Russell v. Collins

Jun 28, 1991
No. 89-7679; No. 90-5512; No. 90-5726; No. 90-6029; No. 90-6758; No. 90-6819; No. 90-6939; No. 90-7018; No. 90-7067; No. 90-7449; No. 90-7499; No. 90-7557; No. 90-7560; No. 90-7570; No. 90-7756; No. 90-7830; No. 90-7871; No. 90-7905; No. 90-7916; No. 90-7973; No. 90-8023; No. 90-8093
Reporters:
Before:
Marshall

Lead Opinion

C. A. 5th Cir.; Sup. Ct. Fla.; Sup. Ct. Mont.; Sup. Ct. ‍​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Fla.; Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima County; Sup. Ct. Ind.; Sup. Ct. Idaho; Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima County; Sup. Ct. Mo.; Sup. Ct. Fla.; Sup. ‍​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Ct. Ind.; Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; Sup. Ct. S. C.; Sup. Ct. Ga.; Ct. Crim. App. Okla.; ‍​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‍Sup. Ct. Mo.; Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; Sup. Ct. Fla.; Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

denied.





Dissenting Opinion

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my ‍​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‍view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 ‍​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‍(1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.