34 N.H. 218 | N.H. | 1856
Fabyan entered into possession of the premises in question under a written lease, to continue for five years from March 20,1847. He remained in possession until April 29,
In this case there is no evidence to justify an inference of assent by the lessor to any continuance of the tenancy, but, on the contrary, very direct and conclusive evidence, in the demand of possession, to the contrary; while the reply made to that demand by Fabyan negatives any consent on his part to remain tenant of the plaintiff. There was, then, no tenancy in fact between these parties at the time of the fire, and the defendant was consequently either a disseizor or a tenant at sufferance.
When the demand of possession was made upon Fabyan, upon the 22d of March, 1852, the demand was refused, Fabyan saying he had taken a lease of the property from Dyer. The previous demands seem to have been premature, and before the expiration of the lease, but they were refused upon the same ground as the last, and that refusal might constitute a waiver of any objection to the time of their being made.
Such a denial of the right of the lessor, though not a forfeiture of a lease for years, is sufficient to put an end to a tenancy at will, or at sufferance, if the lessor elects so to regard it; and he may, if he so choose, bring his action against the tenant as a disseizor, without entry or notice, and may maintain against him any action of tort, as if he had originally entered by wrong. Delaney v. Ga Nun, 12. Barb. 120.
But as this result depends on the lessor’s election, and nothing
To ascertain the liability of a tenant at sufferance for the loss of buildings by fire, it becomes material to inquire, what is the nature of this kind of tenancy ; and we have examined the books accessible to us, to trace the particulars in which it differs from the case of a party who originally enters by wrong.
All the books agree that he retains the possession as 'a wrongdoer, just as a disseizor acquires and retains his possession by wrong. Den v. Adams, 7 Hals. 99; 2 Bla. Com. 150; 4 Kent Com. 116. By the assent of the parties to the continuance of the possession thus wrongfully obtained or retained, the wrong is •purged, and the occupant becomes a tenant at will or otherwise to the owner. 10 Vin. Ab. 416, Estate, D, C, 2.
If no such assent appears, the tenant is entitled to no notice to quit. Jackson v. McLeod, 12 Barb. 483; 12 Johns. 182; 1 Cru. Dig., tit. 9, sec. 10.
The owner may make his entry at once upon the premises, or he may commence an action of ejectment or real action. Livingston v. Tanner, 12 Barb. 483; Den v. Adams, 7 Hals. 99. And it makes no difference that the lessee, after his term has expired, has taken a new lease for years of a stranger rendering rent, which has been paid; for he still remains tenant at sufferance as to the first lessor, as was held in Preston v. Love, Noy 120; 10 Vin. Ab. 416.
We have been able to discover but one point of difference between the case of the disseizor and the tenant at sufferance, which is that the owner cannot maintain an action of trespass against his tenant by sufferance, until he has entered upon the premises; 4 Kent Com. 116; a point to which we shall have occasion further to advert.
Upon this view the liability of the defendant Eabyan, to answer for the loss by fire, which is the subject of this suit, is regulated, not by the rule applicable to tenants under contract, or holding by right, but by that which governs the case of the disseizor and unqualified wrong-doer.
The mere disseizor or trespasser, who enters without right upon the land of another, is responsible for any damage which results from any of his wrongful acts. Such a disseizor is liable for any damages occasioned by him, whether willful or negligent. He had no right to build any fire upon the premises, and if misfortune resulted from it he must bear the loss.
For this purpose the defendant Fabyan stands in the position of a disseizor.
II. Assuming that Fabyan is liable for the loss of these buildings, the question arises, whether he is liable in this form of action; and, as we have remarked, he is not liable in trespass. Chancellor Kent, (4 Com. 116,) says: “ A tenant at sufferance is one that comes into possession of land by lawful title, but holdeth over by wrong after the determination of his interest. He has only a naked possession, and no estate which he can transfer, or transmit, or which is capable of enlargement by release, for he stands in no privity to his landlord, nor is he entitled to notice to .quit; and, independent of the statute, he is not liable to pay any rent. He holds by the laches of the landlord, who may enter and put an end to the tenancy when he pleases. But before entry he cannot maintain an action of trespass against the tenant by sufferance.” 1 Cru. Dig., tit. 9, chap. 2 Rising v. Stanard, 17 Mass. 282; Keay v Goodwin, 16 Mass. 1, 4; 2 Bla. Com. 150; Co. Litt. 57, b; Livingston v. Tanner, 12 Barb. 483; Trevillian v. Andrew, 5 Mod. 384.
If, then, Fabyan is answerable at all, he must be liable to the action of trespass on the case. There is no evidence of any entry, and the demand of possession, whatever its other effects
The case of West v. Trends, Cro. Car. 187; S. G. Jones 124, 224, is a decision that case lies in such a case.
“ Action upon the case. Whereas he was and yet is possessed of a lease for divers years adtune et adhuc ventur, of a house, and being so possessed demised it to the defendant for six months, and after the six months expired, the defendant being permitted by the plaintiff to occupy the said house for two months longer, he, the defendant, during that time pulled down the windows, &c. Stone moved in arrest of judgment that this action lies not, for it was the plaintiff’s folly to permit the defendant to continue in possession, and to be a tenant at sufferance, and not to take course for his security ; and if he should have an action, it should be an action of trespass, as Littleton, sec. 71. If tenant at will hath destroyed the house demised, or shop demised, an action of trespass lies, and not an action upon the case. But all the court conceived that an action of trespass or an action upon the case may well be brought, at the plaintiff’s election, and properly in this case it ought to be an action upon the ease, to recover as much as he may be damnified, because he is subject to an action of waste ; and therefore it is reason that he should have his remedy by action upon the case. Whereupon rule was given that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff.”
III. It seems clear that if Fabyan is to be regarded as a wrong-doer in retaining the possession of the plaintiff’s property after his lease had expired, all who aided, assisted, encouraged or employed him to retain this possession, must be regarded as equally tort-feasors, and equally responsible for any damage resulting from his wrongful acts. No more direct act could be done to encourage a tenant in keeping possession, than that of leasing to him the property, unless it was that of giving him a bond of indemnity, such as is stated in this case. In wrongs of this class all are principals, and the defendant, Dyer, must be held equally responsible with Fabyan ; and it seems clear that as Dyer could justify in an action of trespass under the authority
Whether the allegations of the declarations are suitable to charge either of the defendants, we have not considered, as the court have not been furnished with a copy.
IY. The case of Russell v. Fabyan, 7 Foster 529, is not to be regarded as a decision of the question raised in this case, in relation to the sale of a supposed right of redemption as belonging to Burnham, after the first levy made upon the property. It was there held, upon the facts appearing in that case, that independent of the question of fraud in Burnham’s deed to Russell, all Burnham’s right of redeeming the levy, which might be made upon the attachment subsisting at the time of the deed, and of course good against it, passed to Russell. Upon this point there can be no question, and none is suggested. The question then arose, whether, if Russell’s deed was proved to be fraudulent as to the creditors of Burnham, the right of redemption did not pass to Dyer by the sale on his second execution, so as to invalidate the tender made by Russell. This question might have been met and decided, but the case did not require it. It was held that whether Russell’s title was good or bad, Fabyan, as his tenant, could not dispute it. He could be discharged from his liability to pay his rent, which was the subject of that action, only by an eviction by the lessor, or by some one who had a paramount title to his ; a mere outstanding title not put in exercise is not a defence. The defendant relied on an eviction on the 14th of June, 1848, as his defence. The sale of the right of redemption was made on the 31st of July following, and after that date there was no eviction, so that the attempt there was merely to show an outstanding but dormant title, which it proved would be no defence. And the court took the ground that Fabyan stood in no position to raise a question as to the validity of Russell’s title, except so far as the opposing title was the occasion of some disturbance of his estate. So far as the principles stated in that case are concerned, they appear to us sound and unanswerable. Whether, if the caso had taken a different
By our statute, every debtor whose land or any interest in land is sold or set off on execution, has a right to redeem by paying the appraised value, or sale price, with interest, within one year. Rev. Stat., chap. 195, sec. 13; chap. 196, sec. 5; (Comp. Stat. 501, 502.) This right to redeem is also subject to be levied upon and sold, as often as a creditor supposes he can realize any part of his debt by a sale, until some one of the levies or sales becomes absolute. But these sales have each inseparably connected with them the right of redemption. If the debtor has parted with his title before the levies are made while the property is under an attachment, that right of redemption is vested in his grantee, who, being the party interested, (Bev. Stat., chap. 196, sec. 14,) may redeem any sale or levy, if he pleases; the effect of his payment or tender for this purpose being of course dependent upon the state of facts existing at the time.
So, if there is no attachment upon the property at the time of the debtor’s conveyance, but bis creditors levy upon the property, upon the ground that his conveyance was not made in good faith, and upon an adequate consideration, and so is fraudulent and void as to them, the effect is the same. Any creditor may levy his execution upon the right of redemption of any prior levy or sale, the deed of the debtor being without legal operation to place either the property itself or any interest in it out of the reach of his process. And the right of redemption, so long as it retains any value in the judgment of any creditor, remains liable to his levy; but when the creditors have exhausted their legal remedies, the right of redemption, necessarily incident to every levy on real estate, still remains, and it is the right not of the deb tor, but of his grantee, who may exercise it at his pleasure.
This we conceive was the position of the present case. The first levy by Dyer being founded on his attachment, took precedence of Bussell’s deed; but Bussell had still the right to redeem
The present case stands free from any question growing out of the relation of landlord and tenant, as that relation is not alleged, and the lease of Russell had expired, and Dyer had never stood in that relation. The evidence offered that Burn-ham’s deed to Russell was fraudulent as to his creditors, is not open to any objection of that kind, which was held decisive in 7 Foster. If the facts warrant that defence, the evidence is competent; and if it should be shown that the deed to Russell was void as to creditors, and Dyer was one of that class, his second levy was good, if properly made, and the title to these premises passed to him, subject to his prior and any subsequent levy, and to Russell’s right of redemption.
As the offer of the defendant to prove Burnham’s deed to Russell to be fraudulent and void as to creditors, and as to the defendant, Dyer, as one of them, was refused, there must be
A new trial.
Pekley, C. J., having been of counsel, did not sit.