21 F. Cas. 31 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri | 1879
The legal and equitable propositions involved have been discussed at great length in many English and American decisions, a review of which would require more time and labor than are at our command. Many of those decisions pertain to the force and effect of the statute of Elizabeth, the doctrine of cy-pres, and the power “parens patria:.” In this country, after long doubt and disputation, the doctrine has been established that where a grant or devise for charitable uses is made, and the donee is capable of executing the trust vested in him, the grant on devise should be upheld if the beneficiary or charitable object is stated in such a manner or with such dis-tinetness that chancery can ascertain what it is, so as to enforce the trust. In construing such instruments, equity adopts, not the old rule favoring the heir, as in England. but the juster rule of effecting the intent of the grantor or devisor. In England, the doctrines of cy-pres and of “parens patnre” were resorted to mainly to overcome the general rule which, under British institutions, favored the heir and perpetuation of estates. Under American institutions, no such policy, and, consequently, no such general rule, ever obtained. The just rule worked out in English courts, through the doctrines or powers named, although such, powers do not exist in this country, is, as to charitable uses made, though not technically, yet, to a large extent, practically, applicable in this country. By this it is not meant that the cy-pres doctrine has any force here, but merely that, for the purpose of upholding conveyances for charitable uses, American courts of equity will, wherever by a liberal construction it can be done, ascertain the designated or de
Of course, if the grant is too vague and indefinite to enable the chancellor to detect to what charity the grant referred or was applicable, then, as the estate was not conveyed away, it (the estate) would necessarily follow the prescribed course of descent. In other words, if the decedent had not disposed of his property otherwise, the law' of descents and distributions would govern. In the light of these doctrines, now fully recognized, this court must look to the conveyances in question. The purpose of the grantor was to found the Russell Institute — to have the avails of the property conveyed vested ultimately in a board of trustees for said institute, and, in the meantime, to have yearly and other payments of said avails or proceeds paid over to Allen, president, and, what is very significant! to him as representing said trustees.
It is obvious that the grantor knew that no such institute existed at the date of the grant; for the grant was to found such an institute in the future. In that condition of affairs, he expressed, with sufficient clearness, that, as the fund should be created from time to time by Horner, the trustee, it was to be paid over to Allen, as president, whose “receipt therefor was to be a full discharge;’’ and that, at the expiration of the ten years named, Horner’s trust was, as soon as practicable thereafter, to cease, and all funds then in his hands to be paid, in the same manner as prior payments had been made, to said Allen, who, as president, was to represent said board of trustees.
It is obvious that the intention of the grantor was to have the. proceeds of the property lodged in the hands of Allen, not for his individual benefit, but for the purpose of founding thereafter the designated institute, of which Allen was to be president.
In the discharge of his trust, then, it is for Mr. Allen, at the proper time, to cause such an institute to be organized, whose trustees will shape the institute and determine the persons to whom and the manner in which endowment shall be applied.
It is obvious that the grantor placed the largest measure of confidence in Mr. Allen with respect to the manner of founding such institute or calling it into corporate existence. Until sufficient funds were received therefor, such an institute could not be beneficially founded. Of course, Mr. Allen could not unreasonably delay action, nor postpone the time indefinitely. In other words, the confidence reposed, if abused by unnecessary delay or otherwise, could be controlled by the supervision of the proper court of equity, when thereto duly called upon to act. It seems-that the purpose of Mr. Russell, in creating
There are many interesting questions involved in the -administration of such charitable uses which are not before us for decision, such as the proper forum and parties to compel due and prompt administration of the “use” when the person charged to act fails to do so — that is, whether a United States court, before which the subject comes incidentally, can lay hold of and compel the proper administration, under its supervision, or whether application therefor must not be made exclusively to the more appropriate state courts. However that may be, in the absence of any proceeding by Allen in the nature of a cross-bill, asking the direction of this court as to the manner in which he shall execute his trust, and in the absence of any prayer of the plaintiffs in this case looking to that end, we are not called upon to decide with respect thereto. We must dispose of the questions before us as they are presented, and not go beyond them. The plaintiffs are here in hostility to the existence of the indicated fund, denying that there is such a fund for the alleged charitable uses, and claiming that the funds rightfully belong to them, per
