689 A.2d 828 | N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 1997
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Plaintiffs, five employees of Rutgers University and their collective bargaining agent, Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters, appeal the Division of Pensions’ denial of health insurance coverage to the employees’ same-sex domestic partners. Denial of coverage was based on the failure of the parties to satisfy the statutory definition of “dependents” — that is, they were not “spouses” under New Jersey law.
On appeal plaintiffs makes four points: (1) the language of the State Health Benefits Plan (“SHBP”) Act, regulations, case law, and public policy mandate liberal construal of the term “dependents” to protect state employees’ families, including their domestic partners; (2) the denial of health benefits to plaintiffs’ domestic partners violates the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) by discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status; and (3) the denial of health benefits to the domestic partners of gay and lesbian state employees violates the employees’ rights to equal protection under the New Jersey Constitution; and (4) the SHBP Act must be interpreted in a manner consistent with Executive Order No. 39, which prohibits discrimination in the executive branch on the basis of sexual orientation.
Amici curiae, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and the New Jersey Lesbian & Gay Law Association, argue that the denial of benefits violates the LAD prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status. As support for their argument, they have provided data on private companies and municipalities that have extended health benefits to their employees’ domestic partners, which amici contend demonstrates that neither the cost to employers, nor the administrative burdens of such coverage, are prohibitive.
In April and July 1992 the individual plaintiffs sought to enroll their same-sex domestic partners as dependents in the SHBP. On September 30, 1992, the Director of the Division of Pensions, refused to enroll them on the advice of the Attorney General’s
On November 15, 1993, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division against Rutgers and the State defendants. They alleged violations of the LAD (counts one and two), violation of Executive Order No. 39 (count three), a violation of Rutgers policy (count four), violations of the New Jersey Constitution (counts five and six), and breach of the collective negotiating agreement (count seven). On January 19, 1994, Rutgers filed an answer, and the State defendants answered on February 1, 1994. On November 15, 1994, the State defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On February 3, 1995, the motion judge ruled that the Director’s decision was properly reviewable by the Appellate Division and entered an order transferring the action against the State defendants to this court, pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2), and, stayed the action against Rutgers pending disposition by this court. The judge also granted plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to the judge seeking reconsideration of the order transferring the case to this court was denied. On June 28,1995, plaintiffs additionally filed a Notice of Appeal. Our careful review of the entire record, together with the arguments raised on appeal and pertinent law, satisfies us that relief from this court cannot be afforded.
The five individual plaintiffs are or were professors at Rutgers who, as state employees, qualify for benefits under the SHBP. Each had lived in a long-term, committed relationship with a same-sex domestic partner for between fourteen to twenty-one years, sharing joint ownership of real and personal property and other indicia of financial interrelationship, and in one ease raising a child together.
All plaintiffs, except Anderson, who is also a dean, are represented by the AAUP. The collective negotiating agreement between the AAUP and Rutgers prohibits discrimination on the
In April 1992, plaintiffs Mayo, Derbyshire, Crew, and Anderson applied to enroll their domestic partners in the SHBP. Rutgers sent the applications to the Division of Pensions, asking whether it would extend coverage to them. In August 1992, Rutgers also sent the Division the application of plaintiff Sehurman, a newly hired faculty member. The Division referred the matter to the Attorney General’s Office for an opinion on whether the term “spouse” covers same-sex domestic partners for the purposes of the SHBP. On September 14, 1992, a Deputy Attorney General rendered an opinion that a same-sex domestic partner cannot be considered an eligible dependent under the SHBP “because he/she is not a spouse under New Jersey law.” On September 30, 1992, the Division’s Director denied coverage.
On March 3, 1993, Rutgers once again wrote to the Director enclosing information regarding the implementation of the University of Iowa’s health benefits plan, which covers same-sex domestic partners. The Director replied that “none of the rules and regulations of the State Health Benefits Program have changed” and that the “answers provided in previous correspondence still stand.” Plaintiffs Mayo, Derbyshire, and the AAUP filed a grievance against Rutgers on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The grievance was denied on the ground that the Division administers the SHBP and its interpretation of “dependents” is controlling.
It is plaintiffs’ position that the statutory term “dependents” should be read to include domestic partners who are the functional equivalent of spouses in order to effectuate the remedial purpose behind the SHBP act. N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.26(d) defines “dependents” as:
an employee’s spouse and the employee’s unmarried children under the age of 23 years who live with the employee in a regular parent-child relationship.
The implementing regulations define “dependents” the same way. See N.J.A.C. 17:9-3.1(a). The goal of the SHBP “is to provide
When the SHBP law was enacted in 1961, the meaning of the term “spouse” was so clear that Legislative intent is found by merely reading the plain language of the act. It dictates that health coverage may be extended only to legal spouses of state employees or their dependent children under the age of 23 years. N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.26(d). We recognize that in recent years, in a variety of contexts, our courts have considered the changing notions of “family” when deciding whether cohabitants, both heterosexual and homosexual, should be treated as dependents or family. See Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J.Super. 1, 666 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1995) (same-sex domestic partner of a child’s biological mother may adopt child); see also Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (common law doctrine expanded to allow bystander recovery by a woman who was engaged to and cohabiting with the victim of an auto accident); Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 313 A.2d 609 (1974) (divorced wife qualified as a de facto spouse of decedent because she had resumed cohabiting and asked a priest to remarry them, who refused); Dawson v. Hatfield Wire & Cable Co., 59 N.J. 190, 280 A.2d 173 (1971) (“dependent” in the Workers’ Compensation statute, N.J.S.A. 34:15-13(f), expanded to include a de facto wife).
However, in dealing with statutory and contract interpretation, we have not been disposed to expanding plain language to fit more contemporary views of family and intimate relationships. For example, in Lopez v. Santiago, 125 N.J.Super. 268, 310 A.2d 500 (App.Div.1973), we declined to find that an automobile accident victim was the “spouse” of the driver, even though they had four children, lived together and she had taken his name. Id. at 269-
Plaintiffs acknowledge the plain language definitions under the SHBP Act, but nonetheless contend that by refusing to extend health benefits, a form of compensation, to their domestic partners, defendants violate LAD’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation. The LAD prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of marital status or sexual orientation. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. Our courts have held that health insurance and pension benefits are compensatory in nature. Gauer v. Essex County Div. of Welfare, 108 N.J. 140, 149, 528 A.2d 1 (1987); Weiner v. County of Essex, 262 N.J.Super. 270, 286, 620 A.2d 1071 (Law Div.1992).
The LAD, however, provides several exceptions limiting its scope, one of which covers state employee benefit programs:
Nothing contained in this act ... shall be construed ... to interfere with the operation of the terms or conditions and administration of any bona fide retirement, pension, employee benefit or insurance plan or program, including any State or locally administered public retirement system, provided that the provisions of those plans or programs are not used to establish an age for mandatory retirement.
[N.J.S.A. 10:5-2.1 (emphasis added).]
The LAD’s unambiguous exception for benefit and insurance programs bars plaintiffs’ claim that the LAD precludes the alleged discriminatory effect of the SHBP. The 1961 adoption of the statutory definition of “dependents” was followed by the adoption of the LAD’s prohibitions against discrimination based on marital status or sexual orientation. In such a situation, the rules of statutory construction might call for the more recent of the legislative pronouncements to prevail. 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02 (1992 ed.). However, because the statutory exception to the LAD was part of the later enactment and was intended to place programs such as the SHBP outside the scope of the LAD, the LAD is unavailable to plaintiffs’ cause.
Consistent with that view, a California court, in Hinman v. Dep’t of Personnel Administration, 167 Cal.App.3d 516, 213 Cal.Rptr. 410, 418-19 (1985), held that a similar exception to California’s employment discrimination statute applied to the state’s dental benefits plan. It said that the plan qualified as “bona fide” because it adopted its definition of “family member” before the discrimination statute added the marital status category, thus entitling the plan to a presumption of validity. Id. 213 Cal.Rptr. at 419 (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 202-03, 98 S.Ct. 444, 449-50, 54 L.Ed.2d 402, 412-13 (1977)). In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm’n, 167 Wis.2d 205, 482 N.W.2d 121, 125-26 (App.1992), the Wisconsin court reconciled two seemingly inconsistent statutes, one defining “dependents” for health insurance purposes and the other relating to employment discrimination, by concluding that the Legislature could not have intended to violate its civil rights statute when it statutorily defined “dependents” because the amendment prohibiting marital status discrimination and the statutory definition of “dependents” had been enacted at the same time.
Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, like the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, protects “against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike.” Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568, 494 A.2d 294 (1985). In analyzing equal protection challenges, New Jersey courts have rejected the rigid, multi-tiered approach followed by the federal courts, instead relying on a flexible balancing test. Barone v. Dep’t of Human Services, 107 N.J. 355, 368, 526 A.2d 1055 (1987). The crucial issue under New Jersey case law is “ ‘whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment’ ” involved. Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370, 331 A.2d 262 (1975) (citation omitted), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 2220, 48 L. Ed.2d 826 (1976). Three factors considered under this balancing test are “the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction.” Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567, 494 A.2d 294. Our equal protection analysis requires “ ‘a real and substantial relationship between the classification and the governmental purpose which it purportedly serves.’” Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 368, 526 A.2d 1055 (quoting Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Township v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 43, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Feldman v. Weymouth, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L. Ed.2d 373 (1977)).
In New Jersey when a statute is facially neutral, as here, even if it has a disparate impact on a class of individuals, an equal protection challenge based on the New Jersey Constitution will succeed only if the Legislature intended to discriminate against the class. Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 580, 494 A.2d 294. In that case, the Court found that the Legislature did not intend to
New Jersey courts will examine a classification closely if it discriminates on an invidious basis — that is, if the class is “suspect.” Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973). Our courts have held gender-based classifications to be suspect, Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75 N.J. 62, 69, 379 A.2d 848 (1977) (holding that proof of dependency requirements imposed on widowers but not widows violated the equal protection guarantee), but have not addressed classifications based on marital status or sexual orientation. However, the federal courts have held that sexual orientation classifications are not suspect. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465-66 (7th Cir.1989) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir.1990). We have not created suspect classifications where the federal courts have refused to do so, and therefore, have no reason to view sexual orientation or marital status as deserving of heightened scrutiny.
Therefore, our analysis of equal protection turns on whether there was a “real and substantial relationship” between the differ
The State contends that its policy of extending health benefits to employees’ spouses rather than domestic partners furthers the governmental goal of creating a workable administrative scheme that can be applied in a uniform and objective manner. In Barone, supra, where a definition of “disabled” for the purpose of one act was contingent on an individual’s eligibility for disability benefits under another act, the Court considered valid the government’s interest in simplifying disability determinations so as to maximize the benefits available to applicants. 107 N.J. at 371-72, 526 A.2d 1055. Likewise, in Hinman, supra, the court held that the statutory definition of “family member” was a reasonable means of administering the dental benefits program. 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
Balancing the parties’ and the public’s interest in the marital status classification causes us to conclude that the State’s interest should prevail. The importance of affordable health insurance to employees’ families cannot be denied and this is a stated purpose behind the SHBP Act. Further, the State’s interest in objective determinations of eligibility for coverage is entitled to recognition by the court. The present classification avoids the State getting involved in a subjective analysis, and avoids that certain conflict that would arise from establishing and analyzing subjective criteria.
Nonetheless, we choose to discuss two aspects of the statutory requirement that domestic partners must be married in order to qualify for benefits. Regarding heterosexual domestic partners, an elementary response is that marriage solves the problem and that the health benefits afforded by the SHBP serve to indemnify the employee’s obligation to provide the spouse with
No specific language in New Jersey’s marriage statutes prohibits same-sex marriages. N.J.S.A. 37:1-1 entitled “Certain Marriages Prohibited” prohibits “a man” or “a woman” from marrying any of their “ancestors or descendants” or other specifically delineated relative: siblings, nieces and nephews, aunts or uncles. The statute which requires a marriage license speaks in gender-neutral language: “the persons intending to be married shall obtain a marriage license.” N.J.S.A. 37:1-2. The statute requiring parental consent for marriage has, since 1991, used the term “minor” after an amendment deleted reference to underage males and females. N.J.S.A. 37:1-6. However, the provision that describes where the marriage license is to be obtained refers to the residential municipality of “the female party to the proposed marriage;” or, “if the female party is a nonresident of this state” the municipality in which “the male party resides.” N.J.S.A. 37:1-3(a), (b).
M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976), is the only reported decision in this State which addresses the question of same-sex marriages. There, defendant husband defended plaintiff wife’s complaint for support on the ground that wife was a male and the marriage was therefore void. Id. at 78-79, 355 A.2d 204. The plaintiff had been born a male, but through surgery and hormonal * ' X therapy, ^she became a female. Id. at 79-81, 355 A.2d 204. Although the parties were married a year after the surgery, id. at 79, 355 A.2d 204, defendant contended that at that time plaintiff was a male and therefore the marriage was a nullity. Id. at 83,
We accept — and it is not disputed — as the fundamental premise in this case that a lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female. Despite winds of change, this understanding of a valid marriage is almost universal. Annotation, “Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex,” 63 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1975). In the matrimonial field the heterosexual union is usually regarded as the only one entitled to legal recognition and public sanction. 52 Am.Jur.2d, Marriage, § 1 at 865; e.g. Singer v. Haro, 11 Wash.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (App.Ct.1974); B. v. B., 78 Misc.2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup.Ct.1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.Ct.App.1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Sup.Ct.1971), app. dism. 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972).
There is not the slightest doijbt that New Jersey follows the overwhelming authority. The historic assumption in the application of common law and statutory strictures relating to marriages is tha( only persons who can become “man and wife” have the capacity to enter marriage. Cf. Winn v. Wiggins, 47 N.J.Super. 215, 220, 135 A.2d 673 (App.Div.1957); Jackson v. Jackson, 94 N.J. Eq. 233, 236-237[118 A. 926] (E. & A.1922); N.J.S.A. 37:1-10. The pertinent statutes relating to marriages and married persons do not contain any explicit references to a requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman. N.J.S.A. 37:1-1 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1 et seq. Nevertheless that statutory condition must be extrapblated. It is so strongly and firmly implied from a full reading of the statutes that a different legislative intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the same sex, cannot be fathomed.
[Id. at 83-85, 355 A.2d 204 (footnote omitted).]
The court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s determination that the plaintiff was in fact a female, that the marriage was valid and that the defendant was required to pay support. Id at 90, 355 A.2d 204.
A great number of jurisdictions have expressly forbidden same-sex marriages or expressly limited marriages to heterosexual couples, but we find only five jurisdictions that have had challenges to these limitations on constitutional grounds. Other courts have dealt with the issue of same-sex marriages, but marriage statutes and the interpretation thereof were not involved. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3494, 73 L.Ed2d 1373 (1982) (challenge to section of Immigration and Nationality Act defining spouse as excluding homosexual marriage partner); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 328 Pa.Super. 181, 476 A.2d 952 (1984) (action for
A review of the cases dealing with the challenges to marriage statutes is enlightening on the constitutional issues raised in the present ease. In 1971, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972), and it has since been cited by every court faced with a constitutional challenge to same-sex marriages. At that time, Minnesota statutes did not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages, but the court held that the use of the term marriage was one of common usage
meaning the state of union between persons of the opposite sex. It is unrealistic to think that the original draftsman of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial days, would have used the term in any different sense. The term is of contemporary significance as well, for the present statute is replete with words of heterosexual import such as “husband and wife” and “bride and groom — ”
[Id. 191 N.W.2d at 186.]
The court concluded that the Minnesota statutes did not authorize same-sex marriages. Ibid.
The court rejected the contention that, as interpreted, the statute denied appellants’ fundamental right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties. Id. at 186-87. There was no due process violation because the historic institution of marriage, “as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family,” was more deeply founded than any asserted concept of same-sex marriage and societal interests. Id. at 186. Nor was there any equal protection clause violation:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state’s classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. Petitioners note that the state*458 does not impose upon heterosexual married couples a condition that they have a proved capacity or declared willingness to procreate, posing a rhetorical demand that this court must read such condition into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be prohibited. Even assuming that such a condition would be neither unrealistic nor offensive under the Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)] rationale, the classification is no more than theoretically imperfect. We are reminded, however, that “abstract symmetry” is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Id 191 N.W.2d at 187 (footnote omitted).]
In Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), two males appealed denial of their application for a marriage license alleging state and federal constitutional rights violations. The Washington marriage statute did not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages, and by its language it authorized marriages by “persons of the age of eighteen years, who are otherwise capable.” Id. 522 P.2d at 1189. Nevertheless, because the Legislature had amended the statute to substitute the word “persons” for prior references to males and females, and because another statute relating to marriage license affidavits referred to “the male” and “the female,” the Washington Court of Appeals concluded that the Legislature did not intend to authorize same-sex marriages. Ibid.
Even though the Washington constitution contained an equal rights amendment guaranteeing equality regardless of sex, the court found no violation of that provision, concluding that the denial of the license was not based on appellants’ status as males. Id. 522 P.2d at 1195. Rather, the refusal was based on the State’s recognition that society as a whole “views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and rearing of children,” the possibility of which does not exist in a same-sex marriage. Ibid.
Therefore the definition of marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman is permissible as applied to appellants, notwithstanding the prohibition contained in the ERA, because it is founded upon the unique physical characteristics of the sexes and appellants are not being discriminated against because of their status as males per se.
[Ibid.]
With respect to federal constitutional violations, the court found none. The court employed the traditional rational relationship or
In the now-famous case of Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, 65 U.S.L.W. 2399 (Hawaii Cir.Ct.1996), the trial court, upon remand from the Supreme Court of Hawaii, considered whether the denial of plaintiffs’ applications for marriage licenses on the ground that the couples were of the same sex, deprived them of equal protection of the law under the Hawaiian constitution. Three years earlier the Hawaii Supreme Court considered the case when plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Hawaii’s marriage statute was unconstitutional. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). The statute in existence at that time did not expressly state, as it does now, that a valid marriage contract can only be between a man and a woman. In 1991 the statute merely made reference to “the man and woman to be married.” Id. 852 P.2d at 49.
The Hawaiian trial court had granted the motion of the Director of the Department of Health for judgment, finding that he properly withheld the marriage license and was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and upholding the department’s interpretation of the statute as prohibiting same-sex marriages. Id. at 52. The Hawaii Supreme Court refused to extend the present boundaries of the fundamental right of marriage to include same-sex couples, holding that the “right to same-sex marriages is [not] so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of [society] that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.” Id. at 57. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that appellants should have been given an opportunity to establish that they were
The appellants in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.App.1995), unsuccessfully challenged the gender-neutral language of the district’s marriage statute, which had been interpreted to prohibit same-sex marriages, on federal due process grounds and an alleged violation of the District of Columbia’s Human Rights Act. The Court of Appeals concluded that Congress had intended marriage to have its traditional meaning, that is, that it was inherently a male-female relationship. Id. at 312-15. After rejecting appellant’s human rights act claim, id. at 318-20, the court concluded that same-sex marriage was not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause because that kind of relationship was not deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradition. Id. at 331. The majority also held that the statute did not violate appellant’s equal protection rights, with one judge dissenting. The dissenter concluded that the question required the court to determine whether “the classification at issue, unrelated adult homosexual couples, can serve as a legitimate basis for excluding persons from a state benefit ... [,] which is available
Finally, the New York Supreme Court, in Storrs v. Holcomb, 168 Misc.2d 898, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup.Ct.1996), rejected the claim of two men that they were entitled to a marriage license despite the absence of statutory authorization therefore. Relying upon the decision of its highest court in Matter of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 801, 604 N.Y.S.2d 558, 624 N.E.2d 696 (1993), the court considered itself bound by the holdings that marriage was “limited to opposite sex couples and that the gender classification serve[d] a valid public purpose.” Id. 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287. In Cooper, supra, the New York court adopted wholeheartedly the analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson, supra, and concluded that defining the term “surviving spouse” as excluding same-sex partners was not unconstitutional; it did not violate the equal protection clause of the state’s constitution, as there was no irrational or invidious discrimination. 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800.
Here, our response to plaintiffs claim for relief is restricted by our role as a court that cannot enact laws or create benefits. We must interpret the statutes and laws enacted by the Legislature and the framers of our constitutions. Therefore, our limited answer to their equal protection argument is that it is not only homosexual couples that cannot legally marry and thus, cannot qualify as a dependent domestic partner for enrollment under the SHBP. Cousins, parents, children over 23 years of age, siblings, or anyone related too closely by blood, including those persons legally married to another, cannot qualify for benefits because of the marriage requirement, no matter how dependent or emotionally bonded they may be.
We see no intent by the Legislature, in enacting SHBP, to discriminate against lesbian or gay male persons. We accept the administrative and financial policy reasons offered by the State as the basis for the limited benefits afforded by the SHBP Act. It is not for this court to agree or disagree with the Legislature’s
Plaintiffs urge that by denying health coverage to homosexual employees’ domestic partners, defendants, who are part of the executive branch, violated Executive Order No. 39 (“E.0.39”). E.O. 39, issued by the Governor in 1991, prohibits executive branch agencies from discriminating in the provision of services or benefits on the basis of sexual orientation. It provides, in part:
2. No Executive Branch department, agency, board, commission or other body shall discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation against any person in the provision of any service or benefit by such department, agency, board, commission or other body.
Defendants contend, however, that E.O. 39' does not apply because the SHBP classification refers to marital status, not sexual orientation. This is the approach taken by the California court in Hinman, supra, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 419. As we have pointed out, it is not only homosexual partners that are prohibited from marrying, therefore, the SHBP Act cannot be said to “discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.” Moreover, if E.O. 39 were to be applied to the SHBP it would be in derogation of the Legislature’s prohibition against applying the LAD in a way that interferes with bona fide employee benefit plans. N.J.S.A. 10:5-2.1. An interpretation of an executive directive that would override such a legislative pronouncement must be scrupulously avoided.
The determination of the Division of Pensions denying SHBP coverage is affirmed. We dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint as to the
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
What goes on in other people’s bedrooms is a question that has intrigued me since reaching puberty, but it is none of my business. I thus find it distasteful to uphold the denial of health insurance to the dependents of a deserving segment of the workforce merely because of their sexual predilections. To be sure, the State Health Benefits Program Act (N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.25 et seq.) is neutral both with respect to gender and sexual orientation. However, the statutory reference to “employee’s spouse” in the Act’s definition of “dependents,” N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.26(d), indirectly discriminates against homosexual domestic partners who, because they are unable to enter into lawful marriage, are denied health benefits routinely enjoyed by similarly situated heterosexuals. The State seeks to perpetuate this injustice essentially on the grounds of administrative convenience. But other states, cities and private institutions have extended employee benefits to same-sex domestic partners without the severe dislocations envisioned by the Attorney General. The short answer to the State’s argument is that it can be done, but New Jersey chooses not to do it.
Despite this evident unfairness, I join in the decision of the court essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge Shebell. It is not our function as judges to construe statutes in accordance with our privately held views of justice. Instead, we must apply the law as written. The statutory language is crystal clear. There is no room for interpretation. We are obliged to enforce the clearly expressed legislative intent.
Nor does the New Jersey Constitution afford a remedy. Appellants point to a lengthening line of decisions in which the courts have relied upon state constitutional provisions in creating new rights and remedies. They argue that good law is simply a matter of fairness, and what is just in a given case merely requires us to summon the state constitution to rationalize the appropriate re-
The most cherished principle in our system is that government rests on the consent of the governed. The central idea is that in the meandering course of history, there is time for visions and revisions — for mistakes to be made by the people and rectified by the people. Democracy has its price. Good people are sometimes hurt, even destroyed, in the process. But, surely, the judiciary does not have a monopoly on justice. Appellants must seek redress in another forum.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
Like Judge Baime, I, too, “find it distasteful to uphold the denial of health insurance to the dependents of a deserving segment of the workforce merely because of their sexual predilections.” And I, too, join in the majority decision essentially for the reasons so clearly expressed by Judge Shebell. However, I am not convinced from the record that the addition of “domestic partner” to the definition of “dependents” in N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.26(d) will interfere with “the governmental goal of creating a workable administrative scheme that can be applied in a uniform and objective manner” observed by Judge Shebell. While it is clear that the SHBP is facially neutral and there is no showing of a discriminatory legislative purpose at its enactment in 1961, and the statutory definition of “dependents” as either a spouse or
As my colleagues have stated, our individual views of justice cannot override the clear intent of the Legislature. However, to remain faithful to our oath of office to “bear true faith and allegiance” to the state Constitution and to “the Governments established in ... this State,” N.J.S.A. 41:1-1, we should express more than the thought that appellants should approach the Legislature, vested with the law-making power, rather than the Judiciary, vested with the law-interpreting power.
This issue warrants immediate legislative attention and we should say so. Health care plans are expensive and difficult to obtain, and the denial of health care benefits under the SHBP to employees in plaintiffs’ circumstances is so unjust, that we should actively commend to the Legislature that it re-examine the class of dependents of state employees eligible to receive those benefits. It is not unusual for an appellate court to make a recommendation to the Legislature while upholding current legislation. As Justice Jacobs said, when examining a statutory scheme for compensation of tenured state employees who have been suspended, “we take the liberty of suggesting that the issues are of sufficient public importance to warrant further legislative consideration of the entire subject.” DeMarco v. Bd. Chosen Freeholders of Bergen Cty., 21 N.J. 136,147,121 A.2d 396 (1956). See also All American Auto Salvage v. Camp’s Auto Wreckers, 146 N.J. 15, 30, 679 A.2d 627 (1996) (as to the rights of banks, depositors, and judgment creditors to funds on deposit, “[w]e commend consideration of the issue to the Legislature.”); Riverview Realty, Inc. v. Williamson, 284 N.J.Super. 566, 570, 665 A.2d 1150 (App.Div.1995) (recommending Legislature consider when a tenant dies whether her family members should be evicted or whether they should remain in the apartment under the Anti-Eviction Act); State In Interest
Additionally, twenty years ago, Justice, then Judge, Handler wrote that “[t]he historic assumption in the application of common law and statutory strictures relating to marriages is that only persons who can become ‘man and wife’ have the capacity to enter marriage.” M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.Super. 77, 84, 355 A.2d 204 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976). Our marriage act may be consistent with that thought, as Judge Shebell points out here, in the reference to obtaining a marriage license in either the municipal residence of the “female party” or “the male party” to the marriage. N.J.S.A. 37:l-3(a), (b). But other sections of the act ignore homosexual partnerships. N.J.S.A. 37:1-1 prohibits marriages between a man and certain closely related sisters or daughters and marriages between a woman and certain closely related brothers or sons. It does not prohibit marriages between a man and his brother, son or any other man, nor marriages between a woman and her sister, daughter or any other woman. Also, the statutorily mandated terms of the marriage license are gender neutral. N.J.S.A. 37:1-7. Similarly neutral is N.J.S.A. 37:1-9, which prohibits issuance of a marriage license when “either applicant is infected with a venereal disease in a communicable stage, or is currently adjudicated mentally incompetent.” This all indicates the Legislature was not considering the possibility of a “non-traditional” marriage when it enacted the various sections of the marriage laws. Therefore, one could argue that it was not the intent of the Legislature to deny marriage and its associated benefits to same-sex couples. As Justice Handler recognized in M.T. v. J.T., id. at 83-84, 355 A.2d 204, there are “winds of change” sometimes to be considered. Accordingly, I also commend to the Legislature its examination of