STEPHANIE RUSS v. KEVIN RUSS
S00A0665
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 30, 2000
272 Ga. 438 | 530 SE2d 469
Jenkins & Nelson, G. Carey Nelson III, Peter R. Olson, for appellants. Wood, Odom & Edge, Arthur B. Edge IV, for appellee.
Stephanie Russ brought suit for divorce, and her husband, Kevin Russ, was personally served. Subsequently, an amended complaint
1. Ms. Russ contends that the trial court erred by entering a final decree of divorce without addressing or resolving the issue of child support. If the trial court in a divorce action is unable to obtain jurisdiction over the noncustodial parent so as to enter a binding award of child support, Georgia law expressly authorizes a subsequent application for such support.
Mr. Russ’ current place of employment and current income also are unknown. Even after enactment of the child support guidelines in
The trial court did not base its decision upon any deficiency in the evidence of earning capacity, but rather upon the erroneous legal theory that there was no basis to authorize an award of child support. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error, and this Court cannot affirm the judgment by application of the “right for any reason” rule. Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) (457 SE2d 249) (1995). Notwithstanding the absence of Mr. Russ from the trial, the issue of child support was “contestable” and should have been finally resolved in the divorce decree. Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.7; Edwards v. Edwards, 260 Ga. 440 (396 SE2d 236) (1990).
2. Ms. Russ also complains of the trial court‘s failure to address and resolve certain issues regarding medical insurance and other child-rearing expenses. There is no transcript, and the record does not show the nature or existence of any requests for an award of these expenses. However, the trial court may have considered any such requests as encompassed within its erroneous ruling that there is no basis for child support because Mr. Russ’ whereabouts and place of employment were unknown. Therefore, we leave whatever additional requests were made by Ms. Russ for further evaluation by the trial court on remand, in light of our holding in Division 1.
3. Ms. Russ further contends that the trial court erred in failing to address the issue of property division and, in particular, to award her certain real property which already is titled in her name. Since the judgment did not mention the property at issue, it is unaffected and remains titled in Ms. Russ’ name. Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 623 (436 SE2d 654) (1993); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 263 Ga. 182, 183 (1) (430 SE2d 350) (1993). Accordingly, the omission from the judgment of an explicit award of the property to Ms. Russ is not reversible error. Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra.
4. Ms. Russ asserts that the trial court should have issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. In general, “[s]ince this was an uncontested divorce action, the trial court was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. [
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
STEPHANIE RUSS v. KEVIN RUSS
HUNSTEIN, Justice, concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion and write in order to clarify that a trial court is not limited to the actual income of a parent when assessing the amount of child support to award. In this case, there was no evidence of income and I agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to use an estimated earning capacity in making its award here. However, even in those instances where evidence exists regarding a parent‘s actual income, the trial court still retains the discretion to use earning capacity to determine the appropriate amount of child support where evidence exists to establish that a parent possesses a higher earning capacity than is indicated by his or her actual income. See Duncan v. Duncan, 262 Ga. 872 (1) (426 SE2d 857) (1993).
