132 Minn. 311 | Minn. | 1916
Plaintiff has the record title to a tract of platted land in the village of Laprairie. Defendant John G. Fraser claims title by adverse possession. The jury found in his favor. Plaintiff appeals.
In 1897 this land was “common.” In July of that year defendant John G. Fraser took possession of it; inclosed it with an adjoining tract of his own by a fence of posts and wire; used it as a pasture for stock, and, save for a little shifting of fences, he continued to so occupy it without interruption for more than 15 years. In the meantime he paid the taxes thereon, except that in some cases he purchased tax certificates at tax sales. There is little question as to the sufficiency of his title by adverse possession, unless it is to be defeated by some one or more of the facts which we will now consider.
Adverse possession may originate in naked, wilful trespass. It usually does. The original entry may be tortious and without any pretense of rightful claim, but with a plain purpose to usurp title and possession. It is not necessary that the disseisor should believe or assert that he has a right to enter. Mattson v. Warner, 115 Minn. 520, 522, 132 N. W. 1127. Good faith is not an element required. The terms “claim of title,” “claim of right,” or “claim of ownership,” frequently found in the books in this connection, mean nothing more than the intention of the disseisor to appropriate and use the land as his own to the exclusion of all others. Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 77 N. W. 424; Cool v. Kelly, 78 Minn. 102, 80 N. W. 861; Mattson v. Warner, 115 Minn. 520, 132 N. W. 1127. The statute of limitations is distinctly a statute of repose. It was framed, not out of consideration for the disseisor, but in furtherance of a public policy which deems it important that lands should not remain for long periods of time unused, unimproved, unproductive and with no one discharging the public duty of paying taxes thereon. The statute prefers an interloper who will utilize the land and assume the burdens of ownership, to the true owner who abandons his land and its burdens. Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. 1060.
Fraser might have perfected a tax title in his own name without in the least prejudicing his rights acquired by adverse possession. Cool v. Kelly, 78 Minn. 102, 105, 80 N. W. 861; Hays v. Martin, 45 Cal. 559; Liebheit v. Enright, 77 Kan. 331, 94 Pac. 303; Sands v. Davis, 40 Mich. 14; Burton v. Snow, 165 Mich. 530, 130 N. W. 1116; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 131, 17 S. W. 755; Griffith v. Smith, 37 Neb. 47, 42 N. W. 749; Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240, 100 N. E. 742; 1 Cyc. 1016 (75).
The county auditor, however, advised him that he had better assign the certificate to another. Following this advice, he filled out and signed a form of assignment on the back of the certificate. The assignment reads as follows :
“For and in consideration of the sum of Two Dollars, to me in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, John G. Fraser, do hereby sell, transfer and assign to Donald Fraser all my right, claim and interest in and to the annexed Certificate No. 139 and the land therein described.”
No particular claim is made that an assignment of the tax lien would militate against the rights of Fraser. The claim is that the assignment was in fact a quit-claim deed and that the giving a deed of the land by John G. Fraser to Donald Fraser broke the continuity of his adverse possession and defeated his title.
We see two reasons why this contention cannot be sustained.
The first is that there was not within the 15 years any delivery of this document to Donald Fraser. Donald Fraser was J ohn G. Fraser’s son. At the time the document was signed Donald Fraser was not present, had never been consulted, and knew nothing of the transaction. The certificate with the indorsement thereon was retained by J ohn G. Fraser. Some time later it was recorded, but this was after the completion of the 15 year period. Clearly as long as John G. Fraser held possession of this instrument, defendant Donald Fraser could not have claimed any right under it either as to title or possession.
The second is that the evidence shows that the sole purpose and intent of this document was to assign the tax certificate, and to assign that to be held in trust for the assignor. If the document was in fact an absolute deed, then it did not conform to the actual purpose or, intent of the parties. Although the document was in writing, the real nature of the transaction may be shown by parol. The statute of frauds has no application to such a case. Only as between the parties to an instrument and their privies is a written contract conclusive and unimpeachable by parol evidence. In litigation between one party to the instrument and strangers to it extrinsic evidence may be be received to show what the agreement of the parties to the instrument really was. Van Eman v. Stanehfield, 10 Minn. 197 (255); Sanborn v. Sturtevant, 17 Minn. 174 (200); Buxton v. Beal, 49 Minn. 230, 51 N. W. 918; Clerihew v. West Side Bank, 50 Minn. 538, 52 N. W. 967; Horn v. Hansen, 56 Minn. 43, 57 N. W. 315, 22 L.R.A. 617; Pfeifer v. National Live Stock Ins. Co. 62 Minn. 536, 64 N. W. 1018; 17 Cyc. 750, 1 Greenleaf Ev. (16th ed.) § 279.
Order affirmed.
