Def.'s Mem. Opp. Disputed Material Facts ¶ 90. Ogden, in fact, testified that Rutherford had stopped in to the Human Resources office but "I don’t know when.” Ogden Dep. 36:10-17. The testimony does not constitute an affirmative denial that Rutherford came to the office to deliver his note; rather, simply that Ogden could not recall when he came in. Therefore, the District has not provided sufficient evidence to dispute Rutherford's detailed account of delivering the note to the both Ogden and Meyers’ secretary on June 2, 2011. Pl.'s Dep. 47:4-12; 47:23-48:11. Additionally, Hammer received Rutherford’s Functional Capacity Evaluation, which released him to “Full Duty,” no later than July 22, 2011; she passed it on to Human Resources at their request. Hammer Dep. 54-55
. For this reason, Barrett is not dispositive here. When an employee brings suit for improper denial of leave, it is relatively straightforward to pinpoint the exact date at which the claim accrued—that is, when the leave was denied. See Barrett,