OPINION
Aрpellant Paula Russell appeals from the trial court’s order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas. We affirm.
I
Paula Russell, an employee of Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas (“Metro”), was involved in an on-the-job car accident with Andre Sais on May 21, 2008, while driving a Metro-owned truck. Russell incurred medical expenses and lost wages as a result of the accident and filed for workers’-compensation benefits from Metro, a self-insured political subdivision under Texas Labor Code § 504.011. Metro accepted the claim as compensable and paid Russell benefits totaling $27,084.97. Under section 417.001(b) of the Labor Code, Metro was granted a subrogation interest in Russell’s right to enforce liability against third parties. Metro’s subrogation lien was limited to the total benefits Metro paid to Russell less the percentage of a fact finder’s determination of Metro’s proportionate responsibility, if any. See Tex. Lab.Code § 417.001(b).
In October 2008, Metro sent notice of its subrogated claim to American Century Claims Services, Inc., the claims adjustor for Sais’s auto-insurance carrier. In March 2009, Metro’s workers’-compensation adjustor sent a letter to American Century offering to settle Metro’s subro-gation lien for $25,000 — an amount equal to Sais’s policy limit. American Century agreed to the settlement in exchange for a release of further claims against Sais’s insurer. On April 6, 2009, Russell’s then-attorney sent a letter to Metro and American Century warning that the release would not discharge Russell’s claims against Sais. On April 21, 2009, Russell’s attorney in this case requested the settlement be stoрped in light of Metro’s potential proportionate responsibility for the accident and to determine his right to attorney’s fees derived from the $25,000 *829 settlement. 1 Metro and American Century, however, proceeded with the settlement and signed the release on May 21, 2009.
In October 2009, Russell filed suit against Sais, Metro, and American Century. Russell sued Sais for personal injuries, and American Century for conversion and intentional interference with a contract. She sought declaratory relief against Metro establishing that: (1) the release signed by Metro does not prohibit Russell from suing Sais for personal injuries “separate from the workers’[-]compensation benefits”; (2) Metro exceeded its legal authority by satisfying its subrogation interest without a third-party recovery by Russell; and (3) neither Metro nor any of its representatives were entitled to collect attorney’s fees based on the settlement.
Metro moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing primarily that governmental immunity bars Russell’s claims. The trial court granted Metro’s plea to the jurisdiction without specifying the grounds for its ruling and denied Russell’s request to amend her pleadings. Russell brings this interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, Metro argues Russell failed to demonstrate any provision under which the legislature waived governmental immunity as to her tort claims against Metro. Furthermore, Metro argues dismissal was proper because Russell failed to give pre-suit notice as the Texas Tort Claims Act requires. Although Russell couches her claims as requests for declaratory relief, Metro argues they can be “easily recognized as a transparent attempt to seek Metro’s рartial recovery of its lien and to recover attorney’s fees.” Therefore, Metro maintains, dismissal was also proper because “private parties cannot circumvent sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages as a declaratory[-]judgment claim.” Finally, Metro argues that to the extent immunity is not implicated in Russell’s claims, her requests for declaratory relief are not jus-ticiable and therefore not proper under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
Russell argues in response that her suit doеs not allege tort claims, money damages, or seek an award of attorney’s fees against Metro, and therefore she was not required to plead a clear and express waiver of governmental immunity, nor was she required to give Metro pre-suit notice under the Tort Claims Act. Russell maintains her claims do not sound in tort but are limited to declaratory relief seeking an interpretation of applicable Labor Code statutes and a determination of the parties’ rights, and therefore governmental immunity is not implicated. Alternatively, Russell argues governmental immunity has been waived in cases seeking an interpretation of the sections of the Labor Code pertaining to her claim.
II
Sovereign immunity defeats a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda,
The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. See
State v. Holland,
Much like the summary-judgment standard, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-movant.
See id.
In doing so, we consider the facts alleged in the petition and, to the extent relevant to the jurisdictional issue, any evidence submitted by the parties to the trial court.
See id.
at 555. If a plaintiff pleads facts that affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction and the jurisdictional defect is incurable, then the cause is prоperly dismissed.
Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. of San Antonio,
Ill
A
Metro employees are provided workers’compensation coverage under chapter 504 of the Texas Labor Code. Chapter 417 of the Labor Code, which governs third-party liability in workers’-compensation cases, is expressly included in the coverage provided to Metro employees by chapter 504. See Tex. Lab.Code § 504.002(a)(9). Chapter 417 permits a covered employee to pursue a third-party lawsuit against the responsible third party. Tex. Lab.Code § 417.001(a). In such cases, the insurance carrier (Metro) 2 is subrogated to the rights of the employee for any benefits paid up to the amount of the total benefits paid by the carrier less the amount by which the court reduces the judgment based on the percentage of responsibility determined by the trier of fаct under section 33.003 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code that is attributable to the employer. See Tex. Lab.Code § 417.001(b). Chapter 417 permits the carrier to “enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee.” Id.
*831 In this case, Metro pursued and satisfied its subrogation interest against a third-party, Sais, before Russell sued Sais. Therefore, there was no opportunity for Metro’s subrogation interest to be proportionately reduced by a fact finder’s determination of Metro’s potential responsibility for the aсcident under section 417.001(b) of the Labor Code. Furthermore, because Russell had not attained a third-party recovery from Sais in which Metro’s interests were not actively represented, there was no basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 417.003 of the Labor Code. Additionally, Russell argues that the release of claims signed by Metro as part of its settlement with American Century arguably released Russell’s third-party claims against Sais.
For ease of discussion, we organize Russell’s ten requested grounds for declaratory relief into three categories; (1) grounds seeking a declaration that Metro acted outside its statutory authority by satisfying its statutory lien before Russell could attain a third-party recovery; (2) grounds seeking a declaration that the release signed by Metro is not binding against Russell; and (3) grounds seeking a declaration that Metro is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
B
In grounds A, B, F, and H, Russell seeks declarations that Metro acted outside its statutory authority under chapter 417 of the Labor Code. In ground A, Russell states that “[Metro] is not entitled to recover or retain any of its subrogation interest because there was no third-party recovery by a claimant, [Russell], as stipulated in Texas Labor Code § 417.002(a).” In ground B, Russell alleges that “[Metro] did not have legal authority to disregard [Russell’s] right to have the percentage of [Metro’s] responsibility determined and its subrogation interested reduced accordingly, pursuant to § 417.001(b). Under ground F, Russell states that “[Metro] is not entitled to recover any of its subrogation lien because no lawsuit was filed against the third party that caused [Russell’s] injuries and damages, as required by § 417.001(b) of the Texas Labor Code.” And in ground H, Russell asserts that “Texas Labor Code § 417.001(b) does not authorize an insurance carrier to recover medical benefits paid on or behalf of an employee as part of its subrogation interest.”
The purpose of Russell’s arguments in grounds A, B, F, and H is to obtain a particular interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Labor Code and a finding that Metro acted outside its statutory authority. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) expressly provides that persons may challenge or seek а construction of ordinances or statutes.
See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.004;
Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper,
Nevertheless, it is well-settled that private parties cannot circumvent immunity by characterizing a suit for money damages as a declaratory-judgment claim.
City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
The holding in
Williams
governs grounds A, B, F, and H. The firefighters in
Williams
sought a statutory interpretation that would show they had been denied full payments. Likewise, Russell seeks a statutory interpretation establishing Metro wrongfully satisfied its subrogation lien before Russell could attain a third-party recovery. And, just as the firefighters in
Williams
claimed the city retained money to which it was not entitled, the gist of Russell’s contentions is that Metro has attained $25,000 to which it is not fully entitled. Furthermore, just as the retired firеfighters in
Williams
had no standing to seek a statutory interpretation for prospective relief because their alleged injury had already occurred and was not capable of repetition, Russell does not and cannot argue she will suffer from Metro repeating its course of action, as Metro’s subrogation lien can be satisfied only once. Finally, just as in
Williams
there was no plausible remedy the declaratory judgment could recommend other than money damages against an immunized governmental entity, here there is no relief a declaratory judgment can offer Russell that does not simply lay the predicate for a damages claim against Metro.
3
See Williams,
216 S.W.3d
*833
at 828-29;
see also Castro v. McNabb,
Russell goes to great effort in her briefing to insist she does not seek money damages, or even attorney’s fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, as part of her requested declaratory relief. Rather, she insists she seeks only a “determination of the parties’ respective rights.” But the rule established by
Williams
dictates that our governmental-immunity analysis does not end just because a request for declaratory relief does not on its face include a request for money damages. We must further ask what would be the “conceivable remedy” of a judgment favorable to Russell.
Williams,
C
In grounds C and D, Russell respectively seeks a declaration that Metro “did not have the right to release all of [Russell’s] rights against Sais, and could only release an amount equal to the amount of the settlement, $25,000” and that the release “does not prohibit [Russell] from suing [Sais] for pain and suffering, mental anguish, physical impairment, disfigurement, and any other damages separate from the workers’[-]compensation bеnefits paid by [Metro].”
A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists concerning the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought.
Bonham State Bank v. Beadle,
Grounds C and D present no justiciable controversy. Neither Sais nor Metro has argued the release is binding as to any claim brought by Russell against Sais. For its part, Metro has affirmatively stated in its pleadings, both to the trial court and to this court, that the document does not release Russell’s claims against Sais. Because no party other than Russell suggests the document can be interpreted to release Russell’s claims against Sais, no actual controversy exists between the parties; the requested declaratory relief would amount to an advisory opinion.
See Tex. Air Control Bd.,
D
In grounds E, G, I, and J, Russell seeks declarations related to an award of attorney’s fees under section 417.003, which provides for attorney’s fees for representation of an insurance carrier’s inter *834 est. Russell argues in ground E that “[Metro’s] attorney, Dean Pappas, did not аctively represent Metro in obtaining the third-party recovery, therefore, awarding a portion of the attorney fee to Metro’s attorney is not authorized pursuant to § 417.003(c) of the Texas Labor Code.” Under ground G, Russell maintains that “[Metro’s] non-attorney may not recover attorney fees for herself or her employer, under Texas Labor Code § 417.003(c), for recovering the subrogation interest of an insurance carrier from a third party or third party insurer.” In ground I, Russell insists that “Texas Labor Code § 417.003(c) does not authorize [Metro] to rеcover attorney fees. And under ground J, Russell argues that “[Metro] is not entitled to recover attorney fees under Labor Code § 417.003(c) since there was no recovery by [Russell] in a third-party action pursuant to § 417.003(c).”
None of these grounds concern justicia-ble claims. There is no evidence in the record, and no party contends, that attorney’s fees were awarded to Metro’s attorney, Dean Pappas, or Metro’s non-attorney representative, Carolee Doughman. There is furthermore no evidence that Mеtro now seeks an award of attorney’s fees based on the $25,000 settlement, or that any portion of the settlement represents an award of attorney’s fees. There is no basis under section 417.003 for awarding attorney’s fees absent a third-party action in which Metro was not represented. Accordingly, there exists no actual controversy between Russell and Metro as to attorney’s fees.
See Bonham State Bank,
IV
Russell argues in the alternative that immunity has been waived for claims concerning sections 417.001-.003 of the Texas Labor Code. Russell argues there are “numerous apportionment and subrogation cases involving governmental entities” interpreting the relevant sections of the Labor Code, and “[n]one have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” 4
The parties agree the Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for any of Russell’s claims.
5
Russell instead pleaded in her рetition that immunity had been waived under chapters 401, 417, and 504 of the Labor Code. Russell does not argue any of these sections contain an express waiver of immunity. Instead, she suggests we find that the statutory scheme estab
*835
lished under these chapters impliedly waives immunity for her claims. She relies on the supreme court’s decision in
City of La Porte v. Barfield,
in which the court held that “[t]he rule requiring a waiver of governmental immunity to be clear and unambiguous cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent of the Legislature is disregarded.”
We note initially that if we were to follow
Mata
and hold immunity has been waived for apportionment actions under section 417.003, immunity potentially would be waived оnly as to Russell’s grounds E, G, I, and J, which specifically address the apportionment of attorney’s fees. This is because the waiver recognized in
Mata
is much more limited than the scope of the declarations Russell seeks in this case. We need not decide, however, whether immunity is waived as to any of these grounds because Russell has not sought an award of attorney’s fees, and therefore has not sought the relief for which the
Mata
court found immunity had been waived. Unlike
Mata,
in which a party specifically sought an award of attorney’s fees, Russell seeks only a declaration that
Metro and its representatives
are
not
entitled to attorney’s fees.
Cf. Mata, 2
S.W.3d at 315. As previously noted, however, there is no evidence Metro has been awarded or seeks attorney’s fees. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed those grounds for declaratory judgment because it was not presented with an actual controversy between the parties, and any judgment would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion.
See Bonham State Bank,
*836
Although we do not reach an analysis of whether immunity has been waived for apportionment actions under section 417.003 of the Labor Code, we note that the supreme court’s recent decision in
Travis Central Appraisal District v. Norman,
V
Lastly, Russell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim without allowing an opportunity to amend her pleadings. A plaintiff deserves “a reasonable opportunity to amend” unless the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction.
Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
Nevertheless, based on the reasoning above, we conclude that Russell’s pleadings have affirmatively negated any possible theory upon which jurisdiction could be based. Russell’s grounds that are barred by governmental immunity cannot be re-pleaded to avoid immunity because there is no prospective relief available to Russell other than a judgment that would lay the predicate for a damages claim.
See Williams,
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. Sais was allegedly traveling the wrong way down the Interstate 45 High-Occupancy Vehicle ("HOV”) lane when the accident occurred. Russell alleges that Metro potentially bears proportionate responsibility for the accident because (1) Metro controls access to the HOV lane, and (2) Metro failed to repair or maintain the gate at the entrance to the HOV lane where Sais gained access.
. The term "insurance carrier” is defined to include "a governmental entity that self-insures, either individually or collectively,” such as Metro. See Tex. Lab.Code § 401.011(27)(D).
. Russell points us to several cases in which declaratory-judgment actions related to determining parties’ rights under a statute or ordinance were held not to implicate governmental immunity.
See, e.g., Leeper,
. In each of the reported cases Russell cites, however, the
governmental entity
challenged an award of attorney's fees out of its subro-gated interest.
See Univ. of Tex. at Arlington
v.
Bishop,
. Because the parties agree that the Tort Claims Act does not grant jurisdiction over Russell's claims, we do not reach Metro's argument that pre-suit notice was required but not filed in this case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.101.
. While this case was pending before our court, the supreme court revisited the issue of immunity against retaliatory-discharge claims in
Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman,