45 Ga. App. 55 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1932
It is a rule of law that every normal adult person shall exercise ordinary care for his safety under any and all circumstances, and the only issue that will ever arise under this rule is whether in a given situation the acts or omissions of the person will amount to a failure to exercise such care. If there is no evidence as to such failure, the court should not submit the question, but if there is any evidence that the person has not exercised due care, under the circumstances, and the pleadings also authorize it, the question should be given to the jury. Collum v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 140 Ga. 573 (3) (79 S. E. 475); Atlanta, Knoxville &c. Ry. Co. v. Gardner, 122 Ga. 82 (7) (49 S. E. 818); Southern Ry. Co. v. Gore, 128 Ga. 627 (58 S. E. 180); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Caleb, 143 Ga. 585 (85 S. E. 707).
The exercise of ordinary care on the part of a guest in the au
A person riding as a guest may, until he has notice to the contrary, assume that neither the driver nor others upon the highway will be negligent, and may also assume that the driver will exercise the proper care to avoid the negligence of others; but while the negligence of the host is not imputable to the guest, the guest can not close his eyes to known or obvious dangers arising either from the acts of the driver or from the acts of others, and if there is a danger from either cause, and the circumstances are such that it would become apparent to a person of ordinary prudence in like circumstances, then it is the duty of the guest to do whatever in the opinion of a jury a person of ordinary prudence would or should do in the same or like circumstances. Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696 (2), 700 (89 S. E. 753, L. R. A. 1917A, 306); Sarman v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. Co., 33 Ga. App. 315, 318 (125 S. E. 891); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Reid, 23 Ga. App. 694 (99 S. E. 235); Sharp v. Sproat, 111 Kan. 735 (208 Pac. 613, 26 A. L. R. 1421); Carter v. Phillinger, 142 Md. 365 (120 Atl. 878); Lavine v. Abramson, 142 Md. 222 (120 Atl. 523); Curran v. Anthony Inc., 77 Cal. App. 462 (247 Pac. 236); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304 (161 N. W. 715, 23 A. L. R. 643); Irwin v. McDougal, 217 Mo. App. 645 (274 S. W. 923); Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241 (291 S. W. 449); 42 C. J. 1170.
In the present case the court not only failed to charge the principle applicable to the duty of a person to exercise ordinary care for his safety, but expressly instructed the jury that it would not be applicable if the plaintiff was riding as a guest in the car in which she was injured. The plaintiff herself testified: “Our car ran up behind a wagon to a point about fifteen feet behind it. We stopped
It is true that the answer alleged that the sole cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver with whom the plaintiff was riding; but there was a general denial of the allegation in paragraph 9 of the petition that the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the injury, and there was a similar denial of paragraph 4 of the petition which charged, in effect, that the plaintiff had been injured and damaged by the acts of the defendant. A defendant may file contradictory and inconsistent pleas (Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Pitts, 79 Ga. 532 (3), 4 S. E. 921; Albany Phosphate Co. v. Hugger, 4 Ga. App. 771, 62 S. E. 533; Wheeler v. Salinger, 33 Ga. App. 300 (6), 125 S. E. 888); and under the general denial of tlie allegation that his own negligence was the proximate cause of the injury,'it was permissible for the defendant to show that the injury was caused by anything else. Atlanta, Knoxville &c. Ry. Co. v. Gardner, supra; Savannah Electric Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559 (4) (64 S. E. 680).
The rule that it is not error to fail, without request, to charge the jury upon the law as to contributory negligence unless such' defense
Upon application of the above rulings, the court erred in not granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial upon special grounds 3 and 4 of the amendment thereto.
Judgment reversed.