delivered the opinion of the court.
Stаnsell, the appellee, obtained a decree in the District Cоurt of the United States for the Northern District, of- Mississippi, in Juné, 1879, against the Leveе Board of Mississippi, District No. 1, for $71,623.67. This decree being unsatisfied, he instituted summary рroceedings in the same court, under the provisions of the statute creating the levee board, to obtain an assessment and collection of the charge which was imposed on the lands in the district for its payment. On the 7th of February, 1880, the court entered an order which resulted in an assessment by commissioners appointed for that pulpóse.,. In tjhis ordеr it was provided that any person conceiving himself aggrieved by the action of the commissioners might, by petition to the court, present his griеvance and obtain such redress as he should fairly be entitled to. On the 1st of February, 1881, D. M. Russell, W. H. Stovall, and H. P. Reid appeared, and as individuals and members of an executive, committee appointed at a mass meeting of the several owners of the lands charged with the payment оf the assessment, asked an injunction against the collection of thе assessment that had been made, setting forth in their petition why the proceedings were illegal^ and unjust... The amount with which the petitioners; as individuals, wеre severally charged was as .follows: Russell, $7.58; Stovall, #205.14; and Reid, who was аssessed'only as an *304 agent or attorney, $229.29. No single- individual among all the parties represented by the committee could in any event .be mаde liable for an amount exceeding .$2,500. On the presentation ■ of thé petition the court granted a preliminai-y injunction, but on final hearing that injunction was dissolved and the petition dismissed. From the last order this appеal was taken, which the appellee now moves to • dismiss because the amount in dispute between him and any one of the several persons charged with the payment of the assessment is less than $5,000.
While the appellants, and those whom they have been chosen- to reрresent, are all interested in the question on which their liability to the appellee depends, they are separately charged with the several amounts assessed against them. There is no joint responsibility rеsting on them as a body. The proceeding on his part was to require each of the several landowners in the levee district to pay his sеparate share of the debt’ that had been established against the district. The recovery was against each owner separatеly. While the appellants were permitted, for convenience and to save expense, to unite in a petition setting forth the grievаnces of which complaint was made, their object- was to reliеve, each separate owner from the amount for which he рersonally, pr his property, was found to be accountable. An injunction, if granted, would necessarily be to prevent the appellee from collecting from each owner the amount for which he wаs separately liable. It is clear that under the rulings in
Paving Company
v.
Mulford
(
Appeal dismissed»