163 A. 404 | Conn. | 1932
The plaintiff received personal injuries while riding in an automobile operated by the defendant. The complaint set up two causes of action, one based on negligence, and one based on heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others under our so-called guest statute (General Statutes, § 1628). In answer to written interrogatories the jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the ground of the defendant's negligence, but not upon the ground of her heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others. The defendant appealed, assigning error in the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict and in the charge of the court. It appears to be conceded that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant was negligent, and the two contentions made upon this appeal are, (1) that upon the evidence the jury could not reasonably have found (what they must necessarily have found in order to reach a verdict based on negligence) that the plaintiff was not a guest within the meaning of the guest statute, and (2) that the charge of the court, relative to the test to be applied in determining whether the plaintiff was a guest, was erroneous.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: The defendant owned a farm in Enfield which she had purchased from George Grant, who continued to live on the place under an arrangement by which he had his board and lodging without charge in return for which he did whatever work was to be done upon the place. This included the cultivation of the garden, the money needed to buy seeds and supplies for which was furnished jointly by the defendant and Grant, and the produce of which afforded the sole source of supply *689 of vegetables, etc., for the defendant's table, and was so utilized pursuant to the understanding and agreement between them. In the summer of 1931 Grant also did work upon another farm in Rockville known as the Worcester farm. He hired the plaintiff to assist him in the work both on the Worcester farm and that of the defendant, and on three occasions during the three weeks prior to the date of the accident the plaintiff had been engaged in cultivating corn and potatoes and the garden upon the defendant's place. These were being cultivated for the defendant's benefit. The plaintiff was not hired by the defendant nor did the latter expressly authorize Grant to hire him. On June 4th, 1931, Grant and the plaintiff had been working on the Worcester farm, and the defendant, at Grant's request, drove there to bring him back to work upon her place. Upon her arrival she called to Grant to come with her to work upon her farm, and he in turn called to the plaintiff, and they both got into the defendant's car. The defendant knew that the plaintiff was going to her place to help Grant cultivate the corn, potatoes and garden there. The accident in which plaintiff was injured occurred upon their ride to the defendant's farm.
Whether the plaintiff was being transported as a "guest without payment for such transportation" was submitted by the court to the jury as a question of fact, with the correct instruction that in that event the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of mere negligence. The defendant contends that, upon the evidence, as to which there was little dispute, the plaintiff as a matter of law must be placed in that category, while the plaintiff claims that the jury could reasonably find that he was being transported for the mutual benefit of himself and the defendant, and consequently *690 that his transportation was not gratuitous, and not within the terms of the guest statute.
In Kruy v. Smith,
We are here concerned, not with a relationship growing out of contract, as in the case of a bailment, but with the construction of a statute denying to a certain class of passengers in an automobile a right to recover *692
compensation for injuries resulting from negligence in its operation, to which, prior to its enactment, they were entitled. Its operation should not be extended beyond the correction of the evils and the attainment of the permissible social objects which, it may be assumed, were the inducing reasons for its enactment.Silver v. Silver,
The arrangement between the defendant and Grant created an identity of interest between them in the cultivation of the garden, and the transportation of the plaintiff contemplated a benefit to her by expediting the necessary work in her garden, though the actual wages of the plaintiff were to be paid by Grant instead of herself. The court submitted the question to the jury as one of fact, and we cannot say that it erred in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The court charged the jury upon this point in the language of Kruy v. Smith, and the criticisms of the charge in the defendant's assignments of error are sufficiently answered in our discussion of the question of whether the verdict should stand.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.