1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13529 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1997
Previously, the plaintiff made claim for similar benefits under a policy he had with the Aetna Casualty Surety Co. (Aetna). In binding arbitration between the plaintiff and Aetna, arbitrators held that the "claimant's [the plaintiff here] own negligence was greater than 50%", and therefore found for the respondent carrier Aetna. An application to vacate the arbitration award and an application to confirm the award was brought to this court. On July 19, 1993, the court, Parker, J., denied the application to vacate and confirmed the arbitrators' award. See Russo v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 112129,
The defendant brings this motion for summary judgment on the ground that this action is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. The plaintiff has filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion. CT Page 13530
"Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . . and the a party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of such a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book § 381." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson Peck, Inc. v. Division Drywall, Inc.,
The defendant argues that this action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because in binding arbitration between the plaintiff and Aetna, the arbitrators held that the plaintiff's own negligence was greater than fifty percent. The plaintiff argues that it should not be precluded from bringing this action, claiming that the finding relied upon in the arbitration case did not have the necessary safeguards to permit the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The plaintiff also claims that it is not collaterally estopped because there exists no mutuality of parties.
"`[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue where that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action. . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated. . . . The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it had already has had an opportunity to litigate.'" Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Miller,
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Jones, supra,
The plaintiff here attempts to distinguish that case from the facts in present case, arguing that the doctrine collateral estoppel should be only invoked in instances such as those as presented in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Jones, where there are sufficient safeguards to assure that full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue that is sought to be estopped. Those safeguards, the plaintiff asserts, do not exist in the instant case. This court does not agree.
The plaintiff's comparative negligence was thoroughly litigated in the arbitration hearing against Aetna. That tribunal found him to be more than fifty percent negligent. Its decision was confirmed by this court and that decision was upheld by our Appellate Court. Our Supreme Court has held that a decision of an arbitration panel used to invoke the doctrine or res judicata may apply to a judgment by a court reviewing its decision. Corey v.Avco-Lycoming Division,
The issue of liability was litigated with sufficient safeguards. There is no reason to litigate it again. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
PELLEGRINO, J