Case Information
*0 FILED CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LONG ISLAND OFFICE *1 Case 2:21-cv-01720-JMA-AYS Document 123 Filed 06/06/25 Page 1 of 28 PageID #:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT For Online Publication Only EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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BARBARA RUSSO,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 21-cv-1720 (JMA)(AYS) -against- 6/6/2025 3:44 pm
TUTTNAUER USA COMPANY LIMITED,
BOB BASILE and KEVIN CONNORS,
Defendants.
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AZRACK, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Barbara Russo brought this employment discrimination action asserting five separate theories of liability: 1) Hostile Work Environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”); 2) Gender
Discrimination in the form of an unlawful termination in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL;
3) Retaliation in the form of an unlawful termination in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL;
4) Retaliation based upon the filing of a police report in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL;
and 5) Retaliation based upon Tuttnauer’s commencement of civil litigation against Plaintiff, her
husband, and her son, in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL. (ECF No. 1.) A jury trial was
held from January 6, 2025 to January 22, 2025. (ECF No. 87.) At the conclusion of trial, the jury
returned a verdict finding in Plaintiff’s favor with respect to her claim for a hostile work
environment under Title VII and NYSHRL. (ECF No. 107.) The jury also found that Defendants
Basile and Connors aided and abetted the creation of the hostile work environment. (Id.) The jury
awarded Plaintiff $2,500,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. (Id.)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to enter judgment as a matter of law in their favor with respect to the jury’s finding
of liability as to Bob Basile for aiding and abetting the creation of a hostile work environment at
Tuttnauer. (ECF No. 110.) Additionally, Defendants moved for either a new trial on damages or
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remittitur under Rule 59 for the jury’s award of compensatory damages associated with Plaintiff’s
emotional distress. (Id.) Finally, Defendants moved to reduce or eliminate the jury’s award of
punitive damages because they exceed the statutory limit under Title VII. (Id.) For the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background and procedural history of this case and reviews it only as relevant to the present motion. Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claim arose from her employment at Tuttnauer USA, which began in November
1991. (Tr. 766-67, 1144). Plaintiff alleged that a hostile work environment persisted at Tuttnauer
for years and that it involved numerous sexist and inappropriate emails being circulated amongst
employees, inappropriate sexual comments being made to Plaintiff and other female employees
regarding their weight and/or appearance, sexually explicit and offensive images and notes being
placed in Plaintiff’s office as well as the offices of other female employees, and sexually
inappropriate comments and touching from Defendant Kevin Connors, the CFO of Tuttnauer
during the relevant timeframe. (ECF No. 1; Tr. 304, 489-490, 504, 523-24, 782-84, 1165-66,
1347.) Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Connors walked into her office on one occasion with
his penis hanging out of his pants. (ECF No. 1; Tr. 791.) The alleged hostile work environment
culminated in Defendant Connors’ attempt to sexually assault Plaintiff in her office, during an
incident in which Plaintiff testified that Connors grabbed her arms, pulled them behind her head,
and pushed her down on her desk, pressing on her airways before she pulled away from him and
fled the office. (Tr. 826-28).
The above facts grounded Plaintiff’s claim for damages pursuant to Title VII and NYSHRL for a hostile work environment.
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A. Facts Presented at Trial
At trial, Plaintiff testified that throughout her employment at Tuttnauer up to her termination in 2018, she was subject to a toxic work environment characterized by numerous sexist
emails and disturbing flyers, crude comments about women, and other occurrences that turned the
workplace into a toxic environment. (Tr. 780-83, 999-1000, 1165-66). As corporate secretary,
Plaintiff took and distributed meeting minutes, and as controller, she oversaw accounts receivables
and payables. (Tr. 766-68). Defendant Robert Basile was a Senior Vice President at Tuttnauer,
and Defendant Kevin Connors was the CFO. (Tr. 53-54, 61-62.) While Plaintiff was on the HR
team with Defendant Basile and others, Plaintiff was never trained in HR, and employees and
supervisors, including Basile, were never formally trained in reporting or investigating
employment discrimination. (Tr. 74-75, 82-85, 316-17, 774-76).
Several co-workers testified that Basile knew that supervisor Tim Krause’s office wall was papered with pornography, his computer and laptop screensaver depicted naked women, and that
Krause played explicit sex videos in front of other employees in his office. (Tr. 268-69, 281, 524-
27, 539-40, 548, 1515, 1517-20). While the employee handbook identified Basile as responsible
for addressing harassment complaints, numerous witnesses testified that Basile actively
participated in inappropriate sexual discussions (primarily in the lunchroom) and did nothing to
address situations when others contributed to the hostile work environment by inappropriately
commenting on the physical appearance of female employees. (Tr. 265-67, 276-77, 286-90, 291-
93, 489, 492-93, 512, 533, 541-42, 578, 588).
Plaintiff testified that sexually inappropriate and offensive emails were circulated to Tuttnauer employees on a daily basis, and several such emails were entered into evidence at
trial. (Tr. 780; Pl.’s Ex. 43, 46, 47, 48, 63, 85.) Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that sexually
offensive images and notes were slid under her office door, including naked women engaging in
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sexual activity, a naked man with an erect penis, notes about women being forbidden from entering
certain areas, sexual jokes involving condoms and tampons, and messages naming Plaintiff and
other female employees with crude and expletive language targeting these employees. (Tr. 783-
84, 1165-66; Pl.’s Ex. 20, 24, 33, 34, 44.)
Plaintiff further testified that about three to four times per week, Defendant Connors would inappropriately stare and makes gestures towards her. (Tr. 999, 1346.) Plaintiff testified that
Defendant Connors would “come behind me and . . . squeeze my shoulders[.] . . . He would try to
put my hand in his private area[.] . . . Come from behind me, rub against me, rub in front of
me.” (Tr. 1347.) Aware that Plaintiff was diabetic, Connors made sexual jokes by telling Plaintiff:
“I know what you need, protein. I have protein right here for you.” (Tr. 1347-48.) On her birthday,
Connors told Plaintiff, “I have a present for you, it’s right here,” and then proceeded to grab his
crotch. (Tr. 1348). Both Plaintiff and co-worker Alice Mary Gruninger testified that on one
occasion, Defendant Connors walked out of the bathroom with his penis hanging out of his pants
and walked into Plaintiff’s office, after which Plaintiff yelled at Connors to get out of her
office. (Tr. 559-60, 791.) Plaintiff testified that she once told Basile about the hostile work
environment, right after the incident in which Connors walked into her office with his penis
out. (Tr. 778-80, 997.) Plaintiff mentioned the offensive pictures that someone had placed under
her door and told Basile that “this man is going to get us into a lot of trouble someday.” (Tr. 779-
80, 1396). Plaintiff testified that Basile agreed but never followed up on this complaint. (Tr. 778-
80).
Plaintiff testified that she complained about the hostile work environment verbally and in a written letter to Ran Tuttnauer, who was then CEO of Tuttnauer, Ltd., the parent company of
Tuttnauer USA. (Tr. 777-78, 790-806, 1097-98; Pl.’s Ex. 37.) Despite these complaints, Plaintiff
testified that the sexual harassment continued, with sexually explicit images and notes
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continuously placed in her office and Defendant Connors continuing to make sexually offensive
remarks to her. (Tr. 809-26.)
Plaintiff testified that the hostile work environment culminated in Defendant Connors’ attempt to sexually assault her in her office on January 26, 2018. (Tr. 827-28.) Plaintiff testified
that as she was working with Connors in her office, he “grabbed [her] arms, pulled them behind
[her] head, and pushed [her] down on [her] desk.” (Tr. 828.) Plaintiff testified that Defendant
Connors grabbed her neck and was pressing on her airways, causing her to yell. (Id.) Plaintiff
pulled away from Connors, fled her office, and went home. (Id.) Plaintiff was terminated on
February 1, 2018, five days after this alleged incident with Defendant Connors. (Tr. 829-30.) On
the day she was fired, someone attached a copy of an invoice to Plaintiff’s computer screen with
a scribbled print stating: “Suck my cock.” (Pl.’s Ex. 40; Tr. 831-34 ).
B. Rule 50(a) Motion
Plaintiff completed the presentation of her case-in-chief on Tuesday, January 21, 2025. (Tr. 1687.) At that time, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 with respect to all claims. (Tr. 1668-78.) Defendants’ Motion was
granted in part. (Tr. 1719.) Specifically, the Court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims that were based upon Tuttnauer’s commencement of a civil litigation. (Id.; Elec.
Order dated Jan. 21, 2025.) The remaining causes of action were to be left for a jury’s decision
and verdict.
Subsequently, the jury reached a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor on the hostile work environment claim, finding Defendant Tuttnauer USA liable for a hostile work environment and
Defendants Connors and Basile liable for aiding and abetting the creation of the hostile work
environment. (ECF No. 107.) The jury found in Defendants’ favor with respect to Plaintiff’s
remaining claims: 1) her claim for discrimination based upon an unlawful termination; 2) her claim
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for retaliation based upon an unlawful termination; and 3) her claim for retaliation based upon the
filing of a police report. (Id.) The jury awarded Plaintiff $2.5 million in compensatory damages
and $5 million in punitive damages. (Id.)
C. The Instant Motion
After the jury’s verdict, Defendants filed a Rule 50 motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on the basis that there is insufficient evidence to hold Defendant Basile liable as an aider-
and-abettor of the hostile work environment. (See ECF No. 110-1 (“Def. Br.”) at 5-7). Defendants
also request that the Court either order a new trial on damages or a remittitur under Rule 59 with
respect to the jury’s award of compensatory damages. (See id. at 8-20.) Finally, Defendants argue
that the jury’s award of punitive damages must be reduced or eliminated because the amount
awarded exceeds the statutory limit under Title VII. (See id. at 20-22.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Judgment As a Matter of Law – Rule 50 When resolving a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc . , 530 U.S. 133,
150 (2000). “Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id.
“Incontrovertible evidence relied on by the moving party, such as a relevant videotape whose
accuracy is unchallenged, should be credited by the court on such a motion if it so utterly discredits
the opposing party’s version that no reasonable juror could fail to believe the version advanced by
the moving party.” Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378-80 (2007)). On genuine factual disputes, however, the court cannot “substitute
its judgment for that of the jury.” Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.
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1988); accord Herrera-Amador v. Lee, No. 16-CV-5915, 2024 WL 2316134, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May
22, 2024).
Additionally,
[A] party is not entitled to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict on a given issue unless it has timely moved in the district court for judgment as a matter of law on that issue. Such a motion must be made “before submission of the case to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). Since the purpose of requiring that the motion be made before submission of the case to the jury is “to give the claimant a fair opportunity to cure the defects in proof,” the motion “must at least identify the specific element that the defendant contends is insufficiently supported.” For the same reason, although a motion for [judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”)] may be “renew[ed]” after the jury returns its verdict, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2), it may be renewed only on grounds that were specifically articulated before submission of the case to the jury[.] As to any issue on which no proper Rule 50(b) motion was made, JMOL may not properly be granted by the district court, or upheld on appeal, or ordered by the appellate court unless that action is required in order to prevent manifest injustice.
Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998) (cleaned up).
B. Motion for a New Trial – Rule 59
Rule 59(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues – and to any party . . . after a jury trial, for
any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Rule 59(a)(1)(A) permits a court to grant a new trial “[if] the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence.” See Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417
(2d Cir. 2012). “[A] decision is against the weight of the evidence . . . if and only if the verdict is
[(1)] seriously erroneous or [(2)] a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 417-18 (citing Farrior v.
Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 2002)). “A motion for a new trial ordinarily
should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously
erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare
Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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5863 In considering a Rule 59 motion on the issue of damages, courts may “order[ ] a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner’s refusal to agree to a reduction
(remittitur).” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135
L.Ed.2d 659 (1996); see also Stampf v. Long Island R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 204 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“Remittitur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of an
excessive verdict and a new trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Federal
law, remittitur is appropriate where a jury award “is so high as to shock the judicial conscience.”
Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998). Under New York law, “an award is
deemed excessive ‘if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.’” Lore
v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 177 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)).
III. DISCUSSION Defendants argue that the jury’s verdict finding Defendant Basile liable for aiding and abetting the creation of a hostile work environment must be set aside, and judgment entered in
their favor. For the following reasons, Defendants motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50 is DENIED. However, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for remittitur of the jury’s
compensatory damages award as well as Defendant’s request to reduce the amount of punitive
damages awarded in order to align with Title VII’s statutory cap.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendants first argue that the Court should enter judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 because the evidence was insufficient to find Defendant Basile liable for a hostile work
environment, either through his own direct conduct or as an aider and abettor. Defendants argue
that while Plaintiff entered into evidence several allegedly inappropriate e-mails sent by Basile, all
of these e-mails were sent before the relevant statutory time period for the alleged hostile work
environment. (Def. Br. at 6.) Furthermore, Defendants argue that Basile cannot be liable as an
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aider and abettor because Plaintiff did not complain to Basile about the hostile work environment
during the actionable statutory period and because she did not specifically complain about the
discriminatory conduct she was experiencing at Tuttnauer from Defendant Connors and
others. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff responds to Defendants arguments by noting that the continuing violation doctrine allowed the jury to consider conduct that occurred prior to August 15, 2017 as part of the alleged
hostile work environment claim if it “was sufficiently similar in nature, frequency, and severity,
such that it was part of a continuing hostile work environment.” (Pl. Br. at 11.) However, the jury
was also instructed that “if conduct spans across different people or large time intervals, without
harassing conduct occurring, then, you could find that conduct that predated August 15, 2017, is
not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing hostile work environment.” (Id. (citing Tr. 1806-
07).) Furthermore, Plaintiff correctly argues that liability for aiding and abetting a hostile work
environment “may extend to supervisors who failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial
measures despite being informed about the existence of alleged discriminatory conduct.” (Pl. Br.
at 11 (citing Aiola v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 3d 321, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).)
Here, the record supports the jury’s finding that Basile aided and abetted the hostile work
environment at Tuttnauer.
To establish individual liability under the NYSHRL, “a plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant was personally involved in the violation.” Adams-Flores v. City of New York, No.
18-CV-12150, 2020 WL 996421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020); see Feingold v. New York, 366
F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may establish individual liability by showing that a
defendant failed to take remedial action in response to reports of discriminatory behavior or
observation of discriminatory behavior. See Lee v. Riverbay Corp., 751 F. Supp. 3d 259, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 2024). The evidence at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that
Defendant Basile actively participated in and condoned the hostile work environment at Tuttnauer
both before and after August 15, 2017, which is the relevant statute of limitations date.
Testimony at trial revealed that in early 2018, after Plaintiff complained to Defendant Basile about the lack of toilet paper in the women’s bathroom, she received a note under her office
door reading: “What is four inches long two inches wide and drives barbara Out of her fucking
mind that damn empty toilet paper roll Not cock hahahahahaha.” (Pl.’s Ex. 32; Tr. 825-27).
Plaintiff testified that this note was slid under her office door in early 2018 after she had made
complaints to Defendant Basile that there was never any toilet paper in the women’s bathroom.
(Tr. 825-827.) Plaintiff further testified that she did not complain to anyone else other than
Defendant Basile about the toilet paper in the women’s bathroom. (Tr. 827.) Since Plaintiff
testified that she only complained to Defendant Basile about the toilet paper shortage, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that Defendant Basile left that message for the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, since the message was similar in tone and style to the other sexist notes and images
that Plaintiff received at work both before and after August 15, 2017, the jury could reasonably
conclude that this message was part of a continuing violation and furthered the hostile work
environment experienced by Plaintiff at Tuttnauer.
Defendants argue in response that this message left for the Plaintiff cannot be attributed to Defendant Basile because Plaintiff testified that she “created” the document during cross
examination. (Def. Repl. at 2.) Defendants refer to the following questions and answers during
Plaintiff’s cross examination:
“Q. I’m going to show you a document in evidence as Exhibit 32. Do you see that document?
A. Yes.
Q. Who created that document?
A. I did.”
(Tr. 1181.) However, this answer was given in the context of Plaintiff explaining a process in
which she collected several messages and graphic images that were placed under her door and
placed them into a folder in order to document the hostile work environment she was experiencing
at Tuttnauer. (Tr. 785-87, 802, 1015-17, 1181-82.) Moreover, immediately after the portion of
testimony that Defendants refer to, the following questions and answers were given:
Q: Okay. And is this one of the documents that you believe was placed or shoved under your door?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do with that document when you saw it?
A: Put it in the folder.
(Tr. 1181-82.) Therefore, the jury could reasonably conclude that this was one of the inappropriate
messages that Plaintiff received in her office and that she later placed it in a folder with other
messages and images to document the hostile work environment she was experiencing at
Tuttnauer.
In addition to this alleged activity by Defendant Basile, the jury could have found that he aided and abetted the hostile work environment as part of a continuing violation by sending
sexually offensive emails on January 30, 2017, February 8, 2017, and March 6, 2017. (Pl.’s Exs.
43, 63, 85; Tr. 782-84.) Furthermore, in 2013, Basile allegedly did nothing when a service
technician sent him, Plaintiff, and 12 other employees an email with a graphic sex joke. (Pl.’s Ex.
47; Tr. 100-01, 780). While Basile claimed he never saw this email or other offensive e-mails that
he was listed as a sender or recipient on, (Tr. 188-89, 191-95, 217, 219-222, 255), the jury could
have reasonably disbelieved him since the documents listed him as a sender or recipient.
Furthermore, Defendant Basile testified that he never tried to confirm, through the company’s
computer technicians or otherwise, whether someone else had cut-and-pasted his name onto these
e-mails. (Tr. 106-14, 196-98, 234-36.) In 2011 and 2015, an engineer sent Plaintiff and Basile
sexually inappropriate emails. (Pl.’s Ex. 46, 48; Tr. 95-100, 185-86, 781-82, 779-780). While
Basile also denied seeing these emails (Tr. 99, 191-94, 255), the jury could reasonably have found
otherwise. Plaintiff testified that emails like this were “common” and circulated '”[o]n a daily
basis.” (Tr. 780.) By sending sexually offensive e-mails and not taking action to address similar
e-mails that were received by himself and Plaintiff, Basile could reasonably be found to have aided
and abetted the hostile work environment.
Plaintiff testified that she complained to Defendant Basile about the hostile work environment right after Defendant Connors “had come out of the bathroom with his penis hanging
out.” (Tr. 779; see Tr. 997.) Plaintiff testified in addition to complaining to the CEO of Tuttnauer
Ltd. about the offensive images and notes being circulated at the office, she also complained to
Defendant Basile about these topics. (Tr. 779.) Regarding Defendant Connors and his alleged
inappropriate behavior, Plaintiff testified that she told Defendant Basile that “this man is going to
get us into a lot of trouble someday,” to which Defendant Basile replied: “yes.” (Id.) Plaintiff
further testified that there was no follow-up from Defendant Basile on this issue. (Tr. 780.)
Furthermore, the trial record contained evidence that Basile knew about and participated in
inappropriate sexual and gender-based discussions at the office. (Tr. 265-68, 276-77, 286-90, 291-
93, 489, 492-93, 512, 533, 541-42, 578, 588). Defendant Basile’s secretary, Laura Gorman,
testified that Basile was present when these offensive discussions occurred, did nothing to stop it,
and sometimes participated in the inappropriate discussions. (Tr. 285-93.) Given the evidence at
trial, jury reasonably concluded that Defendant Basile had aided-and-abetted the hostile work
environment at Tuttnauer.
Defendants argue that all of Defendant Basile’s discriminatory conduct occurred before the statutory limitation date, but the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant Basile
“failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial measures” both before and after the relevant
statutory date of August 15, 2017. See Aiola, 115 F. Supp. at 337 (“[l]iability ‘may extend to ------
supervisors who failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial measures despite being informed
about the existence of alleged discriminatory conduct.”); Delisi v. Nat’l Ass’n of Pro. Women, Inc.,
48 F. Supp. 3d 492, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“courts have found that a failure to investigate can
constitute ‘active participation’ to support an ‘aiding and abetting’ claim”) (citing Feingold v. New
York , 366 F.3d 138, 157-158 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary judgment denied on § 296 claims where
defendants took no action to remedy such behavior of which they were aware)).
As outlined above, there was extensive testimony and evidence presented at trial regarding the overall hostile work environment at Tuttnauer and Defendant Basile’s actions and inactions in
the years prior to the statutory limitation date, including Defendant Basile’s failure to investigate
Plaintiff’s complaints regarding sexually offensive images and Defendant Connor’s behavior. (Tr.
779-80.) Furthermore, Defendant Basile was the Senior Vice President and a member of the HR
team for the 40-person workforce in the Tuttnauer USA office, and his office was located right in
between Plaintiff’s office and Defendant Connor’s office, near the location where much of the
alleged harassment took place. (Tr. 153.) This evidence, along with the circumstantial evidence
that Defendant Basile had involvement in placing sexually offensive notes in Plaintiff’s office,
allowed the jury to draw the reasonable conclusion that Defendant Basile knew of the hostile work
environment, participated in it, and failed to investigate it, both before and after the statutory
limitation period and as part of a continuing violation theory. Therefore, Defendant’s Rule 50
motion is denied.
B. Remittitur
Defendants also request that the Court order a new trial on damages or remittitur based on the jury’s “excessive” damages award. (See Def’s Br. at 3-4.) As stated above, under New York
law, “an award is deemed excessive ‘if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation.’” [1] Lore, 670 F.3d at 177 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)). Defendants argue that
the jury’s award of compensatory damages “far exceed the damages that have been awarded in
comparable cases” that involve worse conduct and more severe harm. (Def Br. at 9.) Defendants
contend that the compensatory damages award should be remitted to $75,000. (Id. at 18.)
Additionally, Defendants contend that the punitive damages award should be reduced or eliminated
because the $5 million punitive damages award exceeds the statutory limit under Title VII. (Id. at
20-22.)
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for remittitur. The Court remits Plaintiff’s $2,500,000 compensatory damages award to $1,000,000 and reduces the punitive
damages award to $299,999 in order to comply with the statutory limit set forth under Title VII.
1. Compensatory Damages
Under applicable New York state law, a monetary judgment is excessive “if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” Allam v. Meyers, 906 F.Supp.2d 274,
286 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). “In determining whether an award ‘deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation,’ N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5501(c), [district courts] compare the jury’s award to
awards allowed in analogous cases involving similar types of injuries.” Allam, 906 F.Supp.2d at
286–87 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 425 (1996)). “While instructive,
such earlier awards are not binding for [district courts’] review.” Id. at 287 (citing Lewis v. City
of New York, 689 F.Supp.2d 417, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
A court should determine whether the award is “within a reasonable range,” not just “balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict in the instant case if the number
of lower awards is greater.” Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(quoting Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990.) Additionally, “[i]n the compensatory
damages context, the Second Circuit has adopted the ‘least intrusive standard’ for remittitur, which
holds that ‘a district court should remit the jury’s award only to the maximum amount that would
be upheld by the district court as not excessive.’” Herrera-Amador v. Lee, No. 16-CV-5915, 2024
WL 2316134, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2024) (quoting Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d
1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Here, the jury awarded Plaintiff $2,500,000 in compensatory damages for her hostile work environment claim. (See ECF No. 107.) Given the details of this case, the Court finds that this
award is excessive.
At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence of the pain and suffering she experienced as a result of the hostile work environment she experienced at Tuttnauer. Plaintiff testified that her mood
began to change in 2016 and 2017, when she started to have eating problems, became socially
withdrawn, stopped engaging in hobbies that previously interested her, and “fell into a deep
depression.” (Tr. 860.) Plaintiff testified that her desire to avoid people led her to stop going out
to eat with her husband like she used to. (Tr. 1277). Plaintiff began taking medication for
depression in 2018 or 2019 and is still taking such medication. (Tr. 859-60, 1299.)
Plaintiff testified that for the first time in her life, she began suffering panic attacks in 2016 or 2017. (Tr. 858). She testified that during these panic attacks, she feels “all the air being sucked
out” of her to the point where she feels like she is going to pass out, and then she starts to
hyperventilate. (Id.) Plaintiff has reportedly suffered panic attacks “constantly” since 2016-17.
(Id.) Plaintiff further stated that for about a year and a half, Defendant Connors “was constantly
coming after me, and on my way to work in the morning I would have panic attacks not knowing
if that day he was going to touch me or he was going to say something or he was going to threaten
me with my job by saying things like ‘if you want to keep your job, you know what you have to
do for me.’” (Tr. 846). Plaintiff also testified about experiencing insomnia, night sweats,
nightmares, intestinal issues, and weight loss as a result of the emotional distress she experienced
from the hostile work environment. (Tr. 858-60, 906-08, 1354.)
From June 2019 through June 2022, Plaintiff treated with Dr. Enoch Chan, a physician specializing in internal medicine who diagnosed Plaintiff with post traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. (Tr. 1020.) Dr. Chan
prescribed Plaintiff various medications to treat for PTSD, panic attacks, nightmares, and
nervousness. (Tr. 866-67.) Plaintiff stopped seeing Dr. Chan in June 2022 because he no longer
accepted her insurance, but she continued receiving these prescription medications through her
primary care physician. (Tr. 865-67.)
Plaintiff’s husband and son both testified about changes in Plaintiff’s behavior in which she suffered panic attacks, became socially withdrawn, experienced eating problems and hair loss,
and stopped engaging in hobbies that had previously interested her. (Tr. 1523-25, 1573-79.)
Plaintiff’s husband testified that Plaintiff is still suffering this emotional distress to a large degree.
(Tr. 1578-79.) Finally, Dr. Darlene Powell Garlington, an expert in clinical psychology, PTSD,
and related disorders, testified that after having met with Plaintiff for three to four hours and
administering various tests, she concluded that Plaintiff’s PTSD and psychological trauma were
caused by the sexual harassment she suffered at work, including the attempted sexual assault by
Defendant Connors. (Tr. 1421, 1443-44, 1465.)
Plaintiff argues the emotional damages she suffered are “egregious,” and should be compensated as such. (See Pl. Br. at 15) (citing Sooroojballie v. Port Auth., 816 Fed. App’x 536,
546 (2d Cir. 2020) (describing “egregious” emotional distress claims as those that “yield the
highest awards and are warranted only where the employer’s conduct was outrageous and shocking
or affected the physical health of the plaintiff.”)) While the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s emotional
distress was in fact egregious, the Court cannot find comparable precedent to ground the jury’s
award of $2,500,000. Neither, does it seem, can Plaintiff. Even the comparable cases Plaintiff
cites only establish a compensatory damages award of $1,481,809.59 (in 2025 dollars [2] ) at the high
end in the context of a hostile work environment claim and attendant emotional damages. (See Pl.
Br. at 22-23) (citing Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2014)).
In Turley, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury’s award of $1,060,000 (which amounts to $1,481,809.59 in 2025 dollars) in compensatory damages for emotional distress that the plaintiff
had suffered as a result of three years of racial harassment that comprised a hostile work
environment. 774 F.3d at 146, 151-52, 162-63. As a result of the racial harassment campaign
experienced by the plaintiff in Turley, the plaintiff had “lost 30 pounds; he suffered from panic
attacks, depression, isolation and anxiety; [and] on two separate occasions, unable to withstand the
hatred any longer, he was taken to the hospital directly from work.” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna,
Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 425, 449 (W.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 774 F.3d 140 (2d
Cir. 2014). At trial, Dr. Syed Jaffri, a psychiatrist, confirmed that Turley suffered from Post–
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Adjustment Disorder and opined that Turley would continue to have
triggers the rest of his life. Id. At one visit in 2008, Dr. Jaffri remembered that Turley presented
as “noticeably distraught, depressed, hopeless, [and] helpless.” Id. The district court in Turley
noted that while Turley “had possessed a colorful and animated personality,” the harassment left
him “broken and dispirited.” Id. at 151.
Here, the Court recognizes that the jury similarly credited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her extensive emotional distress and does not seek to disturb their findings. Rather, the Court puts
the emotional distress damages in context. Like Turley, Plaintiff here experienced a host of
emotional distress and suffering after a long period of harassment that created a hostile work
environment. (See Tr. 859-60, 865-67, 1020.) Additionally, like the Plaintiff in Turley, Plaintiff
presented testimony from her physician substantiating her condition. See Sooroojballie, 816 Fed.
App’x at 546 (holding that egregious emotional distress claims “generally contain evidence of
debilitating and permanent alterations in lifestyle” corroborated by mental health professionals.)
(quoting Menghi v. Hart, 745 F. Supp. 2d 89, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)). Finally, unlike Turley, Plaintiff
did not experience multiple outright threats against her life and did not experience two
hospitalizations during the course of the alleged hostile work environment. Overall, these factors
weigh in favor of a smaller award than Turley. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the
“maximum amount” Plaintiff can be awarded without being excessive is $1,000,000.
In Turley, the Second Circuit favorably cited other seven-figure damages awards in multi- year harassment cases. 774 F.3d at 163 (citing Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655,
673 (2d Cir. 2012) and Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc. , 412 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2005),
aff’g 338 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)). While not directly analogous to this case, these
cases have some similar features and help to set an upper range for cases involving serious
emotional distress as a result of long-term harassing conduct. In Pollard, the plaintiff sought relief
for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under a Tennessee statute after
experiencing long-term sexual harassment at her job. 412 F.3d at 664–65. The plaintiff, formerly
“an outgoing, confident, self-assured, and professionally successful individual,” “to a large degree
lost each of these attributes” because of the harassment and management’s failure to remedy it.
338 F. Supp. 2d at 884. The Sixth Circuit in Pollard affirmed a judgment granting, among other
things, $950,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. 412 F.3d at 660-63, 666.
Taking inflation into account, this award amounts to approximately $1.56 million compensatory
damages award in 2025 dollars, exceeding the award in Turley and in this case. [3] Furthermore, in
Zeno, the Second Circuit upheld an award of compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000
for the plaintiff, a teenager who suffered educational harm and endured 3.5 years of racial
harassment. 702 F.3d at 672–73. In upholding this award, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he jury
reasonably could have found that the harassment would have a profound and long-term impact on
[plaintiff’s] life and his ability to earn a living.” Id. at 672. Additionally, “[e]vidence presented at
trial, including the testimony of [plaintiff], his mother, and Maxey (of the N.A.A.C.P.), revealed
[plaintiff’s] increasing frustration, loneliness, and other emotional anguish.” Id. Taking inflation
into account, the award for compensatory damages in Zeno amounts to approximately $1.4 million
in 2025 dollars. [4]
At the other end of the spectrum, Defendants cite to cases awarding low-to-mid six figures awards of compensatory damages for emotional distress in sexual harassment and discrimination
cases. (See Def. Br. at 11 (citing Angulo v. 36th St. Hosp. LLC, No. 19 CV-5075, 2020 WL
4938188, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4936961
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020 ); Garcia v. Comprehensive Ctr., LLC, No. 17-CV-8970, 2019 WL
8274296, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1435002
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 68, 99 (E.D.N.Y.
2020); and Styka v. My Merchants Servs. LLC, No. 14-CV-6198, 2016 WL 11396819, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3866550 (E.D.N.Y. July
13, 2016)).
The recovery of non-economic compensatory damages in these cases cited by Defendants ranged from $120,000 to $300,000 (or from $161,000 to $371,000 in 2025 dollars). Again, none
of these cases are directly analogous to the instant case, and they all have key differences
distinguishing them from this case. See Angulo, 2020 WL 4938188, at *14 (recommending
$300,000 in emotional distress damages in a sexual harassment case with a one-time sexual assault
based on the complaint and plaintiff’s affidavits on a default judgment motion); Garcia, 2019 WL
8274296, at *8 (recommending $120,000 in emotional distress damages in a sexual harassment
case where plaintiff submitted affidavit stating she suffered physical violence and harassment for
over a year on a default judgment motion); Antoine, 489 F. Supp. at 99-100 (recommending
$200,000 in emotional distress damages in sexual harassment case involving a sexual assault and
physical violence, but where the court noted a “near-complete absence of corroborating evidence”
for plaintiff’s testimony on a default judgment motion); Styka, 2016 WL 11396819, at *5
(recommending $120,000 in emotional distress damages in a sexual harassment case where
allegations were supported by plaintiff’s testimony only on a default judgment motion).
Nevertheless, reference to the emotional distress awards in these cases is helpful to set a range of
emotional distress awards in sexual harassment cases. Having carefully considered the evidence
presented at trial in this case, as well as the damages awarded by other courts in comparable
circumstances, the Court finds that finds that the “maximum amount” Plaintiff can be awarded
without being excessive is $1,000,000.
Defendants also raise arguments suggesting that Plaintiff’s pain and suffering were caused by her termination as opposed to the hostile work environment she experienced at Tuttnauer.
(Def. Br. at 15-16, 17-18.) However, the jury was entitled to find that Plaintiff’s pain and suffering
commenced while she still worked for Tuttnauer and the hostile work environment was ongoing,
as testimony was presented that her serious emotional and physical symptoms began in
2016-17. (Tr. 858-60, 1277, 1573-78.) Additionally, Defendants raise arguments implying that
since Dr. Enoch Chan practices internal medicine and is not a psychiatrist, his diagnosis and
treatment do not offer sufficient support for Plaintiff’s emotional distress findings. (Def. Br. at
16.) However, the jury was entitled to find that Dr. Chan, a licensed physician specializing in
internal medicine, appropriately diagnosed Plaintiff and prescribed this medication. Furthermore,
Dr. Chan’s findings of emotional distress were corroborated by Plaintiff’s expert witness, her
husband, and her son, who all testified regarding her substantial pain and suffering.
Defendants’ other factual arguments against a finding of emotional distress damages do not warrant any further remittitur than the Court has already granted. First, Defendants argue that
because Plaintiff forwarded two of the inappropriate workplace e-mails in 2011, she “knowingly
participated” in the inappropriate workplace conduct at Tuttnauer. (See Def. Br. at 16 (citing Tr. - -
Ex. X; UU).) However, this was from an earlier time period that preceded the bulk of the hostile
work environment experienced by Plaintiff, and the jury was entitled to give that evidence the
weight it deserved. Defendants also argue that there is no evidence of Plaintiff suffering
permanently because Plaintiff’s Social Security Administration disability finding did not explicitly
find Plaintiff to be disabled as a result of PTSD and other mental conditions. (Def. Br. at 17.)
While Defendants recognize that “it remains unclear as to the underlying basis for the [SSA’s]
decision to ultimately find Plaintiff disabled,” they argue that “it is clear that such findings are not
as a result of Plaintiff’s alleged PTSD, depression, or other claimed emotional distress attributable
to Defendants.” (Def. Mem. at 17). However, the jury was still entitled to credit the large amount
of testimony and evidence that documented Plaintiff’s emotional distress, and the SSA disability
determination does not warrant any further remittitur on Plaintiff’s compensatory damages.
Finally, Defendants argue that remittitur is warranted because the jury’s award of compensatory damages was improperly influenced by Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation. (Def. Br.
at 19-20.) However, there is no blanket prohibition against counsel asking the jury to award a
specific damages amount. “[T]he determination of whether to allow a plaintiff to request a specific
damages amount from the jury is within the court’s discretion. Although the Second Circuit has
not prohibited parties from suggesting particular damages amounts to the jury, it has cautioned
against this practice.” Bovell v. City of Mount Vernon, New York , No. 21-CV-1621, 2023 WL
3559544, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2023) (citation omitted); see Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp.,
110 F.3d 898, 912 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is best left to the discretion of the trial judge, who may either
prohibit counsel from mentioning specific figures or impose reasonable limitations, including
cautionary jury instructions”). The Court instructed the jury that summations are not evidence.
(Tr. 1721 ). See Thomas v. Kelly, 903 F. Supp. 2d 237, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“To cure any potential
prejudice [from counsel’s requested dollar amount), the Court reminded the jury that ‘[w]hat the
lawyers have said the evidence shows in their opening statements, objections or questions, or have
said in their closing arguments, is not evidence’”). Like Thomas , this Court charged that
summations are “not evidence; it’s just what the lawyers believe the evidence has
shown.” (Tr. 1721). Jurors are presumed to follow these instructions. See U.S. v. Agrawal, 726
F.3d 235, 258 (2d Cir. 2013).
2. Punitive Damages
With respect to punitive damages, Defendants contend that the punitive damages award should be reduced or eliminated because the $5 million punitive damages award exceeds the
statutory limit under Title VII. [5] (Id. at 20-22.) Defendants argue that the statutory cap for
compensatory damages and punitive damages under Title VII is $50,000 because Tuttnauer USA
employed between 14 and 101 employees during the relevant timeframe. (Id.) Plaintiff argues
that a statutory cap of $300,000 applies to the Title VII damages because Tuttnauer USA operated
as the “daughter company” and “sales arm” of Tuttnauer Ltd., which employed over 500
employees. (Pl. Br. at 28-30.) Furthermore, Plaintiff moves to allocate all of the compensatory
damages for pain and suffering (less one dollar) to the uncapped NYSHRL claim and to allocate
all of the punitive damages to the capped Title VII claim. (ECF No. 117-5.) For the following
reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to allocate damages. Furthermore, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion to reduce the punitive damages award in order to comply with Title VII’s
statutory cap.
District courts in the Second Circuit routinely allocate damages in cases alleging Title VII and state law discrimination claims such that “the successful plaintiff be paid under the theory of
liability that provides the most complete recovery.” Singleton v. City of New York, 496 F. Supp.
2d 390,393 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir.
1992)), aff’d, 308 Fed. Appx. 521 (2d Cir. 2009); see Mayo-Coleman v. Am. Sugar Holdings, Inc.,
No. 14-CV-79, 2018 WL 2684100, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 5, 2018) (“courts regularly allocate all, or
nearly all, of the compensatory damages to the state law claims and the punitive damages to the
Title VII claims in order to maximize plaintiffs’ recovery by removing the compensatory damages
from Title VII’s statutory cap”). In light of the above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to allocate
all of the compensatory damages for pain and suffering (less one dollar) to the uncapped New York
State Human Rights Law claim and to allocate all of the punitive damages to the capped Title VII
claim.
Turning to Defendants’ argument to reduce the punitive damages award based on Title VII’s statutory cap, the Court will reduce the jury’s award of punitive damages to $299,999 to
comply with the statutory cap. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the compensatory damages and punitive
damage cap under Title VII is $50,000 for companies with between 14 and 101 employees and
$300,000.00 for companies with more than 500 employees. Defendants argue that the $50,000
cap should apply because Tuttnauer USA employed between 14 and 101 employees during the
relevant timeframe, while Plaintiff argues that the $300,000 cap should apply because Tuttnauer
Ltd., Tuttnauer USA’s parent company, employed over 800 employees. (See Def. Br. at 21; Pl. Br.
at 28-30.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will apply the $300,000 statutory cap.
In Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held that domestic employees may sue their foreign-based employer for violations of the ADEA. Id. at 41-44.
Further, when counting employees for the purpose of determining whether jurisdiction over the
employer exists under the ADEA (which limits its reach to employers with 20 or more employees),
all employees of the foreign corporation were counted, not just U.S.-based employees. Id. at 44-
45. In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit explicitly noted that the ADEA was modeled
in large part on Title VII, which has minimum-employee requirements for reasons including the
burdens of compliance and potential litigation costs, “the protection of intimate and personal
relations existing in small businesses, potential effects on competition and the economy, and the
constitutionality of Title VII under the Commerce Clause.” Id. (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995)). The court held that none of these reasons suggest that whether a
foreign employer is subject to the ADEA should turn on the size of its U.S. operations alone. Id.
This logic extends to the determination of the relevant statutory cap in this case, as the evidence at
trial revealed that Tuttnauer USA was the “sales arm” of Tuttnauer Ltd., which employed 800
employees worldwide. (Tr. 912-13, 965, 1098.); see Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 26 F. Supp.
2d 649, 651-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (relying on Morelli in recognizing that one counts all employees
of a company in determining the statutory cap, i.e., the employees of the bank where the plaintiff
worked and its foreign parent). In Greenberg, the court relied on Morelli to find that the proper
entity for purposes of determining the statutory cap under § 1981 was the parent bank of the bank
branch initially named in the lawsuit. Id. at 655. Furthermore, following the Second Circuit’s
ruling in Morelli, the court counted the entire worldwide employment of the parent bank in
determining which statutory cap to apply. Id.
Additionally, while the Court in Greenbaum did not apply the “single employer” doctrine for determining the proper entity to examine when applying the statutory cap under Title VII,
courts in other circuits have utilized this doctrine for determining the relevant statutory cap in
awarding damages. See, e.g., Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 447 (5th Cir. 2000),
Shipley v. Hypercom Corp., 09-CV-0265, 2012 WL 12872905 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2012); Story v.
Vae Nortrak, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Ala. 2001). Under this theory, if the entities are part of
an integrated enterprise, then each entity is the same for purposes of calculating the number of
employees at issue under the Title VII cap.
“The ‘single or joint employer’ test utilizes a four-factored analysis developed by the NLRB to determine whether two or more employers can be treated as one for purposes of assigning
liability. In this Circuit, this analysis has been confined to two corporate contexts: first, where the
plaintiff is an employee of a wholly-owned corporate subsidiary; and second, where the plaintiff’s
employment is subcontracted by one employer to another, formally distinct, entity.” Gulino v.
New York State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 378 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Cook v. Arrowsmith
Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (identifying the four factors as “(1) interrelation
of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common
ownership or financial control”)). The inquiry is particularly focused on the second factor,
“centralized control of labor relations.” Cook, 69 F.3d at 1241. Additionally, “since ‘[t]he
statutory cap is properly excluded from jury instruction, and only after a verdict is submitted,
[must] the trial court [ ] ensure that any award complies with the relevant statutory maximums
applicable,’ the evidence the Court may consider when evaluating the size of a defendant employer
is not restricted to the evidence actually offered at trial.” Shipley, 2012 WL 12872905, at *8 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 10, 2012) (citing Parrish v. Sollecito , 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
As demonstrated at trial, Tuttnauer USA operated under the authority of President Ran Tuttnauer, who testified that Tuttnauer USA was the “daughter company” of Tuttnauer Ltd., or the
“sales arm” of the parent company. (Tr. 1098; Pl.’s Ex. 21.) Ran Tuttnauer was the President of
Tuttnauer USA and the CEO of Tuttnauer Ltd. (Tr. 1098.) He testified that he came to the United
States in 1987 and started Tuttnauer USA as the “sales arm” of Tuttnauer Ltd. (Id.) Tuttnauer Ltd.
had several subsidiaries worldwide, including in Europe, China, and Vietnam. (Tr. 1099.) While
supervisors and managers handled the day-to-day responsibilities of Tuttnauer USA, everyone
answered to Ran Tuttnauer, as reflected in the organizational chart. (Tr. 1099-1103; Pl.’s Ex. 108.)
When Ran Tuttnauer sold the company in 2017, Nir Kinory became CEO of Tuttnauer Ltd.
(Tr. 912-13.) Mr. Kinory testified that Tuttnauer Ltd. had 800 employees worldwide and that
Tuttnauer USA had 40 employees. (Tr. 965). Mr. Kinory testified that the management team of
Tuttnauer Ltd. worked alongside Tuttnauer USA executives in 2017 to develop a business plan that
would enable them to grow the overall company. (Tr. 915-17.) Mr. Kinory also testified that
Tuttnauer Ltd. was responsible for the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment and that he
and Michael Sammet, CFO of Tuttnauer Ltd., were involved in that decision. (Tr. 921-22.) Mr.
Kinory testified that only headquarters, i.e., Tuttnauer Ltd., had the authority to take employment
action against employees with Plaintiff’s rank or higher. (Tr. 923-24 (“Any executive who wanted
to replace, substitute had to get the permission from the headquarter”); Tr. 924 (“Kevin could
dismiss other accountants by himself, but was not allowed to dismiss Ms. Russo without getting
permission from the headquarter”).) Defendant Basile, Senior Vice President, also testified that
when Ran Tuttnauer was CEO of Tuttnauer Ltd., Mr. Tuttnauer alone had authority to terminate
anyone, including Plaintiff. (Tr. 159). Defendant Connors testified that termination decisions are
“made along with the lawyers and the people in Israel.” (Tr. 347-48).
Given the evidence on the record, it is clear that Tuttnauer USA operated as a “sales arm” to parent company Tuttnauer Ltd., and the Court will use Tuttnauer Ltd.’s global employee count
to set the Title VII statutory cap at $300,000.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for remittitur as to compensatory
damages and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to allocate damages. Because the Court finds the
compensatory damages award excessive, the Court grants a new trial on the issue of compensatory
damages only, unless plaintiff accepts a remittitur of the compensatory damages awarded from
$2,500,000 to $1,000,000. The Court also reduces the jury’s punitive damages award based on
Title VII’s statutory cap of $300,000. In sum, the Court allocates $999,999 in compensatory
damages to the NYSHRL claim, $1 in compensatory damages to the Title VII claim, and $299,999
in punitive damages under Title VII, for a total award of approximately $1.3 million.
By August 8, 2025 , Plaintiff’s counsel shall file via ECF written notice of whether Plaintiff will accept the remitted compensatory damages award. If Plaintiff elects to have a new trial on
damages, the Court will schedule a conference to set a new trial date. The Clerk of the Court is
respectfully directed to terminate ECF Nos. 110 and 117.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 6, 2025
Central Islip, New York
/s/ (JMA) JOAN M. AZRACK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
[1] As will be discussed infra Section B. 2., the Court will allocate all of the compensatory damages for pain and suffering (less one dollar) to the uncapped NYSHRL claim for a hostile work environment and allocate all of the punitive damages to the capped Title VII claim. Therefore, the Court will analyze the jury’s award of compensatory damages under New York law to determine whether it “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” Lore, 670 F.3d at 177 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)).
[2] In Turley, the Second Circuit affirmed Plaintiff’s compensatory damages award of $1,060,000 for a hostile work environment and its attendant emotional damages. See 774 F.3d at 163–64. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, that sum has the same buying power as $1,481,809.59 in April 2025 dollars. See U.S. B UREAU OF L AB . S TAT ., CPI Inflation Calculator (last accessed June 2, 2025.) https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. See also Jennings v. Yurkiw, 18 F.4th 383, 393 n.7. (2d Cir. 2021) (using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator to assess prior damages awards to account for inflation.)
[3] According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Inflation Calculator, $950,000 in June 2005 has the buying power of approximately $1.56 million in 2025. CPI Inflation Calculator, United States Department of Labor, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited June 2, 2025).
[4] According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Inflation Calculator, $1,000,000 in December 2012 has the buying power of approximately $1.4 million in 2025. CPI Inflation Calculator, United States Department of Labor, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited June 2, 2025).
[5] While Defendants only raise arguments about the statutory cap and do not argue that the jury lacked a factual basis to award punitive damages, the Court holds that there was a sufficient factual basis for an award of punitive damages and that an award of $299,999 in punitive damages is not unconstitutionally excessive under the relevant factors. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).